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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the historiography of the Gold Standard and the Great
Depression by addressing the performance of the Spanish financial sector during
the period 1921-1935. Spanish policymakers’ options were very limited to re-
spond to the shocks that hit the country during that period. Spain experienced
a severe economic contraction during the 1930s, especially during 1931, when
depositors ran on banks and the exchange rate continued to deteriorate rapidly.
My argument is in contrast with the traditional account that depicts Spain as
having escaped the Great Depression because its currency was not convertible to
gold and because it did not experience widespread or large bank failures. I argue
that exchange rate depreciation did not add to banking stability, but actually
transformed the 1931 banking crisis into a twin crisis, a common feature of both
the Interwar Period and the more recent emerging market financial crises. More-
over, the sharp drop in asset prices added pressure to bank balance sheets, when
liabilities were already under stress. The thesis has four substantive chapters.
First, I document the conflicting goals that appeared between the monetization
of public debt by the banking sector and the stabilization of the exchange rate
between 1928 and 1931, when the Spanish peseta depreciated rapidly. Second,
I show that this depreciation limited monetary policy options when depositors
ran on banks in the spring of 1931. Bank loans contracted severely due to the
limitations on how much emergency liquidity could be provided, thus helping
to understand the collapse in private investment that the country experienced.
Third, I analyse the reasons and the consequences of the allocation of emergency
liquidity at the bank-level. In the last chapter I provide a novel explanation for
why Spain did not see widespread bank failures during the Great Depression, in
contrast to other countries.
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Introduction
To read about Spain during the Great Depression of the 1930s is to puzzle oneself.
One might read that Spain was the one European country that escaped the Great
Depression and then turn the page to find out about a run on banks, a collapsing
currency, capital flight or a severe stock market contraction. Turning more pages
one would then find political instability, failed military coups, religious and so-
cial conflict, proto-fascism and in the end, another, this time successful, military
coup. How can such a country be portrayed as escaping the Great Depression?
As it is natural, this depends to a great extent on the metrics and definitions
used when comparing different countries exposed to similar economic shocks dur-
ing the interwar years. In this sense, escaping might just work as a relative term,
a word used more to illustrate the challenges faced by other countries rather than
to provide a faithful description of economic and political developments in Spain.
Therefore, it might seem exaggerated to put so much emphasis–include it in the
title of a doctoral dissertation even–on that single word. It turns out, however,
that it is not. Portraying Spain as escaping the Great Depression does not only
depend on the metrics or the words chosen. It also depends on how much do
we actually know about economic, monetary and financial developments in Spain
during the interwar years.
1.1 Motivation
Learning more about Spain is crucial, given the country’s importance in the in-
ternational historiography and the great narratives of the Great Depression. In
these, Spain is not just another country in the sample or a marginal part of the
story. Spain is frequently presented as a possible counterfactual. Spain is the
only major European country that had not stabilized its currency when the rest
of Europe went back to the gold standard during the second half of the 1920s;
the Spanish peseta was not convertible into gold. Spain is also one of the few
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countries that did not see widespread or large bank failures during the 1930s,
as opposed of a number of countries that saw important parts of their banking
sectors going under. It is tempting to draw a causal link between these two
exceptional features of the Spanish experience: exchange rate depreciation and
banking stability. This link is, in fact, a crucial part of the widely-held answer
to one of the central questions about the Great Depression: how would countries
have fared if they had not been constrained by the Gold Standard? This thesis
argues that we need to know more about Spain in order to help answer this ques-
tion. An exception might not be enough to grant a valid counterfactual.
Spain was indeed exceptional in many crucial ways during the 1920s and
1930s, but in this thesis I argue that this does not imply that it is the counterfac-
tual it is commonly thought of as. If Spain is to be informative to cross-country
analyses of the Great Depression, there are other questions that need to be an-
swered first. Was a flexible exchange rate enough to escape the Great Depression?
Did Spanish policy makers just outsmart everyone else in designing a monetary
framework that would isolate the country from external shocks, or did that policy
come as an accident? How much monetary autonomy did Spain actually enjoy
during the Great Depression? Why did Spain not see large or widespread bank
failures? Can Spain be portrayed as having escaped the Depression or should it
be perhaps portrayed as having masked its deep consequences? What are the
implications of revisiting the Spanish experience for the international literature
on the Great Depression? To answer these questions we need to understand if
currency depreciation was a stabilizing factor, as it is commonly thought of, or
a rather destabilizing one. If the latter is true, then what did bring about the
banking stability we observe in the data? By drawing on a wealth of newly col-
lected and previously unexplored data, this thesis aims to provide an answer to
these important questions.
I argue that depicting Spain as having escaped the Great Depression does not
reflect the actual developments that the country underwent during the interwar
years. Spain suffered from very similar shocks, very similar limitations and as
a result it shared very similar outcomes with other European countries. I argue
that if Spain did not see its banking system collapse, as other countries did, it
was not because it enjoyed unlimited monetary autonomy granted by a flexible
exchange rate, as is assumed in most of the historiography of the period. Spain
wanted to be on the gold standard; Spanish policymakers, just as their European
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neighbors, thought of a stable and strong exchange rate as the cornerstone of eco-
nomic prosperity. Spanish policymakers did much more than pay lip service to
the gold standard, they implemented policies to join the gold club and these poli-
cies had implications. Ironically enough, Spain only managed to peg the peseta
to gold–to the French Franc–in mid 1932, with strong capital controls in place,
and when only a handful of countries were still somewhat stubbornly attached to
gold. By that time, Spain had already been exposed to a number of shocks that
caused a strong economic contraction.
Crucially, in 1931, following a sudden political regime change from an author-
itarian monarchy to a democratic republic, the Spanish banking system experi-
enced a severe liquidity shock that pushed banks to contract credit supply, as
monetary authorities faced binding limitations when providing emergency liquid-
ity to overcome the shock. Monetary autonomy did not keep the banking system
afloat, because in fact, Spain did not have much more monetary autonomy than
other countries on gold. To be sure, whatever small room was available for mon-
etary activism on its own, it was used and it certainly helped; it was necessary,
but in no way sufficient. Crucially, specific government interventions in the form
of capital controls, negotiation of international financial assistance and policies
aimed at protecting the erosion of bank capital helped Spain to keep its banking
sector afloat throughout the 1930s. This, however, did not prevent Spain from
undergoing a severe economic contraction between 1929 and 1933 which resem-
bled the one experienced by Germany, Italy or France and in which the collapse
of financial intermediation was also a key driver.
1.2 Argument
The fluctuations of the peseta during the 1920s and 1930s were not a deliberate
decision of Spanish monetary authorities, especially when these implied a depre-
ciation. I argue that right at the end of the Great War, Spain lost an opportunity
to introduce a well-defined monetary policy framework that would put monetary
authorities in effective control of the evolution of credit. The 1921 Banking Law,
which established the Banco de Espan˜a as the provider of an elastic currency and
an eventual liquidity backstop for the rest of the banking sector, failed to deter-
mine responsibilities over exchange rate policy. Neither the Government nor the
Banco de Espan˜a held direct responsibility of keeping the peseta at any specific
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exchange rate relative to other currencies, at the same time that exchange rate
dynamics played a pivotal role in the political backdrop. In contrast, the Law
was successful in institutionalizing a system of credit expansion that was based
on the indirect monetization of public debt by banks. The Law tied monetary
policy to the fiscal needs of past, present and future governments. The Law made
sure banks would have an incentive to accumulate government bonds by deeming
the latter eligible at the discount window of the Banco de Espan˜a at subsidized
rates. The Banco de Espan˜a became a passive actor that was only ascribed with
the task of “commanding the credit of the nation”, while banks continued to fuel
a credit boom that added pressure to the external value of the Spanish peseta.
This system worked in favour of Spain and its authorities through the first half
of the 1920s. However, when the country started accumulating current account
deficits in the second half of that decade, and the reversal in international capital
flows accelerated, the Spanish peseta started an unstoppable fall.
Unhappy with any sign of weakness in the external value of the peseta, the
Government took action. At this moment, the 1921 Law revealed its flaws. With
one hand, the Government tried to stop the fall of the peseta by borrowing in
foreign exchange and conducting a number of failed interventions and by per-
suading the Banco de Espan˜a to raise interest rates. With the other hand, the
Government kept allowing for banks to monetize their holdings of public debt at
subsidized rates, thus canceling out any effects of interest rate changes on bank
lending. In the last days of 1929, as stabilization policies had repeatedly failed,
the Spanish government embarked into what was expected to be the definitive
stabilization plan and issued ten-year gold bonds payable and redeemable in gold
or gold-convertible currencies. Bonds were bought by Spanish banks in the ex-
pectation that the stabilization would succeed. Spanish banks, however, lacked
gold or foreign exchange, so in order to subscribe the bonds, they borrowed gold
abroad at very short maturities. Being affected by what economists have dubbed
as the “original sin”—that is, being unable to borrow internationally in its own
currency—the gold loan planted the seeds of a potential currency mismatch prob-
lem in bank balance sheets. As the peseta continued to fall, rolling over these
operations became increasingly difficult for banks. Despite that, and with a ral-
lying stock market and the continued increase in bank deposits, the currency
mismatch caused by the contracting of the gold loan was the only pressure banks
faced until 1931.
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In 1931, however, banks suffered two additional shocks. First, following the
proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic, between April and September de-
positors withdrew 20% of their funds from the banking sector. This shock to their
liabilities, coupled with the already growing currency mismatches caused by the
subscription of the aforementioned gold bonds, put banks under severe liquidity
pressure, especially in April and May. The Banco de Espan˜a, even if operating a
non gold-convertible currency, faced quantitative limitations on how much liquid-
ity could provide, as any expansion in its fiduciary issue limits had to be approved
by the Minister of Finance. The latter, fearing capital flight and the effects of
the expansion of base money on the exchange rate, did only authorize the Banco
to lend freely to banks once capital controls were in place. This, however, took
place a month and a half after banks had suffered their sharpest liquidity shock,
which pushed many banks to contract their credit supply. Monetary autonomy
in the form of large room for a lender of last resort intervention by the Banco
de Espan˜a was only feasible when Spanish monetary authorities gave up capital
mobility. Importantly, only banks that suffered a deposit withdrawal contracted
lending significantly. Banks that were not affected by the bank run or borrowed
large amounts from the Banco de Espan˜a continued to lend. This particular part
of the argument is elaborated in Chapter 3, for which a revised version was pub-
lished in January of this year at the European Review of Economic History.
Bank assets also suffered from the shocks experienced in 1931. In that year,
the stock market suffered a sharp contraction. Spanish banks—mostly univer-
sal banks—held large portfolios of private stocks, as well as public debt, which
greatly exposed their solvency to developments in the stock market. Aware of
this, Spanish authorities sought to provide a fast solution to keep the banking
sector afloat. The solution that banks, the Banco de Espan˜a and the Minister
of Finance agreed upon was the suspension of mark-to-market accounting from
1931. Banks were allowed to value their portfolios of securities at 1930 prices.
Since Spain did not experience a drop in the stock market in 1929, stock prices
had remained in a very high plateau during 1930, despite new issuances of securi-
ties had contracted significantly. This intervention allowed banks to keep paying
dividends and taxes and to remain nominally solvent, something that would have
not been the case if a change in accounting practices had not been granted. This
explains why Spain did not witness a chain of insolvencies and in fact did not
experience any reduction in bank capital during the 1930s. However, Spanish
banks became something very similar to what economists call a “zombie” bank-
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ing sector and lending did not recover.
In sum, this thesis argues that exchange rate volatility was not only decried
and fought by monetary authorities; more importantly, it did not contribute to
improve Spain’s financial position and bank stability. In fact, exchange rate dy-
namics operated in the opposite direction, they created fragilities in the banking
sector. It is a fact that the Banco de Espan˜a intervened as a lender of last resort
during 1931, and that this was a necessary step, but this is not enough to explain
why Spain was exceptional in terms of bank stability during the Great Depres-
sion. Instead, it was a combination of policy measures—that were either absent
or came much later in a number of other countries—that kept the banking system
afloat. This, however, did not translate in the resumption of economic growth
or price stability. The Spanish economy contracted as sharply as the Italian, the
French or the German did. Deflation also kicked in from 1933. Bank lending
remained depressed. As a result, the Spanish experience does not seem to be
a reliable counterfactual for other countries when discussing the links between
exchange rate regimes and financial stability during the Great Depression. Spain
was exceptional for reasons that had to do with ad hoc policy choices that were
not necessarily determined by its exchange rate regime.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis contributes to the historiography of the Great Depression and the
literature on the development of central banking and financial crises in emerging
markets by reconsidering two common assumptions present in the literature on
these fields. First, I argue that the reason Spain did not enjoy the monetary
autonomy with which it has been commonly described by the historiography is
that, in fact, the country had all the features of what today would be called
an emerging market. When trying to stabilize its exchange rate, the Spanish
Government could not borrow internationally in its own currency, and faced it
increasingly difficult to borrow at long term maturities even domestically. The
response to this was to borrow in international reserve currencies, which at the
time meant gold. This change in the interpretation, which I back with extensive
qualitative and quantitative evidence, implies that both the assumption of mon-
etary autonomy and the implications that stem from it need to be readdressed.
Doing this puts the causal link between exchange rate depreciation and banking
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stability into question.
A second pervasive assumption that this thesis proposes to reconsider is, there-
fore, the widely held idea that banking stability—measured by the number or size
of bank failures—was a by-product of the effects of a depreciating currency. As
the argument usually goes, allowing the Spanish peseta to depreciate while other
European economies were tied to gold, avoided the debt-deflation dynamics that
brought down economic activity and contributed to the collapse of the banking
system. Moreover, devaluation is also thought as the reflection of an increase in
room for lender of last resort interventions by central banks, which undoubtedly
contribute to banking stability. However, this assumption overlooks the fact that
devaluation or rapid depreciation of a currency can have very different effects
in different contexts. In particular, it can have strong destabilizing effects if the
country in question is exposed to currency mismatches, either in the balance sheet
of the Government or in the banking sector’s. It can also add to political turmoil,
especially in a context in which exchange rate stability remained as a key policy
objective, even in countries like Spain, that operated non gold-convertible cur-
rencies. More importantly, currency depreciation can impose severe limitations
on monetary authorities when responding to shocks to the banking sector, as it
was the case in Spain in 1931, and as it is commonly the case in emerging market
economies. Revisiting the Spanish case by reconsidering these two assumptions
implies that the sources of banking stability have to be found elsewhere and,
therefore, that the implications of exchange rate flexibility and financial stability
during the Great Depression are not fully supported by the Spanish experience.
1.4 Political and macroeconomic context
The 1920s and 1930s in Spain were the most volatile years of the twentieth cen-
tury. In the autumn of 1923, with the support and approval of the King Alfonso
XIII, General Primo de Rivera took power after a military coup and established
a Dictatorship that would last until 1930. The Dictatorship was then replaced by
the so-called ‘Softatorship’ that was inevitably compelled to attempt a transition
towards more democracy, given the increasing discredit, not only of the Regime
in its various forms, but also of the Bourbon Monarchy. After a year of political
conflict between the Regime and the Monarchy on the one hand and supporters
of a republican alternative on the other, the first clear step to test the demo-
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cratic waters was to hold a local election on 12 April 1931. The results of the
local elections materialized the discredit of the Monarchy and its various forms of
Government. Republican parties won by a landslide in most provinces, including
the cities of Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao. As Admiral Aznar Caban˜as–who
had been appointed head of Government of the Monarchy two months earlier–
famously put it: “will there be a crisis? Is it not enough crisis that of a country
that goes to bed as monarchic and wakes up as republican?”.
On 14 April 1931, having lost the support of the Army, and with republican
supporters celebrating the results of the election in the streets, the Second Span-
ish Republic was proclaimed and the King and its closer allies fled the country.
In what turned out to be a remarkably peaceful transition, given the scope of the
regime change, a Provisional Republican Government was formed right after the
local elections and the support of the masses opened the door for a change. In
May, however, violent clashes between Monarchics and Republicans took place in
the streets of several cities and villages; a number of churches and convents were
burnt down, including some emblematic buildings such as the Professed House
of the Society of Jesus in Madrid. These incidents, which might at first seem
unrelated to bank balance sheets, had direct implications for some banks that
had very close relations with religious congregations. In particular, as I discuss
in Chapters 4 and 5, these ties affected one of the most important banks at the
time, Banco Urquijo de Madrid. As a response to these events, and fearing con-
tagious social unrest, the Provisional Government declared a “state of war”, the
army took the streets and incidents subdued. A month and a half later, in the
last days of June 1931, the first General Election was held. Results confirmed the
strong support the newborn Republic. After some months of internal disputes,
mostly centered around the role of the Catholic Church in the Republic, a Gov-
ernment was formed in November 1931. The new Republican Constitution was
voted and approved in December of the same year.
The newborn democracy aimed at reforming Spanish society in several ways.
Even if the historiography of the period is still affected by a degree of polariza-
tion, it is fair to say that most historians have come to agree in that each of the
fronts opened for reform during 1931-33 (the so-called Reformist Biennium) faced
a very strong reaction from different factions of the Spanish society. Too hasty
a reform program after too long a repressive regime, one can argue, caused too
strong a reaction. Land reform, educational reform, the secularization of Span-
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ish society or the degree of autonomy granted to different regions like Catalonia
or the Basque Country aimed at pushing Spain towards a progressive reform
agenda after almost a decade of stagnation in these areas. Between November
1931 and February 1936, Spain embarked into a gradual but increasingly volatile
path towards political polarization. Constantly affected by political swings, the
implementation and reaction of policies by different governments, the short but
intense life of the Second Spanish Republic came to a sudden end with the mili-
tary coup that started the Civil War in July 1936.
The historiography concerned with the political aims, limitations and threats
faced by the Second Spanish Republic is vast. It pales in comparison to the
thousands of pages that have been written about the Spanish Civil War, but
the political and social history of the 1920s and first half of the 1930s has been
an area of extensive research, and continues to be. Next to politics, however,
there was the economy. There is a broad agreement in the historiography of the
period in that any economic origins of the Spanish Civil War are to be found
on structural reasons; an unfinished land reform as well as income and wealth
inequality and a general protracted backwardness are amongst the main factors.
The effect of specific and sudden economic shocks, which were a feature of the pe-
riod, however, are commonly downplayed as having had any identifiable influence;
Spain is often described as a country that was isolated from the Great Depression.
As its political leaders, the Spanish economy was also bounded by its aims, its
limitations, and to some extent, a degree of exceptionality. A peripheral, mostly
agricultural but rapidly urbanizing and growing economy, during the 1920s and
early 1930s, Spain remained exceptional in the international monetary system.
Since it suspended the gold-convertibility of its currency in the late nineteenth
century, Spain was the only major European economy that operated a currency
that was not convertible into gold during the so-called Classical Gold Standard
era (1880-1914) and the Interwar Gold Exchange Standard (1925-1931/36). This
exception meant that, by the late 1920s, Spain remained the only major Euro-
pean country whose currency was not stabilized, and that was depreciating. As
opposed to most of its European neighbors, neither the Spanish Government nor
the Banco de Espan˜a held formal responsibility over the maintenance of a specific
level of the exchange rate. This, which at first sight can be seen as granting the
room for maneuver lacked by other countries tied to gold-convertibility, eventu-
ally turned into a trap. All the reputation that the incumbent government gained
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when the peseta appreciated collapsed as the exchange rate started to deteriorate.
In particular, the Dictatorship fell into that trap when in 1926 it tied the prestige
of the Regime to the value of the Spanish peseta. In that year, General Primo
de Rivera claimed that the appreciation that the currency was experiencing was
an unequivocal sign of the strength of the Regime’s economic program. Two
years later, he could not get out of the trap. As the peseta started depreciating
rapidly from 1928, Primo de Rivera (and the subsequent heads of Government
after he retired) tried, policy after policy, Minister of Finance after Minister of
Finance, to stop the fall of the peseta. Having placed the strong exchange rate as
the most salient outcome of the economic success of the Regime, the fall of the
Spanish currency in foreign exchange markets could only anticipate its collapse.
Crucially, Spanish authorities did not deliberately allow the peseta to fall. All
governments decried the fall of the peseta and introduced measures to stop it. To
illustrate this, it is perhaps useful to reproduce the opinion of the representative
of the Rothschild Fre`res in Spain, Ignacio Bauer, when in 1930 he wrote to the
House of Rothschild in Paris1: “it is hard to believe how much the question of
the exchange rate weights in all aspects of Spanish politics. (...) Mr. Argu¨elles
[the Minister of Finance] has been replaced by Mr. Wais. I have nothing to say
against the new Minister, on the contrary, he is intelligent, young and honest.
His predecessor, however, had the same qualities, and despite all this, the peseta
continued to fall. Nowadays everything depends on the exchange rate”. Despite
several attempts to stop it, the depreciation of the peseta survived the Dictator-
ship and the Softatorship. In fact, and along with mounting financial fragility,
the fall of the peseta did not only survived these regimes, it contributed to their
demise. The depreciation was only stopped by a combination of external financial
support, capital controls and the departure of Sterling from the gold standard in
September 1931.
The evolution of the peseta was not the only problem Spain faced when,
overnight, it transitioned from an authoritarian monarchy into a democratic re-
public. As soon as the Republic was proclaimed, banks suffered deposit with-
drawals, especially during the second quarter of 1931. Depositors ran on banks
and hoarded cash, but also exported capital and sold their pesetas in foreign
exchange markets. In parallel, the stock market fell drastically, after having re-
mained relatively flat during 1930, although the total amount of private issuances
decreased sharply from their peak in 1929. Therefore, while Spain was relatively
isolated from the developments of 1929 in international stock markets, from April
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1931, the price of public and private securities fell rapidly. The Spanish peseta,
which had been almost finally stabilized in March, started falling rapidly again.
Capital flight was, as it is commonly the case, a cause and a consequence of ex-
change rate dynamics. When the banking panic subdued, during the third quarter
of the year, the banking sector had lost 20% of its deposits, loans outstanding
had contracted by a similar percentage, asset prices remained depressed (albeit
public debt recovered relatively fast) and private investment had collapsed. All
in all, however, the banking, currency and stock market crisis of 1931 took little
casualties: only four, relatively small banks failed during this year.
If one was to delete the last sentence of the previous paragraph, it could be
easily claimed that 1931 was a terrible year for the Spanish financial system. In
fact, doing so reveals the important similarities between Spain and other coun-
tries that underwent deep economic difficulties during 1931, like Germany. The
two countries suffered similar economic contractions during the Great Depres-
sion (Figure 1.1), and were plagued by political instability during this period. It
can also be argued that both countries experienced strong exchange rate pres-
sure, even if they were under different exchange rate arrangements for most of
the interwar years. Both countries were under constant threat of capital flight,
introduced capital controls, and experienced comparable shocks to their banking
system (Figure 1.3). Spanish banks lost 20% of their deposits between April 1931
and September 1931, a figure that is very similar in size and timing to the shock
experienced by German banks (Balderston, 1991; Schnabel, 2004a). Interestingly,
the comparison, even if suggestive at first, falls into pieces as soon as we bring
banking stability to the picture. Germany, as a number of other European coun-
tries, witnessed large bank failures during the 1930s, while the Spanish banking
system remained remarkably stable after suffering very similar shocks.
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Figure 1.1: Change in GDP per capita in %, (1929-33)
Source: Bolt and Van Zanden (2013).
Here lies the puzzle. How could Spain, a country that suffered all the afore-
mentioned shocks, exit 1931 with virtually all its banking system afloat? Is it
the case, as implied in most of the literature about the Great Depression, that
currency depreciation shielded Spain from the limitations that the Gold Stan-
dard imposed on its European counterparts? Was non gold-convertibility of the
Spanish peseta enough to keep the Spanish banking system afloat? Do bank
failures tell the full story about the actual performance of the banking system
during the 1930s? In the next four chapters, I shall argue the contrary. Spain
was exceptional because its currency was not convertible to gold and because its
banking sector remained afloat despite suffering very strong shocks during the
1930s. However, establishing a causal link between exchange rate depreciation
and banking stability, and taking the number of bank failures as a reliable sign
of having escaped the Great Depression is, as I argue, inaccurate. Given the
importance of Spain in the conventional narrative about the economic collapse
of the 1930s, revisiting its financial history has important implications for under-
standing the role of the Gold Standard in the Great Depression.
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1.5 The Great Depression, the Gold Standard
and banking stability in Spain: a literature
review
Over the course of the last forty years, research on causes, transmission and
consequences of the Great Depression has developed extensively. New empirical
evidence both at the macroeconomic and microeconomic level has contributed to
filling important gaps in the historiography, as well as to deepening our under-
standing of some well established historical facts. As the international literature
developed, and despite substantial progress in the 1980s and 1990s, important as-
pects of the impact of the Great Depression in Spain have remained unexplored,
especially in the subfield of financial history and also in terms of empirical re-
search. Here I discuss the main contributions made by the literature and contex-
tualize my contribution to this body of research.
1.5.1 The Spanish historiography
Pablo Mart´ın-Acen˜a’s book “La pol´ıtica monetaria en Espan˜a, 1919-1935” (Mon-
etary Policy in Spain, 1919-1935) remains the most comprehensive analysis of the
period2. This work was complemented with new long-run estimates of monetary
aggregates also provided by the same author (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984, 1985). Mart´ın-
Acen˜a’s work focused primarily on the evolution of monetary policy formulation,
analysing both the intellectual framework in which it operated (the international
context), as well as in the specific policy decisions taken (the domestic context).
He concluded that over the Interwar Period, the Banco de Espan˜a (BdE) took a
rather passive stance in monetary policy affairs. Engaged in almost constant con-
flict with the Government about the responsibilities over exchange rate stability
and the ultimate causes of currency depreciation, the central monetary institution
failed to emerge as a central bank that could command the credit of the nation,
even if this was its main mandate.
While Mart´ın-Acen˜a documented the numerous and unsuccessful attempts to
transform the BdE into a modern monetary authority, his conclusions are more
optimistic with regards to the impact of the main shocks of the Great Depression
in Spain. In particular, he highlighted the crucial role of the BdE as lender of last
resort during the 1931 financial crisis. According to his work, the combination
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of a proactive Ministry of Finance which allowed for increases in the fiduciary
issue coupled with the liberality with which the BdE lent during the crisis, are
the main explanations of banking stability and the relatively mild economic con-
traction that Spain suffered vis-a`-vis other European economies. That said, he
also concluded that the overall monetary policy stance in Spain after 1931 was
definitely not expansive and that Spanish monetary authorities’ decision to peg
the peseta to the French Franc in 1932 and join the gold bloc contributed to im-
port deflationary pressures (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984, 2013). This view was partially
shared by Herna´ndez Andreu (1983), who also argued that the depreciation of
the peseta between 1928 and 1932 did not avoid a sharp economic contraction in
Spain, and that the decision to peg it to the Franc in 1932 was also detrimental for
the Spanish economy. In general, however, he attributed the poor performance
of the Spanish economy during the Great Depression to structural deficiencies,
mainly an underdeveloped agriculture and an external sector dependent on ex-
ports of primary goods and imports of machinery3.
Compared to the depth of the analysis of the institutional foundations, intel-
lectual framework and policymaking decisions of the Banco de Espan˜a provided
by Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984), his analysis of the evolution of individual Spanish banks
during the 1920s and 30s remained captured mostly by the evolution of mone-
tary aggregates, although he provided qualitative evidence of bank-specific events
when relevant. In a contribution aimed at filling this gap, Gabriel Tortella and
Jordi Palafox switched the focus from monetary policymakers to the receivers of
the policy—the banking and industrial sectors—by incorporating bank balance
sheets to their analysis of banking and industry during the early 20th century
(Tortella and Palafox, 1984). Their analysis relied on annual data from the An-
uario Financiero y de Sociedades Ano´nimas de Espan˜a (AFYSADE), and in-
cluded mostly consolidated balance sheet data of the Spanish banking system,
albeit they narrowed the focus to the largest six banks for certain parts of their
work. Overall, their conclusions about the impact and the consequences of the
1931 crisis in Spain, the role of the Banco de Espan˜a during the whole period,
as well as the stance of monetary policy during the 1930s are, if acknowledgedly
provisional, remarkably optimistic. Tortella and Palafox (1984) concluded that
during the 1930s4: “(...) nothing massive or dramatic occurred, no really impor-
tant banks suspended payments; no large scale “salvaging operation” was required.
(...) The banking system as a whole never had a liquidity problem.”
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In essence, their conclusion stems from three main arguments. First, banks
never had a liquidity problem, so the sharp contraction in bank lending that the
economy suffered can be explained entirely by the deterioration in economic ex-
pectations brought about by the regime change that took place in April 1931.
Falling demand due to a sharp deterioration in economic expectations brought
down bank lending. Second, while the authors acknowledged a contraction in
balance sheet items relating to commercial banking, they concluded that other
assets like securities (public bonds and industrial securities) experienced healthy
increases. Third, bank profits, if not comparable to those accruing during the
1920s, remained healthy during the 1930s5. Similarly, Palafox (1991) concluded
that the impact of the Great Depression in Spain was limited; the path of do-
mestic economic activity—measured by the evolution of industrial production—
constituted an exception to the rest of the world. The author highlighted the
differential path of deflation between Spain and other countries in the world;
however, his work also showed that deflation kicked in in 1932-33, after Spain
stabilized the peseta and pegged it to the French Franc. Palafox concluded that
the 1928-31 depreciation, if decried by the Government, had positive effects,
mostly through inflation, which compensated for the distortions it created in the
determination of import prices in pesetas. The benefits of the depreciation out-
weighed the costs. Regarding the impact of the proclamation of the Republic on
the financial sector, Palafox (1991) showed that deterioration in economic expec-
tations had started in 1930, but that the impact of the regime change had severe
consequences for the Spanish economy. In particular, he discussed the impact
of deposit withdrawals on the banking system in 1931 and the following years.
The sharp contraction in lending, he concluded6:“(...) can not be attributed only,
and certainly not mainly, to a drop in the demand for credit, but to the attitude
of the great banks, which affected by the deterioration in expectations, contracted
supply.”
Palafox rejected the hypothesis that monetary factors or liquidity pressure
could explain the contraction in lending; instead, he attributed it entirely to the
change in expectations7. In general, in his interpretation of the crisis, there is
no role for a contraction in lending explained by liquidity constraints suffered by
different banks; any source of heterogeneity in the lending behaviour of individual
banks had to do with differences in their expectations over the newborn Republic.
In a collection of papers, Jose´ Luis Garc´ıa Ruiz challenged some elements
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of the previous account, while he broadly agreed with Palafox (1991) in that
credit supply played a role in the contraction of lending and private investment.
Garc´ıa Ruiz (1987, 1992, 1993) argued that bank lending might have been, in
fact, affected by supply constraints. In contrast with the account provided by
Tortella and Palafox (1984), he pointed to a “liquidity crisis” in 1931, and argued
that banks restricted credit supply during the 1930s, a period dominated by high
real interest rates compared to other countries in Europe, something that Comı´n
(2012) also documented, but that was not reflected in nominal interest rates,
which fell between 1932 and 1936. Garc´ıa Ruiz’s contribution, if innovative and
certainly at odds with some of the previously established accounts, also relied on
aggregated data and suffered from the lack of archival evidence available at the
time. Accordingly, his provisional conclusions left the door open for “a deepening
that is only going to be feasible when private bank archives are open.”8
More recently, authors interested in a long term approach to financial crises
have reassessed the importance of the 1931 crisis in Spain. In a recent article that
focuses on the importance of current account deficits as determinants of financial
crises, Betra´n and Pons (2018) provide a comparative analysis of the severity
of financial crises in Spain between 1850 and 2015. Their interpretation of the
1931 crisis coincides with that of Mart´ınez-Ruiz and Nogue´s-Marco (2014), but
contrasts with previous classifications of the 1931 crisis, such as the one in Bordo,
Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Mart´ınez-Peria (2001). Betra´n and Pons (2018) de-
scribe it as a triple crisis: currency, banking and stock market. Using qualitative
and quantitative evidence on the evolution of monetary aggregates, their own es-
timates of current account imbalances and estimates of annual GDP from Prados
de la Escosura (2003), they show that Spanish GDP lost an accumulated 13.04%
compared to the pre-crisis trend after 1931 and they argue that current account
imbalances sit at the core of the explanations of financial crises during the period.
Recent updated GDP per head estimates for the period provided by Prados de la
Escosura (2017) also suggest that previous accounts might seem too optimistic;
he concluded that the real contraction experienced by Spain during the 1930s is
comparable to European countries and therefore “challenges the view of a weaker
impact due to Spain’s relative international isolation and backwardness.”9. To be
sure, the figures of the GDP contraction in 1931 pale relative to the post-Bretton
Woods crises that Spain experienced, which are twice as strong by that metric.
However, if the 1931 crisis is compared to the 1925 crisis–whereby the develop-
ment of the Spanish financial sector and the structure of the economy is more
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comparable–the difference is clear: 1931 was a severe crisis, while the GDP loss
from the 1925 banking crisis was negligible. A similar account is provided by
Mart´ın-Acen˜a (2013): the 1931 crisis was much more severe than that experi-
enced in 1925. A more recent experience might help contextualize these figures:
by 2016, the GDP of the United States was still 13% below its pre-crisis trend10.
There are, therefore, two broad interpretations of the developments of Span-
ish banking during the Great Depression. On the one hand, Tortella and Palafox
(1984) described the crisis as mild and argued that its consequences were limited.
On the other hand, the works of Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984, 1995, 2013), Garc´ıa Ruiz
(1987, 1992, 1993), Palafox (1991) and Betra´n and Pons (2018) argue that 1931
was definitely a crisis year, although they differ on the main drivers. That said,
they all agree in that banking, currency and stock market problems coincided and
they had an effect on the evolution of GDP, which had been growing steadily since
the mid-1920s. As stressed above, in some cases the conclusions reached are con-
ditional on the metric chosen to compare Spain to other countries. For example,
Tortella and Palafox (1984) do not attach too much importance to the contraction
in bank lending as a sign of distress during and after 1931, while they emphasize
the evolution of bank portfolios of securities and profits as a proof of the strength
of the Spanish banking system during the 1930s. In contrast, Garc´ıa Ruiz (1993)
went beyond bank failures, and concluded that if there was a contraction in bank
lending, this was mostly because banks reallocated their portfolios towards more
liquid and safe assets. At the same time, a liquidity shortage during the 1931
crisis is not a crucial part of his explanation of the crisis11. The argument he
presented emphasizes high real interest rates and credit rationing, rather than
the persistence of a sharp liquidity shock. The most updated conclusion of the
Spanish historiography is, therefore, that Spain had a crisis in 1931, albeit there
is no agreement on its exact extent, its causes and its actual scope.
Interestingly, as I shall show in the next section, the international literature
that flourished in the late 1980s and 1990s about the international dimension of
the Great Depression relied mostly on the conclusions reached by Tortella and
Palafox (1984). Most international accounts and cross-country comparisons do
not incorporate the explanation of the evolution of monetary policy provided by
Herna´ndez Andreu (1983) and Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1985, 1995), but also the not so
optimistic approach about banking during the 1930s taken by Garc´ıa Ruiz (1987,
1992, 1993).
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1.5.2 The international historiography
The conclusions reached by Tortella and Palafox (1984) about the performance
of the Spanish banking sector during the 1920s and 30s influenced greatly the
perception of the Spanish experience during the Great Depression in the interna-
tional literature. Accordingly, the most influential and comprehensive accounts
of the period tend to conclude–to summarize it in one representative quote–
that “Spain avoided the Great Depression by never being on the Gold Standard”
(Temin, 1993). This narrative has, in turn, been incorporated also by the most
recent publications in the history of financial crises; the last example of this is the
work the historical recurrence and common patterns of financial crises provided
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). As recently documented by Albers (2018), it is
almost common knowledge that Spain escaped the Great Depression.
Besides the fact that the aforementioned account of Spanish banking develop-
ments can be considered perhaps overly optimistic, as I discuss in the following
chapters, there are at least two important additional shortcomings with the way
the Spanish experience is introduced in cross-country analyses. Frequently, these
analyses rely on dummy variables to define countries’ exchange rate arrange-
ments or monetary frameworks, and also use dichotomic definitions of banking
crises: a country had a crisis or it did not. This approach, while justified from
the point of view of the methodology needed to establish international compar-
isons given binding data constraints, hides important nuances. Dummy variables
fail to capture structural variations in the relationship between the operation of
the exchange rate regime and outcome variables. Similarly, a binary definition of
banking crises fails to account for the variety of countries’ experiences12. Between
the black and white of a dummy variable, there is a wide spectrum of relevant
gray (Urban, 2009).
This matters because Spain is usually presented as an important example in
the literature connecting adherence to the Gold Standard, banking panics and
economic performance during the Great Depression. Unable and unwilling to let
exchange rates depreciate during the late 1920s and the early 1930s, governments
and central banks enforced deflationary pressures on their economies (Bernanke
and James, 1991; Eichengreen, 1992; Eichengreen and Temin, 1997). Deflation did
not only operate through changes in household consumption, expectations and
35
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 1
uncertainty, as highlighted by Temin (1989, 1993), Romer (1990) or Olney (1999).
It also contributed to add pressure on bank balance sheets through debt-deflation
spirals (Fisher, 1933; Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). Importantly, these pressures
contributed to increased financial fragility. Bank failures, in turn, caused the
costs of financial intermediation to rise, transforming monetary shocks such as
the one described by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) into a real contraction in
economic activity through the collapse of the supply of bank loans (Bernanke,
1983; Bernanke and James, 1991; Calomiris and Mason, 1997; Anari, Kolari,
and Mason, 2005; Richardson, 2007; Richardson and Troost, 2009; Postel-Vinay,
2016). In this context, gradual exchange rate depreciation (or sharp devaluation)
would have avoided countries falling into the Depression or helped recovering from
it. This is because exchange rate depreciation eased the effects of deflationary
pressures in industrial production (Choudhri and Kochin, 1980). It facilitated
the adjustment of current account deficits by boosting exports (Eichengreen and
Sachs, 1985); it also contributed to banking stability during the 1930s (Grossman,
1994; Temin, 2008). In particular, suspending gold convertibility allowed central
banks to engage in monetary expansion and gave them more latitude to respond
to banking crises (Temin, 1989; Eichengreen, 1996). Therefore, not being on the
gold standard allowed for countries to incorporate a more aggressive lender of last
resort reaction to their toolbox (Grossman, 2010). Somewhat taking the argument
to the extreme, some authors have argued that in a country that operated a fiat
currency (a variant, but not the only one of gold-inconvertibility), the monetary
base could be expanded without constraints to assist the banking system, thus
allowing the exchange rate to take the hit (Martin, 2009). Although recent works
on the history and theory of banking and central banking like Grossman (2010)
or Ugolini (2017) question the extent to which this is actually a feasible policy
in the presence of fiscal and/or political constraints (even in flexible exchange
rate regimes), this account has been incorporated to cross-country and long term
analyses of the determinants and the incidence of financial crises. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) summarize this widely-held narrative by claiming that Spain: “ex-
perienced runs, but the Bank of Spain could lend freely as a lender of last resort.”13
A second limitation of the conventional methodology is that it downplays the
importance of twin crises and, in particular, their incidence in emerging markets
and peripheral economies. An explanation for this–as Schnabel (2004a) argued–is
that the body of economic literature about the incidence and channels of trans-
mission of twin crises was not born until the late 1990s. This could certainly
36
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 1
explain why a number of the works outlined above did not include the possibility
of a twin crisis when they observed the sharp depreciation of the peseta between
1928 and 1931. Another explanation is that, given the need for a standard for
comparison between countries with different levels of financial development, and
the difficulty to find a representative measure of the latter, researchers had to rel-
ativize the importance of the differences between core and peripheral economies
in their ability to deal with financial crises. To be sure, however, the effects of de-
valuations or sharp depreciations depend greatly on the composition of economic
agents’ liabilities, which tend to be very different in core and peripheral countries.
Either way, I argue that the conventional interpretation of the Great Depression
in Spain puts too much emphasis on the effects of currency depreciation in coun-
tering deflationary pressures, mostly through the influential work of Choudhri
and Kochin (1980), but also Temin (1993) and Grossman (1994). This is done at
the expense of taking into account that rapid exchange rate depreciation can have
negative effects on the banking system if the latter holds significant short term
liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, as widely documented by Kamin-
sky and Reinhart (1999), Krugman (1999), Chang and Velasco (2000) and Calvo
(2006), among others. In this case, exchange rate depreciation worsens currency
(and maturity) mismatches in bank balance sheets and can contribute to addi-
tional pressure on the banking system. This is especially the case if the latter is
already under liquidity problems as depositors are withdrawing funds from banks.
Moreover, this account seems to ignore the fact that during the Interwar Period,
fixed exchange rates and adherence to the Gold Standard were a very ingrained
aspiration in policymakers’ agenda (Eichengreen, 1992; Eichengreen and Temin,
1997; Moure´, 1991, 2002; Straumann, 2010). As I show in Chapter 3, Spain was
no exception to this trend; very few economic agents could see benefits stemming
from a falling peseta. Some observers acknowledged that it contributed to ease
deflationary pressures, but this was definitely over in 1931 when prices began
to stagnate and fall as international deflation and internal factors affected the
Spanish economy.
Therefore, there seems to be limitations in the way the international histo-
riography has represented the Spanish experience during the Great Depression.
First, the use of dummy variables to determine the incidence of banking crises
fails to capture the nature of such crises. Second, the assumption that exchange
rate depreciation can be used as a linear predictor of banking stability is also
problematic, as it fails to account that the marginal returns to exchange rate de-
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preciation from the point of view of banking stability are not linear and might be
negative altogether. The next two subsections contextualize these limitations in
the international historiography and explain why the Spanish case is important
to improve our understanding of the mechanisms underlying banking stability
during the Great Depression.
1.5.3 The relevance of the Spanish experience
The importance of Spain as a benchmark for comparison in the literature about
the Great Depression can hardly be exaggerated. It is literally reflected in the
following quote from one of the most influential papers in the historiography,
Choudhri and Kochin (1980)14. In their paper, Ehsan U. Choudhri and Levis A.
Kochin compared the performance of industrial production and the price level
with the evolution of exchange rates between 1928 and 1932. They found a pos-
itive correlation between exchange rate depreciation and industrial production.
As they put it:
“The centerpiece of our evidence is Spain, which, during the Great
Depression, operated on flexible exchange rates combined with fairly
stable monetary conditions while most of the world was committed to
the gold standard. A comparison of Spanish experience in this period
with the gold-standard countries provides a striking historical experi-
ment on the insulation capabilities of the flexible exchange rate system.
(...) Thus, at the onset of the Great Depression, Spain was the only
major country operating on a flexible exchange rate system. During
the depression, while Spain went through several changes in its govern-
ment, the Spanish economy was largely unaffected by political turmoil
until the Civil War several years after. The Spanish peseta was flexible
until March of 1934. (...) Spanish prices and output remained, for the
most part, unaffected during the depression period. Indeed, the 1932
level of prices and production in Spain was not much different from
the level in 1928. (...) [Spain] virtually escaped the Great Depression.”
Interestingly, and as opposed to the rest of authors that deal with the Spanish
experience, Choudhri and Kochin (1980) did not draw from Spanish historiogra-
phy to contextualize or inform their empirical findings. While their data come
from the League of Nations Statistical Yearbook, the qualitative information and
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the narrative of the Spanish experience (both economic and political) is drawn
from Delaplane (1934), a Ph.D. dissertation from Duke University. The nature
of the secondary sources used by these authors can explain the arguably opti-
mistic account about Spain’s performance during the Great Depression. Inter-
estingly, however, they acknowledged that “the Spanish money supply behaviour
(...) remained reasonably stable except in the year 1931 when there was a sizeable
decrease in the money stock”, albeit they did not report why, or discuss its im-
plications for the sharp contraction in industrial production they observed from
1931. In addition, there are many aspects of the Spanish experience that are not
accurately captured by the data that Choudhri and Kochin (1980) had access to.
As Albers (2018) has recently pointed out, the focus on industrial production as a
proxy of economic activity during the Great Depression, while indicative, comes
with strong limitations. Empirical work by Rodrik (2013) showed that uncon-
ditional convergence can take place in the industrial sector but not necessarily
in less modern parts of the economy. This implies that industrial production
can grow independently from other sectors, which might be quantitatively more
important, and thus can render a misleading picture of the overall evolution of
economic activity. Accordingly, using principal component methodology to es-
timate the evolution of monthly economic activity, Albers (2018) found a sharp
contraction in economic activity in Spain. As Figure 3.1 shows, while private
investment collapsed by more than 30% during 1931, industrial production only
contracted by 10%. In fact, GDP contracted almost 10% during the period that
Choudhri and Kochin (1980) discussed, which is in sharp contrast with their
conclusion that output remained unaffected (Figure 1.1). In addition, Spain did
indeed experience political volatility during the 1920s and 30s, before the Civil
War. In fact, political shocks were instrumental to the magnification of some
economic and financial shocks. Finally, it is inaccurate that the Spanish peseta
floated until 1934. This is not a minor question, because the fact that Spain sta-
bilized in 1932 shows that even right after the worst of the crisis, exchange rate
stability remained a main policy goal. Spanish monetary authorities pegged the
peseta to the French Franc in 1932 (i.e. to gold) overvaluing the exchange rate
and importing deflation (Herna´ndez Andreu, 1983; Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). This is
reflected in the evolution of wholesale prices, which fell by 8.2% between 1931
and 1935 (Maluquer de Motes, 2013). While deflation kicked in later and with
less intensity in Spain than in other countries, it still shows up in the data.
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While Choudhri and Kochin (1980) focused only on the link between exchange
rate depreciation and economic activity–thus not including the banking system
in their analysis–other authors put the focus on the implications of exchange rate
policy for central bank interventions during the Great Depression. In this strand
of the literature, one of the most influential works is Temin (1993). Peter Temin’s
“Transmission of the Great Depression” has been highly influential in the histo-
riography of the Great Depression, and since it summarizes the interpretation of
the Spanish experience in international academic debates quite succinctly, it is
also worth quoting at length15:
“Spain stands as the prime example of a country that avoided the worst
excesses of the Great Depression by staying off the gold standard. Did
it also avoid financial panics? Spain tried to fix the peseta in the late
1920s as France and Italy stabilized their currencies, but the defla-
tionists lacked the political muscle. The government continued to run
deficits which were monetized by healthy banks. There was a run on
Spanish banks contemporaneous with the failure of the Credit Anstalt
in Austria. Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1992) cites internal causes, but the peseta
was under pressure as well. Very few banks failed, and the experience
is not thought of as a panic. The Bank of Spain acted as a lender of
last resort enabled to do so by two factors. The banks held large port-
folios of government debt that could be sold for cash. And unlike the
Reichsbank, the Bank of Spain was not bound by the inflexible stan-
dard of the gold standard. It did have to raise Spanish interest rates
to protect the value of the peseta, but it continued to lend freely-as
Bagehot advised (Tortella and Palafox, 1984).”
In fact, Temin’s interpretation of the 1920s is accurate. However, it is the
second part, the one that deals with the policy response to the crisis, that seems
to rely too much on an overly optimistic account. Moreover, Temin’s statement
about bank failures shows how Spain’s exceptional experience in this particular
aspect of banking crises has pushed to the conclusion that there was no panic.
As stated above, however, the use of dummy variables in this type of analysis
can fail to capture important nuances at the country level. The exact place at
which we draw the line that separates crisis from “noncrisis” is inevitably discrete
and risks bundling together clearcut cases with borderline cases. It also creates
a difficulty in comparing two different episodes for the same country in different
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moments in time. Even if I do not explicitly deal with the 1925 banking crisis
in Spain, its comparison with 1931 is an interesting example of the challenges of
finding a single metric for comparing banking crises. For instance, in their work
on the links between deflation, the Gold Standard and financial crises during
the Great Depression, Ben S. Bernanke and Harold James considered that Spain
had a banking crisis in 1925 but not in 1931. This was because one relatively
important bank failed in 1925 and only four relatively small banks failed in 1931
(Bernanke and James, 1991). The bank in question, Cre´dito de la Unio´n Minera
(CUMI), accounted for 4.7% of total assets before its failure in 1925, while in
1931 failed banks accounted for 2.5% of total assets16. As Tortella (2001) and
Mart´ın-Acen˜a (2013) documented, risk of contagion from CUMI to Banco Cen-
tral (BCEN), pushed General Primo de Rivera to force the BdE to intervene.
Despite there was a lender of last resort operation–credit to BCEN–a regionally
important bank went under (CUMI). In 1931, in contrast, there was also a lender
of last resort intervention, but there were relatively smaller bank failures.
This would suggest that in fact, 1925 was a “crisis” year in banking, but 1931
was not. The question is where to draw the line. For example, if we look at the
evolution of bank deposits and bank lending, the 1925 crisis pales next to the mag-
nitude of 1931. Moreover, GDP growth was unaffected by the 1925 crisis, while
in 1931 it accumulated a 13% negative deviation from pre-crisis trend (Betra´n
and Pons, 2018). In addition, the 1925 crisis was geographically contained. In
1925, sharp deposit withdrawals only took place in the provinces of the Basque
Country (where the bank had its headquarters) and Asturias (where the bulk of
mining activity was located), while the rest of the country was mostly unaffected.
In contrast, deposit withdrawals in 1931 took place nationwide (Mart´ın-Acen˜a,
1984; Tortella, 2001). This can be seen in Figure 1.2, which maps the average
deposit drop suffered by banks at the province level in 1925 and 193117. It also
includes a map that shows the share of total coal production in Spain by the
beginning of 1925, also at the provincial level. As can be seen, the 1925 crisis
was concentrated in the regions where shocks to the mining industry were rele-
vant, while banks in the rest of the country did not suffer from that shock. This
contrasts with 1931, in which a number of provinces were severely affected by de-
posit withdrawals. Even accounting for the fact that deposit losses in branched
banks are mostly attributed to the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona and Vizcaya,
the nation-wide character of the 1931 crisis is evident. This comparison suggests
that bank failures, if obviously a crucial feature of banking crises, do not tell the
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full story on their own. The difficulty lies, then, in finding a definition of banking
crisis that can consistently work across borders and across time.
The case of Spain during the 1930s illustrates the implications of this chal-
lenge. Depending on whether we consider the year 1931 in Spain as a crisis or not
matters crucially for our assessment of the connections between the Gold Stan-
dard, banking instability and the Great Depression. A clear example of the im-
portance of learning about the borderline cases in cross-country comparisons that
use dichotomous outcome variables is the influential work by Grossman (1994).
Richard Grossman conducted a cross-sectional study including 25 countries, and
found that currency depreciation between 1929 and 1931 contributed significantly
to predict bank stability. In fact, this was the main robust result that he obtained
from the data he had access to18. The more currency depreciation a country un-
derwent, the less likely it was to suffer a banking crisis; conversely, countries that
remained on gold for longer were associated with a higher probability of crisis.
At one extreme of the distribution of exchange rate depreciation during 1929-31
sits Spain, with the Spanish peseta falling 42.8% during that period. Using an-
nual data, Grossman (1994) estimated univariate and multivariate probit models
in which the outcome variable was dichotomous: countries either had a crisis
or not. While he openly acknowledged the limitations of this approach and the
difficulties of finding general patterns in the data, his findings are supportive of
the conventional account that suggests that allowing the exchange rate to take
the hit would have prevented a number of banking crises during the Great De-
pression. Grossman’s results are important because of their strong implications
for the literature. For example, as Temin (2008) put it in his discussion of the
ultimate causes of the German (twin) crisis of 1931:
“Not all countries on gold had banking crises, but there were no bank-
ing crises in countries off gold. This strong result implies that being on
the fixed exchange rate of the interwar gold standard was an important
cause of banking crises. In fact it was the only systematic cause that
Grossman found in his sample”19.
In his cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of banking stability dur-
ing the Great Depression, Grossman (1994) coded countries as having suffered a
banking crisis if a high proportion of bank failed, an especially large or important
bank failed or if there was a Government intervention that prevented failures. If
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(a) Deposit losses, 1925q1
(b) Share of coal production, 1925
(c) Deposit losses, 1931q2
Figure 1.2: Two crises compared, 1925 vs. 1931
Source: own calculations based on Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario for deposit losses and Estadistica
de la produccion de carbones en Espan˜a durante los nueve ultimos an˜os, formada por el Consejo de Mineria,
Anuario 1925-1926, Fondo Documental, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) for coal production.
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none of the three applied, countries were coded as not having a crisis. Grossman
discussed the potential for a “third category” that included countries for which
none of the above applied, but still experienced banking difficulties, like Finland
or Spain20. Interestingly, while in the case of most countries he could use the
publications of the League of Nations (Commercial Banks, 1925-33 ), Grossman
was unable to obtain contemporary accounts that documented the actual scope
of the 1931 crisis in Spain. This highlights, as described above, the unfortunate
disconnection between some detailed research papers published in Spain and the
international historiography of the Great Depression. As a result, both the limi-
tations of the dichotomous outcome variable analysis as well as the unavailability
of a detailed contemporary description of the scope of the 1931 banking crisis in
Spain can have important implications for the conclusions we reach about the
role of the Gold Standard in causing banking crises during the Great Depression.
The importance of a better understanding of the Spanish experience during
the Great Depression can be shown by replicating Grossman’s work and show-
ing the sensitivity of the results he obtained to changes in the coding for Spain.
Columns 1 and 4 in Table 1.1 show the replication of Grossman’s single and
multi-variable strongest results with “crisis” as dependent variable and currency
depreciation, population per bank and central bank discounts as covariates. A
first interesting exercise is to recode Spain as “crisis” country and then run the
same specification. This is done in Columns 2 and 6 of Table 1.1. Doing this
halves down the coefficient associated to currency depreciation and weakens its
statistical significance. Even if we ignore the change in statistical significance,
Spain alone accounts for around half of the association that Grossman found
between exchange rate depreciation and banking stability. Not surprisingly, the
country that Grossman argued that, alongside Spain, ought to have been placed
in a hypothetical third category, Finland, accounts for the other half21. As I
argued above, it is crucial to determine whether Spain’s case should be included
in the “crisis” or in the “non-crisis” group, as this has implications for the con-
clusions we can draw on the links between exchange rate depreciation and bank
stability during the Great Depression. A second alternative estimation is then to
recode Finland. In in Columns 3 and 7 of Table 1.1, I recode Finland as a “crisis”
country; the loss of significance is similar to the one associated with Spain. In
turn, Columns 4 and 8 recode both Spain and Finland as “crisis” countries. Doing
so renders the coefficient on currency depreciation insignificant. While the case
of Finland falls out of the scope of this thesis, it also highlights the importance of
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the constraints imposed by definitions and specific metrics in our understanding
of the underlying reasons for bank stability during the Great Depression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grossman ESP crisis FIN crisis ESP & FIN crisis Grossman ESP crisis FIN crisis ESP & FIN crisis
Currency value 0.0540∗∗ 0.0298∗ 0.0366∗ 0.0188 0.0723∗∗ 0.0570∗ 0.0454∗∗ 0.0319
(2.47) (1.69) (1.95) (1.09) (2.54) (1.95) (2.07) (1.33)
Population per -0.00473∗∗ -0.00514∗∗ -0.00368∗ -0.00413∗∗
bank (-2.02) (-2.11) (-1.86) (-1.97)
∆ Central bank 0.000898 0.00133∗∗ 0.000633 0.00106∗
discounts (1.53) (2.05) (1.32) (1.85)
Constant -4.874∗∗ -2.526 -3.145∗ -1.433 -5.630∗∗ -3.953 -3.192∗ -1.723
(-2.38) (-1.58) (-1.83) (-0.91) (-2.29) (-1.63) (-1.68) (-0.84)
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Log-likelihood -13.55 -15.69 -15.11 -16.24 -7.916 -8.008 -10.12 -9.349
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 1.1: Determinants of banking crises: replication of single and multi variable
probit results in Grossman(1994)
Note: dependent variable is 0 for “noncrisis” countries and 1 for “crisis” countries. Independent variables
are calculated as the ratio of their value in 1931 over 1929. For Spain, Grossman (1994) calculated currency
devaluation as the ratio between the value of the peseta in December 1931 and its gold parity of 1868 at (25.22
pesetas per Sterling). For the sake of comparison with the original source, the table does not include marginal
coefficients, which might be easier to interpret. Coefficients associated with central bank discounts differ slightly
from the original source, but overall the estimation is virtually the same. Source: see Table 4 and 5 in Grossman
(1994, p.675-76).
After reestimating the same model, the association between exchange rate
depreciation and bank stability is revealed as highly dependent on the border-
line cases. The results of this replication suggest that our understanding about
the relationship between exchange rate regimes and financial stability during the
Great Depression can improve by learning more about these cases. The way in
which exchange rate depreciation is included in cross-country comparisons during
the Great Depression can be challenging, because a falling currency can quickly
turn from a blessing into a curse. Depreciation or exchange rate pressure meant
very different things for Britain in September 1931 or for the United States in
March 1933 than for Germany during 1931 or for Spain between 1928 and 1931.
As Accominotti (2012) concluded, Britain’s departure of the Gold Standard in
September 1931 did not have significant effects on the British banking system
because its liabilities were denominated in Sterling. This contrasts with Isabel
Schnabel’s account of the German twin crisis of 1931 (Schnabel, 2004a). Im-
portantly, this also contrasts with the case of Spain, whose banks, as I show
in Chapter 3, held a large portfolio of short term debt denominated in Sterling
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in 1931. Therefore, predicting the determinants of banking stability as a lin-
ear function of currency depreciation—both theoretically and empirically—can
fail to capture the fact that currency depreciation can be the specific channel
through which countries’ shocks to the banking system turn into full-blown fi-
nancial crises. In this sense, this type of analysis risks downplaying the insights
from the literature that appeared in the 1990s about the connections between
currency and banking crises, the so-called twin crises (Krugman, 1999; Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1999; Chang and Velasco, 2000; Glick and Hutchinson, 2000). It
also underestimates the importance of capital outflows, which naturally go hand
in hand with exchange rate depreciation. Capital flight was not only a key de-
terminant of countries’ monetary policies during the Great Depression, as Wolf
(2008) shows; the role of the international capital cycle has also been recently
highlighted as severely limiting monetary policy options in emerging economies
(Farhi and Werning, 2014; Rey, 2015). As such, the role of exchange rate depreci-
ation in the form of non-adherence to the Gold Standard risks being overstated22.
In fact, twin crises plagued the Interwar Period; Germany, Austria and Hungary
experienced severe twin crises in 1931 (Schnabel, 2004a,b; Macher, 2017, 2018)
and, as I show in Chapter 3, Spain was not an exception in this sense.
Drawing a line between “crisis” and “non-crisis” countries based on discrete
measures of banking difficulties is a difficult task, because it is determined by def-
initions that might fail to capture interesting variation. Introducing non-discrete
measures, however, is also challenging. In their influential work on the effects of
deflation and banking crises during the Great Depression, Bernanke and James
(1991) studied the extent to which a banking panic had an impact on countries’
real economic activity during the 1930s. Spain is again an interesting case in their
study. In order to include to control for the incidence of banking panics in each
specific year, Bernanke and James had to introduce a dummy variable to deter-
mine whether a country had a banking panic or not. Similar to Grossman (1994),
having to draw a line to determine the incidence of a crisis and make countries
comparable, Spain is coded as having a banking crisis in 1925 but not in 1931.
This is because, as I discussed above, an important bank failed in 1925 but not
in 1931. To be sure, in this case, changing the coding of Spain does not affect the
general argument presented by Bernanke and James (1991); undoubtedly, bank-
ing panics mattered a great deal during the Great Depression, regardless of how
Spain is coded. However, it is still interesting to see the importance of improving
our knowledge about the Spanish experience and the challenges of finding an en-
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compassing but useful definition of banking crisis. To this end, Figure 1.3 shows
the annual change in the deposit-currency ratio between 1930 and 1936 for all
countries included in their sample. Countries which Bernanke and James (1991)
code as experiencing a panic during each year reported are represented in black
bars, while those that are coded as not having experienced a panic are in light
gray. For the sake of representation, I exclude the country-years that witnessed
increases in the deposit-currency ratio, and country-years below the 10% thresh-
old that Bernanke and James (1991) established as relevant. While this is not
the variable that the authors used to determine the incidence of a banking panic
in their empirical analysis, they report this data as informative of the monetary
shocks suffered at the country level, which is then illustrative of the incidence of
banking panics. The contraction in the deposit-currency ratio in 1931 in Spain is
stronger than the average. It is also much stronger than the shocks experienced
by the United States in 1931 and 1933, and is certainly comparable to the shock
suffered by that country during the Chicago banking panic of 1932 (Calomiris
and Mason, 1997; Postel-Vinay, 2016). It is also stronger than the shock the
French banking sector underwent in 1931 (Baubeau, Monnet, Riva, and Ungaro,
2018). Restricting the sample to 1931, the Spanish banking system ranks as the
eighth suffering the sharpest liquidity shock in that year, among the sample of
25 countries; it ranks above the United States, France or Belgium, for example.
Again, the Spanish case reveals the difficulties of translating a continuous vari-
able (such as the currency-deposit ratio) into a comparable, discrete metric for
banking crises in the form of bank failures.
Unfortunately, recent comparative exercises that use modern econometric
techniques and that emphasize the extent to which other policies mattered for
countries’ emergence from the Great Depression do not include Spain, precisely
because of its differential exchange rate regime at the time. This is the case,
for example, of the analysis of the role of capital controls in the recovery of
the Great Depression by Mitchener and Wandschneider (2015) or empirical ap-
proaches to discuss the reasons for countries’ entry or exit of the interwar Gold
Standard like Wandschneider (2008) and Wolf (2008). Despite this somewhat
natural exclusion of the Spanish experience is justified because the country oper-
ated a gold-inconvertible currency during most of the Great Depression, leaving
Spain out of these international comparisons has an impact in the historiogra-
phy. In particular, it does not address the fact that Spain committed to the Gold
Standard in the last months of 1930, and that after the more visible parts of
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the 1931 crisis had subdued, Spanish monetary authorities incorporated Spain to
the gold bloc in 1932. These are not trivial or residual policy choices, they had
an impact that is an undeniable part of the country’s experience during the 1930s.
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Figure 1.3: Changes in country-year deposit-currency ratios, 1930-36
Note: figures are log-differences of the ratio of commercial bank deposits to money and notes in circulation.
Source: Bernanke and James (1991).
All the evidence presented here suggests that the way in which we classify
Spain matters crucially for our understanding of the role of the Gold Standard
in the Great Depression. Therefore, it is necessary to revisit the case of Spain
in more depth. In general, the way the country is included in the historiogra-
phy detailed above is the result of a lack of detailed data–both quantitative and
qualitative–on the actual developments in the banking sector during the 1930s.
Much work was done in the 1980s and 1990s, but since then, a number of new
archival sources have become available. Exploiting these sources should help us
know more about the actual extent of financial and banking developments in
Spain during the Great Depression, and should improve our understanding of
how much room would have countries had if they suffered the same shocks under
a non-gold convertible currency.
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One might be tempted to use the benefit of hindsight to praise Spain and its
monetary authorities for their superior monetary regime during the Great De-
pression. The truth is that, rightly or wrongly, Spain wanted and tried to be
on gold. This had important implications that need to be taken into account.
If Spain is to be useful as a counterfactual, then, it has to be for different rea-
sons. To this end, to illustrate what is the actual informative value of Spain for
the literature of the Great Depression, this thesis provides evidence and argues
that Spain can only be a useful counterfactual because it shows that room for
monetary autonomy depended on a number of factors that were not only related
to gold-convertibility. Exchange rate depreciation did not contribute to banking
stability. Instead, Government intervention in the form of capital controls–which
allowed the Banco de Espan˜a to lend freely, the negotiation of international fi-
nancial assistance and policies aiming at protecting the asset-side of the banking
system saved the day. These saved the day, perhaps the days, or even the weeks,
but not much more. Certainly not enough to escape the Great Depression.
1.6 Chapter summaries
The argument of the thesis is structured in four chapters. Each chapter consists
of a self-contained argument and speaks to slightly different strands of the lit-
erature on the Great Depression as well as to the literature concerned with the
development of central banking, money markets and financial crises in emerging
economies. However, the four chapters can be read as pieces of the broader ar-
gument described above.
1.6.1 Chapter 2: Conflicting goals: banking reform, debt
monetization and the fall of the Spanish peseta,
1921-1931
The first substantive chapter of the thesis analyses the conflicting goals that
Spanish fiscal authorities faced as a result of the 1921 Banking Law. This Law,
which was passed right after the failure of the Banc de Barcelona in 1920, institu-
tionalized a system of indirect monetization of public debt that rendered changes
in the BdE’s Discount rate ineffective. Banks were granted access to the lending
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facilities of the BdE by pledging public debt as collateral. While this made sure
the Government could finance its deficits, it revealed incompatible with exchange
rate stability, a goal that emerged as crucial in the late 1920s. Until 1927, this
system worked well for all parts involved: the Government, the banking sector
and the BdE. However, as the peseta started falling from that year, this mecha-
nism revealed the time-inconsistency problem in which fiscal authorities had put
themselves: this form of fiscal dominance left the discount rate of the BdE unable
to exert any countering pressure to the rapid depreciation of the peseta, which
fell rapidly from 1928 to 1931. This pushed to the introduction of exchange rate
interventions that ended up failing repeatedly. In 1930, as monetary authorities
were unable to stabilize the exchange rate due to the continued “indirect moneti-
zation” of public deficits by the banking sector, the former decided to issue gold
bonds in a desperate attempt to stop the fall of the peseta. Unable to borrow
abroad, the Government relied on Spanish banks doing so. They borrowed at
short term maturities in foreign currency in order to provide the Government
with long term credit in gold-convertible currencies. As a result of this, Spanish
banks ended up holding large amounts of short term liabilities denominated in
foreign exchange and thus became exposed to any eventual shock to their lia-
bilities. The shock, which came in April 1931, as well as its consequences, are
analyzed in the the three following chapters.
1.6.2 Chapter 3: The limits to lender of last resort inter-
ventions in emerging economies: evidence from the
Gold Standard and the Great Depression in Spain
This chapter shows how Spanish policymakers found their hands tied when trying
to allow the Banco de Espan˜a to lend freely during the 1931 banking panic, be-
cause they had to choose between expanding the monetary base and allowing for
capital mobility. Currency mismatches accumulated in the banking sector as a
result of previous failed exchange rate stabilization attempts limited their policy
options. Ultimately, Spanish authorities had to forgo capital mobility and thus
the BdE was only allowed to lend freely after capital controls were in place.
The second key element discussed in the chapter is the evolution of bank
lending. I show that the collapse in bank lending (which fell by more than 20%
in 1931) can be explained by the limitations that monetary authorities faced in
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providing emergency liquidity to banks when these were faced with a sudden run
on their deposits following the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in
April 1931. Some banks borrowed enough to not only convert their depositors
funds into cash, but also to expand their loan portfolios during the crisis and
the following years. Others, fell short of liquidity and contracted lending sharply.
Interestingly, I also find that banks that did not suffer a run on their deposits did
not contract lending during 1931, which strongly suggests that I am identifying
a credit supply shock caused by a liquidity shortage in the banking system.
The findings of this chapter, thus, raise two important questions. First, if some
banks managed to borrow enough from the BdE while others experienced severe
liquidity problems, how was emergency liquidity provided and what determined
the allocation among different banks during the crisis? The second question is:
present all these limitations, why did Spain not see a widespread chain of bank
failures during 1931? Both questions are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5.
1.6.3 Chapter 4: Allocation of limited lender of last resort
assistance: bank-level evidence from the 1931 crisis
in Spain
In this chapter, I disaggregate emergency liquidity provision by the BdE at the
bank level in order to understand how and why it was allocated among different
banks. Bringing the focus down to the bank level provides a very different picture
of the 1931 crisis, compared to the evidence that has been available so far. Liq-
uidity provision was not proportional to banks’ liquidity needs, especially during
the first two months of the crisis, when Spanish monetary authorities could not
allow the Banco de Espan˜a to lend freely until they introduced capital controls.
First, I address the the way in which the BdE screened collateral brought
to the discount window before the crisis. I document how being a frequent dis-
counter of bills of exchange with the BdE before 1931 provided a superior access to
the discount window during the crisis. This happened because the other lending
facility, short term collateralised credit against public debt became more expen-
sive to banks as the price of public debt fell sharply during the crisis, despite
efforts by the Government to restore credibility in public finance and the aim of
the BdE at not increasing haircuts charged in these operations. Second, I show
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that the inability of monetary authorities to deem the BdE Discount Rate as
an effective monetary policy tool to price banks’ access to central bank liquid-
ity window also explains the way in which emergency liquidity was distributed
among banks during the crisis. Because the BdE Discount Rate was below the
rate at which banks discounted bills in the market, the BdE had to rely on col-
lateral eligibility to manage its lending activity through the outright purchase
of bills of exchange. In some cases, this criteria seems to have been based more
on the long-term relationship lending between the BdE and some banks, than
in the nature of the bills it rediscounted, while in others the BdE would screen
bills thoroughly even before they were discounted by a given bank. This differen-
tial access to the discount window helps understand the bank-level provision of
emergency liquidity and, speaking back to Chapter 2, highlights some of the con-
sequences of the 1921 Banking Law failure in modernizing Spain’s money market.
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Explaining bank stability in Spain dur-
ing the 1930s
This chapter addresses the question of how could Spain emerge from the 1931
banking crisis with such remarkable bank stability, given all the shocks and policy
limitations explained in previous chapters. I provide three explanations for this,
which complement the necessary (but not sufficient) intervention of the BdE as
lender of last resort. First and foremost, Spain suspended mark-to-market ac-
counting from 1931 for both public and private bonds and shares. This shielded
bank balance sheets from an average fall of 13% in the price of public debt and a
stronger and more permanent 32% drop in private shares and bonds. I construct a
counterfactual estimate of how would have banks’ portfolios of securities evolved
if they would have reflected market prices, and estimate how much capital would
have been eroded as a consequence. This calculation—while limited to a certain
extent by data availability—reveals that the largest Spanish banks would have
experienced large losses with potentially critical consequences to their capital,
while an additional eleven banks would certainly have been unable to survive,
had they been forced to mark their assets to market.
A second reason for bank stability comes from the social origins of depositors.
The strata of society that, in 1931, saw the political regime change as opportu-
nity, instead of threat, had traditionally deposited its money in savings banks,
and not so much in banks, while the opposite was true for the other group. As
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a result, savings banks did not suffer any deposit losses, while banks were “dis-
proportionately” exposed to them. Finally, I show that complete secrecy about
the actual extent of individual bank deposit losses was key to contain the panic.
This is illustrated by the case of Banco Urquijo de Madrid. This bank, which had
close connections with the Society of Jesus, lost more than 50% of its deposits
during the crisis and never recovered them. The lion’s share of the deposit loss
was due to the withdrawal of funds associated with religious institutions. The
bank only survived because it was absorbed by the Banco de Espan˜a, a move
that, as I show in Chapter 4, crowded other banks from accessing the limited
emergency liquidity available.
The four chapters summarized above are the main pillars of the argument I
present in this thesis and suggest that the reconsideration of the Spanish expe-
rience has important implications for our understanding of the role of exchange
rate depreciation, monetary policy and financial crises during the Great Depres-
sion. They are followed by a conclusion in which I outline the main implications
of the thesis, its limitations and further steps for research.
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Conflicting goals: banking reform,
debt monetization and the fall of
the Spanish peseta, 1921-1931
2.1 Introduction
By the late 1920s, the Spanish peseta was the only major European currency
that had not been stabilized. In contrast to most countries on gold, Spain saw
its currency depreciate rapidly from 1928 until 1931, only reaching stabilization
by mid-1932 and with strong capital controls in place. This chapter analyses one
of the underlying driving forces behind the fall of the peseta: the monetization
of public debt by the banking sector. Already from the onset of the First World
War, but increasingly after 1920, the Spanish Government ran persistent budget
deficits (Comı´n and Diaz, 2005a). Unable to introduce an effective fiscal reform
that increased government revenue through direct income and wealth taxation, a
sizable shortfall persisted (Comı´n and Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984; Melguizo, 1986; San-
tamar´ıa, 1986). In particular, 1921 was the year where the largest issuance of
public debt took place, although during the late 1920s, issuances of various types
of Government debt also experienced a large increase (Figure 2.1). By virtue of
the 1921 Banking Law, and in order to make sure that the Government’s debt
issuance would be successful, banks were allowed to buy public debt in the pri-
mary market and automatically monetize it by obtaining loans against collateral
from the Banco de Espan˜a at rates that were set below the yield of government
bonds. Moreover, the Law established that the Government would have the right
to set specific interest rates for collateralized borrowing at the discount window
of the BdE for new issuances of government bonds, in order to make sure bond
issuances were successful and banks had incentives to accumulate public debt23.
With the reform of the banking system in 1921, the Government also aimed
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at turning the Banco de Espan˜a into a “bank’s bank”: by being progressively
withdrawn from its commercial business, the aim was to transform central bank
money almost entirely into reserves that banks could then use to create deposits
and extend loans. Since the BdE had been forbidden from holding public debt
since the early 1900s, this new mechanism allowed for the monetization of public
debt without the latter showing up in the balance sheet of the central bank as
government bonds, but rather as credit to commercial banks. The 1921 Banking
Law outsourced the monetization of public debt to commercial banks. At the
same time, the Law provided commercial banks with a liquidity backstop offered
by the BdE on government bonds at any time. That said, money creation was not
unlimited; the Law also included a fiduciary limit that had to be negotiated with
the Government in the event that money in circulation reached the limit. This
limit, however, was only reached during the 1931 crisis, when depositors ran on
banks and emergency liquidity provision by the BdE caused notes in circulation
to hit the upper fiduciary limit twice (as I discuss in Chapter 3). Until then, and
especially from 1927, bank lending boomed.
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The 1921 Banking Law was highly successful in achieving some of its main
goals. First, it helped the Government find a way for financing its deficits and
ensuring subscription to its new bond issuances. Some elements of financial re-
pression contributed to this goal as well; banks were obliged to hold at least 20%
of the debt they purchased from the Government until maturity. Second, it pro-
vided bondholders (banks) with an automatic liquidity backstop and the ability
to create deposits by monetizing government bonds. As a result, between 1922
and 1934, public debt in bank balance sheets almost tripled (Table 2.1). Third,
the Law discharged the BdE of direct government deficit monetization and also
from any responsibility over the evolution of the exchange rate. The achievement
of these goals, however, came with a price. Once the debt monetization system
had been established in such a way, it revealed incompatible with exchange rate
stability. The government fell into a time-inconsistency problem in which its fiscal
needs were incompatible with a stable exchange rate, a goal that–not the least
because of its strong links with the reputation and fate of several Ministers of
Finance–was helplessly pursued from 1928. Monetary policy became dominated,
to a great extent, by the fiscal needs of the Government and, despite a desperate
but quickly reverted attempt at sharply balancing the budget in the first half
of 1930, the depreciation of the peseta did only start receding in the autumn of
1931, and became finally stabilized in 1932 (Garc´ıa Delgado, 1979; Mart´ın-Acen˜a,
1985).
Year Assets Loans Public Debt Private stocks 3-month bills Deposits Capital
1922 7362 1857 995 635 1041 4210 1449
1925 7628 1666 1231 729 1248 3981 1384
1928 10069 1992 1860 1111 1479 5379 1463
1930 12500 2569 2381 1554 1784 6808 1728
1931 11575 2092 2371 1501 1554 5943 1757
1934 12250 2040 2716 1553 1523 6471 1719
% ∆ 1922-34 66% 10% 173% 145% 46% 54% 19%
% ∆ 1922-30 70% 38% 139% 145% 71% 62% 19%
% ∆ 1930-34 -2% -21% 14% 0% -15% -5% -1%
Table 2.1: Composition of bank balance sheets (1922-34)
Note: All figures are million pesetas and year averages, except 1922, which is end of year. Source: Boletines del
Consejo Superior Bancario.
This mechanism of indirect monetization has been documented before; both
contemporary observers and recent research have discussed its origins and func-
tioning (Paret, 1921; Comisio´n del Patro´n Oro, 1929; Olariaga, 1946; Pedro´s Abello´,
1978), while more quantitative approaches using time-series analysis have focused
on its implications for the evolution of monetary aggregates (Sabate´, Gadea, and
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Escario, 2006, 2015), already suggesting a regime of “fiscal dominance”. By
drawing on a newly collected and assembled database of all Spanish banks dur-
ing the period 1922q4-1934q4 at quarterly frequency, this chapter analyses the
consequences of the aforementioned mechanism for the effectiveness of monetary
policy implemented by the Banco de Espan˜a (BdE). Bank-quarter-level data al-
lows me to show, empirically, how this mechanism of fiscal dominance in the form
of indirect monetization of public debt by commercial banks rendered monetary
policy ineffective. In particular, I argue that price signals provided by changes
in the interest rates from the BdE were ineffective in impacting domestic credit,
which boomed from 1927. Both the BdE and commercial banks became passive
but crucial elements of the time-inconsistency problem of Spanish governments.
In order to document the channels through which Spanish monetary author-
ities lost control of monetary policy (to fiscal authorities), I estimate a dynamic
panel data model in which I analyse the effects of changes in the BdE rates on
bank lending. Similarly to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the 1921 Banking
Law created the Consejo Superior Bancario (Supreme Banking Council), which
divided the Spanish banking system into two types of banks: those who had
access to the discount window of the BdE and those who didn’t (members and
non-members). Because of this clear cut division, the data I collect allows for
an estimation of the differential reaction to the changes in BdE interest rates for
the two types of banks after controlling for a number of bank characteristics and
dynamics of the real economy. I follow the standard literature on the transmis-
sion of monetary policy and find that banks that could count on the liquidity
backstop provided by the BdE on government bonds were not reactive to changes
in the monetary policy stance; they continued to lend regardless of rate changes.
I also document the specific link between banks’ holdings of public debt and the
extent to which this affected the effectiveness of changes in the discount rate, the
main policy tool with which the BdE–according to its Statute–was expected to
manage the evolution of credit24. This confirms contemporaries’ concerns that
the 1921 Banking Law worked well as a solution for the fiscal needs of present and
future governments, as well as to increase the interaction between the BdE and
the rest of the banking sector, but that the monetization mechanism it created
would eventually reveal incompatible with exchange rate stability.
Between 1928 and 1931, with the peseta falling rapidly, the time-inconsistency
problem of the Government revealed the weakness of the discount rate of the
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BdE as a tool to control the evolution of credit. This pushed the Government
to resort to foreign exchange interventions in order to stop the fall of the peseta
(Mart´ın-Acen˜a, Mart´ınez-Ruiz, and Nogue´s-Marco, 2013). In fact, as I discuss
in Chapter 3, these interventions, which consisted in the Government first and
then the banking sector borrowing abroad at short term maturities and in gold-
convertible currencies, failed repeatedly. As a result of the debt monetization
framework institutionalized by the 1921 Banking Law, the Government imple-
mented policies to stop the depreciation with one hand, while with the other it
continued to run deficits that only contributed to fuel an ongoing bank lending
boom. This explains why, despite repeated attempts and rhetorical allusions to
an eventual return to gold convertibility, Spain was unable to stabilize the ex-
change rate during the late 1920s. Quite tellingly, in 1930, the Bank of England
sent a questionnaire to the Banco de Espan˜a in order to learn about the exchange
rate stabilization strategy that Spanish monetary authorities were pursuing. In a
section called “Currency (notes, gold and silver)”, the Bank asked25: “Is it a fact
that some kinds of Treasury Bonds change hands in the manner of bank notes?
If so, is this not a form of inflation? Can an estimate be formed of the extent
to which this is practiced? What measures would be necessary to put a stop to
the practice?”. While I have not been able to find the reply from the Banco de
Espan˜a, this chapter addresses some of these questions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides the histor-
ical background and discusses the origins and the contents of the 1921 Banking
Law. Section III shows how the money market changed following the banking
reform. Section IV describes the empirical approach; Section V discusses the data
collected and used and Section VI provides the results of the empirical estimation.
Section VII concludes.
2.2 Historical background
Due to Spain’s neutrality during the First World War, external demand for Span-
ish goods boomed as European belligerent countries reallocated resources and
demanded imports. Following the sharp improvement of its current account, the
country experienced the largest gold inflow since the years of the Spanish Em-
pire at the same time that virtually all its external debt was repatriated (Comı´n,
2012). The consequences of Spanish neutrality can be seen in the evolution of the
trade balance. Since the 1890s, Spain’s export capacity had been decreasing; the
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impact of the First World War constituted a parenthesis in this trend. After an
initial shock to Spain’s import capacity in 1914, exports expanded rapidly and
the country accumulated historically large current account surpluses as neigh-
boring belligerent countries (mainly France) concentrated their industrial efforts,
labor and capital into war-related activities (Tena, 2005). Trade surplus reached
its maximum in 1919. Then, with the end of the war came the reversal of these
dynamics. Exports started falling in 1920, to collapse in 1921; in turn, imports
boomed in 1920, as a latent demand for foreign products began to be satis-
fied. Despite imports receded after this post-war surge, trade deficits continued
throughout the 1920s (Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2: Trade balance as % of GDP, 1900-1935
Source: (Tena, 2005).
The improvements in the current account balance during the war caused a
strong appreciation of the peseta, particularly against the French Franc and the
Pound Sterling. This caused the peseta to trade above the gold-parity that was
established in 1868 (and abandoned in 1883) of 25.22 pesetas per Sterling. Fac-
ing this favourable context, the BdE embarked in large purchases of gold, thus
causing a concomitant increase in the monetary base (Mart´ınez Mendez, 2005).
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Most of the gold was purchased in US dollars, especially in 1917, the year when
the largest gold purchase took place (Figure 3.6). Since both the French Franc
and the Pound Sterling remained substantially overvalued in New York, the BdE
issued pesetas to acquire the surpluses accumulated in these currencies and used
the latter to buy undervalued gold (US dollars) in New York. This lasted until
late 1917, when the US Government started limiting gold exports (Sudria`, 1990).
By the end of that year, the gold reserve of the BdE had increased from 710
million gold-pesetas (at the 1868 parity) to 2055 million (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1985).
During the two following years, gold purchases by the BdE continued at a slower
pace but the BdE ended up holding the fourth largest gold reserve in the world
(League of Nations, 1925-37).
The end of the war caused a sharp reversal to the war-time bonanza. Along-
side the real expansion of the economy, the banking sector had also experienced
rapid growth. Banks had grown their regional networks during and after the
War, and a number of new institutions had been founded (Tortella and Palafox,
1984; Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984, 2005). On the intensive front, banks contributed to
finance the war boom by expanding their supply of financial services. On the ex-
tensive front, banks started to develop a branch network throughout the country
in order to capture new deposits and compete with the branches of the Banco de
Espan˜a, mostly for short term commercial credit (Paris Eguilaz, 1947; Velarde,
1968; Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984; Pueyo, 2006). The expansion of the banking sector
brought about a change in the composition of the money supply. As Mart´ın-
Acen˜a (1985) put it26:
“(...) as a result of this change in the composition [of the money sup-
ply] monetary authorities lost a large part of the direct control they
had over the money supply until then. If monetary authorities wanted
to regulate the money market, they had to take care not only of their
own consolidated balance sheet, but to exert a tighter control over the
evolution of the liabilities of the banking sector.”
As the following subsections show, this challenge and the need of a banking
reform were evidenced by the failure of the Banc de Barcelona in 1920. The
reaction of Spanish legislators was fast; Spanish policymakers began to discuss a
new banking law, which came into being in the last days of 1921.
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Figure 2.3: The expansion of the Banc de Barcelona, 1900-1922
Source: Anuario Garciceballos (1900-1918) and Anuario Financiero del Banco de Vizcaya (1919-1921).
2.2.1 Liquidity and solvency: the 1920 banking crisis
On the Christmas Day of 1920, after 76 years of history, the Banc de Barcelona
(BB) suspended payments. Albeit the crisis had almost no effect on the aggregate
real economy, the failure of the Banc de Barcelona became the worst financial
episode the country experienced in the first decades of the 20th Century (Betra´n,
Mart´ın-Acen˜a, and Pons, 2012). It was, and in fact is, a hotly debated episode
in the Spanish political and economic historiography27.
Unable to overcome the effects of the international post-war deflation, the
situation of the BB deteriorated rapidly and the bank became insolvent (Blasco
and Sudria`, 2016). The bank had pursued two unsustainable strategies during
the trade boom that Spain experienced between 1914 and 1919. As other banks
in Spain, the BB generated abnormal profits during the War (Figure 2.3). How-
ever, the BB pursued a much more aggressive expansion strategy. Figure 2.3a
shows the evolution of the main Spanish banks’ dividends between 1900 and 1922.
As can be seen, all banks increased their dividend payments during the boom,
but the Banc de Barcelona stands out from the rest, especially compared to its
pre-war dividend policy. In parallel, the bank cut drastically the proportions of
annual profits that were added to its reserves (Figure 2.3b).
Blasco and Sudria` (2016) documented the collapse of the bank in detail. In
the last days of December 1920, depositors ran on the bank as news about large
losses became public. The bank resorted to the BdE and the Government, and
while both were initially willing to help, the bank failed, as it had no more as-
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sets that could be offered as collateral. Relying on detailed archival evidence,
these authors show that the bank run was the consequence of the weaknesses
of the bank, rather than the cause28. During the war, the bank had extended
loans for which it accepted commodities as collateral, valued at war prices. When
the sharp recession and deflation started after the war and exporters and other
debtors started defaulting on their loans, the bank was left with highly depreci-
ated collateral.
During the expansion of business that the War brought about, some of the
bank’s managers embarked in risky lending operations with a handful of individ-
ual foreign borrowers that moved to Barcelona attracted by the boom the city
was experiencing. Moreover, the bank had invested in German Marks during
the war, in the expectation that Germany would return to its pre-war gold par-
ity once the war was over. Albeit the Mark appreciated somewhat during the
summer of 1920, it started falling rapidly again from September onwards, in a
process that culminated in the well-known German hyperinflation (Sargent, 1982;
Balderston, 1989; Eichengreen, 1992). This policy of aggressive expansion was
not followed with improvements in the management or the internal control on
lending standards. The same members of the board that had managed the bank
during the easy pre-war years were kept in managerial and executive positions,
and embarked in operations for which they did not have sufficient knowledge.
This led to an uncontrolled expansion of the bank and to excessive risk-taking.
As Blasco and Sudria` (2016) concluded, a combination of mismanagement and
excessive expansion left the bank insolvent.
The interpretation of the crisis by contemporaries was different, especially
among some members of the executive, which did not agree in that the bank
failed for insolvency issues; instead, it was considered that the bank would have
survived if it had received more assistance from the Banco de Espan˜a, or the Gov-
ernment29. Among them was Mr. Francesc Cambo´, who was appointed Minster
of Finance in August 1921. Cambo´ did not fail to acknowledged the misman-
agement problems within the bank’s organization and their role in the bank’s
failure30:
“Until the War erupted, the Banco de Barcelona was a bank sur-
rounded by an almost century-old prestige; but I must say that the
actions of the bank, even if very profitable for its shareholders, as it
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provided very good dividends, were null for trade, industry and the
public interest. (...) Lending against commodities is risky and when,
not in years or months, but in weeks commodity prices fall by more
than two or three times the most conservative predictions, a bank that
is largely invested in these operations can undergo severe distress. (...)
all large commercial banks in the world have suffered from this problem,
and if they survived (...) it’s because of the extraordinary assistance
they received from the issuing bank or the State.”
However, he still considered that the failure of the bank ought to have been
avoided by the provision of assistance from the Government and the BdE. Ac-
cordingly, he stressed the importance of improving banks’ access to a liquidity
backstop in moments of financial distress and to a more elastic currency during
normal times. Although the BdE had acted as lender of last resort before, it had
been usually at its own discretion (see Chapter 4). This discretion was, according
to Mr. Cambo´, the product of a fragmented banking system in which the central
bank was disconnected from and competed with the rest of the banking system; a
rule was needed. Accordingly, the importance of the BdE’s role as “banks’ bank”
would be stressed in the preamble of the law that was passed in 1921, and which
embodied the institutional response to the 1920 banking crisis31:
“In a credit system, the issuing bank has to be the rearguard, a very
firm position that is not subject to convulsions, keeping always the
necessary firmness to be able to assist the banks, which in turn need a
higher elasticity to be able to attend the needs and changing nature of
the nation’s economic life.”
2.2.2 The legislative reaction to the crisis and the reaction
to the new law
In October 1921, while the reasons underlying the failure of the Banc de Barcelona
were still under official investigation (this only ended in 1923), the Minister of Fi-
nance presented a project to the Parliament for a Banking Law32. A key element
of the reform was the speed at which it was passed. The Minister rushed the pass-
ing of the law arguing that the monopoly of issuing that had been granted to the
BdE would expire on the 31st of December. As I discuss below, this was highly
criticized by contemporaries as a way for the Government to ensure that the law
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could be pushed forward without a proper parliamentary debate or an external
evaluation of the actual causes of the 1920 banking crisis. Crucially, critiques
of the speed at which the law was passed also pointed out that the Government
was including a mechanism through which its public debt could be monetized
by banks, especially considering the large debt issuance that the former had to
make sure was successful (Figure 2.1). Moreover, contemporaries also acknowl-
edged the fact that the BdE could have been given a temporary extension of the
monopoly of issuing that would have allowed for a more thorough discussion of
the law.
A second key element of the reform was that it had to take into account the
interests of the Government, the Banco de Espan˜a and the banking sector at
once. The reform had to achieve the integration of the Spanish national banking
system by bringing both the BdE and the rest of the banking sector together into
one single, joint negotiation with the Government. The Minister of Finance was
convinced that in order to strengthen the Spanish banking system, interaction
between the BdE and banks had to be increased. Reflecting the overall nation-
alist approach to economic development of the period (Garc´ıa Delgado, 1985;
Florensa, 1979; Velarde, 1968), the reform also sought to protect the Spanish
banking sector from foreign competition, as claims of a foreign “invasion” dom-
inated the public discourse at the time33. As Garc´ıa Ruiz (2001) documented,
claims against an “invasion” from foreign banks were clearly exaggerated. The
rapid increase in the number of foreign bank offices in Spain between 1914 and
1920 triggered this reaction against non-Spanish financial institutions. However,
when Cambo´ presented the 1921 Banking Law project, foreign banks were al-
ready finding it difficult to expand in Spain. They were more heavily taxed than
Spanish banks–something that the 1921 Law did not change–and were excluded
from the clearinghouse system that was introduced in 1923 (Pons, 1999).
As discussed above, the timing of the parliamentary discussion of the reform
and the passing of the law was subject to strong criticisms. First, while the
monopoly of issuing was about to expire, and in theory this pushed for a fast
reform, it was very unlikely that the BdE would not see its charter renewed. The
monopoly of issuing had been in place since 1874, and the BdE had extended
the use of the paper, inconvertible peseta and financial services across the Span-
ish territory since the last years of the 19th century (Tortella, 1970; Castan˜eda,
2001). Thinking about a national monetary authority that could perform the
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same duties without causing the collapse of the payments system was not an op-
tion. While the Minister argued that this reduced his scope for real negotiation
in one of the crucial points at the time–the profits of the BdE–contemporaries
argued that there was an easy solution for that; the Government just had to issue
a Decree to extend the monopoly of issuing until the law was discussed in full.
The Minister of Finance responded that there was no room for action34.
The Minister went on to discuss other challenges he faced. Mr. Cambo´ high-
lighted that the expiration of the monopoly of issuing opened the door to reform
the BdE but that banks would only accept to be regulated if the BdE was re-
formed first. The question raised by the Minister, then, was how to induce two
so-far competing actors to cooperate. The argument was that banks had grown
so disconnected from the BdE, under a spirit of “exaggerated individualism” and
“anarchy” that they would only accept to be brought under a common regula-
tory framework if a compensation was provided. Pushing this argument, Cambo´
sought to reform the whole banking system at once35:
“(...) the Banco [de Espan˜a] will only accept the impositions to its
structure and its habits enforced by law if they are conducive to an im-
provement and modernization of the current situation when the Par-
liament will have full sovereignty to decide over the extension of the
privilege of holding the monopoly of issuing. (...) Regarding private
banks (...) the only way to bring them under new regulation without
affecting their habits, is to offer them a compensation, and this can
only be provided after the structure of the BdE is reformed, and for
this, the right moment is given by the expiration of the monopoly of
issuing.”
To be sure, the compensation that would be given to banks for “inducing”
them to hold public debt and to park it with the BdE could not come from an
erosion in the profits of the BdE; new regulation had to take into account the
BdE’s ability to keep paying stable dividends to its shareholders36:
“Putting in place a regime that prevents the hopes of the Banco’s share-
holders from keeping their dividends (...) apart from causing distor-
tions in public credit, it would have had all the characteristics of a
pillage (...) I should make it clear that this law draft does not reflect
my ideas or my convictions; it is an adaptation of the latter to the
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reality on which I had to act and on which the Spanish Parliament has
to decide.”
Another pressing issue was how to manage currency issuing in a regime of
gold-inconvertible currency. The law would keep the total amount of pesetas in
circulation within limits established by metallic reserves at the BdE and, for the
uncovered issuing, within a quantitative ceiling that would be increased only after
an ad hoc negotiation between the Government and the BdE. This option was
preferred over a fixed proportionality rule between metallic reserves and notes,
because it would grant the Government the chance to negotiate the terms of the
rule with the Banco when notes reached the limit (in case this happened before
1946, when the new monopoly expired)37.
Finally, and crucially, the Minister addressed the future of the exchange rate
of the peseta. A return to the Gold Standard had been discarded during the
War, when the Spanish currency was trading above the 1868 parity. By the end
of 1918, the peseta traded at 20 pesetas per Sterling, a 25% above the 1868 parity.
However, as the Spanish trade boom came to an end, the peseta started falling
again, and by the time the law was being discussed, the peseta was again trading
around 10% below the 1868 parity. In sight of this, and not inclined to im-
pose more deflation to the Spanish economy, the Minister anticipated that Spain
would be operating a gold-inconvertible currency during the following years. The
fact that Spain was not going to join the Gold Standard in the very short run,
however, did not exempt the country from seeking a stable currency (and from
actually committing to establish gold convertibility as late as in 1930, as I docu-
ment in Chapter 3).38 The country should have a strategy to maintain exchange
rate stability39:
“Two factors affect the external value of a currency. The trade balance
is one (...) Internally, when fiduciary inflation happens, when paper
money is created, (...) because of the law of supply and demand, the
currency depreciates internally and externally. From the two causes,
the first can not be solved by this Law. (...) The second, however, can
be fixed by avoiding fiduciary inflation. And the one that can prevent
this is the one that causes it, and it is always the State.”
The Minister of Finance was aware that the virtue of the law that was being
discussed hinged on the way it dealt with the fiscal needs of future governments40.
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Expanding fiscal expenditures without a concomitant increase in revenue would
increase the likelihood that the BdE was induced to monetize some of the debt,
inevitably contributing to the depreciation of the peseta. The Minister went on
to discuss how exchange rate stability could be achieved:
“There are two weapons to influence the external value of a currency,
to be able to control the exchange rate. One is a good discount pol-
icy. The discounts of the issuing bank end up conditioning the interest
rates in the country. It is evident that an increase in the discount
rate can keep the depreciation of the currency. (...) This law does not
deal with discount policy directly, but indirectly it has been understood
that everything that could be done has been done, in order to ensure
that the discount will be determined in Spain, responding only to the
interests of the Spanish economy. [In reference to a second weapon],
using gold to defend the depreciation of the currency is something that
had to be done with extreme prudence. When a country does not have
in fiduciary inflation the fundamental cause of the depreciation and
its trade balance is only temporarily in disequilibrium, moving gold
can help stabilize the currency; but when the causes of the deprecia-
tion are the permanent deficits on its trade balance, using gold can be
catastrophic.”
To be able to deal with an eventual depreciation of the peseta, monetary au-
thorities would have to be ready to use interest rates, as this was though to be
the most effective tool against exchange rate depreciation. The Law, as Cambo´
acknowledged, had a weakness in that the the discount rate was expected to be
the main “weapon” against exchange rate depreciation, but at the same time,
it failed to establish any specific rule that linked discount (rate) policy with ex-
change rate stability. While this was indeed a weakness of the Law, because it
did not place responsibility about exchange rate stability neither with the Gov-
ernment nor with the BdE, this was not the main weakness. More importantly,
changes in the BdE rates would only work to curb an eventual depreciation of
the peseta if they could have an effect on the supply of credit. However, this
transmission channel could not be at work if banks could monetize government
deficits with the BdE. Unsurprisingly, when this link between BdE rates and the
exchange rate was needed from 1928 onwards, it revealed as extremely weak.
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2.2.3 The 1921 Banking Law
The final version of the law was passed on 29 December 1921, two days before
the monopoly of issuing expired. The Law had two parts. The first dealt with
the Banco de Espan˜a, while the second dealt with the rest of the banking system
through the creation of the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB), a regulatory body
to which banks could voluntarily choose to adhere.
The Banco de Espan˜a
The law dealt with a number of questions regarding the BdE. Here I discuss
Sections 7 and 8 of Article 1, which are the most relevant for the argument.
Section 7 dealt with the eventual need to intervene in foreign exchange markets
to stabilize the peseta. This section contemplated, not a systematic interven-
tion in foreign exchange markets to stabilize the peseta, but rather an eventual
need to intervene. Therefore, the law did not include any commitment from the
BdE or the Government to control exchange rate fluctuations. Instead, it was
stated that if the foreign exchange situation required a stabilization intervention,
the initiative would have to be taken by the Government. If the BdE agreed in
the stabilization plans suggested by the Government, then the former could con-
tribute to these plans with its own resources (its gold reserve). The intervention
would be financed 50% by the Government and 50% by the BdE, and so would
be any profits or losses resulting from the interventions41. On the one hand, the
BdE held the fourth largest gold reserve in the world at the time, which made
it the institution that was better equipped to defend the exchange rate. On the
other, the law made it clear that only if the BdE agreed with the Government
it could be then asked for intervention. This shows the bargaining power of the
BdE during the negotiation of the law. With this clause, the BdE managed to
avoid having to internalize the eventual costs of a time inconsistency problem,
namely that a future government could pursue a too expansionary fiscal policy
funded by issuing debt causing the peseta to fall, and then forcing the BdE to use
its gold reserve to defend the exchange rate. If government debt followed a path
that the BdE considered inconsistent with exchange rate stability (as happened
in the second half of the 1920s), the latter could just decline any proposition for a
stabilization plan.42 However, no specific metric was defined; neither on what was
considered exchange rate stability nor on how much fiscal deficit was acceptable.
In practice, therefore, exchange rate management fell into a legal void in which
no specific institution was given a specific mandate about it.
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Section 8 introduced a reduction in the Discount and Lombard rates that CSB
member banks would enjoy when accessing the discount window of the BdE43. Al-
though a reduction on the discount rate had been contemplated by a law drafted
in 1918, this was optional for the BdE and it was not introduced as compulsory
until the 1921 Banking Law44. An important nuance of Section 8 was that, while
the decision to rediscount a bill of exchange was ultimately at the discretion of
the BdE45, the latter could not reject CSB member banks’ operations using pub-
lic debt as collateral. This implied that, once the Law was passed the BdE had
to be ready to interact with all CSB members, at least, through advances against
public debt, while its portfolio of discounters of bills of exchange remained vir-
tually unchanged46. The Government also introduced the obligation for banks to
hold at least 20% of the public debt they subscribed on their balance sheets, thus
directly introducing an element of financial repression in the negotiation (Sabate´
et al., 2006).
The discount rate charged to CSB members was reduced by 1.0% vis-a`-vis
other private clients, unless the official rate was below 5.0%, in which case the
reduction was of 0.2% (the official rate never fell below 5.0% so the reduction
was always 1.0%). This sought to progressively withdraw the BdE from private
discounting by providing the public an incentive to discount bills with banks.
Advances against public debt were also granted a reduction. This one, however,
was not constant and predetermined. The Law opened the possibility for differ-
ent Lombard rates applying to different types of Government bonds (and also
to private stocks). The Lombard rate on Government bonds could be decided
between the BdE, the CSB and the Minister of Finance whenever new issuances
of public debt took place. This meant that while there was a “normal times” rate
for advances against public debt, in the event that the Government was in need
of issuing more debt than the market was willing to take, it could avoid paying
higher yields by setting a specific lower rate for advances. Importantly, this type
of operation differed from modern-day repurchase operations (repo) in that the
bank in question did not sell the bonds to the BdE, as the latter was forbidden to
buy them both in the primary and the secondary market. Instead, banks pledged
the asset as collateral, which meant that, while the asset was with the BdE and
a given bank had obtained liquidity to create deposits and loans, the yield from
the asset pledged continued to accrue to the bank. In a way, this scheme resem-
bled the recent Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) introduced by the
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European Central Bank, in which the latter did not buy public bonds, but lent to
banks at low rates against public debt as collateral. This specific part of Section
8 was highly controversial, as it was an essential part of the time-inconsistency
problem the Government was incurring into. In sum, the rate at which CSB
banks could monetize their public debt holdings at the BdE was already below
the yield to maturity (YTM) of that public debt but, in addition, this rate could
be further lowered for specific issuances if the Government needed to do so.
Three weeks before the Law was passed, a group of parliamentarians presented
a proposal to amend Section 8, focusing precisely on the Government’s right to
change the Lombard rate for specific issuances of public debt depending on its
fiscal needs47. The proposed amendment sought to limit the Government’s ability
to set specific rates for specific bond issuances, by removing from the text of the
Law the clause that allowed the Government to negotiate these specific rates at
its convenience with the banking sector and the BdE48. Despite the Minister of
Finance was aware of the potential problems associated to the special treatment
of public debt, the proposal of amendment was dismissed in the final text49. In-
stead, an additional line was kept in the text: a specific Lombard rate for new
issuances of public debt could be renegotiated between banks (CSB), the BdE
and the Government at any given moment.
The result of the Law in terms of interest rates and spreads is presented in
Figure 2.4. Throughout the period the Lombard Rate was below the YTM of
Government bonds. The figure shows different types of bonds, an average in-
dex of YTMs and the main rates of the BdE, the Discount Rate for bills, the
Lombard rate for public debt, and a specific rate set for gold bonds in 1930. In
addition, Figure 2.5 shows the spread between the YTM of government bonds
and the Lombard rate for CSB members and non-members; that is, for those
that had open access to the monetization of government bonds with the BdE and
those who did not. The difference is clear; until late 1930, CSB banks enjoyed a
positive spread, while non-members, in case they wanted to access the discount
window of the BdE using public debt and the latter was willing to lend to them,
would experience the inverse conditions than CSB members. This explains why
non-members did not access the lending facilities of the BdE. Although there is
no direct evidence, it is very likely that CSB members arbitraged out this differ-
ential access to the lending facilities of the BdE by lending to non-members at
lower rates than the “shadow rates” the latter would have been charged at the
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de Consejo del Banco de Espan˜a.
Table 2.2 shows the relative amounts of each type of government bond pledged
at the BdE for a representative quarter in which concerns over the depreciation of
the peseta were at their highest but during which banks were not under liquidity
pressure from depositors and were extending loans (1931q1). The largest part of
bank access to the discount window of the BdE through advances was done by
pledging 5% government bonds. This is true for the whole period displayed in
Figure 2.4. From 1930, however, there was also strong use of 6% gold bonds, pre-
cisely because the Government had set a specific (lower) Lombard rate for them.
While I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3, a brief explanation is due. Albeit
they constitute a a unique case, gold bonds were the most notorious example of
the scheme described above. In January 1930, in a last attempt to stop the fall of
the peseta, the Government issued 350 million pesetas in gold bonds. These were
issued at a yield of 6%, they carried taxation exemptions and were paid in gold or
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Figure 2.5: Spread between yield-to-maturity of public debt and Lombard rate,
CSB members and non-members (1922q4-1934q4)
Source: own calculations using Mart´ınez Mendez (2005).
gold-convertible currencies. More importantly. banks holding these bonds could
pledge them at the BdE at a Lombard rate of 4% which had been specifically set
for these bonds. Although the case of gold bonds was unique, it shows how the
problem that contemporaries had highlighted during the discussion of the Law
in 1921 did materialize, precisely when the conflict between government finance
and exchange rate stability was at its highest. With one hand, the Government
borrowed from banks to stabilize the peseta. With the other banks could use new
issuances of Government bonds to borrow from the BdE and keep lending.
The banks
Article 2 of the 1921 Banking Law created a new institutional and regulatory
framework for banks: the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB) (Supreme Banking
Council). Banks could voluntarily join the CSB. For this, they had to comply with
liquidity and capital ratios. Banks also had to comply with upper limits in inter-
est paid to depositors as well as commit to not discount bills in the market below
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Nominal yield % of advances
3% Public Debt 2.4%
4% Public Debt 1.9%
4% Railways Debt 11.4%
5% Public Debt 68.0%
6% Gold Bonds 16.3%
Table 2.2: Share of different types of Government bonds used as collateral by
banks at the discount window of the BdE (1931q1)
Source: Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a for amounts pledged.
the BdE discount rates. The goal of the CSB was to create a uniform regulatory
criteria for banking, so banks would be under the same discipline, and situations
like the one the Banc de Barcelona underwent in 1920 would be avoided in the
future. According to the Minister of Finance, the intention of turning the BdE
into a “bank’s bank” and withdrawing it from the retail business was inspired by
the Banque de France, albeit this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the
Banque kept a substantial commercial business until well after WWII. In prac-
tice, the establishment of the CSB as a group of banks that, subject to a certain
regulation were granted with access to the discount window of the central bank,
was more reminiscent of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act (Meltzer, 2003; Mitchener
and Richardson, 2013; Calomiris, Jaremski, Park, and Richardson, 2015).
Minimum liquidity and capital ratios were decided by the CSB, and were re-
markably lax50. As Artola-Blanco (2016) highlighted, the liquidity rule was never
officially published, so it is very likely that it was never enforced; bank-level ev-
idence suggests that it was, at best, meaningless. The liquidity rule asked CSB
banks to maintain a proportion of two-thirds between their short term liquid as-
sets (activo realizable) and their short term liabilities (pasivo exigible). Liquid
assets, under the CSB definition, included: cash and deposits at the BdE, foreign
exchange in cash, interbank loans, 3-month bills of exchange, public debt (at 90%
of their value), stocks (at 80% of their value), collateralized loans, call loans and
loans in foreign exchange51. In short, everything except long term (uncollater-
alized) loans was included in the liquidity ratio. In turn, short term liabilities
included: sight deposits (current accounts), deposits in foreign exchange, inter-
bank deposits and the share of time deposits that could be withdrawn with a less
than eight day notice. Minimum capital ratios were also defined52. Disbursed
capital, reserves and 50% of the non disbursed capital had to add up to no less
than 10% of banks’ deposits. If, for exceptional circumstances, banks exceeded
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the liquidity and capitalisation limits, they had to submit the case to the CSB
for evaluation, which would consider if a penalty applied.
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the liquidity ratios established by the CSB
for member, non-member and foreign banks compared to the minimum limit (in-
dicated by the horizontal line at 2/3). Given the laxity of the liquidity rule, it is
not surprising that both CSB members and non members held similar ratios (Fig-
ures 2.6a and 2.6b). Foreign banks presented a different picture, mostly driven
by their higher proportion of deposits in foreign exchange with respect to the
other two types of short term liabilities computed in the ratio (sight deposits,
interbank deposits and less than 8-day deposits) (Figure 2.6c). While Spanish
banks held, on average, less than 10% of deposits in foreign currency around the
moment when the 1921 Banking Law was passed, foreign banks held more than
30%. However, even taking this into account, foreign banks were also comfortably
above the minimum liquidity requirement. Figure 2.6 suggests, therefore, that
the regulatory requirements for banks did not seem to involve a strong readjust-
ment of their portfolio.
A similar picture emerges when comparing banks’ capital ratios. Given the
data at hand, which does not allow for distinguishing between disbursed and
non-disbursed capital, it is not possible to calculate the CSB capital ratios for all
banks. However, an approximation can be done by comparing a standard capital
ratio, which includes capital and reserves as a percentage of total assets (Figure
2.7). Again, there seems to be no positive relation between CSB membership
and capital ratios. Rather the contrary, non members held higher capital ratios
than CSB members (Figures 2.7a and 2.7b). Although CSB members had very
high capital ratios–on the vicinity of 30% of assets–compared to other countries53,
the difference between both groups makes sense if we consider that non-members
had no access to the facilities that the 1921 Banking Law established for member
banks when accessing the discount window of the BdE and the fact that they
were, on average, much smaller banks54.
In exchange for these liquidity and solvency rules, banks that joined the CSB
would be granted with two benefits. First, they could rediscount bills of exchange
with the BdE at 1.0% lower than the official rate, provided that the BdE would
consider them eligible. Interestingly, and in order to ensure banks would have an
incentive to rediscount their bills with the BdE, the new regulation also estab-
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Figure 2.6: Liquidity ratios established by the CSB, 1922-1934
Note: for details on the ratio, see text. Line is unweighted average with 95% confidence intervals. Source:
Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
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Figure 2.7: Capital ratios, 1922-1934
Note: for details on the calculation of the ratio see text. Line is unweighted average with 95% confidence
intervals. Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
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lished that banks could not discount bills to firms and individuals below the BdE
official rate55. This restriction contributed, to a large extent, to isolate the BdE’s
profits from competition. Second, all CSB banks could obtain advances from
the BdE by pledging public debt. As stressed above, the important part of this
second element was that, while the BdE still held some discretionary room for
eligibility when rediscounting bills (some of the largest and most widely branched
commercial banks in Spain did very rarely rediscount a bill with the BdE and
the latter never rediscounted a bill to non-CSB members), it was obliged to grant
CSB banks with advances against public debt insofar as they abode by the liq-
uidity and capital ratios. Unsurprisingly, the result of this asymmetric discount
window lending policy is reflected in banks’ portfolio composition: CSB members
held larger portfolios of public debt than non-members (Figures 2.8a and 2.8b).
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Figure 2.8: Public debt as % of securities portfolio
Note: line is unweighted average with 95% confidence intervals. Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Ban-
cario.
2.2.4 Contemporary critiques to the 1921 Banking Law
During the two months in which the law was discussed in the Parliament, mem-
bers of the opposition criticized the Minister of Finance for having rushed the
reform in order to ensure that the Treasury would find a way to finance its deficits,
even if this was through indirect monetization. More precisely, the critique re-
volved around the incompatibility of the Law with controlling the fluctuations
of the peseta. The day after the aforementioned amendment to Section 8 was
presented, its proponent, Mr. Gregorio Balparda56, lamented that the Minister
had disregarded his proposition to amend the law, and stressed that this would
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leave Spanish monetary institutions unable to stabilize the exchange rate when
needed57:
“ (...) this law has turned out to be a project in order to facilitate
the operations of the Treasury (...) and Mr. Cambo´ knows that the
increase in the amounts in circulation cause the increase in the value
of all things, raise prices, increase banks’ current accounts (...) In
sum, the Banking Law is an extraordinary danger, an obvious peril to
the national economy; its consequences will be the the fall of the peseta
(...) and economic and monetary disorder. With respect to the banks,
it will not regulate them, but will enthrone the financial oligarchy.”
Similarly, Mr. Juan Alvarado, former Minister of Finance during 1909 and 1910
summarized the critique58:
“(...) from the two main functions that issuing banks have as providers
of credit and regulators of circulation, the Banco de Espan˜a will just
be able to conduct the first, because given the structure of the Law,
there are excessive facilities to an unconsidered increase in fiduciary
circulation. (...) Another important question that demonstrates that
we will move towards excessive increases in circulation is the composi-
tion of the Board of the Banco. All the new members that are brought
to the Board are interested in increasing credit; they are interested in
issuing more and more notes; there is none with a contrary interest;
they will all try to get as much credit as possible for those who they
represent (...).”
Mr. Alvarado went on to criticise the speed at which the Law was being
pushed for debate59:
“What will happen if on the 31 of December the Senate has not ap-
proved the Banking Law? Is the Minister scared that the Banco de
Espan˜a will not be willing to continue to hold the monopoly of issuing
and rediscount? Forget about this, because there is nothing to fear.
With a Decree from the Minister of Finance that extends the current
law for a month or two, the Banco will continue to enjoy the great
benefits it enjoys today. Nothing will happen. But what could cause
great damage is that the law is passed too fast, without deep study and
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giving the country the impression that we are not dealing properly with
such a crucial issue as the Banking Law.”
Criticism did not remain in the Parliamentary domain. Contemporary economists
also argued that the Banking Law perpetuated a system in which monetary au-
thorities would lose control over the evolution of credit and, subsequently, on
the exchange rate. In a book published right after the Law was passed, Paret
(1921) criticized the ties between the Government and the BdE, which were now
protected by the Section 8 of the Banking Law60:
“(...) only with the complete independence from politics it [the BdE]
can provide the services that such an institution ought to provide. The
area in which this freedom needs to be more clear is in the determina-
tion of interest and discount rates (...) The Lombard rate should not be
arbitrary, because fatal consequences for the country can derive from
its level. In Spain, from the imposition of Ministries of Finance, and
not rejected by the BdE, the Lombard rate has almost constantly been
below–sometimes much below–the net yield of public debt, (...) this has
encouraged speculation and has created a false easiness for the State to
issue debt, giving the profane public the feeling that money was abun-
dant, and freeing Ministries of Finance from having to worry about
finding alternative ways to finance the deficits. Such a regime can not
continue if Spain wants to stop being a country that is constantly ex-
posed to monetary and exchange rate perturbations. (...) This policy
causes tremendous damage on the exchange rate.”
The law was also strongly criticised by Luis Olariaga, who by 1928 would find
himself in charge of foreign exchange interventions to defend the peseta. In 1946,
when discussing the monetary situation of the 1920s and 30s, Olariaga recognized
that the 1921 Banking Law had failed to make the needed reforms to the Spanish
monetary system. It is interesting to see how, writing in 1946, Olariaga com-
pletely dismissed the role of fiscal matters in the evolution of the peseta during
the 1920s. Instead, Olariaga seemed to stress the reduction of discount rate to
banks, but completely neglected the importance of public debt in banks’ access
to the discount window61:
“The 1921 Banking Law (...) should have normalized the structure and
functioning of our issuing bank and put it in line with the standard of
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the banks of its kind. It failed to do so. (...) There was a lot of
debate on turning the Banco into a bank of banks, and a reduction
in the discount rate charged to banks was introduced, but everything
was pure theory compared to the actual goal, and the effects of these
reductions did not, and could not, discipline the Banco as the issuing
institution.”
Recent research has also pointed to the conflict between fiscal and mone-
tary policy. In line with the detailed description of this regime provided by
Pedro´s Abello´ (1978), quantitatively-focused work has approached the study of
this framework from an aggregate perspective. Using annual data for macroeco-
nomic and monetary aggregates and implementing time-series analysis, Sabate´
et al. (2006) and Sabate´ et al. (2015) concluded that this implied an “indirect
monetization” of public debt, and found evidence that put Spain into a regime
of fiscal dominance, in which, in line with the fiscal theory of the price level,
monetary policy ended up being determined ex-ante by fiscal deficits. Their view
is not far from Mart´ınez-Ruiz and Nogue´s-Marco (2017) argument that conflict-
ing interests made it difficult for monetary authorities to fight the depreciation
of the peseta and join the Gold Standard already before 1914. However, the
crucial role of banks has not been yet addressed empirically. This is important
because, through their creation of money, banks are the necessary channel for
this indirect monetization scheme to take place62. In order to contribute to fill
this gap, I now turn to analyse the effects of the 1921 Banking Law in the bal-
ance sheet of the Banco de Espan˜a, the banking system and in the money market.
2.3 The impact of the 1921 Banking Law in the
money market
As a result of the regulatory changes that took place after the fall of the Banc
de Barcelona, the Spanish money market experienced some important changes,
which made Spain diverge from the common practice in Europe. First, as a re-
sponse to the 1921 Banking Law, the composition of the balance sheet of the BdE
changed. A new set of counterparties needed a new lending policy. In parallel,
eligibility criteria for collateral at the discount window of the BdE also changed.
Before the War, the BdE used to intervene in money markets through stand-
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ing facility purchases of bills of exchange (i.e. rediscounting), as did most central
banks at the time (Table 2.3). Spanish banks (as well as bankers and non-bank
firms) accessed the discount window of the BdE using up-to-90-day bills which
were either accepted by domestic banks or by international banks. Lombard op-
erations (or advances) were much less used. A follower of the real bills doctrine,
the BdE had been historically concerned that lending against collateral in op-
erations that did not involve a real transaction of produced goods conduced to
an excessive increase in credit. Moreover, the BdE had also been concerned that
these operations opened the room for a larger number of counterparties for which
there might not be a credit history readily available at the BdE’s credit lists.
Although these operations had historically yielded more to the BdE, as the Lom-
bard rate had been traditionally higher than the discount rate (before the CSB
reduction was put in place), the problem was more that these operations might
not represent a self-liquidating commercial transaction. Also, these operations
could involve a larger pool of borrowers whose use of liquidity provided might
be opaque. Therefore, the evaluation counterparty emerged as a problem. In its
“1896 Regulation for Branches”, the BdE warned to63:
“(...) not give these operations [advances] great latitude, circumscrib-
ing them to cases that are undoubtedly far from any suspicion of a
fradulent origin of the assets pledged (...). The Executive Board should
reject all operations that are not presented by a person of notorious
morality (...).”
The quote above suggests that, by the late 19th century, the true collateral
involved in these operations was, in fact, “borrowers morality”. By 1916, the BdE
had become already less conservative about advancing credit against collateral.
Its “1916 Regulation for Branches” reads64:
“These operations [advances] will be given the latitude that specific
conditions in each branch location determines.”
By 1932, the BdE had become much more keen to advance credit against
collateral65:
“[Advances] provide, in general, either in the form of loans or short
term credit accounts, the basis for positive profits, meaning that they
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should be given all the extension and amplitude compatible with the
interests of the Banco; for this, the solvency of the borrowers should
always be taken into account, as well as an estimation of the market
value of the collateral pledged.”
By the 1930s, the initial criteria of “borrowers’ morality” was complemented
by a more objective one, the market value of the pledged asset. During the 35
years that separate the first and the last quotes that refer to the exact same
banking operation, the BdE stopped distrusting the “non-commercial” nature of
the advance operation itself, but highlighted counterparty risk, as the pool of
borrowers widened. In fact, the 1921 Banking Law tackled the counterparty risk
problem by introducing CSB membership; as explained above, the latter acted as
a guarantee that member banks abode by the same liquidity rules and minimum
capital ratios.
1921 Banking Law
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Figure 2.9: Changes in the balance sheet of the BdE (ratio of advances to dis-
counts)
Source: own calculations, using (Mart´ınez Mendez, 2005).
Once the 1921 Banking Law granted direct access to liquidity from the BdE
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to all CSB members, the former had to change its lending policy. Figure 2.9
shows the ratio between the BdE’s holding of advances and discounts in its bal-
ance sheet. Right after the law was passed in December 1921, the composition
of the balance sheet of the BdE changed. Consistent with the BdE’s attitude
towards advances reflected in the quotes above, before the enactment of the 1921
Banking Law, the BdE interacted with its counterparties mostly by the outright
purchase of bills of exchange; the ratio between advances and discounts was never
above one66. After the law was passed, and given the new pool of actors, the BdE
started to interact with CSB banks mostly by lending against collateral through
advances. In turn, from December 1921, banks started to borrow from the BdE
using public debt as collateral.
Ratio Advances/Discounts Public debt/portfolio
Country 1880 1909 1928 1880 1909 1928
Austria 0.2 0.1 0.1 14% 2% 8%
Belgium 0.0 0.1 0.0 10% 9% 16%
Britain 0.9 0.6 1.0 38% 31% 60%
France 0.2 0.6 0.6 8% 6% 4%
Germany 0.2 0.3 0.1 4% 2% 1%
Italy 0.3 0.3 0.5 12% 19% 18%
Netherlands 0.9 1.1 0.9 0% 0% 0%
Norway 0.0 0.8 0% 0% 0%
Switzerland 0.1 0.4 0% 0%
Denmark 2.2 2% 0%
Finland 0.4 0.1 1% 16%
Bulgaria 3.5 1.7 45% 70%
Greece 5.2 1.0 50% 97%
Latvia 0.5 4%
Portugal 0.3 0.2 76% 84%
Poland 0.1 10%
Romania 0.4 0.6 13% 44%
Sweden 0.1 0.4 0% 1%
Czechoslovakia 0.7 90%
Yugoslavia 3.0 0.2 71%
Spain 0.8 0.5 2.5 61% 38% 6%
Table 2.3: Central banks’ portfolio composition, 1880-1928
Source: Jobst and Ugolini (2016) for data from Austria to Switzerland (the figure for Britain is the average
ratio for 1875-1885, as advances behave abnormally during some years and cause ratios that do not reflect the
common practice of the Bank of England at the time). League of Nations (1925-37) for data from Denmark to
Yugoslavia (1913 instead of 1909). Mart´ınez Mendez (2005) for Spain (data is for 1900 instead of 1882).
When the Spanish peseta started to fall from 1928, the Government com-
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missioned a study about an eventual return to the Gold Standard to a group of
economists led by one of the most reputed economists of the time, Antonio Flores
de Lemus (the so-called Comisio´n del Patro´n Oro). The Comisio´n reported on
the “indirect monetization” problem. A look at Table 2.3 illustrates the problem
highlighted by the Comisio´n: by 1928 the BdE had the highest ratio of Advances
to Discounts in its portfolio, while at the same time had the lowest percentage
of public debt compared to most European countries at the time. The main rea-
son why this figure was so low had to do with the way the 1921 Banking Law
outsourced the monetization of public debt to the banking sector. This situation
was clearly explained in the report the Comisio´n issued in 192967:
“(...) Nowadays, the debts of the State are not a burden to the Banco
[BdE], instead, the State places the bondholder [the CSB bank partic-
ipating in the primary market] between the Treasury and the Banco.
Discount policy is managed in such a way that the bondholder finds an
immediate and direct profit in subscribing the bonds, as it can borrow
from the Banco. The creation of credit is then in favour of the bond-
holder; the Banco’s balance sheet is not inflated with public debt; now
it is private instead of public debt, what fills the gap that in previous
times was filled by the debts of the Treasury.”
The Comisio´n went on to warn about the impossibility of embarking into a
successful exchange rate stabilization without addressing the time-inconsistency
faced by fiscal authorities68:
“Our Banking Law clearly states that the State intervenes in the deter-
mination of the discount rate and the rate charged on advances against
public debt. (...) it is a condition to the stabilization of our exchange
rate that the production of public debt ceases (...).”
Changes in the composition of the BdE’s balance sheet did also bring about
changes in its profit structure. Figure 2.10 shows the evolution of the Banco’s
profits by the type of operation and the ratio between profits from discounts and
advances. Again, the main change came right after the 1921 Banking Law was
passed. From 1921 onwards, no less than 50% of the Banco’s profits came from
advanced credit against public debt. As the rest of banks expanded their branch
network and started competing with the BdE, its profits from discount operations
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fell. This was not caused by a contraction in economic activity, as banks con-
tinued to expand their bill portfolio during the same years (Figure 2.11). While
this explains the sharp increase in the ratio between profits from advances and
discounts, it also reveals that banks’ use of the new advance facility allowed the
BdE to achieve a substantial increase in profits. More importantly, it also shows
that after a relative decline in overall profits after 1926, these started increasing
strongly again in parallel to the fall of the peseta.
Figure 2.10: Composition of BdE’s profits (1900-1935)
Source: Memorias de las Sucursales del Banco de Espan˜a.
During the second half of 1927, banks started expanding their loan portfolios.
To fund the expansion banks relied on two sources. First, and thanks to the ex-
tension of their branch network, they kept receiving retail deposits. Importantly,
this increase in deposits was not driven by deposits in foreign exchange, as these
had been decreasing steadily since the early 1920s (Figure 3.5). Second, and
more importantly, during the last quarter of 1927, banks’ holdings of public debt
started increasing much faster than their holdings of commercial bills (Figure
2.11). This was facilitated by the debt conversion that took place in 1927-1928
(Figure 2.12). In the first months of 1927, the Government started the conver-
sion of 5225 million pesetas from short-term floating debt into long term 5%
redeemable bonds; by the end of the year, the conversion had been successfully
completed, with banks ending up holding most of the newly issued consolidated
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bonds (Mart´ın-Acen˜a and Comı´n, 1984; Comı´n, 2012). The conditions of the
conversion explain why banks engaged in this conversion strongly, taking into
account how this debt could then be monetized at the BdE. They were offered
two options: either a conversion to 85.5% of par, or at 98% with fiscal exemption
of the prevailing 20% tax on public debt interest earnings (Comı´n, 1988; Pan-
Montojo, 2014). Both cases represented an attractive option for banks, given
that this increased their ability to borrow from the BdE and that, by that time,
the Lombard rate for these bonds was at 4% (Figure 2.4).
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Just as the depreciation of the peseta started to become the main concern of
the Government from early 1928, the framework that the 1921 Banking Law had
put in place revealed its pro-cyclical nature. In a scenario of fiscal and current
account deficits and the tightening of international financial markets, the Gov-
ernment needed to issue new debt to fund its attempts to stabilize the exchange
rate. The strategy, however, was always going to be self-defeating had it not been
coupled with a an improvement on fiscal accounts (Figure 2.12). To make sure
that this debt would be absorbed by the banking system, it had to pay higher
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Figure 2.12: Public debt in circulation (1922-1935)
Note: debt is in million pesetas. Source: Comı´n and Diaz (2005b).
yields. Banks would subscribe the debt as long as it was possible for them to use
it at the discount window of the BdE. Finally, while the BdE warned against the
link between new issuances of debt and the depreciation of the peseta, the 1921
Banking Law had discharged it from any direct responsibility over the evolution
of the exchange rate. In addition, CSB membership granted banks with access
the BdE’s Lombard facility with the only requirement that they pledged public
debt. The BdE could not deny CSB banks’ these kind of operations. Therefore,
as long as the amount of pesetas in circulation was below its legal maximum, the
BdE could not impose any binding limit on CSB banks’ demand for liquidity if
they held public debt. Because of that, and with its profits increasing as banks
made use of the BdE’s Lombard facility during the boom, the latter had not only
little scope, but also little incentive to stop the lending boom. In sum, from 1928,
the depreciation of the peseta became impossible to stop by domestic means.
As the peseta kept falling, the Minister of Finance of the Dictatorship em-
barked into increasingly costly stabilization policies69. One after another, these
policies failed. Unable to stop the expansion of lending and growing pressure on
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the balance of payments–as current account deficits kept mounting–the Minister
finally embarked into what was going to be the last and definitive stabilization
plan: the issuance of gold bonds in the last days of 1929 and the first days of 1930.
As a last attempt to stabilize the peseta, which had been falling since mid-1928,
the Minister of Finance of the Dictatorship, Mr. Jose Calvo-Sotelo, issued 350
million pesetas in 10 year gold bonds. Gold bonds were very attractive for sub-
scribers: they were issued at 6% and in virtue of the 1921 Banking Law, they were
eligible as collateral at the discount window of the BdE at a cheaper rate that
had been established ad hoc for this specific issuance (4.0%). These bonds also
carried taxation exemptions. Given the conditions of the bond issuance, Spanish
banks subscribed all the bonds that the Government had earmarked for them.
However, Spanish banks didn’t hold any gold themselves, and they held almost
no foreign exchange in cash. The bonds had to be subscribed in gold (either coin,
bullion or gold-convertible currencies), so in order to subscribe the gold bonds,
banks borrowed abroad70. Banks did so by embarking into short-term forward
contracts in London (so-called “dobles” in Spain) by which they sold spot pesetas
against Sterling, and repurchased them at a term no longer than three months.
In doing so, banks ended up with large currency mismatches in their balance
sheets. In fact, the issuance of gold bonds did nothing but to transfer currency
mismatches from the Government to the banking system (and the public). As
the peseta kept falling, banks’ currency mismatches mounted, and banks needed
more pesetas to roll over their forward operations in Sterling (Figure 3.5).
Attempts by the Government to stabilize the peseta also failed because they
involved issuing more public debt, since the BdE had been freed from the defense
of the exchange rate by the 1921 Banking Law. The Government’s repeatedly
failed attempts to stabilize the peseta were accompanied by the issuance of new
debt that had to pay higher and higher yields. This was not only the case with
gold bonds. All new issuances of public debt were done at rates above the Lom-
bard rate (Mart´ınez Mendez, 2005). To ensure successful new issuances, the
Government had to grant increasingly higher yields, not only because this was
in line with banks’ incentives to purchase the bonds, but because as budget and
current account deficits increased, the price of already floating bonds also fell
(Figure 2.4). In sum, attempts to stop the depreciation of the peseta were not
consistent with curbing bank lending, which boomed almost uninterruptedly un-
til the 1931 crisis (Figure 2.13).
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Figure 2.13: Evolution of total bank short term commercial credit
and lending (1922q4-1934q4)
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
Amid these interventions in foreign exchange markets, the Government and
the BdE tried to stop the depreciation of the peseta by raising interest rates.
They did so in three occasions: 1928, 1930 and 1931. By that time, however,
Spanish monetary authorities had already accepted that the only monetary pol-
icy tool available at the BdE to control the evolution of credit was not going to be
very effective in curbing bank lending and thus helping stop the rapid exchange
rate depreciation that the country was experiencing. Contemporaries, as well
as policymakers became well aware of the limitations that discount rate policy
had as a monetary policy tool. Critiques of the 1921 Banking Law had precisely
highlighted that this failed from deeming BdE rates effective. In the following
sections I conduct an empirical analysis to evaluate the extent to which these
critiques were right and changes in BdE rates had any effect on bank lending
during this period.
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2.4 Monetary policy transmission model and em-
pirical estimation
The goal of this section is to measure the impact of changes in the main BdE
monetary policy indicators on bank lending. I estimate a loan equation derived
from the monetary policy transmission model proposed by Ehrmann, Gamba-
corta, Mart´ınez-Pages, Patrick, and Worms (2003), which captures the impact of
changes in policy rates on bank lending. This model is chosen because it allows
for interactions between the monetary policy indicator and different bank char-
acteristics, in order to capture the asymmetries in the transmission of monetary
policy depending on these characteristics. Details about the model are described
and discussed in the Appendix. The estimated loan equation is the following:
∆ ln(Loansit) = ai +
l∑
j=1
bj∆ ln(Loansit−j) +
l∑
j=0
cj∆MonetaryPolicyt−j+
+
l∑
j=0
dj∆ ln(GDPt−j) +
l∑
j=0
ej · CPIt−j + fCharacteristicit−1+
+
l∑
j=0
g1jCharacteristicit−1 ·∆MonetaryPolicyt−j+
+ hControlsit + εit
(2.1)
where i = 1, ..., N , N the number of banks and t = 1, ..., T with T the number
of quarters. For the first term on the right-hand side of the equation, l is the
number of lags of the dependent variable (log of loans in pesetas) included in the
estimation, and accordingly Lit is the end-of-quarter loan portfolio of bank i in
period t (lending to corporates and families). The model is estimated with four
lags of the dependent variable. To capture the effects of the 1921 Banking Law
on the transmission of monetary policy, I use different indicators for this vari-
able: Discount and Lombard rates for CSB members, the YTM of public debt,
and the spread between the latter and the Lombard rate (see below). Economic
output and prices are captured in GDPt and CPIt, respectively. Bank-specific
characteristics (size, liquidity and capital ratios and CSB membership) are cap-
tured by the vector xit and, as explained above, they are interacted with the
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monetary policy variable. I include a number of controls in the regression: the
Madrid stock market index, an index of the exchange rate of the peseta, foreign
central banks’ discount rates and a banking crisis dummy for the 1931 crisis71.
As in all standard estimations in the literature, the model allows for fixed effects,
which are captured by the intercept ai which is specific for each bank (Angeloni,
Kashyap, and Mojon, 2003; Gambacorta and Marques-Iban˜ez, 2011).
If central bank rates are effective in reducing bank lending, one would then
expect the coefficient associated with MonetaryPolicyt−j to be negative. In the
case at hand, however, this might not happen. In my case, banks had no reason
to delever when the BdE raised rates. Their reserves were unchanged, precisely
because they could keep pledging public debt with the BdE. Also, any increase in
the cost of funding on the liabilities side could also be transmitted to the asset side
through an increase in the interest rate at which loans were made to customers
(given that demand for loans was sustained). In the original model presented
by (Ehrmann et al., 2003) banks have to delever because their reserves become
insufficient after the central bank absorbs them through open market sales that
raise market rates. In my case, monetary policy (rate changes) is expected to
be ineffective because it does not lead to a reduction in base money; continued
deficits and their monetization kept the monetary base increasing regardless of
BdE rate changes.
There are two challenges when estimating Equation 2.1. The first one is that
in order to allow for dynamics, the model has to include the lagged value of the
dependent variable. The introduction of dynamics in the panel estimation needs
to be taken into consideration, as the error term can be correlated with past real-
izations of the dependent variable, introducing endogeneity. The second is that in
order to disentangle the effect of changes in monetary policy from other macroe-
conomic variables, the model needs to include measures of real output, inflation,
stock market index, exchange rate, etc. All these measures—mostly but not only
real output—complicate causal inference from the estimation, as business cycle
dynamics are expected to be a major determinant of demand for loans. This
poses a problem because we are willing to isolate the effect of monetary policy in
the dependent variable, that is in bank loan supply.
The literature interested in identifying the transmission of monetary policy
has traditionally dealt with these two challenges by implementing the difference
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GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which provides with
efficient and consistent estimators, provided that the instruments are chosen to
take into account the serial correlation properties of the model72. Dynamic-panel
estimation with GMM is, in fact, indicated for panels in which T is relatively
small and N is relatively large. Therefore, and in order to have a balanced panel
I limit the analysis to the period that maximizes the number of bank-quarter
observations while still includes the crucial years of 1928-1931. The final sam-
ple leaves me with a balanced panel that comprises 130 banks over 23 quarters
(1927q1-1932q3), so a total of 2990 bank-quarter observations (see Tables 2.8
and 2.9 in the Appendix). From this, 96 are CSB members, while 34 are non-
members. Foreign banks are excluded from the estimation73.
2.5 Data
2.5.1 Bank balance sheets
Starting in the last quarter of 1922, both members and non-members of the
CSB submitted their harmonized balance sheets and the CSB published and dis-
tributed them afterwards. I collect this data from the Boletines del Consejo
Superior Bancario, which contains quarterly observations on a number of differ-
ent items for assets and liabilities from 1922q4 to 1934q4. Not only CSB member
banks are included, but also non-members and foreign banks. This data was pub-
lished with an average delay of two years74. Around 500 copies were published
and distributed, to banks that sent their balance sheets and to other government
and financial institutions75. The resulting sample consists of quarterly balance
sheets for 302 banks over the period 1922q4-1934q4, which makes a total of 49
time periods. Observations are end of period. As explained above, however, I
limit the sample to 130 banks for the 1927q1-1932q3 period. This captures all the
changes in the BdE rate and, more importantly, the surge in bank lending that
started in 1927 (Figure 2.13). In order to estimate Equation 2.1 I aggregate three
different types of bank loans: call loans, loans on collateral and long term loans.
All loans are in pesetas. I use other items of bank balance sheets to construct
liquidity and capital ratios (see below).
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2.5.2 Monetary policy indicators
The indicator of monetary policy is the main variable of interest. Following the
contemporary discussion on the inability of the BdE to control aggregate lend-
ing that took place during the parliamentary debate on the 1921 Banking Law,
I use the two main rates of the BdE: the discount rate and the Lombard rate
as monetary policy indicators. Both are used including the reduction that CSB
banks enjoyed. Data on interest rates is taken from Mart´ınez Mendez (2005).
Interest rates are introduced at their end of quarter value. In addition to official
rates, I use two more indicators of monetary conditions: the yield to maturity
(YTM) of public debt and the spread between the latter and the Lombard rate
(see Figure 2.5). These last two indicators are expected to capture the channel
through which Spanish monetary authorities lost control of the evolution of ag-
gregate credit following the 1921 Banking Law. All monetary policy indicators
are shown in Figure 2.4. Given the move towards restrictive monetary policy
that started in early 1928 in the United States and Germany, in all specifications
of the model I include the reference interest rate of foreign central banks. This
is also to control for contemporaries’ concerns about foreign central bank rate
changes causing withdrawal of funds from Spain76. Interest rates from the Bank
of England, the Federal Reserve, the Banque de France and the Reichsbank are
included as controls in all specifications. However, coefficients associated with
foreign central bank rates turn out to be either not statistically significant or tiny
compared to other variables. To make tables more readable, I do not report these
coefficients, although they do not play any significant role77. A discussion of the
rate changes is provided in the Appendix.
2.5.3 Economic activity
There are no readily available quarterly GDP estimates for the Spanish economy
during the period I study. A solution to this problem could be using annual GDP
to determine the end-of-year levels and interpolate the industrial production in-
dex that was elaborated by the INE and included 14 different industries in order
to proxy the within-year variation. However, as Albers (2018) point out, using
industrial production to proxy economic activity in developing countries could
be misleading, because unconditional convergence in the industrial sector during
the 1920s leads to a partial picture, in which industry is given too much weight
compared to its relative importance for GDP. For the years under study in this
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paper, Spain was still mainly an agricultural country. Between 1920 and 1935,
agricultural employment was never below 45% of the total, and accounted for
more than a quarter of GDP (Prados de la Escosura, 2003).
Therefore, I use the Economic Activity Index (EAC) created by Albers (2018)
to have a better grasp of the dynamics of the period. The main difference between
the methodologies used in the two indexes is that the EAC does not make any
ex-ante assumptions on the weights of a certain industry or indicator. Instead,
the weights are obtained depending on how strong is the co-movement between
one indicator and the rest. This provides a broader sense of the dynamics of the
economy at the time. Figure 2.14 compares the evolution of the two indexes78.
The EAC index and the industrial production follow similar patterns, but indus-
trial production is much more volatile. In addition, a longer period is available
for the EAC index, and its methodology is consistent over time79. Figure 2.14
shows that economic activity accelerated substantially from mid-1927, which is
when banks holdings of public debt started to outpace their portfolios of bills of
exchange (Figure 2.11).
Figure 2.14: Economic Activity indicators compared, 1925q1-1934q4
Source: see text.
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2.5.4 Prices
There are two price indexes available in the Spanish literature. On the one hand,
Prados de la Escosura (2003) provides the annual GDP deflator from 1850. On
the other hand, Maluquer de Motes (2013) elaborated a consumer price index
for the period 1830-2012, which includes monthly data for some groups of goods
and periods. In addition, I collect a third series, from the Statistical Yearbook
(Anuario Estadistico) from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), which con-
tains monthly information on prices at the individual good-level. The INE also
elaborated a monthly price index of consumer goods, agricultural goods, imports
and exports.
Figure 2.15: Different price indexes (1922q4-1934q4)
Source: see text.
Figure 2.15 shows the three different price indexes: the CPI and the agricul-
tural price index elaborated by the INE, and the WPI for the city of Barcelona
elaborated by Maluquer de Motes (2013). All indexes are originally provided on
a monthly basis, so I average them to obtain the quarterly data. As expected,
the agricultural price index is much more volatile than the other two; seasonality
is slightly washed away by the two other indexes. Interestingly, all indexes show
that consumer, wholesale and agricultural prices started to fall from mid-1932,
when the peseta was pegged to the French Franc.
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2.5.5 Bank characteristic variables
Following the standard literature in the transmission of monetary policy, I include
three bank characteristics: size, capital ratios and liquidity ratios 80. Bank size is
calculated as the log of total assets. Capitalization as the ratio of capital and re-
serves over total assets. Finally, liquidity is computed as the ratio of liquid assets
over total assets81. While size and capitalisation can be calculated without major
problems, liquidity is difficult to measure for this particular period in Spain. In
fact, there were two different official measures of liquidity at the time: one from
the CSB and the other from the BdE. There are remarkable differences in the
categories included as liquid assets and short term liabilities between the two.
For example, the CSB did not consider long term loans as liquid assets, whereas
the BdE did. On the contrary, the CSB included loans in foreign currency and
interbank deposits as liquid assets, but the BdE did not. In the short term lia-
bilities side, the CSB did not consider deposits with maturities over a month to
be short term, nor it did consider foreign currency deposits as such. However,
the BdE included all kinds of deposits, regardless of their maturity as short term
liabilities. This discrepancy is not surprising, as the 1921 Banking Law left it to
the CSB to decide the liquidity and capitalisation rules that its member banks
would abide to, highlighting the challenges that regulatory change faced when
trying to bring together a single measure of liquidity accepted by all banking and
monetary institutions.
These differences make it difficult to create a single measure of liquidity. First,
because the CSB did have a minimum to which one can compare the actual situ-
ation of banks (Figure 2.6), but the BdE only elaborated a ratio between liquid
assets and short term liabilities. In the case of the BdE, a ratio above 100 probably
meant that a bank was considered to be in a liquid position, but no explanation
is available on specific limits for that ratio82. Second, because it is sensible to
think that both definitions had different purposes. The CSB established its final
measure of liquidity in 1924. The BdE, instead, elaborated its measure in an oc-
casional paper published in 1935 (Liquidez bancaria), only for the largest banks
and covering the 1931-1934 period, after it had already provided some banks with
emergency liquidity in the 1931 crisis. In sum, as expected, the BdE was much
more conservative with the measure of liquidity than the CSB. However, the BdE
measure was irrelevant, as it did not have any binding effect on CSB banks, be-
cause they would have access to its discount window simply by being within the
liquidity limits established by their own rule. For the empirical estimation, I
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calculate a third measure of liquidity based on what can be realistically thought
of a very liquid asset at the time. My third measure of liquidity only includes
cash, 3-month bills of exchange, public debt and cash over total assets. In further
estimations of the model, I divide the liquidity measure in bills and public debt
separately (see below). In addition, I include the main characteristic of interest,
which is CSB membership. Membership takes value 1 for non member banks
and 0 for CSB member banks, in order to easily interpret the coefficients in the
estimations below. The interaction between membership and monetary policy
indicator captures the differential reaction of non-member banks to changes in
monetary policy. Membership is also interacted with the other characteristics
(size, capitalisation and liquidity).
2.6 Results
The results of estimating Equation 2.1 are presented in Table 2.4. All coefficients
reported are long-run, which includes the effect of changes in the independent
variable on future realizations of the dependent variable. In all specifications, the
main coefficients of interest are those associated to the Monetary Policy Indicator
and its interactions with Liquidity and CSB Membership (in bold). In Columns
1 and 2, the Discount Rate of the BdE is used as the main monetary policy indi-
cator83. In Columns 3 and 4, the monetary policy indicator is the Lombard Rate.
In Columns 5 and 6, it is the yield of public debt and, in columns 7 and 8 it is
the spread between the YTM of public debt and the Lombard rate. Regression
diagnostics are also reported84.
Results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 show that changes in the discount
rate had, on average, a negative impact on bank lending (Column 1). However,
the coefficient is entirely driven by non-member banks, that is, by banks that had
no direct access neither to the rediscount of bills nor to advances at the BdE. As a
result, the negative sign of the coefficient associated with the Discount rate of the
BdE disappears when the latter is interacted with the CSB membership dummy
(Column 2). On average, CSB member bank lending was unaffected by changes
in the discount rate. This coefficient is expected to capture the fact that CSB
banks were able to avoid adjusting their loan portfolio following a change in the
discount rate because they could pledge public debt at the BdE at rates below the
YTM. This, however, was something that was not available for non-members, as
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they had to either borrow at more expensive rates from the BdE (which they did
not do) or to borrow from CSB banks (or foreign) banks at higher rates. In fact,
the differential reaction of the two types of banks illustrates how their differential
access affected their lending schedules. Non-members did not borrow from the
BdE; the latter could refuse to lend to them by virtue of the 1921 Law. All CSB
banks, instead, could borrow using public debt. In a way, this created an “inner
circle” in which CSB banks operated, and an “outer circle” in which non-members
operated. As discussed above, CSB banks transmitted rate changes from their
liabilities to their assets, and this included lending to non-members. The latter,
however, could then not transmit higher rates further, as these would be too high
to meet demand. The need to maintain profitability conduced non-members to
cut lending, something that CSB-members (who did the lion’s share of lending)
could avoid.
A similar picture emerges when using the Lombard Rate as the monetary
policy indicator, with non-member banks driving the negative results (Columns
3 and 4). Results in Columns 1 to 4 are almost identical, because when the BdE
raised the Discount Rate it also raised the Lombard rate and both were at the
same level (Figure 2.4). This happened in every rate change, except the one
that took place in 1931, in which the Lombard rate was left unchanged. This ex-
plains the smaller magnitude of the coefficients for the Lombard rate in Column 2.
Because of the mechanism of indirect monetization described above, the YTM
of public debt could not reflect actual monetary conditions for banks, as they
could just transform this debt into even more liquid assets and as long as there
was growing demand for credit. As I showed above, from 1927 government debt
in bank balance sheets started growing much faster than commercial bills. This
crowding-out also was reflected at the discount window of the BdE, in which
virtually all CSB banks used public debt for Lombard lending, instead of the re-
discount of bills of exchange. In addition, the Government could issue new debt
and set a specific Lombard rate for each type of bond, as I described above for
the extreme case of gold bonds, and as reflected in Figure 2.4. Columns 5 and 6
in Table 2.4 illustrate this process. When I use the yield of public debt as a an
indicator of monetary conditions, both groups show a similar behavior. Increased
supply of government bonds and continued fiscal deficits translated into higher
yields. The results show that higher yields were more than compensated by the
fact that public debt could be automatically exchanged for cash at the discount
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window of the BdE. Columns 7 and 8 confirm that the spread between the yield
of public debt and the Lombard rate was also associated with an expansion in
bank loans.85
MP measure Discount Rate Lombard Rate Public Debt Yield Spread
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
MP -0.033*** 0.021** -0.014*** 0.004 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.023*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
MP*No-CSB -0.252*** -0.072*** 0.021*** 0.039***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP 0.293*** 0.026 0.292*** 0.093 0.192*** -0.276*** 0.270*** 0.131*
(0.025) (0.077) (0.027) (0.068) (0.022) (0.069) (0.025) (0.074)
CPI 0.362 0.633* 0.567** 0.726 1.030*** 5.697*** 0.763*** 0.540***
(0.228) (0.333) (0.226) (0.490) (0.188) (0.433) (0.189) (0.061)
Stock Market -0.133*** -0.232*** -0.116*** -0.188*** -0.063*** 0.026 -0.096*** -0.120***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.025)
Exchange Rate 0.133*** 0.013*** 0.110*** 0.009*** 0.046*** -0.002** 0.096*** -0.000
(0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001)
1931 crisis -0.170*** -0.238*** -0.174*** -0.208*** -0.225*** -0.301*** -0.206*** -0.269***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.008) (0.015)
MP*GDP 0.068*** 0.113*** 0.070*** 0.124*** 0.034*** -0.003 0.048*** 0.228**
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.018) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.094)
MP*CPI -0.045 -0.251*** -0.104** -0.251** -0.245*** -1.236*** -0.161*** -1.547***
(0.052) (0.070) (0.052) (0.109) (0.042) (0.087) (0.041) (0.138)
MP*GDP*No-CSB 0.077*** 0.004 -0.027* -1.336***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.125)
MP*CPI*No-CSB 0.559*** 0.374*** 0.307*** 0.301**
(0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.151)
MP*Size 0.044*** 0.013 -0.021*** 0.019***
(0.012) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005)
MP*Size*No-CSB -0.007 0.010 0.095*** -0.001
(0.016) (0.027) (0.011) (0.012)
MP*Capital 1.031*** -0.098 -0.345*** 0.151
(0.207) (0.551) (0.100) (0.128)
MP*Capital*No-CSB 2.550*** 3.520*** 1.506*** 0.148
(0.227) (0.567) (0.125) (0.106)
MP*Liquidity 1.218*** 1.298*** -0.059 0.721***
(0.252) (0.353) (0.115) (0.097)
MP*Liquidity*No-CSB -2.713*** -2.170*** -0.469*** -1.168***
(0.237) (0.318) (0.092) (0.084)
AR(1) Test, p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) Test, p-val 0.544 0.444 0.502 0.774 0.592 0.158 0.520 0.634
Sargan Test, p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen Test, p-val 0.736 0.326 0.726 0.532 0.758 0.284 0.721 0.434
Num. banks 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Num. instruments 147 129 147 129 147 129 147 129
Observations 2,802 2,600 2,802 2,600 2,802 2,600 2,802 2,600
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.4: Loan equations with different indicators of monetary policy
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While these results confirm contemporaries concerns that BdE rates were in-
effective for CSB banks, they do not say much about the precise channel through
which this lack of effectiveness operated. In this sense, there is an interest-
ing result that stands out from Table 2.4. Theoretical and empirical work on
the transmission of monetary policy finds that, all things equal, the more liq-
uid banks are, the less sensitive their lending is expected to be when interest
rates change (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Angeloni et al., 2003; Ehrmann
et al., 2003; Ehrmann and Worms, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005; Gambacorta and
Marques-Iban˜ez, 2011). However, and at odds with the consensus in the litera-
ture, all estimations in Table 2.4 produce a negative estimated coefficient for the
interaction between the monetary policy indicator and the liquidity ratio for non-
member banks. This would imply that, being more liquid than CSB members,
non members would react more to changes in the BdE rate. However, this is due
to the way liquidity ratios are calculated. In the loan equation that I estimate on
Table 2.4, liquidity ratios include banks’ holdings of 3m bills of exchange, public
debt and cash as a proportion of their total assets. This is a standard definition of
liquidity. However, and precisely because of the argument presented in previous
sections, these three assets can not be considered equally liquid for all banks; the
BdE still had discretion on the eligibility of bills of exchange (and would not re-
discount bills held or accepted by non-members). However, it was forced to grant
advances to CSB members when they pledged public debt. Therefore, public debt
ought to have carried had a substantial liquidity premium over commercial bills.
This implies that banks with more public debt in their portfolios should be able
to increase their liabilities at cheaper rates by pledging public debt at the BdE.
It is precisely this ability to counter Discount rate hikes by pledging public debt
what is expected to eliminate the friction in reallocating liabilities that causes
central bank rates to influence bank lending. Because of that, it is necessary to
disaggregate the liquidity measure to identify the precise channel through which
this a priori differential lending reaction based on liquidity operates.
Table 2.5 runs six new specifications of Equation 2.1 with different measures of
liquidity: the original measure, bills of exchange as percentage of total portfolio,
and the same for public debt. In this new specification, the sign and magni-
tude of the coefficients associated to the interaction between the monetary policy
indicator, liquidity and membership are intended to capture the liquidity pre-
mium that public debt carried for CSB banks. Findings provide an answer to the
counterintuitive results presented in Table 2.4. While all other coefficients tell
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MP measure Discount Rate Lombard Rate
Liquidity measure All Bills Public Debt All Bills Public Debt
1 2 3 4 5 6
MP 0.021** 0.019** 0.022** 0.004 0.004 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
MP*No-CSB -0.252*** -0.277*** -0.266*** -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.080***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
GDP 0.026 -0.124 0.054 0.093 0.247*** 0.133**
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075) (0.068) (0.061) (0.062)
CPI 0.633* 0.328 0.430 0.726 0.528 0.344
(0.333) (0.350) (0.358) (0.490) (0.452) (0.401)
Stock Market -0.232*** -0.220*** -0.207*** -0.188*** -0.167*** -0.192***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
Exchange Rate 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1931 crisis -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.222*** -0.208*** -0.188*** -0.208***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
MP*GDP 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.081*** 0.124*** 0.088*** 0.118***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
MP*CPI -0.251*** -0.173** -0.191** -0.251** -0.192* -0.156*
(0.070) (0.073) (0.075) (0.109) (0.100) (0.090)
MP*GDP*No-CSB 0.077*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.004 0.008 0.007
(0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
MP*CPI*No-CSB 0.559*** 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.374*** 0.371*** 0.382***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
MP*Size 0.044*** -0.280*** -0.040*** 0.013 0.037 -0.065***
(0.012) (0.028) (0.009) (0.022) (0.034) (0.017)
MP*Size*No-CSB -0.007 0.448*** 0.138*** 0.010 -0.456*** -0.048
(0.016) (0.052) (0.015) (0.027) (0.109) (0.036)
MP*Capital 1.031*** -1.928*** -0.022 -0.098 -3.381*** -3.174***
(0.207) (0.337) (0.149) (0.551) (0.614) (0.445)
MP*Capital*No-CSB 2.550*** 4.397*** 2.455*** 3.520*** 4.274*** 4.599***
(0.227) (0.405) (0.185) (0.567) (0.432) (0.371)
MP*Liquidity 1.218*** -2.556*** 0.673*** 1.298*** 2.592*** -1.223***
(0.252) (0.198) (0.116) (0.353) (0.681) (0.468)
MP*Liquidity*No-CSB -2.713*** 1.998*** -1.181*** -2.170*** -5.005*** 2.556***
(0.237) (0.265) (0.115) (0.318) (0.902) (0.702)
AR(1) Test, p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) Test, p-val 0.444 0.143 0.161 0.774 0.592 0.423
Sargan Test, p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen Test, p-val 0.326 0.444 0.430 0.532 0.438 0.316
Num. banks 130 130 130 130 130 130
Num. instruments 129 129 129 129 129 129
Observations 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600 2600
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.5: Loan equations with different measures of liquidity
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the same story—the average effect of changes in the monetary policy indicator
on lending is stable—those associated to liquidity are different. CSB members
and non members, reacted differently to changes in BdE rates. When the BdE
raised the discount rate, CSB members holding a larger share of public debt in
their portfolios were not reactive to the rate change. However, those that held
more bills of exchange were more likely to contract lending. This provides an
explanation for the lack of transmission of BdE rate changes to bank lending, but
also shows that on average, CSB members faced a liquidity penalty for holding
bills of exchange, while the contrary applied to public debt. The opposite picture
comes up when I use the Lombard rate as monetary policy indicator in Columns
4 to 6 in Table 2.5. CSB banks holding more public debt were more sensible
to changes in this rate. CSB banks backed their loan expansion by subscribing
public debt while, for non-members this was not an equally viable strategy. This
explains why CSB banks kept accumulating public debt throughout the period
while non-CSB banks didn’t86.
In sum, results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 confirm that rate changes implemented
by the BdE during the years when the peseta depreciated had no impact on bank
lending for CSB members. This reflects the limitations of the 1921 Banking Law
outlined in previous sections. While CSB banks were precisely the group of banks
that were supposed to be the target of the BdE’s interest rate policy, they had a
mechanism to avoid that. Although there is no direct evidence of that, it is likely
that this explains why the BdE was also opposed to increase interest rates during
the late 1920s; it would only increase CSB banks’ reliance on its Lombard facility
and lead the BdE to approach the fiduciary limit. In fact, as the Government
and the BdE discussed the first increase in the Discount Rate in 1928 in order to
curb the increase in the money supply and stem the depreciation of the peseta,
contemporaries were aware that it would have little, if any, effect87. This was
indeed the case. Figure 2.16 shows the evolution of banks’ deposits created by
monetizing public debt with the BdE (figures are averages for all CSB banks and
95% confidence intervals). When a bank drew from the credit account that it held
with the BdE against public debt, this was reflected as an increase in the bank’s
interbank liabilities. Thus Figure 2.16 shows a jump in the share of interbank
liabilities that takes place in 1928q4. This is reflecting banks’ readjustment of
their portfolio as soon as the monetary policy stance of the BdE changed after five
years of unchanged interest rates. In turn, Figure 2.17 shows that this increase
in interbank deposits was not the consequence of a general increase in interbank
102
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 2
activity among CSB banks (i.e. some banks borrowing from other banks or via in-
flows of foreign depositors), as total interbank assets remained flat over the whole
period, while interbank deposits (which included BdE credit against public debt)
increased markedly from 1928q4. CSB banks reacted to the BdE rate change by
drawing from their credit accounts. At first, right after the rate change, banks
stored 80% of these newly created deposits in cash, which then were used to keep
expanding credit, almost uninterruptedly, until April 1931 (Figure 2.13).
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Figure 2.16: Share of deposits at the BdE in banks’ total deposits (1925q1-
1934q4)
Source: own calculations using Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
The impact of the main monetary policy tool that the 1921 Banking Law
had made available to the BdE and the Government to control credit–interest
rates–was ineffective. Alternative tools were not used; quantitative instruments
were not mobilized. It is important to acknowledge that the reduced size of the
rate changes calls into question the extent to which one could expect them to be
effective. However, there are two important points to highlight here. First, the
reaction of non-CSB banks suggests that these rates had an effect on those bank
that could not rely on an automatic access to the Lombard facility of the BdE
and thus were exposed to higher rates that they could not pass-through to their
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Figure 2.17: Total interbank assets and interbank liabilities, CSB banks (1925q1-
1934q4)
Source: own calculations using Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
borrowers from 1928. Second, the size of CSB banks’ reaction to 1928 in the form
of increased reliance on the BdE Lombard facility after the first rate change (even
if it was timid), shows how the automatic access to that lending facility countered
any effect of rate changes in bank lending. In sum, this section’s results confirm
contemporaries’ concerns that the 1921 Banking Law, while ensuring CSB banks
remained liquid, prevented Spanish monetary authorities from controlling the
evolution of credit aggregates and to curb the collapse of the exchange rate from
1928.
2.7 Conclusion
After the First World War, and in need of funding its budget deficits, the Span-
ish Government established a system of “indirect monetization” of public debt
through which banks were allowed to borrow from the BdE using government
bonds. The latter had to accept these loans. This regime was embodied in
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the 1921 Banking Law, which came as a reaction to the failure of the Banc de
Barcelona in 1920. Policymakers in charge of the Ministry of Finance interpreted
this crisis as a liquidity crisis and thus exploited the need to ensure bank liquidity
as a way to make sure issuances of public debt could be successful. In doing so,
the Law outsourced monetization from the central bank to the banking sector.
As fiscal authorities failed to balance the budget almost in every year during the
Interwar Period, banks started accumulating public debt that they used to bor-
row from the BdE. This revealed the time-inconsistency problem in which fiscal
authorities placed themselves in 1921: fiscal policy became incompatible with
attempts at reducing pressure on the exchange rate via reduced bank lending.
When the peseta started falling rapidly in 1928, the Government tried to stop
the depreciation. All attempts were fruitless because with one hand the gov-
ernment persuaded the BdE to raise its interest rates, while with the other it
kept running fiscal deficits that could be monetized by the banking sector. As a
result of the 1921 Banking Law, monetary policy tools that were supposed to be
monetary authorities’ device to “command the credit of the nation” (as the BdE
Statutes read), were deemed ineffective and proved an obstacle to stop the fall of
the peseta and the concomitant discredit of the government’s economic program.
The regime that the 1921 Banking Law had put in place made it very hard to rec-
oncile macroeconomic policy objectives (fiscal and monetary). On the one hand,
the Government pushed for higher Discount rates to defend the exchange rate.
On the other, it had to borrow to finance growing deficits and loans to stabilize
the currency, which it did by issuing public debt that banks could automatically
pledge at the discount window of the Banco de Espan˜a. This is not to say that
raising interest rates would have been enough, on its own, to stop the fall of the
peseta (especially since they were raised mildly). Rather, the conclusion of this
chapter is that when it passed the 1921 Banking Law, the Government intro-
duced a time-inconsistency problem and made monetary policy dependent on the
future path of fiscal authorities. While the Law was successful in granting fiscal
authorities with a reliable source of deficit funding (monetization), this revealed
incompatible with the objective of stabilizing the peseta in the late 1920s. This,
as the next chapter shows, pushed monetary authorities to resort to other means
to stop the fall of the peseta, which ended up increasing the vulnerability of the
banking sector to an eventual liquidity shock caused by a run on its retail deposits.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 The model
In order to estimate a loan equation that depends on monetary policy indicators
and a set of other factors, I use the model developed by Stein (1998) and Ehrmann
et al. (2003), which solves the optimization problem of a profit maximizing bank88.
In this model, bank i balance sheet is defined as:
Li + Si = Di +Bi + Ci (2.2)
where Li, is the volume of loans, Si are securities, Di the secured deposits,
while Bi represents the non-secured deposits. Ci is the capital of the bank. The
representative bank develops its business in a monopolistic competition, and faces
a demand for loans that is described by:
Ldi = −a0 · rL,i + a1 · y + a2 · p (2.3)
Bank-individual loan rate is denoted by rL,i, while y is aggregate real output
and p is the price level. All the coefficients in Equation 2 are assumed to be
positive. The model further assumes that the amount of loans is related to capital
and that securities’ holdings are also proportional to deposits89.
Ci = k · Li (2.4)
Si = s ·Di (2.5)
In turn, Di, which are secured but non-interest bearing deposits, are subject
to a demand function. This is determined by the interest rate of a risk-free asset,
rs. The model further assumes that, since banks don’t remunerate deposits,
they can’t influence the amount held at the representative bank, Di. This is
considered to be exogenous and will therefore drop after the monetary authority
tightens monetary policy, without the representative bank being able to influence
this. The demand for deposits is therefore a negative function of the policy rate.
D = −b0 · rs (2.6)
While it is not true that banks didn’t remunerate deposits in Spain at the time,
it is not too an heroic assumption that they couldn’t influence the distribution
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of deposits. The top 6 banks held 51% of the deposits, and since they were part
of CSB, the interest they paid on them was capped. It is plausible to assume
that the vast majority of the rest of CSB members were also respecting the CSB
deposit remuneration cap and that the non members could not influence this
rates. Therefore, in Equation 5 the demand for deposits is described and, b0 is
positive; hence banks’ deposits drop when the central bank raises the interest
rate. Despite banks lose reserves when monetary policy tightens, they also get
funds from other sources (namely Bi in Equation 1). This funding is not secured
and banks need to pay interest on that. They pay rB,i, which is the risk-free rate,
rs plus a premium based on the banks’ perceived health.
rB,i = rs · (µ− c0 · xi) (2.7)
Where xi is the a bank’s health signal, which lowers the unsecured finance
premium, as c0 is positive and the whole parenthesis is non-negative. The indi-
vidual bank decision on how much it can pay for unsecured funds is determined
by Equation 6; in fact, it will not be able to obtain funding if pays less than rB,i.
If pays rB,i or more, the bank will be able to obtain all necessary funds. How-
ever, as the bank maximizes profits and rB,i enters its profit function as a cost
(Equation 7), it will never be willing to pay more than rB,i. Therefore, the rep-
resentative bank’s profit function takes the following form. Income is earned by
lending (loans to corporates, families and other banks) and yields from securities
(bills discounted, stocks, public debt).
pii = Li · rL,i + Si · rs −Bi · rB,i −Ψi (2.8)
where Ψi captures bank-specific costs, such as administration costs, personnel,
etc90. To solve the bank’s maximization of profit, Equations 1 to 5 are inserted
in Equation 7, resulting into:
pii = Li ·
(
− 1
a0
· Li + a1
a0
· y + a2
a0
· p
)
+ s ·Di · rS
− ((1− k) · Li − (1− s) ·Di) · rB,i −Ψi
(2.9)
from which, after setting first order conditions for maximization, and inserting
Equation 6 (which determines the funding premium each bank has to pay for
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unsecured funds) we obtain the loan equation that will be estimated:
Li =
a1
2
· y + a2
2
· p− a0 · µ · (1− k)
2
· rS
+
a0 · c0 · (1− k)
2
· xi · rS − a0
2
· δΨi
δLi
(2.10)
The model assumes homogeneous loan demand, and therefore there are no
differences between customers’ reaction to interest rate hikes. This is not a plau-
sible assumption in the case I have at hand, as it is very likely that CSB member
banks captured the more risk-averse depositors and the non-member banks were
mainly recipients of less risk averse depositors. This makes sense if we think about
the distinction that I am stressing between member and non-member banks. In-
formation about CSB member banks was much more readily available, and the
public ought to have been more aware that they were (at least theoretically) under
the surveillance of the CSB and that they could access BdE liquidity by pledging
public debt. On the contrary, non-member banks, which were by nature smaller
and characterized by sometimes not even carrying the name “bank”, could be
the recipients of depositors that could expect higher returns on their investments
but at the same time less control and transparency over these banks’ operations.
If we assume (as I do) that this applied to interbank relations as well (because
interbank deposits in non-member banks were significantly lower than in CSB
member banks), this would ultimately imply that non-member banks would face
a higher premium on their interbank funding (i.e. the parameter c0 for the same
observable characteristics of a given bank should be smaller for member banks).
From the point of view of the econometric analysis, this implies that ideally the
two groups ought to be treated separately. In other words, I can assume ho-
mogeneous demand among CSB member banks and among non-member banks,
but assuming it at the aggregate level might be too strong an assumption. To
deal with this problem, I run the estimation with and without dummies for CSB
membership, which has the same effect as if I divided the sample in two, but it
allows me to interact this dummy with other bank characteristics as size, capi-
tal ratios and liquidity ratios91. The model is finally estimated in first differences:
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∆ ln(Loansit) = ai +
l∑
j=1
bj∆ ln(Loansit−j) +
l∑
j=0
cj∆MonetaryPolicyt−j+
+
l∑
j=0
dj∆ ln(GDPt−j) +
l∑
j=0
ej · CPIt−j + fCharacteristicit−1+
+
l∑
j=0
g1jCharacteristicit−1 ·∆MonetaryPolicyt−j+
+ hControlsit + εit
(2.11)
where i = 1, ..., N , with N being the number of banks and t = 1, ..., T with
T being the number of quarters. For the first term on the right-hand side of the
equation, l is the number of lags of the dependent variable (log of loans in pese-
tas) included in the estimation, and accordingly Lit is the end-of-quarter lending
portfolio of bank i in period t (lending to corporates and families). The model is
estimated with four lags of the dependent variable. The monetary policy measure
is represented by rt, which is the log of BdE discount rate. Economic output and
prices are captured in GDPt and CPIt, respectively. Bank-specific characteris-
tics (size, liquidity, capitalisation and membership) are captured by the vector xit
and, as explained above, they are interacted with the monetary policy variable.
As detailed below, I include a number of controls in the regression (the Madrid
stock market index, foreign central banks’ discount rates and a banking crisis
dummy for the 1931 crisis). As in all standard estimations in the literature (An-
geloni et al., 2003; Gambacorta and Marques-Iban˜ez, 2011), the model allows for
fixed effects, which are captured by the intercept ai which is specific for each bank.
2.8.2 BdE rate changes: 1928-1931
19 December 1928
As ad hoc interventions in foreign exchange markets kept failing, the Government
increased the pressure on the BdE to use the discount rate to stop the depreciation
of the peseta (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). The discount rate had been held constant for
five years (Figure 2.4). Both the BdE and the rest of banks opposed strongly to
increases in the discount rate, but after negotiations, the Government managed to
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persuade the BdE to increase to change its rates three times between December
1928 and July 1931. After the appreciation of the peseta during 1927, in the first
months of 1928 concerns emerged that speculation against the currency could be
starting to cause a reversal. The Minister of Finance (Mr. Jose Calvo Sotelo)
contacted the CSB in May and asked whether banks had noticed intentions of for-
eign speculation against the peseta92. Representatives of the main Spanish banks
responded that foreign banks also held large deposits in pesetas, which made
them skeptical about a “genuine foreign interest in the drop of the peseta”. That
said, in a later meeting in July, they recognized that given the Federal Reserve
increase in the discount rate earlier in the year, US banks were withdrawing posi-
tions in Europe and that “this might also be reflected in Spain, because given the
higher rates that are offered there, it is normal that money might be scarce here”93.
Discussions about the increase in the discount rate started in mid-December.
By then, the peseta had already depreciated 10% against Sterling from April
1927. On the 15th of December, there were already rumors in the Madrid Stock
Exchange that the BdE would raise its discount rate, although not about the size
of the hike94. The BdE held an extraordinary meeting on the 18th of December in
which—agreeing with the initiative of the Minister of Finance—decided to raise
the interest rate for all its operations by half a percentage point. The BdE op-
posed the rise initially but accepted it, claiming that it was contrary to the general
interests95. Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984) pointed to the strong opposition of the banking
sector to the rate hike, as it “warned against the unfavourable effects that this
would have for the industry and the trade sectors”96. In Madrid, one of the top
six banks and a very frequent discounter at the BdE, Banco Urquijo de Madrid
(BUMA), considered that the rise in interest rates would cause a contraction in
credit. The bank argued that was unnecessary and claimed that “Spanish banks
are absolutely contrary to the increase, as it would damage the interests of the
country’s economy”97. Another top bank, Banco de Bilbao (BBIL), considered
that the rate hike was unjustified and that affected the stock market negatively98.
Despite the disagreement between the Government, and the banking sector (in-
cluding the BdE), the official discount rate for CSB-member banks was raised
from 4.0% to 4.5% on the 19th of December. The Lombard rate was also in-
creased by 0.5%.99
Banks’ concerns with an overall contraction in credit following the increase
in the discount rate did not materialize. As Figure 2.13 shows, short term credit
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was not reactive to the rate hike, while bank loans seem to have reacted slightly,
but continued to expand strongly afterwards. In fact, the slight drop in bank
loans is driven by only two banks (BHAM and BUMA); the rest of the banking
system continued to expand lending without reacting to the rate hike. Figure
2.16 helps understanding why: the effects of the rate hike were countered by
CSB banks by increasing their liabilities with the BdE through advances against
public debt. Figure 2.16 shows the evolution of interbank deposits as a percent-
age of all deposits; the connecting dots are means and the vertical bars are 95%
confidence intervals. When a bank pledged public debt as collateral at the BdE,
this was reflected as an increase in its interbank liabilities. Thus the jump in
the share of interbank liabilities then is reflecting banks’ readjustment of their
portfolio as soon as the monetary policy stance of the BdE changed after five
years of unchanged interest rates. In turn, Figure 2.17 shows that this increase
in interbank deposits was not the consequence of a general increase in interbank
activity among CSB banks (i.e. some banks borrowing from other banks), as to-
tal interbank assets remained flat over the whole period, while interbank deposits
(which included BdE credit against public debt) increased markedly from 1928q4.
This raise was transmitted to the market discount rate of banks almost im-
mediately. For example, Banco Urquijo increased its discount rate by half a
percentage point to all operations the same day100. Other important banks fol-
lowed. The Banco de Vizcaya raised its discount rate by the same amount on
the 28th of December as a response to the raise of the discount rate of the BdE’
and applied it to all its operations101. The fact that it was not clear if finally
the rate would be raised by a full percentage point did increase the impact of
the decision. In general, short term market rates reacted to the BdE decision102.
After six years of progressive decline in market rates103, the reaction to the first
move of the BdE can be clearly seen. From an average market discount rate
of 5.0% in 1928, after the BdE raised its rate, the discount rate in Madrid and
Barcelona moved up to 6.25% in average, and remained high until 1932, when
the BdE started loosening again.
In fact, as shown by Figure 2.13, for most of the year 1928, “conditions in
the market were exactly the same as in 1927”104. According to contemporary ob-
servers, large banks appeared to have less pressure to adjust their loan portfolio
than smaller banks105. Referring to the changes in the discount rate, in January
1930 the Finance Minister wrote a piece in El Economista, in which he argued
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that in Spain, “experience has shown that the variations of the discount rate have
very scarce influence in the market”106. The limited impact on the market was
a cause of concern at the time, as “there was the risk that that the raise in the
official rate might not be followed by the free market, as it seems that there is
plenty of pesetas in the money market”107.
18 July 1930
The second raise in the interest rate was much more anticipated and came in
after the peseta had already lost nearly half of its value against Sterling. On
the 16th of July, the Finance Minister approached the BdE and suggested that,
“in order to improve the exchange rate of our currency” and to cause a “healthy
contraction in credit that would attract foreign capital” the official discount rate
and the rest of interest rates should be raised by 0.75 percentage points108. The
BdE and representatives of the CSB argued that it “would not be possible to
implement the measure because it would not exert any of the positive effects that
it was attributed and would not attract foreign capital” because foreign interest
rates were higher109. A day later, disregarding the previous answer, the Minister
signed a Real Order and the BdE raised interest rates in 50 basis points in all
its operations, thus leaving the official discount rate at 5.0%, the highest level
since 1921110. The BdE acceded with “a feeling of deep pain”, and added that
this would affect the clients of the bank, which at the time was synonymous to
CSB banks.
It is interesting to see that as opposed to the previous raise, in this case there
were no rumors of a further unexpected increase. On the other hand, similarly
to 1928, the public was not certain about the size of the hike. The impact of this
rate raise on market rates was much smaller, although it still caused the average
market discount rate to rise again. In Madrid, banks raised their discount rates
only because the BdE rose its discount rate111. Banks’ concerns with this second
rise was less marked than in the previous one. For instance, there is not a single
mention to this rate hike in the minutes of Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA),
and in the minutes of Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) the opposition to the rise was not
comparable to that in 1928. By July 1930, and as Figure ?? shows, CSB banks
had already subscribed to the gold bonds issued by the Government in January
1930, which is reflected in the increase in their holdings of foreign liabilities. Be-
cause of that, CSB banks could not be under increasing liquidity pressure by a
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change in the discount rate or the Lombard rate if they could rely on pledging
these bonds when needed at a constant rate of 4% (Figure 2.4), that is 2 percent-
age points below the bonds’ nominal yield. Attempts by the Government to stop
the fall of the peseta by raising interest rates were incompatible with its own way
of financing other means of stabilizing the exchange rate. As Figure 2.13 shows,
banks continued to expand their loan portfolios despite the rate hike.
08 July 1931
The third and final rate hike took place in early July, along with the BdE inter-
vention as lender of last resort between April and September 1931 (see Chapters
3 and 4 for details). In this case, the BdE made two moves. The first was a 50
basis points hike in the discount rate, which was decided on the 7th of July and
enacted a day after112. The Government and the BdE, “given the evolution of the
fiduciary circulation (...) decided to raise in half a percentage point the official
rate for all operations with the exception of those that involve public debt”113. In
addition to that, the government cut the 100bp reduction in the discount rate
for CSB-member banks by 50bp. Therefore, the overall increase in the discount
rate for CSB members was of 100bp (50bp from the actual rate hike plus 50bp
from the reduction in CSB-members rate). Hence, the official discount rate was
raised to 6.0% for CSB-member banks, which marked the highest official rate
since mid-nineteenth century and the steepest increase since the summer of 1914.
In this occasion, the Lombard rate was not changed (Figure 2.4).
In sum, changes in the discount rate aimed at stopping the depreciation of the
currency seem to have had–despite the warnings from the banking sector and the
BdE–little effect on bank’s loan schedule. The first increase in the discount rate,
which was the first in five years, signalled that monetary policy might become
tighter in the following years, as the defense of the exchange rate became a priority
for the Government. However, banks compensated this move by resorting to their
holdings of public debt which allowed them to draw from their credit accounts
with the BdE without having to readjust their loan portfolios.
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2.8.3 Size, capitalisation and liquidity normalized mea-
sures
Following Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta and Marques-Iban˜ez (2011),
all measures of banks’ characteristics are normalized with respect to their average
across all banks in the sample, in order to get indicators that sum to zero over
all bank observations. The average of the coefficient associated to the interac-
tion between a bank characteristic and the monetary policy indicator is zero and
therefore, its coefficient can be interpreted directly as the overall monetary policy
effect on loans. The measures are constructed as follows:
Sizeit = logAit
1
Nt
∑
i
logAit (2.12)
Capitalisationit =
Cit
Ait
− 1
T
∑
t
(
1
Nt
∑
i
Cit
Ait
) (2.13)
Liquidityit =
Lit
Ait
− 1
T
∑
t
(
1
Nt
∑
i
Lit
Ait
) (2.14)
where Ait are bank i’s total assets, Lit is the sum of cash, 3-month bills of
exchange and public debt and Cit is the sum of capital and reserves. T is the
number of quarters and N the number of banks.
2.8.4 Comparison with other estimates in the literature
Banks’ characteristics
Monetary Policy Size Capitalisation Liquidity Banks Period Country
My estimation (CSB members) 0.021** 0.044*** 1.031*** 1.218*** 130 1927q1-1932q3 Spain
My estimation (non-members) -0.252*** -0.007 2.550*** -2.713*** 130 1927q1-1932q3 Spain
Ehrmann et al. (2003) -1.969*** -0.063 2.304 8.106*** 312 1994q3-2000q3 France
Ehrmann et al. (2003) -0.526*** -0.044 -0.469 3.936*** 2689 1994q1-1998q4 Germany
Ehrmann et al. (2003) -1.510*** -0.214* -11.304 3.986** 210 1991q1-1998q4 Spain
Hernando and Mart´ınez-Pages (2003) -2.579*** /-1.566*** -0.132 -6.045 3.403* 216 1991q1-1998q4 Spain
Gambacorta (2005) -0.825*** 0.079 3.616 2.278*** 587 1986q4-2001q3 Italy
Benkovskis (2008) -0.039 0.014 0.544 0.092 23 1998q2-2006q4 Latvia
Juurikkala, Karas, and Solanko (2011) 0.08 -0.100 0.270 1.520 1475 1991q1-2007q1 Russia
Gambacorta and Marques-Iban˜ez (2011) -1.569** 0.641*** 8.888* -6.959 1008 1999q1-2009q4 15 countries
Table 2.6: Comparison of the estimation results with the literature on monetary
policy transmission
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2.8.5 Stock market index
All regressions include an index of the Madrid Stock Market as a control. This
is needed because non-CSB member banks could be more likely to hold riskier
portfolios that included a larger share of particularly riskier or volatile stocks. By
including this, I try to rule out the possibility that their lending was only reacting
to stock exchange variations and not to monetary policy tightening. I elaborate
the index by averaging the price of the 27 main shares quoted in Madrid, which I
collected from the Boletin Oficial de Cotizaciones, Bolsa de Madrid. I use end-of-
quarter observations for the period 1922q4-1934q4. Table 2.7 contains a summary
of the shares I use. The resulting index is plotted in Figure 2.18 along with an
alternative annual index elaborated by Hoyo Aparicio (2007) as a benchmark for
comparison. The index is included in the estimations in logs.
Table 2.7: Shares included in the index and type of firm
Name Sector/good produced
Banco de Espan˜a Bank
Banco Hipotecario Bank
Banco Central Bank
Banco Espan˜ol de Credito Bank
Banco Hispano Americano Bank
Telefonica preferentes Communications
Cooperativa Electra Madrid Electricity
Hidroelectrica Espan˜ola Electricity
Mengemor Electricity
Compania Sevillana de Electricidad Electricity
Union Electrica Madrilena Electricity
Chade Electricity
Union Espanola de Explosivos Explosives
La Union y el Fenix Espanol Insurance
Altos Hornos de Vizcaya Iron and steel
Los Guindos Mining
Duro Felguera Mining
Minas del Rif (portador) Mining
Ferrocarriles Andaluces Railways
Ferrocarril Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante Railways
Ferrocarriles del Norte Railways
General Azucarera Sugar
Compan˜ia Arrendataria de Tabacos Tobacco monopoly
Metropolitano de Madrid Transport
Tranvias Electricos de Granada Transport
Madrilen˜a de Tranvias Transport
Construccion Naval Transport
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Figure 2.18: Madrid stock market index, 1922-1934
(1926q1=100)
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2.8.6 Information about banks used in the estimation
Table 2.8: Banks’ names, membership and size of loan portfolio (thousand pese-
tas, in 1928q3)
Name Code Loans Assets Loans/assets
CSB Members Antonio Gonzalez Egea AGEG 1387 4892 28%
Alfaro y Cia ALYC 752 1243 60%
Aramburu Hermanos ARAH 1791 7360 24%
Arnus Gari ARGA 30620 84030 36%
Banca Arnus BAAR 38751 97012 40%
Banco Asturiano de Ind. y Com. BAIC 15480 24454 63%
Banco de Aragon BARA 18106 59553 30%
Banco Aragones de Credito BARC 18856 56030 34%
Banco de Avila BAVI 1462 4357 34%
Banco de Badalona BBAD 495 2752 18%
Banco de Bilbao BBIL 3543 25587 14%
Banco Calamarte BCAL 1550 47122 3%
Banco Castellano BCAS 10059 76795 13%
Banco Central BCEN 102959 788151 13%
Banco Coca BCOC 4172 20228 21%
Banco del Comercio BCOM 107 176 61%
Banco de Castellon BCTL 19589 142842 14%
Banco Comercial de Tarrassa BCTR 3438 32953 10%
Banco de Credito de Zaragoza BCZA 1348 8562 16%
Banco Espan˜ol de Credito BECR 216481 1050512 21%
Banco de Felanitx BFEL 2332 40543 6%
Banco de Gijon BGIJ 181 694 26%
Banco Gijones de Credito BGJC 197 839 23%
Banco Guipuzcoano BGUI 18659 136789 14%
Banco Hispano Americano BHAM 11252 64263 18%
Banco Hispano Colonial BHCO 538 2865 19%
Banco Herrero BHER 1769 5133 34%
Banco Internacional de Ind. y Com. BIIC 9948 27598 36%
Banco de La Corun˜a BLAC 23983 124794 19%
Banca Lopez Quesada BLOQ 4800 14169 34%
Banca Marsans BMAR 3015 9894 30%
Banco Mercantil BMER 7655 38239 20%
Banco Minero Industrial de Asturias BMIA 111940 739968 15%
Banco del Oeste de Espan˜a BOES 42449 108194 39%
Bosch i Codola BOSC 10924 41160 27%
Banco de Palafrugell BPAL 1414 5374 26%
Banco Pastor BPAS 221702 1361684 16%
Banco del Penedes BPEN 43516 213653 20%
Banco Popular de Leon XIII BPLE 33980 162271 21%
Banco Popular Previsores Porvenir BPPP 213392 1087362 20%
Brunet y Cia BRUN 22788 65975 35%
Banco de Sabadell BSAB 31163 177489 18%
Banco Sainz BSAI 43182 201808 21%
Banco de Santander BSAN 1051 1601 66%
Banco de Soller BSOL 4884 20658 24%
Banco de San Sebastian BSSE 29852 182332 16%
Banco de Torrelavega BTLV 3400 6509 52%
Banco de Tolosa BTOL 1320 31983 4%
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Table 2.9: Banks’ names, membership and size of loan portfolio (thousand pese-
tas, in 1928q3)
Name Code Loans Assets Loans/assets
CSB Members Banca Tusquets BTUS 11652 78979 15%
Banco Urquijo Catalan BUCA 26652 120988 22%
Banco Urquijo Guipuzcoano BUGI 18953 65364 29%
Banco Urquijo de Madrid BUMA 148881 515783 29%
Banco Urquijo Vascongado BUVA 17409 102774 17%
Banco de Valencia BVAL 13689 68356 20%
Banco de Valls BVLS 0 1290 0%
Banco de Vitoria BVIT 1701 3638 47%
Banco de Vizcaya BVIZ 73 959 8%
Banco de Zaragoza BZAR 3225 17539 18%
Credito Balear CBAL 710 6876 10%
Credito y Docks de Barcelona CDBA 1468 3259 45%
Clemente Fernandez CLEM 24515 87691 28%
Credito Navarro CNAV 20807 95480 22%
Corrales Hermanos CORR 9593 37171 26%
Dorca y Cia DORC 952 3406 28%
Francisco Lopez FLOP 0 1165 0%
Fomento Agricola de Mallorca FOAM 451 1902 24%
Gonzalez del Valle y Cia FONZ 4834 20373 24%
Garriga Nogues y Sobrinos GARR 4341 7756 56%
Hijos de Clemente Sanchez HDCS 963 7515 13%
Hijo de Manuel Peral HDMP 3593 20378 18%
Hijos de F. Mas Sarda HDMS 98 1941 5%
Hijo de Dionisio Puche HDPU 448 2775 16%
Hijos de M. Rodriguez Acosta HMRA 410 4403 9%
Hernandez Mendirichaga y Cia HMYC 2384 27257 9%
Hijos de Olimpio Perez HOLI 7276 26786 27%
Herrero Riva y Cia HRYC 4591 12639 36%
Hijos de Simeon Garcia y Cia HSIM 1800 11178 16%
Hijos de S. Ulargui HSUL 229 1753 13%
J. Merle Sucesores SA JMER 757 2263 33%
Jover y Cia JOVE 1853 5131 36%
Jose Saez Azores JSAE 12252 41293 30%
La Vasconia LAVA 12493 86352 14%
Lazard Brothers LAZA 52511 91263 58%
Matias Blanco Cobaleda MBCO 13007 33345 39%
Moreno y Cia MORE 5749 11492 50%
Nietos de P. Martin Moreno NIET 2146 10902 20%
Orzaes y Gomia ORZA 283 1206 23%
Padro Hermanos PADH 231 2682 9%
Pedro Lopez e Hijos PELH 1571 20405 8%
Perxas, Dorca y Cia PERX 1979 4586 43%
Sindicato de Banqueros de Barcelona, SA SBBA 18 868 2%
Smith, Horn y Cia SHYC 11013 23052 48%
Soler y Torra Hermanos SOLE 4465 34252 13%
Viuda de Antonio Vicens VAVI 1503 6092 25%
Viuda e hijos de Carlos de Casas VHCC 257 2798 9%
Vicente Trelles VICE 28 469 6%
118
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 2
Table 2.10: Banks’ names, membership and size of loan portfolio (thousand pe-
setas, in 1928q3)
Name Code Loans Assets Loans/assets
Non-members A. Clara Turon ACTU 60 496 12%
Anacleto Carbajosa Prieto ANCP 1228 10851 11%
Banco Agrario de Baleares BABA 5494 44088 12%
Banco de Burriana BBUR 18804 38695 49%
Banco Cooperativo del Norte de Espan˜a BCNE 4026 16872 24%
Banco del Escorial BESC 149 3540 4%
Banco de Ferrerias BFER 266 46138 1%
Banco de Figueres BFIG 1471 7078 21%
Banca Lopez Bru BLOB 29759 91774 32%
Banco Mercantil Agricola BMAG 2823 21953 13%
Banca March BMCH 10042 45526 22%
Banco de Menorca BMEN 1172 30165 4%
Bonifacio Cano y Cano BONI 0 1399 0%
Bartolome Payeras BPAY 8564 53438 16%
Barcaiztegui y Maestre BYMA 481 1486 32%
Fomento Agricola, Ind. y Com. Lluchmajor FAIL 411 1403 29%
Francisco Castaner FCAS 2896 26284 11%
Felix Ribera FELI 1012 4540 22%
Herederos de Antonio Ridruejo HARI 398 1185 34%
Hijo de Dominguez HDOM 614 1869 33%
Hilario Dominguez HILD 685 2837 24%
Hijo de Juan Ferrer HJUF 1107 10055 11%
Luis del Pueyo y Pueyo LPYP 684 1573 43%
Matias Crespo Mun˜oz MACM 42 218 19%
M. Bruguera Sabater MBRU 0 1823 0%
Miqueletorena, Muguiro y Cia MIQU 72 2896 2%
Narciso Obanza NARC 318 4680 7%
Raimundo Perez Perez RAPP 0 1762 0%
Segundo Gimenez SEGG 3869 11360 34%
Solomon Benhamu SOLO 1095 3115 35%
Union Iberica Mobiliaria e Inmobiliaria UIMI 8300 11885 70%
Viuda de Esteban Rodriguez Silva VEST 942 4279 22%
Viuda de Jose Delmuns VJDE 46 419 11%
Viuda de M. Sargatal VMSA 2571 8764 29%
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The limits to lender of last resort inter-
ventions in emerging economies: evidence
from the Gold Standard and the Great
Depression in Spain
3.1 Introduction
When most European countries returned to the gold standard during the second
half of the 1920s, they limited their central banks’ room for lender of last re-
sort (LLR) interventions during banking crises. In such circumstances, monetary
authorities had a hard choice to make: they could limit emergency liquidity as-
sistance to the amounts compatible with their convertibility rules or they could
ensure they provided enough assistance for the banking sector to overcome liq-
uidity shocks. The first might imply allowing for the banking system to undergo
severe liquidity pressure, while the second might force them to suspend convert-
ibility (Eichengreen, 1992). This trade-off implied that prioritizing exchange rate
stability was a major cause of banking crises during the Great Depression, con-
tributing to the deflationary dynamics of the 1930s (Bernanke and James, 1991;
James, 2002). At the same time, this meant that central banks in countries
that suspended gold-convertibility had much more room to act (Eichengreen and
Sachs, 1985; Grossman, 1994). Spain is commonly used as an illustration of this
trade-off, as it operated an currency that was not convertible to gold. Accord-
ingly, conventional accounts argue that Spain avoided the Great Depression by
never being on the gold standard (Temin, 1993; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
This chapter revisits Spanish banking developments in the 1930s, with a spe-
cific focus on the 1931 financial crisis. I use detailed and newly collected archival
evidence from the Banco de Espan˜a (BdE) and the banking sector. In particular,
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I argue that the actual policy options available to Spanish monetary authorities
were very limited. Because of rapid currency depreciation and growing currency
mismatches in the banking system, Spain lost its monetary independence and
ability to implement a fully-loaded lender of last resort intervention in 1931. Mon-
etary authorities only regained command of monetary policy once capital controls
were introduced. This delayed the intervention and limited its scope, and helps
understand the sharp contraction in bank lending and economic activity that
took place after April 1931. The interpretation provided in this chapter contrasts
significantly with the traditional account. Using the macroeconomic trilemma
framework, the literature on the Great Depression usually depicts Spain as hav-
ing deliberately forgone the exchange rate stability granted by a gold standard
in exchange for room for discretion in monetary policy (and free capital mobil-
ity). Instead, I argue that the Spanish experience during 1931 supports recent
research that questions the actual existence of a macroeconomic trilemma for
emerging economies and suggests that policy options are more frequently limited
to a dilemma: regardless of the exchange rate regime, when the monetary pol-
icy stance changes in the center country (the main creditor), room for monetary
policy autonomy is possible only once capital controls are in place (Farhi and
Werning, 2014; Rey, 2015).
In fact, during the Interwar Period, Spanish policymakers only accepted a
floating exchange rate as long as the peseta remained relatively stable or appre-
ciated due to capital inflows (1923-1927), reflecting their aim at the reputation
that came attached to a strong currency at the time (Eichengreen, 1992; Strau-
mann, 2010). This trend, however, ended as soon as the international reversal of
capital flows gained momentum after 1928 (Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016).
As soon as the peseta began to fall rapidly between 1928 and 1931, the trilemma
boiled down to a dilemma. Exchange rate stability and a peg to gold emerged as
superior policy goals (Sarda`, 1936; Vandello´s, 1936; Velarde, 1968; Mart´ın-Acen˜a,
1984). Because of that, Spain was not exempt from other countries’ limitations
in dealing with the 1931 financial crisis, as policymakers faced very similar con-
straints to countries on gold. My argument is supported by new archival evidence
that combines bank-level data on bank borrowing from the the BdE’s discount
window during the critical months of 1931 with balance sheet data also at the
bank level. This allows me to track major changes in the BdE’s lending opera-
tions at a daily frequency and couple them with bank balance sheets in order to
assess the evolution of liquidity and bank portfolios during and after the crisis.
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The main finding of the chapter is that when a large number of depositors
panicked following the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in April
1931 and banks started losing deposits, Spanish monetary authorities fell prey to
the vicious cycle of a “third-generation” currency crisis.114 In this context, LLR
interventions in emerging economies tend to be less effective than in core, devel-
oped economies, because monetary authorities are unable to accommodate the
high demand for liquidity denominated in domestic currency without severely
affecting the exchange rate and contributing to the ongoing reversal in capital
flows (Calvo, 2006). Similar to what Germany, Austria or Hungary suffered also
in 1931, the combination of bank and currency problems aggravated the crisis
and reduced policymakers’ room to act (James, 1984; Schnabel, 2004a; Temin,
2008; Schubert, 1991; Macher, 2018). In this sense, the Spanish experience is
not dissimilar from the general experience in debtor countries during the Great
Depression, as the threat of capital flight put monetary authorities between a
rock and a hard place (Wolf, 2008). Comparing bank deposit losses and the liq-
uidity assistance provided by the BdE, I show that because of the limitations
outlined above, monetary authorities fell short of providing banks with sufficient
liquidity assistance. This limitation was especially binding when banks suffered
the sharpest liquidity shocks in April and May. As a result, despite demand for
credit continued to exist, banks that were affected by the bank run contracted
lending. Banks that were unaffected continued to lend. I also find that banks
that obtained more liquidity assistance from the BdE called back less loans, sug-
gesting that, within its limits, the intervention of the BdE worked in the right
direction. These findings suggest that, within its limitations, the LLR interven-
tion conducted by the BdE worked in the right direction. Moreover, they also
suggest that willingness to lend did not disappear overnight for banks that could
overcome or were not affected by the liquidity shock. However, monetary author-
ities were limited in how much liquidity they could provide to ailing banks and a
sharp contraction in aggregate lending could not be avoided.
The micro bank data analysis conducted in this chapter produces strong par-
allels with the Central European twin crises of 1931 in the importance of the
feedback loop between banking and currency problems, but it also holds similari-
ties with the case of the United States during the Great Depression. My findings
are in line with the literature that describes banking crises of the 1930s in the
United States as caused by a sharp liquidity shock that had its origins in a gen-
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eral contagion of panic, affecting both healthy and unhealthy banks (Friedman
and Schwartz, 1963; Calomiris and Gorton, 1991). Although Richardson (2007)
found a role for both liquidity and solvency problems in explaining bank failures
during the 1930s and Calomiris and Mason (1997) found that in the case of the
Chicago panic of 1932 banks that failed had weaker fundamentals than those
that survived the Depression, more recent work by Carlson (2010) suggests that
the liquidity shock caused by the contagion of panic did indeed exacerbate the
Depression by eliminating viable alternatives (other than closure) for troubled
banks. Endogenous liquidity problems were also highlighted as a determinant of
the sharp contraction in bank lending in the United States during the Depression
(Postel-Vinay, 2016).
The Spanish experience in 1931 provides an interesting case study of the ef-
fects of a bank run that had little to do with depositors’ perception of bank
fundamentals, despite there were important vulnerabilities in the banking sector.
Consistent with contemporary narrative accounts, I find that the only predictors
of bank-level deposit losses during the bank run that started in April 1931 are
specific political and social developments and an increase in hoarding, but not
observable bank fundamentals. In a similar vein to what Bernanke (1983) and
Anari et al. (2005) described for the banking panics in the United States during
the Great Depression, my results show that even once hoarded cash returned to
banks after the panic subdued, it was parked into safe liquid assets and lending
to the non-financial sector did not recover, thus highlighting the persistent effect
of sharp liquidity shocks among affected banks. That depositors do not seem to
have observed invidivual-bank fundamentals when withdrawing deposits does not
mean that bank fundamentals played no role in the crisis. Monetary authorities
were very concerned about growing currency mismatches in the banking system,
and this delayed and limited their intervention. Therefore, even if weak bank
fundamentals do not seem to have played a role in determining depositor behav-
ior in Spain in 1931, they were definitely present in the banking sector at the
time, and conditioned the policy reaction to the crisis. However, in contrast to
the case of the United States, Germany or Austria, where bank failures were a
central feature of the 1930s banking crises, my findings show that even in the
absence of widespread or large bank failures, the contraction in bank loans was
sharp and permanent.115
Monetary authorities in emerging markets face severe problems dealing with
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banking crises, as these usually take place along balance of payments prob-
lems and rapid currency depreciation. Therefore, LLR interventions in emerging
economies tend to be less effective than in core economies, because central banks
are unable to accommodate the higher demand for liquidity denominated in do-
mestic currency without severely affecting the exchange rate and contributing to
an often already ongoing reversal in capital flows (Calvo, 2006). This can cause
costly withdrawals of credit lines to the private sector. So far, Spain has been
depicted as having avoided the Depression because of the inconvertibility of the
peseta. New evidence provided in this chapter shows that non adherence to gold-
convertibility was not a sufficient condition for escaping financial troubles during
the Great Depression.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature
on the Great Depression in Spain and relates it to the one on twin crises. Section
III explains the limits to the LLR intervention. Section IV describes the new data
sources used and Section V conducts an empirical approach to the determinants
of the 1931 bank run as well as to the consequences of the limitations faced by
monetary authorities. Section VI concludes.
3.2 The Gold Standard and the Great Depres-
sion in Spain
3.2.1 Revisiting tradition
Conventional accounts of the Great Depression argue that Spain managed to es-
cape it. As the only country that operated an inconvertible currency–the peseta–
Spain had two advantages over countries on the Gold Standard. First, thanks to
the depreciation of the peseta that started in 1928 Spain avoided the deflationary
pressures that plagued most countries (Choudhri and Kochin, 1980; Temin, 1993).
Second, when a bank run ensued in 1931, the BdE would have been able to lend
freely at banks’ demand as it was not subject to the strictures of a gold-convertible
currency (Tortella and Palafox, 1984; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). In addition,
since Spain did not experience widespread bank failures during the 1930s, it is
commonly coded as not having suffered a banking crisis in 1931 (Bernanke and
James, 1991; Grossman, 1994). First, I review the evolution of the main macroe-
conomic variables in order to show the depth of the economic contraction in
Spain. Second, I highlight the fact that the previous account underestimates
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that Spain did not experience a banking crisis in complete isolation, but cou-
pled with sharp deterioration in the balance of payments and a currency crisis.
Accordingly, I review the limitations imposed by the dynamics of twin crises in
emerging economies, especially when the banking sector plays a fundamental role.
This section provides contrasting evidence.116 Between 1931 and 1934, the
Spanish economy accumulated a GDP loss of 13%, defined as the deviation from
the pre-crisis growth trend (Betra´n et al., 2012). Figure 1.1 shows that between
1929 and 1933, Spain fared much worse than countries that devalued in the au-
tumn of 1931 (UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) and than countries that remained
on gold (e.g. Belgium, Italy or Switzerland). In fact, Eichengreen and Mitch-
ener (2003) find a very sharp contraction in their credit composite indicator for
Spain, which is comparable to the one experienced by Germany or the United
States. More recent and higher frequency estimates of monthly economic activity
provided by Albers (2018) reveal a similar picture: the recession in Spain was
severe, and as long-lasting as in many countries on gold. Other measures of eco-
nomic activity tell exactly the same story; private investment and bank lending
collapsed in 1931 (Figure 3.1).
The country was also affected by the reversal in international capital flows that
took place during the late 1920s and early 1930s (Accominotti and Eichengreen,
2016; Betra´n and Pons, 2018). After the strong capital inflows due to its neutral-
ity during the First World War, capital abandoned the country during 1920-25.
In 1926 and 1927, following international trends, capital inflows returned. This
short lived episode ended when accumulated current account deficits coupled with
capital outflow from 1928 (Betra´n and Pons, 2018). As a result, the peseta started
depreciating rapidly from 1928 (Figure 3.2). The depreciation of the peseta cer-
tainly explains higher comparative inflation rates during the late 1920s vis-a`-vis
countries on gold, as Choudhri and Kochin (1980) argued. But when deflation
became a worldwide concern in the early 1930s, Spain suffered a drastic appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate versus Sterling and the US Dollar (Figure 3.3).
By mid-1932, Spanish authorities pegged the peseta to the French Franc, over-
valuing the exchange rate and importing deflation (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). Given
the international depression, pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices
seems to have been limited: imports contracted by 40% between 1931 and 1935
(Prados de la Escosura, 2003) and import prices fell by 10% (Instituto Nacional
de Estad´ıstica, 1934). External demand did not contribute to avoid deflationary
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Figure 3.1: Economic activity (1930=100)
Source: Prados de la Escosura (2003) for GDP and its components, Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario
for bank lending.
pressures. Exports collapsed by 43% between 1931 and 1935, and data on prices
confirms this: the GDP deflator points to a drop in the aggregate price level in
1932 and 1933, mainly driven by the collapse of import and export prices (Pra-
dos de la Escosura, 2003). The CPI fell by 3.1% during 1931-35, while WPI fell
by 8.2% during the same period (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, 1934; Malu-
quer de Motes, 2013). This is not surprising for a country in which 80% of exports
were commodities (Tena, 2005). Moreover, real interest rates increased during
the early 1930s, despite the BdE cut the Discount and Lombard rates from 1932
(Comı´n, 2012).
3.2.2 Gold Standard mentalite´ and twin crises
Spanish policymakers and the public in general hardly appreciated any potential
benefits stemming from a falling peseta. Several Ministers of Finance resigned
as a consequence of the depreciation that took place between 1928 and 1931,
which contributed to reinforce the link between the evolution of the peseta and
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Figure 3.2: Capital flows and exchange rate, 1915-34
Note: million pesetas. A positive amount represents net capital inflows. Capital flows are estimated by adding
the current account balance to the changes in gold reserves. Source: own calculations using Betra´n and Pons
(2018) and Mart´ınez Mendez (2005).
political instability.117 Currency appreciation was regarded as a sign of prowess,
while depreciation was politically unacceptable. Despite gold-inconvertibility of
the peseta, Spanish policymakers were bounded by the same intellectual frame-
work of the time, the so-called gold-standard mentalite´ (Eichengreen and Temin,
1997; Moure´, 2002; Straumann, 2010). This is not surprising; the literature on
emerging markets and exchange rate regimes shows that policymakers tend to
be reluctant to either allow their exchange rate to float freely (Calvo and Rein-
hart, 2001, 2002), or to reveal the true nature of their policies, highlighting the
difference between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes (Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger, 2005; Urban, 2009). Spain never abandoned the aspiration of a
strong, fixed exchange rate and a gold-convertible currency, and enacted poli-
cies that pursued these goals. This is not only demonstrated by contemporary
debates about joining the Gold Standard, but it was also revealed by specific
policy moves when the peseta appreciated in 1926 and depreciated from 1928.118
Even if attempts at exchange rate stabilization failed repeatedly, they were not
innocuous, and eventually reduced monetary authorities’ room to act during the
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of the peseta exchange rate (1924-1936)
Source: Mart´ınez Mendez (1990).
1931 crisis.
It is clear from the evidence presented above that by 1931, Spain had been
experiencing an ongoing deterioration in the balance of payments and severe ex-
change rate depreciation. By April 1931, the peseta had already lost 50% of its
value against Sterling.119 Importantly, banking crises in emerging markets rarely
happen in complete isolation. Instead they frequently take place along mounting
deterioration in the balance of payments (Bordo and Meissner, 2006; Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2009). This explains why the provision of emergency liquidity by the
central bank can be severely limited. The collapse of the exchange rate feeds back
into the already weak banking sector, which is commonly affected by currency
mismatches (Bordo, 2006). In this framework, so-called “third generation cur-
rency crisis”, currency depreciation is reinforced by growing currency mismatches
in banks and firms’ balance sheets (Krugman, 1999; Chang and Velasco, 2000). In
addition, the increase in the domestic currency value of banks’ foreign exchange
liabilities increases the chances of a bank run. This might happen because depos-
itors fear that banks will be unable to repay deposits, as the depreciation of the
currency requires committing an increasing amount of domestic currency to repay
debt in foreign exchange. At this stage, the provision of emergency liquidity to
the banking sector might have strong drawbacks. Holders of domestic currency
will then expect further depreciation as monetary authorities will have to expand
the monetary base to provide liquidity assistance to ailing banks, among other
things, to meet depositors’ demands of repayment. Eventually, both problems
feed back to each other and the currency enters a vicious cycle that aggravates
the crisis. Policymakers find their hands tied, and eventually have to resort to
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capital controls and international assistance, (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In
the extreme, a LLR intervention can lead to “currency substitution” if the public
starts switching away from the domestic, depreciating, currency (Calvo and Ve´gh,
1999). In such a scenario, expanding the balance sheet of the central bank to fight
an eventual bank run enters into direct conflict with exchange rate stability. The
threat and eventual speed of capital flight limits policy options, a problem that
core, developed economies do not necessarily experience (Calvo, 2006; Rey, 2015).
It is usually difficult to identify the initial shock that triggers the vicious cy-
cle described above (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Schnabel, 2004a). Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutchinson (2000) concluded in the context
of liberalized capital accounts (in the 1980s), banking crises tend to precede cur-
rency crises. However, these findings are somewhat at odds with the effects that
rapid exchange rate depreciations can have on banks’ balance sheets, multiply-
ing the domestic value of liabilities denominated in foreign currency (Schnabel,
2004a). In fact, there seems to be no strong reason for a domestic bank run if
depositors are not aware of banks’ currency mismatches. At the same time, if
the bank run is triggered by a shock unrelated to banks’ currency mismatches,
causality can go from banking to currency. The Spanish experience provides an
interesting case study because it allows for the identification of a clear exogenous
trigger for the bank run: the unexpected results of the April 1931 local elections.
Almost overnight, Spain changed from a Monarchy that had sympathized and
co-existed with authoritarianism to a democratic Republic. Despite the peseta
had been falling since 1928, banks had continued to receive deposits until March
1931 (Figure 3.4). By then, however, currency mismatches in the banking sector
had increased substantially (Figure 3.5). As Figure 3.5 shows, between 1928 and
1931, foreign exchange-denominated liabilities in the banking sector (excluding
foreign banks) increased from 10% of peseta-denominated loans to 25-30%. In this
context, the bank run was the spark that put in motion the “third-generation”
dynamics described above, which then delayed and limited the scope of the LLR
intervention.
Similar to what Schnabel (2004a) highlighted for the case of Germany, since
most of the literature considering the Spanish crisis of 1931 appeared before the
development of a theoretical literature on twin crises, the importance of the de-
preciation of the peseta as a limiting factor to deal with the banking crisis has
been frequently overlooked.120 As a result, the literature has tended to take for
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of total deposits and loans (1931q1=100)
Note: deposits and loans in pesetas. Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
granted that the BdE could expand its balance sheet without any consideration
about the evolution of the monetary base and the exchange rate. However, as it
is often the case with emerging markets, monetary authorities’ moves were not
necessarily credible to the eyes of foreign exchange markets: sharp increases in
the monetary base were interpreted by foreign investors as a sign of authorities’
inability to deal with the crisis, rather than as a sign of policy boldness. More-
over, the country had been suffering continued capital outflows since 1928 (Figure
3.2), and the expansion of the amount of pesetas in circulation could only operate
in the same direction: fueling capital flight. As a result, a large increase in the
monetary base could not take place unless strong capital controls were introduced.
The fact that the peseta was not convertible to gold did not imply unlimited
room for LLR interventions. The conventional account described above implicitly
neglects the fact that the BdE operated a currency that could not be converted
to gold, but not a completely fiat currency. Taking the two things as synonyms is
misleading.121 There were limits on how much monetary base could be created,
and this depended on the gold–and to a much lesser extent silver–reserve at the
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Figure 3.5: Currency mismatches in the banking system
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BdE (Mart´ın-Acen˜a et al., 2013). In fact, when the bank run started in April
1931, there was very little room to expand the fiduciary issue to support ailing
banks. Another important limitation that is often neglected by the literature
on LLR interventions is that a rapid increase in the monetary base to assist the
banking system can turn out to be counterproductive. Faced with a reversal
in capital flows or the freezing of foreign lending (the so-called “sudden stop”
episodes), monetary authorities lacking international reserves have to resort to
finance emergency liquidity provision with increases in the supply of domestic
currency, affecting both the price level and the exchange rate.
Interestingly, Spain did not lack international reserves. The BdE held the
world’s fourth largest gold reserve at the time, only after the US, Britain and
France. However, already from 1928, all governments failed to persuade the BdE
to use gold sales to stabilize the exchange rate, as all parties involved disagreed
on the specific stabilization policies and their costs. Hence, on top of balance
of payments and monetary constraints, institutional design also played a role in
limiting the policy reaction in 1931. This explains why during the crisis, tempo-
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rary stabilization of the exchange through gold sales was never a feasible option.
As a consequence, assistance to ailing banks could only be provided freely once
the provisional Republican Government had imposed capital controls, to ensure
that expanding the monetary base would not translate directly into capital flight
and further exchange rate depreciation. In fact, Spain was the first country to
impose such controls, in the last days of May 1931 (Bernanke, 2000). As I show
in the following sections, however, this move took too long to allow banks to
overcome the sharp liquidity shock they suffered in the first months of the crisis
and contributed to the sharp contraction in credit supply.
3.3 The Banco de Espan˜a as a constrained lender
of last resort
3.3.1 The stabilization of the peseta and “original sin”
By 1931, Spanish authorities had spent three years trying to stabilize the ex-
change rate (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). All attempts failed. Repeated failure not
only contributed to the domestic and international discredit of monetary author-
ities’ ability to deal with exchange rate depreciation, but also limited room for
action during the 1931 banking crisis. This section provides evidence on how pre-
1931 attempts to stabilize the peseta ended up switching currency mismatches
from the government to the banking system, strengthening the link between the
banking and the currency crisis in 1931. I also show that when banks suffered a
sharp liquidity shock from April 1931 there was very little room to provide emer-
gency liquidity assistance. Fiduciary issuing was about to hit its legal maximum,
so the expansion of the monetary base to meet banks’ liquidity needs was capped.
Fearing a vicious cycle from the banking crisis to the currency crisis through ac-
celerating capital flight, authorities took one month and a half to allow for a large
increase in the monetary base, which only materialized after the introduction of
strong capital controls. Between 14 April, when the bank run started and 29
May, when capital controls became effective, the BdE could not attend all banks’
liquidity needs.
When the Republic was proclaimed on 14 April, the peseta had been falling
since 1928 (Figure 3.3). Incumbent politicians and the public in general decried
the fall of the peseta. The appreciation that took place in 1926-27 had pushed
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dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera and his Minister of Finance Jose´ Calvo-Sotelo, to
make exchange rate stability the cornerstone of the regime’s economic reputation,
going as far as tying exchange rate stability to moral and racial considerations.122
This backfired when capital started leaving the country and the peseta began to
fall in 1928. The evolution of the exchange rate became the main reason behind
the resignation of several Ministries of Finance (including Calvo-Sotelo) and one
of the main factors behind the growing discredit and later resignation of Primo de
Rivera (Velarde, 1968; Eguidazu, 1979; Ben-Ami, 2012). Interestingly, in 1929,
Primo de Rivera himself regretted that “when almost a year ago we saw the pe-
seta around 27 per Sterling, national vanity made us dream for some hours about
reaching parity with gold [i.e. the 1868 parity]. The Gold-Peseta! Viva Espan˜a!
That was more a moral success than an economic one...”.123 Some years later, in
1933, Calvo-Sotelo claimed that “if in 1927 the Government had intervened–our
critics claim–it would have been possible to buy foreign exchange in order to cre-
ate a large reserve. This is not only an ex-post recommendation but also unfair.
Monetary interventionism to stop the appreciation of a currency! No. In 1927,
no government would have dared doing that”.124
Thus, from 1928, the fall of the peseta and the discredit of the Spanish Monar-
chy and its different executives (the Dictatorship and later the so-called Softa-
torship) became strongly interlinked.125 As a response, in January 1930 the
Dictatorship took the last attempt to stabilize the peseta: the issuance of gold
bonds. Gold collected would be used to compensate the losses from previous
failed interventions, to liquidate the Government’s accumulated short term for-
eign exchange debtor positions, and to intervene in foreign exchange markets to
defend the peseta. As in previous occasions, this stabilization plan also failed.
However, the way gold bonds were issued and subscribed, had implications for
the 1931 crisis, as it tied the hands of the three main actors–the Government, the
banking system and the BdE–leaving them with very little room to act.
The Government issued 350 million pesetas in 10-year gold bonds in the first
days of 1930. The goal was to liquidate the Government’s accumulated short term
foreign exchange debtor positions, which had been growing since 1928, when for-
eign exchange interventions started and failed repeatedly.126 Gold bonds were
very attractive: they paid unusually high yields (6%), were made eligible as col-
lateral at the discount window of the BdE at a rate specially set for these bonds
(4%) and carried taxation exemptions. Subscribers of the bonds could acquire
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them either with gold (coins or bullion, domestic or foreign) or with foreign, gold-
convertible currencies. Coupons were to be paid quarterly in gold-pesetas, which
were defined at the parity of 1868, of 25.20 pesetas per Sterling or 5.18 pesetas
per US Dollar. They could be serviced in foreign gold coins and in bills denom-
inated in currencies that were convertible to gold. In short, gold bonds were
redeemable in foreign exchange at the 1868 parity.127 Despite previous failed at-
tempts to stabilize the peseta, demand for gold bonds was very strong.128 Bonds
were bought mainly by Spanish and foreign banks, while the BdE ended up not
holding any.129 In practice, in trying to stop the fall of the peseta, the Dictator-
ship transferred currency and maturity mismatches from its balance sheet to the
banking sector’s, thus planting the seeds for a twin crisis, were banks to suffer a
sharp liquidity shock.130 Strong demand for gold bonds was interpreted as a sig-
nal of solid confidence in the stabilization of the peseta, but the latter continued
to fall during 1930, as current account deficits mounted and capital continued to
leave the country (Figure 3.2). By the time gold bonds were issued, the peseta
traded at 70% of its 1868 parity; just before the proclamation of the Republic in
April 1931, it traded at 54%; by September 1931, just before Britain left gold,
it traded at 45% (Figure 3.2). The continued depreciation of the peseta made
honoring the bonds increasingly expensive for the Government. Even more so
as the collapse of international trade caused a fall in foreign exchange revenue
at the customs, making it even more costly to service coupon payments in gold-
convertible currencies.131
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Given their attractiveness, the main Spanish banks purchased all bonds the
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Government had earmarked for them, amounting to one third of the total is-
suance. Spanish banks didn’t hold any gold themselves, and they held almost no
foreign exchange in cash, so they borrowed abroad.132 They did so by embarking
in short-term forward contracts in London (so-called dobles in Spain) by which
they sold spot pesetas against Sterling, and repurchased them at a term no longer
than three months. As long as the peseta did not depreciate rapidly or if foreign
exchange markets trusted the stabilization plans of the Government, banks were
able to rollover these operations, especially because their access to the discount
window of the BdE was not quantitatively limited before April 1931. If the pe-
seta continued to fall, this would cause severe pressure to their balance sheets by
increasing their currency mismatches even more, and would leave them unable to
repay their lenders in gold or “hard currency”. To do so, they might also have to
access the discount window of the BdE to obtain pesetas and buy Sterling, thus
contributing to existing pressure on the exchange rate. Therefore, by the time
the banking crisis started in April 1931, banks were in a very fragile position, as
they had rapidly accumulated currency mismatches after several years of lowering
their exposure to exchange rate volatility (Figure 3.5).
If one bank suffered a strong liquidity shock, it could, in principle, ask the
BdE for liquidity assistance. As long as this happened only to one bank, this
would not pose a problem, as a one-off liquidity injection to a single bank would
not necessarily trigger a run on the currency or make foreign investors suspicious
about the feasibility of stabilization plans.133 However, when from April 1931
more than 30 banks lost more than 15% of their deposits, the amount of liquid-
ity required by the system was not readily available at the discount window of
the BdE. Moreover, as this was coupled with a sharp depreciation of the peseta,
Spain fell prey to the “third-generation” currency crisis scenario described above:
banks needed liquidity to convert clients’ deposits into cash and to rollover their
short-term liabilities in foreign exchange. At the same time, the creation of this
liquidity caused their currency mismatches to increase, as the public exported
capital and demand for foreign currency caused the peseta to fall even more. In
turn, rolling over short-term foreign exchange forwards required more liquidity
assistance from the BdE.
The BdE had not subscribed to any of the government gold-bonds, and there-
fore was reasonably isolated from the direct effects from the fall of the peseta.
Moreover, it valued its gold reserves at the parity of 1868, so its profits were pro-
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tected from fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. However, when in April
banks started losing deposits and turned to the discount window, the BdE faced
a binding trade-off between liquidity provision and exchange rate stability. On
the one hand, it had to take a conservative stance in the provision of liquidity
assistance, as both its own credit risk and the binding quantitative limits on fidu-
ciary issuing made it difficult to satisfy liquidity demand. On the other, the BdE
had incentives to be as bold as possible, in order to avoid the deepening of the
banking crisis. If it did not provide as much liquidity assistance as banks needed,
these risks could materialize. If it provided too much, they could also do so, as
capital flight would throw the peseta into a depreciation spiral and add pressure
to the same ailing banks. From the very onset of the crisis, the BdE made it
known that it would be ready to help banks facing liquidity problems but subject
to a certain set of conditions, as it faced limitations on how much assistance it
could provide.
Right after the proclamation of the Republic, the BdE acknowledged that:134
“(...) banks have faced deposit withdrawals that forced them to resort
to us, to be able to comply with their clients’ demands, by rediscount-
ing bills and using their credit accounts. This has caused circulation
to increase (...) and despite the fact that we have enough reserves to
allow for larger increases in money circulation and will attend to the
petitions that we are required to attend to, the assistance that is pro-
vided to private banks must be consistent with their healthy policy and
the current circumstances, with the final aim of avoiding an excessive
increase in the volume of circulation, and thus affecting the external
value of the currency and the price level (...)”
As much as they mattered, it was not only the exchange rate or the price level
that affected the BdE’s reaction; it was also worried about its own exposure to
credit risk. If the economy entered a severe recession, protested and eventually
unpaid bills of exchange could weight on its profits. In general, the BdE had
been very conservative in the type of securities it was willing to purchase from
banks. Similarly to other central banks at the time, the BdE operated following
the real bills doctrine, only discounting bills that represented an underlying real
commercial transaction and that were therefore “self-liquidating”, and avoiding
to discount financial bills135. Since bills were accepted directly by the banks that
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rediscounted them, counterparty risk appeared, as banks that were selling the
bills were under severe liquidity pressure themselves136. In addition, banks used
public debt as collateral for advances at the discount window of the BdE, so it
was also exposed to increased market risk as the market value of the collateral
banks used to borrow fell sharply.
While ready to help, the BdE was constrained. It also feared losing gold.
Officially, its gold reserve was only at risk if the BdE agreed to use it to join the
Government in a stabilization plan that happened to go wrong, something the
former had resisted since 1928. Only then, the Government could ask the BdE to
cover 50% of the costs of the intervention with its own gold reserve.137 However,
there were also unofficial concerns that equally limited the BdE’s intervention.
The more the peseta depreciated and the less gold in the Government’s vaults,
the higher the risk for the BdE of being pushed to use its own gold to defend the
currency138. As the stabilization of the peseta continued to fail (Figure 3.3) and
the Government ran out of gold again (Figure 3.6a), by the end of 1930 gold held
at the vaults of the BdE—its shareholders’ private property—was the very last
reserve that Spanish authorities could use to defend the peseta, although they
needed the approval of the board of the BdE.
In October 1930, amid the unstoppable fall of the peseta and unable to get
the BdE involved in gold sales to intervene in foreign exchange markets, the Gov-
ernment had sent a delegation of the BdE to meet with representatives of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Paris (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 2006). The
goal was to ask for a credit in Sterling for the final stabilization of the currency.
Negotiations continued in London, where Montagu Norman, the Governor of the
Bank of England, argued that Spain should use the BdE’s gold reserve to sta-
bilize the peseta before asking for external assistance. In fact, Norman believed
that news about the BdE mobilizing its gold would suffice to stop the depreci-
ation.139 Norman’s hard opposition to a line of credit failed to understand the
high political sensitivity of gold-related issues in Spain (Toniolo and Clement,
2005); the BdE abhorred the idea of mobilizing gold or using it as collateral for
international credits.140 Norman’s stance is perhaps better explained by his fears
of the potential spillovers of an excessive intervention of the BIS in Spanish af-
fairs:141 “the responsibility over a long period of stabilization is a domestic and
political question and, judging from past experiences, great difficulties are liable
to arise and mistakes are liable to be made, which cannot be assumed by the BIS
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or anybody in that position”. Increased political instability in Spain–with the fall
of the peseta as one of its main driving factors–implied that the BIS would be
regarded as liable for the outcomes of an intervention conducted in a country with
a record of political and economic uncertainty. This was a risk that, according
to Norman, the BIS ought not to take.
Finally, a solution that satisfied both Norman and Spanish monetary author-
ities was found. The BdE agreed to ship gold to London as collateral for the BIS
stabilization credit (Figure 3.6b). In turn, the BIS acceded to extend the loan,
but only after a stabilization plan for the peseta was put on paper by Federico
Carlos Bas, then Governor of the BdE. The plan, which had been actually drafted
by BIS agent Michel Mitzakis, stipulated that: “Spain would reform its monetary
system by adopting the gold bullion standard, after a transitory phase on the gold
exchange standard, at a somehow devalued parity relative to the prewar period”.142
On 29 December, the BIS lent £1.5 million to the BdE for a duration of three
months, to be fully reimbursed, principal and interest, in one single payment at
maturity.143 The BIS charged 2.5% interest and a 0.125% commission, and the
loan was fully collateralized by £1 million in gold bars and £0.5 million in gold
coins, deposited at the Bank of England in the name of the BIS. The credit was
doubled to £3 million after the three initial months, on 29 March 1931. In addi-
tion to the BIS credit, the Government had also approached foreign banks to ask
for stabilization loans. This materialized on 26 March 1931, when J.P.Morgan,
the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and Mendelsshon & Co. opened credit
accounts to the BdE with the guarantee of the Government, amounting to 60
millions US Dollars, and to be repaid in 18 months and at a rate of 1.0% above
the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.144 After months of
negotiations and a falling peseta, the outcome of the agreement with the BIS and
foreign banks and Spain’s commitment to join gold, was well received in foreign
exchange markets, causing the peseta to appreciate in the very days before the
Republic was proclaimed (Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.7: Spot exchange rate of the peseta in London (daily)
Source: Financial Times Historical Archive.
The appreciation trend ended when the Republic was proclaimed on 14 April
1931 (Figure 3.7). Just as its predecessors, the provisional Republican Govern-
ment thought that domestic and foreign speculation against the peseta was the
cause of its unstoppable depreciation, and wanted to identify its ultimate source
before making any clear public statement about a new stabilization plan involving
a specific peg (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). The main consequence of this was a sudden
stop in foreign stabilization loans; international lenders canceled the credits they
had opened less than a month before.145 Foreign creditors claimed that stabiliza-
tion loans were not supposed to be used for ad hoc interventions that deviated
from the plan Spain had committed to, so the provisional Government was no
longer entitled to the funds. From the very onset of the crisis, Spanish monetary
authorities had very little room to defend the peseta in foreign exchange markets.
The situation could only be worsened by the bank run that started just af-
ter the proclamation of the Republic, on 14 April 1931. Between April and
September 1931, the banking system lost 20% of its deposits (Figure 3.4). The
deposit drain started in April, along the political regime change, but did not stop
there. It continued in May, following short-lived but violent incidents between
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supporters of the ousted Monarchy and the newborn Republic in which a number
of churches were burnt down in many provinces. In June, political uncertainty
about the General Elections (28 June 1931) and the cancellation of the BIS credit
also caused depositors to drain banks. Faced with a sudden drop in their liabil-
ities, banks had to turn to liquidate their assets. They did so by rediscounting
bills of exchange with the BdE, pledging public debt and liquidating loans. As
reflected by the quote above, the BdE was initially willing to assist banks under
pressure, but even if it would have wanted to provide as much liquidity as the
banking sector needed to overcome the liquidity shock (without considering any
of the risks described above), it could simply not do that. There were binding
quantitative limitations on how much fiduciary currency could be issued.
3.3.2 Capital outflows and fiduciary issuing limits
The second important limitation faced by Spanish monetary authorities came
from the quantitative cap on how much fiduciary currency could be created. The
fiduciary limit (the amount of notes that were not covered by the metallic reserve)
could be raised only after the approval of the Government.146 This implied that
just as in gold standard countries, room for LLR was ultimately limited by the
metallic cover. Figure 3.8 plots the evolution of notes in circulation as a percent-
age of the legal maximum as well as daily borrowing from the BdE. On 14 April
1931, the day the Republic was proclaimed, fiduciary notes in circulation were
already at 95% of their legal maximum. The limit was timidly raised, coming into
effect on 7 May, but banks and firms complained. Banks kept losing deposits and
notes in circulation reached the legal limit again. The second raise, this one more
ambitious, became effective on 29 May, only once the Government introduced
capital controls simultaneously.
One day later, banks approached the BdE to ask for an increase in the note
issuing limit.147 The vice governor of the BdE, Mr. Pedro Pan argued that there
were enough notes in circulation and that “maybe after some days, things will
ease”. This optimism contrasted with the situation banks were facing and, after
they insisted on the urgency of the situation, Mr. Pan accepted to ask for ap-
proval from the Government.148 A formal petition was sent to the Government
on 18 April 1931, when the BdE had already exhausted its room to lend (Fig-
ure 3.8). The provisional Minister of Finance of the Republic, Indalecio Prieto,
replied that the increase would not be above 200 million pesetas, over the existing
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limit of 5000 million, a tiny 4%. This was also considered enough by the BdE,
but banks claimed it was insufficient, and urged the Minister and the BdE to un-
derstand that the demands were not from banks themselves, but were the result
of clients’ liquidation of their deposits.149 The Government did not move until 5
May. On that day, banks lamented that “the Minister of Finance, after resisting
since 18 April without authorizing the increase in note circulation, finally decided
to increase it.”150 Two days later, on 7 May, the increase became effective, but
given its small size, the limit was quickly reached again. Figure 3.8 shows the
evolution of banks’ daily borrowing from the discount window of the BdE and
the evolution of notes in circulation as a percentage of the legal maximum. Right
after the first change in the note cover ratio (7 May), which caused the legal limit
to increase by 200 million pesetas, notes in circulation started to increase fast as
banks continued to face deposit withdrawals. Notes reached the new legal limit
of 5200 million pesetas, pushing for further action.
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Figure 3.9: Spot exchange rate and forward premium/discount of the peseta in
London (daily)
Note: forward rates are annualized 1-month forward premium (-) or discount (+). Source: Financial Times
Historical Archive.
The provisional Government was extremely concerned with capital flight, and
saw the latter as the main link between banking and currency problems. In-
creasing the fiduciary issuing limit again would imply that banks would receive
more liquidity, either to keep rolling over their forward positions in pesetas or to
pay back depositors, who would also probably convert their pesetas into “hard
currency”.151 This explains why the second, more ambitious increase in the fidu-
ciary note limit, could only come after capital controls were introduced, on 29
May.152 On this day, the issuing limit was raised to 6000 million pesetas–the legal
maximum and a 20% increase from the beginning of the crisis–at the same time
that capital controls were introduced through a Decree that limited and banned
operations in foreign exchange.153 As Figure 3.8 shows, right after the second
change in the cover ratio, discount window borrowing surged.
Rather than a remedy, the increase in the fiduciary issue was considered a
policy failure. The day before signing the Decree that allowed for the increase
in fiduciary issue, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Prieto, presented his resignation
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to the President of the Republic, Niceto Alcala´ Zamora, who refused to accept
it. Mr. Prieto considered that the increase in the fiduciary issue limit was evi-
dence of his failure to deal with the crisis (Cabezas, 2005). The next day, when
the increase in note issuing was authorized, he then presented his resignation to
the Council of Ministries, but he was also forced to remain in charge of financial
affairs (Velarde, 1983). Moreover, the Government faced the additional problem
that increasing the fiduciary limit would be interpreted by the public as a signal
that the banking crisis was more severe than initially thought. As a result, it took
one month and a half between the moment in which banks had started to suf-
fer deposit withdrawals and the provisional Government authorized for a second,
large increase in the fiduciary issuing limit. Interestingly, the Bank of England
faced the same problem in the last days of July 1931, but it was allowed to ex-
pand the fiduciary issue as early as on 1 August (Accominotti, 2012). That said,
the developments in foreign exchange markets once the increase in the fiduciary
note issuing limit was authorized in the last days of May, provide some rationale
for the delay in allowing the BdE to lend freely. Daily quotations of spot and
forward pesetas in London are plotted in Figure 3.9.
Until the proclamation of the Republic in 14 April 1931–and consistent with
the agreement between the BIS, foreign banks and Spanish monetary authorities–
foreign exchange markets had expected the peseta to stabilize and eventually join
the Gold Standard after a slight revaluation.154 The peseta traded at a premium
until the local elections of 12 April 1931, when it started trading at a small dis-
count. When the Republic was proclaimed on 14 April 1931, the peseta fell by
11%. Unaware of the severity of the bank run, foreign exchange markets con-
tinued to consider the stabilization possible, and the exchange rate remained
relatively flat in the second half of April.155 However, as banks needs for liquidity
increased, and a first increase in the fiduciary issue was granted on 7 May, the
peseta started falling again.156 The turning point came when authorities finally
acknowledged the scope of the liquidity shock that banks were suffering and al-
lowed for a large increase in the fiduciary limit. The increase in the issuing limit
became effective on 29 May, a Friday. Next Monday, the peseta started trading at
a heavy discount, and it fell by 14% against Sterling. Far from reassuring foreign
exchange markets, the policy reaction needed to deal with banks’ liquidity shock
was in direct conflict with the stabilization of the exchange rate. Right after the
Government increased the note issuing limit and introduced capital controls, the
Financial Times read:157
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“Spanish pesetas continued their record-breaking career (...). The in-
crease in the fiduciary issue and the flight of capital are the contrib-
utory factors leading to lack of confidence. (...) the swelling of the
fiduciary note issue to its legal maximum is an indicator of broken-
down confidence, and this must be accentuated by the confession that
the government feels bound to authorize further issues, that is, infla-
tion.”
If the provisional Government feared the collapse of the peseta, what tipped
the balance and pushed it to decide forgoing capital mobility and allowing the
BdE to increase the fiduciary issue? Contemporary accounts show that it was
only when the real economy started to suffer the consequences of the monetary
shock that the Government was pushed to make a decision. Just before the note
issuing limit was raised and capital controls were introduced, La Epoca reported
that:158
“Talks are being held about increasing the note issuing limit as firms
are suffocating, due to the restriction of credit from banks.”
The restriction of credit was especially hard in the real estate industry, but it
was not the only one affected.159 Members of different industries met with Mr.
Prieto, who acknowledged the meeting as a reason behind the expansion of the
fiduciary issuing limit:160
“I received the visit of members of industry, trade and real estate
from Madrid, which came to me to explain the truly anxious situa-
tion in which they find themselves because of the credit restrictions
from banks. Since banks justify the contraction in credit because the
Banco de Espan˜a is restricting rediscount operations, I announce that
an increase in note circulation will be authorized. (...) Even though
this might not be a pleasant measure, it will contribute to eliminate
the current suffocation caused by the restriction in credit.”
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Interestingly, the Minister passively acknowledged the mistake of having in-
creased the issuing limit only by a small amount earlier in May:161
“This afternoon I signed the decree authorizing the increase in fidu-
ciary circulation (...) in order to eliminate workers’ anxiety, as they
are being fired in large quantities because banks are restricting credit.
To avoid having to keep pinching small increases in circulation, I au-
thorized for the maximum increase, six million pesetas.”
On the day the issuing limit was raised, La Libertad reported that:162
“Before the issuing limit was raised, banks were cutting down lending
because they could not rediscount [at the BdE]”.
As capital controls became tighter and more effective, pressure on the peseta
eased. On 2 June 1931 the Government forced exporters to convert their holdings
of foreign currency into pesetas and asked banks to submit a statement with their
holdings of gold bonds and foreign currency, which would eventually be central-
ized and liquidated.163 Crucially, it started negotiating a credit with the Banque
de France (BdF) in Paris. The BdF would replace the BIS, whose credit would
be let to expire at maturity at the end of June. News about the negotiations
with the BdF caused the peseta to appreciate substantially.164 As negotiations
proceeded and banks continued to demand liquidity from the BdE, pressure on
the exchange rate returned. Increased political uncertainty before the 28 June
General Elections also caused markets to bet on further depreciation. However,
the results confirmed the strong support to the provisional Republican Govern-
ment and contributed to ease the pressure165.
After the insistence of the newly appointed Governor of the BdE, Julio Cara-
bias, the board agreed to ship £6 million in gold to the Banque de France branch
in Mont-de-Marsan (the closest branch to the Spanish border), as collateral for
an equivalent credit in Sterling.166 The loan would be used to nationalize forward
contracts in pesetas in London to solve the problem that banks had to service
them amid a falling peseta (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). Although pressure on the pe-
seta mounted again from mid July (despite an increase in the discount rate) banks
currency mismatches eased considerably thanks to the credit obtained from the
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Banque de France (Figure 3.5). By the end of August, foreign exchange markets
started expecting the peseta to be stabilized at 52 pesetas per Sterling.167 Mean-
while, the Government kept trying to get the BdE involved. Having acceded to
mobilize gold to the Banque de France, the Government tried to increase the pres-
sure for further uses of the gold reserve, although no more gold was shipped.168
Increased pressure from the Government on the Board of the BdE to use its gold
reserve changed market expectations about the future of the peseta, as markets
interpreted this as a possibility that gold sales to defend the peseta might take
place. This somewhat confirmed Montagu Norman’s claims that more than mov-
ing gold, it was the willingness to do so what would ease pressure on the peseta.169
This kick-started an appreciation trend that was reinforced soon enough, when
Britain left gold on 21 September 1931 and political stability improved in the
second half of October 1931.
3.4 Data
In order to reassess the impact of the 1931 crisis in the Spanish economy as well
as banking developments in Spain during the Great Depression, I draw on original
and newly collected archival material, both at the quantitative and qualitative
level. The new dataset used in this chapter allows to match the two sides of
the market—the central bank and the banking system—during the 1931 crisis.
Data on daily lending operations from the BdE to the banking sector is obtained
from the Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a. The sec-
ond source of data incorporates the banking system. I collect consolidated bank
balance sheets on a quarterly basis from 1922q4 until 1934q4 from the Boletines
del Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB). The total number of banks affiliated to
the CSB at the beginning of 1931 was 125, representing 85% of the banking
sector’s total assets and holding 89% of total deposits. In turn, there were 11
foreign banks and 166 small Spanish banks and bankers that were not affiliated
to the CSB, which represented 12% and 3% of total assets respectively. That
said, data from the Actas detailed above contains only the operations that were
conducted at the BdE’s discount window in Madrid. This implies that I am only
able to couple the two sides of the market for 24 banks, while I can use the full
sample when data from the BdE is not involved. However, these 24 banks repre-
sent around 65% of the total banking sector assets (Table 3.7), thus making the
sample representative.170 To the extent that it was feasible, I solved these data
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limitations by accessing a number of individual bank archives to gather informa-
tion on their daily borrowing from the BdE from their ledgers. I could do this for
three additional banks that borrowed mostly in the BdE’s branch in Barcelona,
which increases the geographical variation of the dataset.171 Information about
variables used in the empirical estimations and about banks is provided in Tables
3.6 and 3.7 in the Appendix. I also gather and use qualitative information from
the Minutes and Meetings of the Board of the CSB (Actas del Consejo Superior
Bancario), the Minutes of the Board of the BdE (Actas del Consejo de Gobierno
del Banco de Espan˜a) and annual reports of different banks. I also use data from
an occasional report published in 1935 by the Research Department of the BdE,
“Liquidez Bancaria, 1931-1934 ”. Where used, other quantitative or qualitative
sources are detailed; these are mostly contemporary accounts from economists,
politicians and both the Spanish and international financial press.
3.5 The 1931 financial crisis: empirical analysis
How did banks fare during the critical months of 1931? In order to answer this
question, this section conducts two empirical estimations. The first explores the
determinants of the bank run at the bank level, in order to show that it had little
to do with observable bank fundamentals. This helps clarify that the bank run
that the political regime change brought about was the initial spark that trig-
gered the “third-generation” currency crisis dynamics. The second estimation
shows that liquidity shortages at the bank-level predict the evolution of bank
lending and analyses the evolution of bank portfolios after the crisis.
3.5.1 Determinants of deposit withdrawals
Following the boom experienced during the First World War, the Spanish bank-
ing sector continued to grow throughout the 1920s. By the beginning of 1931,
total bank assets had expanded four-fold compared to 1900, and reached 40%
of GDP (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1985). Since the early 1920s, the largest Spanish banks
had extended a network of branches. While retaining their headquarters and
largest operation centers in Madrid, the expansion aimed at reaching new de-
positors and at competing with the regional branches of the BdE and local sav-
ings banks. In general, Spanish banks maintained high capital ratios, averaging
a stable 20% to 25% of total assets during the 1920s and 30s. Consequently,
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the banking sector had a substantial cushion to absorb potential losses. As in
many late-industrializing countries, the Spanish banking system operated under
the so-called “universal banking” model, in which banks mixed the traditional
commercial business with equity holdings in their customers and the presence in
decision-making organs of non-financial firms.
Banks had expanded in parallel to the strong economic growth that charac-
terized the second half of the 1920s and that lasted until 1930, when economic
activity decelerated. This growth was funded mainly through the expansion of
domestic deposits, although capital inflows in the late 1920s contributed to the
expansion of credit. As a result, Spanish banks had become less exposed to lia-
bilities denominated in foreign currency until 1930, when the Government issued
the gold bonds described above (Figure 3.5). Despite the latter caused bank cur-
rency mismatches to soar amid a falling peseta, depositors’ perception of banks’
health remained strong; banks continued to receive deposits and supply credit
until 1931. The bank run that started in April 1931 had everything to do with a
sharp and quite unexpected political regime change172. Following the increasingly
unstable and discredited dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (September
1923-January 1930), General Berenguer’s so-called softatorship (January 1930-
February 1931) and shortly after Admiral Aznar-Caban˜as had been appointed
President, king Alfonso XIII allowed for local elections. On 12 April 1931, Spain
held the first democratic elections in eight years. The results changed the country
almost overnight; Spain “went to sleep as a Monarchy and awoke as a Republic”,
as Admiral Aznar-Caban˜as famously put it. Republican parties won by a land-
slide in almost 80% of the capitals of provinces, including all the main cities
(Tusell, 1969).
This trend came to an abrupt end between April and September 1931 when,
following the Proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic, the banking sector
lost 20% of its retail deposits (Figure 3.4). On 14 April 1931, supporters of
Republican parties took the streets to proclaim the Second Spanish Republic.
Having lost the support of the army and unable to negotiate a transition, king
Alfonso XIII flew the country and a provisional government was formed, with
the main goal of holding general elections. These took place on 28 June 1931.
A second round vote extended until November, but the results of the June elec-
tions confirmed the strong majority of the Republican-Socialist coalition. The
new Constitution was voted and approved, by 82.6% of the votes on 9 Decem-
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ber 1931173. The run on deposits was triggered mostly by political factors, while
bank fundamentals seem to have played minor to no role. Importantly, currency
mismatches in the banking system–an important factor to establish the direction
of causality within the “third-generation” framework–seem to have been ignored
by depositors. To explore the determinants of deposit losses at the bank level, I
conduct four different estimations, which are reported in Table 3.1. For this esti-
mations, I can use the full sample provided by the Boletines del Consejo Superior
Bancario, as I don’t need to couple this data with data on BdE lending to banks.
In fact, detailed information on banks’ balance sheets was only available to the
public two years after banks’ submitted it to the CSB, so it is not surprising that
the public in general was not aware of the situation of specific banks.
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 3.1 report the results of an OLS regression in which
the dependent variable is the negative of percentage change of deposits between
1931q1 and 1931q3, and includes banks that gained deposits during the crisis.
Thus, a positive percentage change means losing deposits and vice-versa. Inde-
pendent variables include a set of measures of bank fundamentals: size, capital
ratio, share of public debt and stocks in portfolio, share of long term loans over
total loans and currency mismatches. The latter are calculated as the share of
deposits denominated in foreign exchange over total loans denominated in pe-
setas. This aims at measuring the extent to which banks suffered increasing
pressure on their liabilities denominated in foreign exchange relative to their rev-
enues in domestic currency.174 To control for specific economic conditions at the
bank-province level, I include population, population density, the number of bank
branches per 1000 inhabitants, bankruptcies prior to the 1931 crisis, work days
lost as a result of strikes before the crisis and the change in agricultural value
(all at the province level). Finally I also include a set of covariates that aim
at capturing political developments: the share of Republican votes in the April
local elections and a dummy for banks in provinces facing violent clashes between
Republicans and Monarchists in early May. The number of religious congrega-
tions per capita is included to control for the confrontation between secularists
and the Catholic Church that characterized the period. I also include a dummy
for the largest 6 banks, dummies for the main three banking centers, Madrid,
Barcelona and Bilbao, and a dummy for banks in provinces of Catalonia apart
from Barcelona. Descriptive statistics of the variables included are provided in
Table 3.6 in the Appendix.
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None of the variables associated with bank fundamentals or regional economic
conditions enter the model significantly. Only in column 3, explanatory variables
reach some significance: a bank being in a province where violent clashes were
registered in May was more likely to lose deposits, and the same happened for
banks in Barcelona and the rest of Catalonia. I further explore the data with a
quantile regression (Columns 4 to 8). In this case, I divide the dependent variable
in different percentiles (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th) in order to segment the
sample depending on the severity of deposit withdrawals at the bank level. The
quantile regression results show a similar picture: observable bank fundamentals
do not help predict deposit losses at the bank level.175 However, Column 8 shows
that for banks suffering the sharpest liquidity shocks through deposit losses, po-
litical variables played a role. Both the share of Republican votes and the May
episodes described above, enter the regression with large and statistically signifi-
cant coefficients.176 All in all, these results suggest that the bank run that started
in April 1931 was not caused by any fundamental weakness in the banking sector
that could be observed by depositors.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS OLS OLS Quantile regression
Q(0.10) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.90)
Size 0.0273∗ 0.0241 0.0298 0.0193 0.0516∗∗ 0.0171 0.0127 -0.00795
ln(assets) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0186) (0.0247) (0.0240) (0.0191) (0.0243) (0.0199)
% change deposits -0.0549 -0.0579 -0.0509 -0.0366 0.0435 0.0152 -0.0730 -0.213∗∗
1930q1-1931q1 (0.0828) (0.0848) (0.0830) (0.110) (0.107) (0.0852) (0.108) (0.0886)
Capital ratio -0.0863 -0.127 -0.121 -0.462∗∗ -0.0391 -0.0983 0.0175 0.425∗∗
(cap+reserves)/assets (0.151) (0.154) (0.152) (0.202) (0.196) (0.156) (0.199) (0.163)
Public debt 0.0184 0.0626 0.0679 0.114 0.137 0.0629 0.100 0.201
as % of securities (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.157) (0.153) (0.122) (0.155) (0.127)
Stocks 0.0366 -0.0147 -0.0455 0.0138 0.154 -0.0620 -0.0896 -0.0154
as % of securities (0.0957) (0.0995) (0.0981) (0.130) (0.126) (0.101) (0.128) (0.105)
Long term loans -0.0986 -0.0949 -0.0565 0.0161 -0.0977 -0.0293 -0.0422 0.0671
as % of total loans (0.0876) (0.0901) (0.0915) (0.121) (0.118) (0.0940) (0.120) (0.0978)
Currency mismatch 0.149 0.0717 0.118 -0.344 -0.188 0.343 0.495 0.295
forex dep/peseta loans (0.204) (0.216) (0.231) (0.306) (0.297) (0.237) (0.302) (0.247)
Population 0.0772 -0.0295 0.0356 -0.00214 -0.0128 0.0147 -0.0417
in logs (0.0582) (0.0941) (0.125) (0.121) (0.0967) (0.123) (0.100)
Population density 0.0117 -0.0224 -0.0453 -0.0211 -0.0184 -0.0227 -0.00156
in logs (0.0477) (0.0562) (0.0744) (0.0723) (0.0577) (0.0733) (0.0600)
Branches/1000 habitants 0.0205 0.00827 0.000155 0.135 -0.00872 -0.00811 -0.0127
in logs (0.0608) (0.0924) (0.122) (0.119) (0.0949) (0.121) (0.0986)
Bankruptcies -0.0118 -0.0323 -0.0240 0.0327 -0.0207 -0.0116 -0.0200
in logs (0.0220) (0.0318) (0.0422) (0.0410) (0.0327) (0.0416) (0.0340)
Work days lost/worker 0.0220 0.00343 -0.0426 0.00562 0.00469 -0.0157 -0.0233
in logs (0.0351) (0.0361) (0.0478) (0.0464) (0.0370) (0.0471) (0.0385)
Agricultural value -0.138 0.0370 0.0971 -0.238 -0.0603 0.0462 0.0441
% change 1930-31 (0.120) (0.127) (0.168) (0.163) (0.130) (0.166) (0.136)
% Republican votes 0.109 0.0726 0.0397 0.142 0.146 0.314∗∗
(0.145) (0.192) (0.186) (0.149) (0.189) (0.154)
May violent clashes (d) 0.168∗ -0.165 -0.0281 -0.00529 0.239∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.0953) (0.126) (0.123) (0.0979) (0.124) (0.102)
Religious congregations 0.0412 0.121 -0.0410 0.0300 0.0518 0.0596
as % of population (0.0702) (0.0929) (0.0903) (0.0721) (0.0917) (0.0749)
Top 6 banks (d) 0.0376 0.195 0.0633 -0.0299 0.0322 0.114
(0.123) (0.162) (0.158) (0.126) (0.160) (0.131)
Madrid (d) 0.106 0.237 0.211 0.215∗ -0.0318 0.0816
(0.118) (0.156) (0.152) (0.121) (0.154) (0.126)
Barcelona (d) 0.374∗ 0.154 0.115 0.281 0.344 0.585∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.254) (0.247) (0.197) (0.251) (0.205)
Bilbao (d) -0.0177 0.0376 -0.0387 0.0194 -0.0155 0.0487
(0.141) (0.187) (0.182) (0.145) (0.185) (0.151)
Rest of Catalonia (d) 0.195∗∗ 0.0103 0.220∗ 0.185∗ 0.170 0.0985
(0.0976) (0.129) (0.126) (0.100) (0.127) (0.104)
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
R2 0.081 0.141 0.262
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Marginal effects. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Table 3.1: Determinants of deposit withdrawals (1931q1-1931q3)
Note: All variables for 1931q1 unless otherwise stated. See Table 3.6 in the Appendix for details on each variable. Source:
Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario for banks’ characteristics and Anuario Historico del Instituto Nacional de Estadistica for
the rest.
While surprising at first, results in Table 3.1 are consistent with contemporary
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accounts that claim that depositors converted deposits into cash and hoarded it
because of rumors that the Government might expropriate current accounts after
conducting an inspection to find out the origins of capital flight and speculation
against the peseta (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984; Velarde, 2015). The inspection did in
fact take place in most banks in Madrid but it was conducted without major inci-
dents or opposition from the banking sector and did not cause any disruption to
bank operations.177 Finally, the large and positive coefficients associated to the
dummy for Barcelona and the rest of Catalonia do capture the contagion episode
that took place following the failure of Banco de Catalun˜a, Banco de Reus and
Banco de Tortosa on 7 July 1931 as well as specific political developments that
took place in Catalonia right after the proclamation of the Republic (Balcells,
1971).
3.5.2 Liquidity assistance and bank lending
Despite bank fundamentals seem to have played a minor role in predicting de-
posits withdrawals, the Government was very concerned about the feedback loop
between the banking and the currency crises, and this delayed and limited their
intervention. As a result, the largest part of the Spanish banking system under-
went severe liquidity pressure, especially during April and May. It is therefore
crucial to examine the impact of the liquidity shock at the bank level in order to
understand the outcomes of the 1931 crisis.
Even if aggregate bank lending contracted by 20% from April 1931 (Figure
3.4), not all banks followed this path. Table 3.2 shows the results of a panel
regression with bank and province fixed effects that confirms that it was only
banks that suffered a sharp liquidity shock due to deposit withdrawals between
1931q1 and 1931q3 the ones that contracted lending sharply. For this, I regress
the log of loans against a dummy for the post-1931q1 period, Post − 1931q1,
and the interaction between the latter and a dummy variable called Bankrun.
This dummy assigns a value of 1 to banks that suffered a deposit loss between
1931q1 and 1931q3 that was larger than their mean variation in deposits dur-
ing the three years before the crisis (in percentage). This aims at capturing the
average differential impact on bank lending for banks that were affected by the
bank run in comparison to those that were not. According to this definition,
from the sample of 119 banks, 87 banks suffered a run and 32 did not. The main
coefficient of interest is the one associated to the interaction between Bankrun
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and Post − 1931q1. Across the different specifications in Table 3.2, it signals
that on average, banks that suffered a sharp drop in deposits between April and
September 1931, contracted lending around 16 percentage points more than those
that were unaffected. The coefficients associated with Post− 1931q1 are not sig-
nificant. Figure 3.10 provides the same results graphically, in order to show the
longer term evolution of bank lending after the shock. By the end of Septem-
ber 1931, unaffected banks’ outstanding loans remained at their pre-crisis level.
By then, however, affected banks had contracted their loan portfolios around 15%.
1 2 3 4 5
Loans (ln) Loans (ln) Loans (ln) Loans (ln) Loans (ln)
Bank run * Post-31q1 -0.155∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0273) (0.0273)
Post-1931q1 0.0244 0.0258 0.0255 0.0311 0.0309
(0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0231) (0.0231)
Constant 8.274∗∗∗ 7.168∗∗∗ 9.646∗∗∗ 7.168∗∗∗ 9.644∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.0801) (0.906) (0.0817) (0.793)
Observations 3197 3197 3197 3029 3029
Num. of banks 119 119 119 113 113
Banks included All All All Ex. top 6 Ex. top 6
Fixed effects No Bank Province Bank Province
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.2: Differences in lending behavior (1928-34), OLS panel fixed effects
estimation
Note: dependent variable is the log of loans. Post − 1931q1 is a dummy that takes value 1 for all quarters after 1931q1.
Bankrun ∗ Post − 1931q1 is the interaction between Post − 1931q1 and the dummy variable Bankrun (see text for details).
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
153
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 3
60
70
80
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
Lo
an
s 
(1
93
1q
1=
10
0)
19
29
q1
19
29
q2
19
29
q3
19
29
q4
19
30
q1
19
30
q2
19
30
q3
19
30
q4
19
31
q1
19
31
q2
19
31
q3
19
31
q4
19
32
q1
19
32
q2
19
32
q3
19
32
q4
19
33
q1
19
33
q2
19
33
q3
19
33
q4
19
34
q1
19
34
q2
19
34
q3
19
34
q4
(a) Affected
60
70
80
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
Lo
an
s 
(1
93
1q
1=
10
0)
19
29
q1
19
29
q2
19
29
q3
19
29
q4
19
30
q1
19
30
q2
19
30
q3
19
30
q4
19
31
q1
19
31
q2
19
31
q3
19
31
q4
19
32
q1
19
32
q2
19
32
q3
19
32
q4
19
33
q1
19
33
q2
19
33
q3
19
33
q4
19
34
q1
19
34
q2
19
34
q3
19
34
q4
(b) Unaffected
Figure 3.10: Evolution of bank lending, affected and unaffected banks
(1931q1=100)
Note: 87 affected banks, 32 unaffected. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals. Source: own calculations
based on Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
These results suggest that the main problem some banks faced after April
1931 was a liquidity shortage caused by the bank run; they also rule out the
overnight collapse in demand for credit as the main driver of the contraction in
bank lending. In general, banks under no liquidity pressure could and did keep
lending. Importantly, this result is robust to different specifications of where the
line is drawn for a deposit loss to be reflecting a run on a given bank. In Figure
3.12 in the Appendix I show that using a threshold of 10%, in line with the one
Bernanke and James (1991) used, the results hold. Therefore, the extent to which
banks suffering from the bank run compensated deposit losses with liquidity as-
sistance from the BdE can help understand the evolution of lending during and
after the crisis. To assess this, I create a variable that allows for the compari-
son of the severity of liquidity shocks suffered by individual banks between April
and September 1931. The variable aims at capturing the extent to which bank’s
liquidity needs were satisfied by their access to the discount window of the BdE
and by drawing from their own cash reserves. It is defined by:
Allocationi =
Liquidity from the BdEi
|Deposits lost - Cash losti|
(3.1)
where the term Liquidity from the BdEi is the sum of rediscounts and ad-
vances received by bank i between April and September (1931q1-q3). In turn, the
term |Deposits lost - Cash losti| is the absolute value of of deposits lost minus the
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variation in cash during the same period. An Allocationi value of 1 implies per-
fect proportionality, as the given bank received enough assistance from the BdE
to respond to its clients’ deposit withdrawals, taking into account how much cash
the bank used to do so before resorting to the BdE. If the variable takes a value
lower than 1 (with a lower limit on 0) this implies that the representative bank is
falling short of liquidity and, everything else constant, will have to contract the
asset-side of its balance sheet. A bank having an Allocationi value greater than 1
is then receiving excess liquidity.178 Looking at banks’ daily borrowing from the
discount window of the BdE during 1931, it can be seen that liquidity provision
was limited until late May, when capital controls were introduced, the fiduciary
issuing limit was raised and bank borrowing from the BdE surged (Figure 3.8).
Until the last days of May, banks were effectively competing for limited central
bank assistance, and many of them underwent severe liquidity pressure. This is
shown in Table 3.3, which provides the monthly Allocationi value for the largest
6 banks (monthly data is not available for the rest of the sample). The column
“W.Average” provides the value of Allocationi weighted by each bank’s assets.
Until June, Spain’s largest banks were under severe liquidity pressure.
Allocation (cummulative)
BCEN BHAM BUMA BECR BBIL BVIZ W.AVERAGE
April 0.9 1.4 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.7
May 0.8 0.8 2.0 0.1 1.5 1.2 0.8
June 2.1 1.2 3.5 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.2
July 1.1 0.9 3.8 0.7 1.9 1.1 1.1
August 1.4 0.9 4.3 0.8 2.2 1.1 1.2
September 1.9 0.9 5.6 0.8 2.2 0.9 1.4
Average 1.4 1.0 3.4 0.5 1.6 0.9 1.1
Table 3.3: Allocation of emergency liquidity, (April-September, 1931)
Note: allocation values in the last column are weighted by the size of banks’ deposits before the crisis (end of
March 1931). Source: own calculations, based on Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a,
Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and Liquidez bancaria (Servicio de estudios del Banco de Espan˜a,
1935).
Can banks’ liquidity shortages predict lending after the crisis? To explore
this, I run an OLS regression, in which I regress the ratio of loans, assets and
different securities in 1934q3 over 1931q1 against Allocationi and a number of
covariates.179 Hence, the dependent variables capture the evolution of bank port-
folios after the crisis compared to their pre-crisis levels. Apart from Allocationi,
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other covariates include the ratio of deposits and capital in 1934q3 over 1931q1,
to capture how did bank portfolios react to returning depositors or eventual re-
capitalizations. I also include bank currency mismatches in order to control for
the possibility that banks did use liquidity from the BdE to rollover their for-
ward contracts in Sterling. I also include a dummy for Banco Urquijo de Madrid
(BUMA), as this bank was the main recipient of liquidity assistance and is a clear
outlier.180 Results are reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
Allocation 0.191∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.0798∗ 0.0829∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(4.39) (4.47) (4.37) (4.26) (6.07) (1.86) (3.18) (3.15) (3.08) (4.23)
Desposits 0.234 0.229 0.238 -0.00902 0.703∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(ratio 1934q3/1931q1) (1.26) (1.19) (1.20) (-0.05) (6.20) (6.73) (6.47) (5.86)
Capital -0.112 -0.138 -0.436 0.522∗ 0.533∗ 0.394
(ratio 1934q3/1931q1) (-0.22) (-0.27) (-1.08) (1.86) (1.83) (1.55)
Currency mismatch -0.127 -0.375 0.0505 -0.0653
(ratio 1934q3/1931q1) (-0.31) (-1.18) (0.22) (-0.33)
BUMA -1.565∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗
dummy (-3.82) (-2.83)
Intercept 0.610∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗ 0.528 0.565 0.926∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.203∗ -0.324 -0.339 -0.170
(9.29) (2.47) (0.99) (1.01) (2.12) (12.16) (1.99) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-0.62)
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R2 0.467 0.505 0.506 0.508 0.728 0.136 0.695 0.740 0.741 0.821
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.4: Evolution of banks’ lending and assets after the 1931 crisis (OLS)
Note: in columns 1 to 5, dependent variable is the ratio of total loans in 1934q3 over 1931q1; in columns 6 to
10 is the same ratio but for total assets. Source: Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a
and Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario (see text).
Results in Columns 1 to 4 in Table 3.4 show that banks that received more
liquidity assistance during the crisis maintained their loan portfolio afterwards
(Figure 3.11). Even after controlling for how fast banks recovered depositors’
hoarded cash after the panic had subsided, for recapitalization, and for their ex-
posure to currency mismatches, Allocationi remains the main explanatory vari-
able.181 The fact that currency mismatches do not enter the regression signifi-
cantly makes sense because from June, the Government nationalized all banks’
foreign exchange liabilities (Figure 3.5)182 An interpretation of the average effec-
tiveness of the LLR intervention can be obtained from the coefficient associated
to Allocationi in column 5 in Table 3.4. This implies that, holding everything
else constant, the average bank with an Allocationi value of 1.0, kept its lending
portfolio at 43% of the pre-crisis level. This suggests that, despite political de-
velopments, the LLR intervention worked in the right direction: banks used LLR
liquidity to keep lending afloat.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Securities Securities Public Debt Public Debt Bills Bills Stocks Stocks Cash Cash
Allocation 0.0406∗ 0.0638 0.0162 0.0281 0.0250 0.0871 -0.149 -0.0720 -0.149 -0.0720
(1.86) (1.41) (0.24) (0.20) (0.44) (0.74) (-0.89) (-0.20) (-0.89) (-0.20)
Deposits 0.950∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗ -0.476 -0.558 -0.476 -0.558
(ratio 1934q3/1931q1) (9.86) (8.68) (3.49) (3.09) (3.16) (2.62) (-0.64) (-0.68) (-0.64) (-0.68)
Capital 0.127 0.0970 1.842∗∗ 1.827∗∗ 1.616∗∗ 1.537∗∗ 1.603 1.504 1.603 1.504
(ratio 1934q3/1931q1) (0.50) (0.37) (2.37) (2.24) (2.47) (2.27) (0.83) (0.75) (0.83) (0.75)
Currency mismatch -0.118 -0.142 0.189 0.177 0.232 0.166 0.0482 -0.0337 0.0482 -0.0337
(ratio 1934q3/1931q1) (-0.60) (-0.70) (0.31) (0.28) (0.45) (0.31) (0.03) (-0.02) (0.03) (-0.02)
BUMA -0.155 -0.0793 -0.416 -0.517 -0.517
dummy (-0.59) (-0.10) (-0.60) (-0.25) (-0.25)
Intercept -0.0552 -0.0193 -1.697∗ -1.679∗ -1.628∗∗ -1.532∗ -0.0673 0.0520 -0.0673 0.0520
(-0.20) (-0.07) (-2.02) (-1.90) (-2.31) (-2.09) (-0.03) (0.02) (-0.03) (0.02)
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R2 0.842 0.845 0.469 0.469 0.448 0.459 0.090 0.093 0.090 0.093
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.5: Evolution of banks’ portfolio of securities after the 1931 crisis (OLS)
Note: dependent variable is the ratio of each category in 1934q3 over 1931q1. Securities includes Public Debt,
Bills of Exchange and Stocks. Source: Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a and Boletines
del Consejo Superior Bancario (see text).
Interestingly, when cash hoarding ceased and banks started recovering de-
posits from September onwards (variable Deposits, Columns 1 to 4 in Table 3.4),
these were not used to extend new loans. Similar to what Bernanke (1983) found
for the case of the United States, the liquidation of loans that could not be pre-
vented by the provision of liquidity assistance from the BdE was permanent and
instrumental for the deepening of the recession. Columns 5 to 8 in Table 3.4
confirm this. Here the dependent variable is the ratio of bank assets in 1934q3
over 1931q1. In this case the evolution of bank deposits becomes very signifi-
cant. This shows, unsurprisingly, that banks that regained depositors’ confidence
faster also grew back faster. However, if recovered deposits were not lent, how
did banks employ them? Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.5 show that when banks
regained deposits they invested them almost entirely in securities, not in creating
new loans.183 In particular, Columns 3 to 9 in Table 3.5 show that returning
deposits were mostly invested in public debt and 3-month bills of exchange, while
banks’ purchase of private bonds and stock remained depressed. As could be
expected, after the liquidity shock, banks shortened their average asset maturity
in what can be described as a flight-to-liquidity. However, the most important
result from Tables 3.4 and 3.5 is that the intervention of the BdE as LLR, within
its limits, contributed to help banks in keeping lending afloat. However, because
of the limitations detailed above, it could not be large or fast enough to prevent
the overall contraction in lending.
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Figure 3.11: Liquidity assistance and bank lending
Note: the line of fitted values excludes BUMA. Source: see text.
At least two important final questions are due. First, uncertainty caused by
domestic political and social developments as well as by turmoil in international
financial and commodity markets must have played a role in banks’ lending de-
cisions. However, if banks remained liquid during the crisis–either because they
did not suffer deposit withdrawals or because they received enough liquidity from
the BdE–they continued to lend184. It could also be that banks invested in cer-
tain sectors were more exposed to deposit withdrawals if depositors learned that
these sectors were going to be affected by the recession. However, results from
Table 3.1 show that the bank run was not related to any observable measure
of bank fundamentals, including the change in the value of agricultural produc-
tion at the provincial level. Moreover, qualitative evidence suggests that most of
the banks in my sample competed for similar depositors and, more importantly,
borrowers185. A second concern arises when considering the way bank loans and
deposits are created. When a bank creates a loan, it also creates a deposit, which
the recipient of the loan might place at the same or a different bank. This implies
that if deteriorating conditions caused firms to suspend investment projects, the
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drop in deposits would be just reflecting firms liquidating loans with banks. This
is something that can not be completely ruled out with the data at hand. How-
ever, qualitative evidence presented above suggests that this did not drive the
contraction in bank lending figures (Figures 3.1 and 3.4). From the very onset
of the crisis, firms faced credit restrictions from banks, which then translated
to a sharp decline in employment in important sectors such as real estate. It
is certainly possible that firms reduced their demand for credit, but according
to the evidence presented above, this happened as a result of credit restrictions
that originated in the banking sector during the months in which the BdE was
quantitatively limited to provide liquidity assistance.
3.6 Conclusion
As the main economy operating an inconvertible currency during the late 1920s
and early 1930s, conventional accounts argue that Spain avoided the Great De-
pression because the Banco de Espan˜a (BdE) could lend freely to ailing banks
during the 1931 banking crisis. Drawing on new data, this chapter provides
contrasting evidence, and contributes to explain the sharp contraction in bank
lending during the 1930s. When, following the unexpected political regime change
that took place in April 1931 depositors ran on banks, Spain fell prey to the so-
called “third generation” currency crisis dynamics. Accumulated currency mis-
matches in the banking sector conflicted with the provision of liquidity assistance.
The findings of this chapter provide a reinterpretation of the links between
the Gold Standard and banking crises during the Great Depression. So far, Spain
has been used as the example of a country that escaped the Depression because
its currency was not convertible to gold. Evidence presented here contrasts with
this account. After booming growth in the late 1920s, Spain experienced a se-
vere economic contraction following the 1931 crisis, to which the collapse in bank
lending was a major driving force. While political instability and uncertainty did
undoubtedly play a role, I find that when the banking system experienced strong
liquidity pressure in 1931, monetary authorities were severely constrained, and
this limited the effectiveness of their intervention. Trapped in a dilemma between
liquidity provision and capital mobility, the BdE could only lend freely when cap-
ital mobility was forgone and negotiations started for a stabilization loan with
international lenders. As a result, banks suffered severe liquidity pressure and
159
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 3
restricted credit supply. The Spanish case suggests that monetary authorities’
room to deal with banking crises during the Great Depression was not necessar-
ily determined by the de jure binary contingency of being in or out of gold, but
also by comparative levels of financial and institutional development. Despite the
peseta was not convertible to gold, Spanish monetary authorities also found their
hands (and minds) trapped in golden fetters.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Data and alternative estimations
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Median Max Min Table
% change in deposits (1931q1-1931q3) 119 -0.08 0.22 -0.06 -0.76 0.94
3.1
Size (log of assets) 119 9.96 1.68 9.82 14.37 6.53
% change in deposits (1930q1-1931q1) 119 0.08 0.25 0.06 -0.56 1.35
Capital ratio ((capital+reserves) as % of assets) 119 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.99 0.00
Public debt as % of securities 119 0.36 0.22 0.37 0.97 0.00
Stocks as % of securities 119 0.30 0.24 0.25 1.00 0.00
Long term loans as % of total loans 119 0.21 0.26 0.05 0.94 0.00
Currency mismatch (forex dep as % of pta. loans) 119 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.56 0.00
Population (in logs) 119 6.53 0.72 6.41 7.49 4.64
Population density (in logs) 119 4.53 0.79 4.54 5.46 2.71
Branches/1000 inhabitants (in logs) 119 -2.89 0.53 -2.98 -1.76 -4.07
Bankruptcies/population (in logs) 119 -0.54 1.39 -0.25 1.50 -2.60
Work days lost per worker (in logs) 119 2.46 0.69 2.33 4.39 0.00
Agricultural value (% change) 119 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.71 -0.26
% of Republican votes 119 0.52 0.23 0.60 0.87 0.00
Religious congregations/population (in logs) 119 -8.30 0.54 -8.31 -7.37 -9.56
May violent clashes (dummy) 119 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00
Top 6 banks (dummy) 119 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.00
Madrid (dummy) 119 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.00
Barcelona (dummy) 119 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00
Bilbao (dummy) 119 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00
Rest of Catalonia (dummy) 119 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00
Bank run (dummy) 119 0.73 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.00 3.2
Allocation 24 1.00 1.15 0.89 5.60 0.00 3.4,3.5
Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics of all variables
Source: see text.
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Bank code Name Assets as % of total
ASAB Anglo South-American Bank 4.8%
BLOQ Banca Lopez Quesada 0.1%
BTUS Banca Tusquets 0.1%
BALT Banco Aleman Transatlantico 0.1%
BCAL Banco Calamarte 0.1%
BCEN Banco Central 4.1%
BCBA Banco Comercial de Barcelona 0.8%
BARA Banco de Aragon 1.4%
BAVI Banco de Avila 0.2%
BBIL Banco de Bilbao 7.7%
BVIZ Banco de Vizcaya 6.0%
BECR Banco Espan˜ol de Credito 12.8%
BERP Banco Espan˜ol del Rio de la Plata 2.7%
BGAS Banco Germanico de America del Sur 0.3%
BGUI Banco Guipuzcoano 1.9%
BHAM Banco Hispano Americano 12.6%
BIIC Banco Internacional de Industria y Comercio 1.2%
BPLE Banco Popular de Leon XIII 0.1%
BSAI Banco Sainz 0.6%
BUMA Banco Urquijo de Madrid 4.3%
BZAR Banco Zaragozano 0.9%
HRYC Herrero Riva y Cia 0.2%
LAZA Lazard Brothers 1.1%
SOLE Soler y Torra Hermanos 0.3%
Total 64.3%
Table 3.7: Banks included in Tables 3.4 and 3.5
Note: share of assets, loans and deposits is as % of total banking sector in 1931q1. Source: Boletines del Consejo
Superior Bancario.
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Subscribed As % of total
Spanish banks 151.0 43%
Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) 38.0 11%
Banco Hispano Americano (BHAM) 33.7 10%
Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA) 16.8 5%
Banco de Vizcaya (BVIZ) 13.4 4%
Banco Espan˜ol de Credito (BECR) 11.1 3%
Banca March (BMCH) 10.3 3%
Others (in Barcelona and Bilbao) 27.7 8%
Foreign banks 43.8 13%
Irving Trust 13.0 4%
Midland Bank 6.3 2%
Moroccan State Bank 6.0 2%
Credit Lyonnais 6.0 2%
Lazard Brothers 6.5 2%
Anglo South American Bank 3.5 1%
International Banking Corporation 2.5 1%
Firms 41.0 12%
CHADE 6.0 2%
Rio Tinto 7.5 2%
Rothschild 3.0 1%
R.C. Asturiana 4.0 1%
Minas del Rif 7.5 2%
Pen˜arroya 2.5 1%
Riegos y Fuerzas del Ebro 2.5 1%
Tabacos de Filipinas 3.0 1%
Sota y Aznar 5.0 1%
Public 24.7 7%
Others (not reported) 89.5 26%
Total 350.0 100%
Table 3.8: Subscribers of gold bonds issued in December 1929 (million pesetas)
Source: Informacio´n Financiera, Gran Vida, An˜o XXVII, Num.318, p.27.
1 2 3 4 5
Loans (ln) Loans (ln) Loans (ln) Loans (ln) Loans (ln)
Bank run * Post-31q1 -0.306∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0316) (0.0316)
Post-1931q1 0.0631∗∗ 0.0647∗∗ 0.0632∗∗ 0.0647∗∗ 0.0633∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0204)
Constant 8.275∗∗∗ 7.241∗∗∗ 9.602∗∗∗ 7.248∗∗∗ 9.602∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.0796) (0.879) (0.0813) (0.778)
Observations 3197 3197 3197 3029 3029
Num. of banks 119 119 119 113 113
Banks included All All All Ex. top 6 Ex. top 6
Fixed effects No Bank Province Bank Province
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.9: Differences in lending behavior (1928-34), OLS panel FE (alternative
estimation)
Note: dependent variable is the log of loans. Post − 1931q1 is a dummy that takes value 1 for all quarters after 1931q1.
Bankrun ∗ Post − 1931q1 is the interaction between Post − 1931q1 and the dummy variable Bankrun (see text for details).
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
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Figure 3.12: Evolution of bank lending, affected and unaffected banks
(1931q1=100)
Note: shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals. Source: own calculations based on Boletines del Consejo
Superior Bancario, see text.
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Allocation of limited lender of last
resort assistance: bank-level evi-
dence from the 1931 crisis in Spain
4.1 Introduction
Until the recent financial crisis, the distribution of central bank emergency liq-
uidity among different banks was regarded as playing a secondary role. In well-
functioning interbank markets, excess liquidity borrowed by a given bank can
be channeled to institutions in need. Recent developments, however, have high-
lighted the importance of individual borrowing from the discount window of the
central bank when interbank markets freeze (Allen and Gale, 2017). Distribution
of funds through interbank markets can no longer be taken as a working theoret-
ical assumption, because interbank markets can easily fall prey of panic. This is
especially the case as banks’ main source of funding is now wholesale (interbank)
and not traditional retail deposit funding (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2010;
Mehrling, 2010). Historically, financial crises have taken place at different stages
of financial development, where interbank markets have played both stabilizing
roles through the creation of liquidity or destabilizing through contagion (Schn-
abel and Shin, 2004; Gorton, 1985; Calomiris and Mason, 1997; Calomiris and
Carlson, 2017; Mitchener and Richardson, 2013, 2019). As such, bank-level al-
location of emergency liquidity is particularly important in emerging economies,
because–as discussed in Chapter 3–monetary authorities face external constraints
when dealing with aggregate liquidity pressure. In the particular case of emerging
economies, balance of payments or fiscal constraints limit the room central banks
and governments have to provide liquidity assistance, and this brings (back) to
the table the question of how to distribute a limited amount of available liquid-
ity among different borrowers (Ugolini, 2017). Because of these constraints, and
lacking well-functioning interbank markets, the distribution of scarce funds be-
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comes a crucial element of lender-of-last-resort interventions, as already stressed
by Bagehot (1873).
This chapter analyses the allocation of emergency liquidity at the bank-level
during the 1931 crisis in Spain. What determined the distribution of the BdE’s
liquidity provision? What were the consequences? In this chapter, I am not
only interested in the amounts of liquidity borrowed by each bank, but also in
the way these differences in liquidity assistance can explain their differential re-
action during and after the crisis. I argue that this is an important aspect of
the 1931 crisis in Spain because, as I discussed in Chapter 3, banks that did not
experience a run on deposits or borrowed large quantities from the BdE did not
contract lending significantly. It was only banks under liquidity pressure that
did so. This suggests that demand for credit did not deteriorate overnight with
the political regime change that took place in April 1931, but that the weight of
the accumulated currency crisis severely limited the room for the BdE to extend
liquidity at banks’ demand. Under a limited amount of liquidity available, and
until capital controls were introduced in late May and the limit to the fiduciary
issue of the BdE was raised, banks were effectively competing for funds at the
discount window of the BdE. Understanding why some banks obtained more or
less liquidity assistance from the BdE and the consequences of these differences
can help to understand the evolution of the banking sector in Spain during the
Great Depression.
So far, the allocation of emergency liquidity by the BdE during 1931 crisis has
remained mostly unexplored. Accounts on bank-specific events during the 1931
crisis have been been elaborated mostly from the written mintues of the Banco
de Espan˜a, but disaggregated bank-level data has not been yet brought to the
picture. The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap by combining bank-level data
on discount window borrowing with also bank-level balance sheet data. I further
develop the analysis of the measure of allocation of liquidity I use in Chapter
3, and when data allows to, I increase the time-frequency of the analysis to the
monthly level. This exercise provides two main findings. First, I document that
during the 1931 crisis, in the absence of a well-developed money market and el-
igibility criteria for collateral in rediscount operations, the BdE lent mostly to
banks with whom it had a strong lending relationship prior to the crisis. Second,
I find that these banks are the ones that, regardless of the severity of the liquidity
shock they suffered, managed to keep their loan portfolio afloat during and after
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the crisis. This was particularly important during the first two months of the
crisis, when the BdE was quantitatively constrained to lend. Accordingly, I find
that banks that suffered more liquidity pressure during April and May and could
not borrow enough from the BdE, contracted credit. In line with Chapter 3, this
suggests that the external constraints that Spanish monetary authorities faced
during 1931 are an essential part of the crisis; in presence of a limited amount of
emergency liquidity available, the BdE could not provide all banks with liquidity
at demand. While not denying a role for a change in expectations from a sharp
and unexpected political regime change, the limitations imposed to Spanish mon-
etary authorities by their condition of emerging and peripheral economy are key
elements that need to be taken into account.
The findings of this chapter illustrate the difficulties faced by the lender of last
resort in emerging economies. These difficulties stem from relative low levels of
financial development and external constraints. Importantly, the findings of this
chapter show that these lending constraints were not determined by the exchange
rate regime. Even if Spanish monetary authorities were not formally constrained
by an exchange rate peg, they had limited room to act. The chapter also doc-
uments the implications of these limitations for the evolution of bank portfolios
during and after a crisis, thus contributing to a field that, albeit has remained un-
explored during the last decades, has experienced a revival during the recent years
(Humphrey, 2010, 2013; Dreschel, Dreschel, Marques-Iban˜ez, and Schnabl, 2016).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides a discus-
sion of the so-called Bagehot Rule, with the focus on the role of interest rates and
collateral eligibility in improving the efficiency of emergency liquidity allocation.
Section III presents the data sources. Section IV describes the functioning of
the discount window of the BdE. Section V analyses the allocation of emergency
liquidity and its consequences, and Section VI concludes.
4.2 The Bagehot Rule and gold-inconvertible cur-
rencies
When Walter Bagehot published Lombard Street: a description of the money mar-
ket, he was referring to a very specific money market (London), which was the
core of a very specific monetary system (the classical Gold Standard). The Lon-
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don money market was the most developed and liquid market, and Britain was
the main nation and creditor in the international monetary system that lasted
until the First World War. Accordingly, throughout the nineteenth century, the
Bank of England developed a lender of last resort technique that was equally
specific, if not unique (Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013). This technique, which has
come to be known as “the Bagehot Rule”, is best presented in Bagehot’s own
words186:
“(. . . ) there are two rules. First. That these loans should only be
made at a very high rate of interest (. . . ). Secondly. That at this rate
these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as
largely as the public ask for them.”
Given the specificities of the London money market, however, it is hard to
describe Bagehot’s Rule as a universal rule that can be automatically adopted by
any given central bank. As Ugolini (2017) highlights, it is better understood as a
positive description of a very specific money market, and as a policy that had al-
ready been in place when Lombard Street was published (Bignon, Flandreau, and
Ugolini, 2012). In fact, some of Bagehot’s dictums–namely that the central bank
should lend freely and make its willingness to act known to the market–have sur-
vived time well. Others, such as the role of high interest rates or the nature of the
collateral purchased by the central bank have not aged equally. In contrast with
what Bagehot advocated, recent interventions in the most advanced economies
have been implemented alongside sharp cuts in central bank rates and with a
significant widening of the criteria of eligible collateral (Humphrey, 2010, 2013;
Bordo, 2014). Emerging markets, however, face different constraints. The role
capital flight or sharp exchange rate depreciation are (and have been) distinct
traits of financial crises in emerging markets, and the importance of financial
development in the effectiveness of lender of last resort interventions is also a
crucial element that needs to be taken into account regardless of the exchange
rate regime (Calvo, 2006; Rey, 2015).
4.2.1 Pricing emergency liquidity provision
One of the most discussed topics regarding the provision of emergency liquidity
to the banking system is the price at which this liquidity should or can be pro-
vided. This debate is not new; its main ideas were already outlined during the
168
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 4
19th century, when most countries operated gold-convertible currencies. During
the last quarter of the 20th century, and in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis,
this debate faded out substantially, but it has experienced a revival in the last
decade (Ugolini, 2017). Why should the price of liquidity matter? It matters if,
as Bagehot (1873) described, central bank reserves are limited187. In this case,
providing emergency liquidity at high interest rates had another justification for
Bagehot, besides the three main pillars of the “Bagehot Rule” described above.
In order to combine the provision of emergency liquidity freely with the protec-
tion of limited central bank reserves188:
“[a very high rate of interest] will operate as a heavy fine on unrea-
sonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications
by persons who don’t require it. The rate should be raised early in the
panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out
of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the banking reserve
may be protected as far as possible.”
As the quote above suggests, Bagehot himself was concerned about strategic
borrowing (out of idle precaution) and its effects on the allocation of limited re-
serves. Interestingly, without the possibility of using the gold reserve of the BdE
to defend the exchange rate during the first months of the crisis, Spanish mone-
tary authorities also had limited reserves. In fact, there is still a relatively open
debate regarding the importance of this point for emerging economies. Synthesiz-
ing a vast theoretical literature that developed in the last two decades189, Martin
(2009) suggested that countries operating fiat currencies are not in need of raising
interest rates when the central bank provides emergency liquidity during banking
panics. However, this is rarely the case in the presence of severe exchange depre-
ciation, large currency mismatches in the banking system and more importantly,
in a country in which the central bank does not issue the international currency
of reserve. As such, the central bank might need to charge a high interest rate
to avoid an excessive injection of liquidity that could, in turn, pose a threat to
exchange rate and price stability (Calvo, 2006). In this case, then, the efficient
allocation of funds is the justification of a high interest rates, as it would prevent
self-selection, i.e. banks that are not in need of funds to resort to the central bank
too early. Although some authors have highlighted this problem as a feature of
the recent interventions of central banks in developed economies, the theoretical
literature seems to have agreed in that in a fiat regime, there is no reason for
the lender of last resort to raise interest rates, as there is no metallic reserve to
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protect. This conclusion, while can hold for developed money markets and core
economies–and held to a certain extent in nineteenth century Britain (Flandreau
and Ugolini, 2013)–is not necessarily the case in developing, peripheral and/or
politically unstable economies. As Ugolini (2017) recently argued190:
“(...) the idea that “penalty rates” find no justification under a fiat
money regime has also been reconsidered in the light of the fact that
even under such regimes central banks do find serious limitations to
their monetary policy making: if existing political or fiscal constraints
imply that room for central bank intervention may actually be limited,
Bagehot’s concern with discouraging a run on cash retains much of its
significance.”
In contrast with the idea that gold-inconvertibility of the Spanish peseta al-
lowed for a fully loaded LLR intervention in 1931, the need of a high interest rate
seems to apply also for Spain during that year. Despite inconvertibility protected
Spanish monetary authorities from both an internal and external drain of gold,
the role of rapid exchange rate depreciation was a limiting factor, as I discussed
in Chapter 3. Under limited room to act, and regardless of the exchange rate
regime, it is necessary to understand the role of the price of emergency liquidity,
the timing of its provision and the elegibility criteria for collateral. As I argue in
the following sections, Spanish monetary authorities did not follow the Bagehot
Rule during 1931, despite it would have helped improve the allocation of liquidity.
4.3 Data
In order to disaggregate the intervention of the BdE and to contribute to pre-
vious aggregate accounts, this chapter draws from two different data sources.
On the one hand, I use the Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de
Espan˜a, which includes the BdE’s lending operations and the daily level in its
Madrid headquarters. By the 1920s and 30s, almost all lending operations were
conducted with banks that had CSB membership (Consejo Superior Bancario).
CSB members could access the discount window of the BdE if they abode by
the liquidity and capital ratios that the CSB had determined. The BdE had
two ways of lending to banks. First, and in line with most central banks at the
time, the BdE would purchase bills of exchange that banks had previously dis-
counted to firms or individuals. These operations, called “discounts”, involved
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the outright purchase of the bill by the BdE, which it held until maturity. Bills
purchased had to contain two signatures of “reputed solvency” and mature in no
more than 90 days. For this operations, data in the Actas contain the name of
the counterparty, the amounts discounted, and the number of bills per opera-
tion. Unfortunately, there is no information on maturity, acceptors, endorsers or
drawer/drawee of the bill. Second, the BdE lent through advances (or so-called
Lombard operations). Advances were short term credit operations for which a
certain security was pledged as collateral. As described in Chapter 2, these were
similar to today’s repurchase operations (repos) but with the difference that the
BdE did not buy and sell the underlying asset. Direct purchases of public debt
had been banned since the early 1900s (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984). The BdE, however,
could lend against its security, charging an interest rate and a haircut. The hair-
cut was the difference between the amount of credit granted and the market value
of the collateral pledged. For advances, the Actas also contain information on
the collateral pledged (the vast majority of it being public debt), but not on the
individual haircut per operation. Complementary qualitative information from
the BdE is taken from the Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a
and the Estatutos del Banco de Espan˜a, which include the meetings of the Board
of Governors of the BdE and the latter’s statutes, respectively.
The second source of data comes from the banking system. I collect balance
sheet information for a number of different items at the quarter-bank-level. This
is collected from the Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario, which published
balance sheet data for both its members and non-members (Spanish and foreign
banks). Data from the Consejo Superior Bancario is complemented with the
meetings of the Board, which include the discussions between member banks, the
Board of the CSB, the BdE and the Government during the crisis. Other quali-
tative sources come from bank’s specific archives. I collected qualitative evidence
from the Archivo Histo´rico del BBVA, Archivo Histo´rico del Banco de Santander
and Arxiu Histo`ric del Banc de Sabadell.
4.4 The discount window of the BdE
When depositors run on banks to withdraw their funds in April 1931, the BdE
found itself in a new scenario, despite it had intervened as lender of last resort
in previous occasions191. However, 1931 was different, at least in three impor-
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tant dimensions. First, in 1931, a very large number of banks was affected with
more than 35 banks losing 15% deposits or more192. Moreover, the crisis had a
fundamental political component, which made it more difficult for the BdE to
discriminate between banks that were borrowing because of weak fundamentals
or because of a politically-triggered liquidity shock. All previous LLR interven-
tions had involved an individual thorough inspection of the troubled institutions
that took place at the same time that emergency liquidity was provided. Banks
suspended payments (temporarily or permanently) while a final decision on their
future was taken193. However, during the 1931 crisis, taking all banks’ idiosyn-
crasies into consideration at the same time that liquidity was provided was not
an option. Banks’ were cutting back credit to the private sector as they faced
severe liquidity constraints due to depositors’ withdrawal of funds. Faced with
this situation, Spanish monetary authorities had to make a move without having
detailed information on banks’ individual situation194 As a consequence, when
the crisis started, the BdE faced a challenge in evaluating both credit risk when
it rediscounted a bill, but also individual counterparty risk when it lent against
collateral.
A second important difference was that in 1931, the shock was unrelated
to banks’ fundamentals and originated on the liability side of banks’ balance
sheets195. As a central bank with limited room for action, the BdE found itself
with the challenge of evaluating all troubled banks’ fundamentals in such a short
period of time196. Third, as I documented in Chapter 3 in detail, the macroeco-
nomic backdrop against which the 1931 crisis took place was, by far, the worst
of all previous cases197.
Given the three challenges presented above, more detail on the reaction of
Spanish monetary authorities during 1931 is due. So far, most accounts of the
1931 crisis have placed the focus on the fact that between April and Septem-
ber 1931 the banking system lost 1600 million pesetas in deposits and the BdE
expanded its balance sheet in 1500 million pesetas (Figure 4.1). At first sight,
the BdE replaced depositors almost entirely. These figures suggest that there
was no liquidity pressure during the crisis. However, aggregate figures cannot
answer why, if the BdE replaced depositors by granting banks with the exact
same amount of liquidity they lost, bank lending plummeted by 20% between
April and September 1931. Moreover, it does not explain why some banks facing
very sharp deposit withdrawals continued to lend throughout the crisis. In order
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to shed light on these questions, I now turn to document the functioning of the
discount window of the BdE with a focus on the role of the discount rate, the
eligibility of collateral and the identity of borrowers.
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Figure 4.1: Discount and Advance portfolio, BdE (1928-35)
Source: Mart´ınez Mendez (2005).
4.4.1 Discount rate, eligibility and the identity of borrow-
ers
After the First World War, the BdE began to interact with a larger pool of banks,
following the 1921 Banking Law, which aimed at strengthening bank-BdE inter-
action. The BdE could lend to banks by the outright purchase of bills of exchange
(rediscount) and by advancing credit against public debt and other securities as
collateral (advances). As discussed in Chapter 2, the law had forced the BdE
to accept public debt as collateral for advanced credit to banks that abode by
the liquidity and capitalization rules of the CSB. However, the BdE still retained
discretion in discounting bills of exchange. In contrast with the majority of Euro-
pean economies at the time, Spanish banks accessed the discount window of the
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Figure 4.2: Top 6 banks deposit losses and access to BdE discount window
(1931q1-1931q3)
Source: own calculations using Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a and Boletines del
Consejo Superior Bancario.
Banco de Espan˜a at rates that were below the ones banks charged their clients198.
As part of the banking regulation put in place after the First World War, banks
could not under-price the BdE when discounting bills in the market199. In Spain,
a bank would discount a bill to a firm and, provided that it was eligible at the
discount window, could re-discount it at the BdE at a lower rate (Figure 4.3). In
addition to the fact that BdE rates were below market rates, the use of interest
rates was very scarce. Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984) documented that, throughout the
1920s and 30s, the BdE refused any change in interest rates as a monetary policy
measure, despite this was the only tool available given the content of the 1921
Banking Law. As I documented in Chapter 2, the main argument that the Board
of the BdE would use was that changes in interest rates would cause a contraction
in credit and did nothing to smooth exchange rate volatility200. As opposed to
other central banks operating under the restrictions of gold convertibility (and in
contrast with the Bagehot Rule) in Spain the price of emergency liquidity from
the central bank was not reactive to demand conditions201.
According to its Statutes202, the BdE would not discount any bill of exchange
with a maturity longer than 90 days. It would also require eligible bills to carry
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two signatures at least, but one of them could be replaced by the pledge of as-
sets that the BdE would select at its discretion203. Moreover, bills would have
to be, “endorsed or accepted by individuals, merchants, industrialists, companies,
commercial associations, of industrial or agricultural nature, of known solvency,
according to the information or previous information gathered by the Board of the
BdE about the discounter”. The Banco could also deliberately choose to admit or
refuse the discount of a bill, without any explanation of the underlying reason.
Regarding advances or Lombard credit, the BdE would not lend for more than
90 days (although in practice these operations were permanently rolled over), for
which it could accept a variety of collateral. Apart from public debt, which it
had to accept from all CSB members, other collateral acceptance was left largely
at the BdE’s discretion. It could lend against gold, silver, public debt, mortgage
bonds, railway bonds or other industrial and mercantile securities, “that the Gov-
erning Board will previously have designated; all of them under the conditions of
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market value and considered enough by the Board as guarantee of the loan”204.
While banks’ use of this lending facility grew fast after 1921 (as discussed in
Chapter 2) banks’ reliance on it was only a viable strategy for banks as long
as the price of public debt was relatively stable. When the price of public debt
collapsed between April and October 1931, it became more expensive for banks
holding public debt to use it as collateral for emergency borrowing. While port-
folios of eligible bills of exchange retained the same liquidity that they had before
the crisis, for every unit of public debt, banks would get less advances from the
BdE205. Therefore, holding an eligible portfolio of bills before the crisis was an
advantage. But what determined the eligibility of these bills?
Contemporaries highlighted the lack of transparency in regards to eligible col-
lateral at the discount window of the BdE. In 1933, Sarda` and Beltran (1933)
wrote206:
“This is one of the most discussed issues in Spain. Currently, it is not
possible to know neither what or to whom the Banco de Espan˜a dis-
counts to private banks nor what they bring to the Banco for discount.
One is left to believe that, following the modern trend, the Banco is
rediscounting more that in other periods, but it is not possible to make
a statement on this side. It would be convenient that the Banco ex-
plained this when it publishes its balance sheets”
In contrast with more developed money markets, in which the eligibility for
bills of exchange was defined by a clear classification and widely known by all
actors involved in the money market207, eligibility at the discount window of the
BdE remained opaque. Since the 1921 Banking Law had provided CSB banks
with granted access to the discount window of the BdE by the pledge of pub-
lic debt, problems associated with eligibility of commercial bills of exchange re-
mained a secondary concern for policymakers and observers precisely until the
1931 crisis. Absent a clear and widely known eligibility criteria, trust built on
long term relationships mattered for a given bank’s access to the discount win-
dow. Evidence gathered from the meetings of the operations boards of Banco
Central (BCEN) and Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), confirm this and helps
shed light on the importance of a frequent relationship with the Banco de Espan˜a
in understanding its lending policy. On one side of the spectrum we find BUMA,
a historical client of the BdE, which had been operating under slightly different
names since the late nineteenth century. This bank embodies quite explicitly the
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importance of long term relationship in determining access to the discount win-
dow. In an interestingly premonitory statement, three months before the 1931
crisis, the Board of Governors of this bank urged its operations managers to208:
“(...) make sure that the relations with the Banco de Espan˜a, with
respect to the discounts are constant, giving preference in the discount
to those signatures that could be doubtful, because doubts will increase
in parallel with the need for discounts, and the pressure the BdE might
experience in case it faces increasing demands that might emerge in
exceptional circumstances.”
The quote has interesting implications for understanding eligibility criteria.
First, the bank stressed the importance of frequent interaction with the BdE.
Second, when borrowing, it was better to sell the BdE the “dubious” signatures
first. This implies that according to BUMA, the BdE had less information on the
quality of signatures. This makes perfect sense from the point of view of liquid-
ity management at the bank level; if able to choose, banks prefer to keep their
more liquid assets in their portfolio and use the relatively less liquid to borrow,
or even risk-shift towards the central bank (Goodhart and Huang, 2005; Bindseil,
2014; Dreschel et al., 2016). However, this suggests that as Flandreau and Ugolini
(2013) showed for the case of the Bank of England, the discount window of Banco
de Espan˜a was also not made of “frosted glass”; the BdE relied quite heavily on
the identity of the discounter than on the nature of collateral itself209.
That said, it could simply be that the BdE just looked at the signature of the
acceptors of the bills, rather than at who did discount them. This does not seem
to be the case. Say BUMA had accepted a bill that it considered dubious and
wanted to rediscount it at the BdE. If the bill was protested and finally unpaid,
BUMA would still be liable as the acceptor. In the case BUMA held a bill ac-
cepted by another bank, it would still be transferring risk to the BdE. It is more
plausible to think that, as its portfolio of commercial bills of exchange had been
declining since the mid 1920s, and as commercial banking expanded throughout
the country, the BdE had lost market share and therefore information on the bill
market and had to rely on second-best approaches to eligibility (i.e. the identity
of the discounter). According to BUMA’s minutes, this would happen without
the latter properly screening the bill.
Finally, the quote shows that BUMA expected eligibility criteria to narrow
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(or certainly not expand) if banks started to borrow more from the BdE using
bills of exchange in an eventual liquidity crisis. Concerns over a tightening of
eligibility criteria during an eventual crisis are confirmed by BUMA’s minutes
during the 1931 crisis. Again, addressing to its operations managers, the Board
urged to210:
“Not discount any commercial bill for which we don’t have complete
certainty that represents a genuine commercial or mercantile transac-
tion (...) even in that case, do not discount any bill for which we have
total certainty that it can be rediscounted at the Banco de Espan˜a.”
The contrast between both quotes (before and during the crisis) can only con-
firm that the common practice was that the BdE relied on the agency of certain
banks when screening bills of exchange. Before the crisis, BUMA was concerned
that the BdE could tighten its eligibility criteria, that is, that it would inspect
bills brought to the discount window more thoroughly if economic conditions in-
creased credit risk. As long as the BdE was not concerned by its own credit risk,
however, it would purchase bills of what BUMA considered “dubious” signatures.
In other words, as long as there was not a surge on demand for emergency liquid-
ity from other banks, BUMA could transfer credit risk to the BdE by counting on
a lax eligibility criteria by the latter. This is consistent with BUMA’s perception
of its own relationship with the BdE211. When discussing the bank’s participation
in the capital of Banco Aragone´s de Cre´dito (BARA), the Marquis of Urquijo, the
main shareholder of the bank, would meet with members of the Board of BARA
in order to212:
“(...) provide moral evidence that the bank [BARA] will have the same
protection from the Banco de Espan˜a and to discuss to which extent
including the name Urquijo on its name could have an influence on
that.”
A contrasting experience can be found in the minutes of Banco Central (BCEN)
also one of the oldest banks in Madrid (which operated under different names over
time). In contrast to the arm’s length relationship that seemed to operate between
BUMA and the BdE, BCEN had to be much more careful. In many instances,
BCEN would have to check with the BdE if a given bill would be eventually
accepted for rediscount before discounting it to a third party. In other words,
BCEN could not afford to hold bills with questionable signatures. For example,
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in 1925, six years before the 1931 crisis, the minutes of its Board of Operations
reads213:
“(...) the board agrees with the discount operation as long as the Banco
de Espan˜a shows complete conformity and ensures the re-discount of
the bill. (...) after having asked the Banco de Espan˜a, they ensure us
that they will rediscount the bill if needed. (...) the bill can only be
discounted under the condition that is re-discountable at the Banco de
Espan˜a. (...) not provide credit unless this is going to be allowed for
re-discount at the Banco de Espan˜a.”
As opposed to BUMA, who could rely on the BdE not screening collateral at
the bill level, BCEN had to ask to the BdE before discounting a bill in the market
if the bill in question would be rediscounted. While there was a rationale for both
screening strategies by the BdE, these reflected very different ex-ante conditions
when accessing the discount window of the central bank for the two banks. Going
back to the quote from Sarda` and Beltran (1933) at the beginning of the section,
it seems that observers were right. There was not a clearly defined eligibility
criteria for bills of exchange. This was not an obvious problem as long as banks
could rely on accessing the discount window of the BdE by pledging government
bonds. As long as the price of public debt remained relatively stable, this was
a safety valve for banks’ management of liquidity. However, between April and
October 1931, the price of public debt fell rapidly, and it became comparatively
more expensive to borrow using advances, while the rediscount rate remained
untouched until early July.
The fact that eligibility criteria was not widely known or uniform does not
mean that this problem originated at the BdE. As Chapter 2 shows, following
the 1921 Banking Law, banks were given a clear incentive to rely mostly on pub-
lic debt to borrow from the BdE. The evolution of the money market after the
mentioned law could have well played a role in limiting the specialization of the
bill market in a way that commercial bills of exchange would never end up being
classified under clear and widely-known eligibility criteria and became the main
money market instrument. Eligibility mattered because this marked the differ-
ence between banks’ being able to rely on the BdE for liquidity with two types
of collateral (bills and public debt) instead of only one (public debt).
If eligibility mattered, did the BdE tighten eligibility criteria for bills during
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the 1931 crisis, as BUMA had anticipated? From the very onset of the crisis, the
Banco expressed its concerns over the commercial nature of the bills that it was
ready to purchase from banks. A follower of the so-called “real bills doctrine”,
the BdE was concerned that providing credit for operations that did not have
an underlying real transaction was inflationary. Bills purchased during the crisis
had to be self-liquidating, as they were referred to at the time. This is clear from
the BdE’s statement three days after the proclamation of the Republic214:
“(...) the assistance that is provided to private banks must be con-
sistent with their healthy policy and the current circumstances, with
the final aim of avoiding an excessive increase in the volume of cir-
culation, and thus affecting the external value of the currency and the
price level (...) in order to avoid affecting self-liquidating 90-day bills
of exchange, banks should restrict the credit operations that involve fi-
nancial bills (...)”.
According to its own stance, the BdE discouraged banks to hold financial bills,
as they would not be rediscounted. This is consistent with the evidence presented
above from the minutes of BUMA, which, after the crisis insisted its managers
to avoid discounting financial bills in the market. Unfortunately, as I explain in
the Data section, daily operations used in this paper do not contain information
on the specific details of the bills purchased by the BdE (drawer, drawee, accep-
tor, etc.). As Sarda` and Beltran (1933) claimed, we don’t know what did the
BdE purchase from banks, nor what they brought to the discount window (so we
have no information on bills rejected), apart from the rules that we can read in
its Statutes. However, the evidence presented in the following section suggests
that eligibility remained opaque and was certainly not widened during the crisis;
pre-crisis lending practice seems to have determined lending during the 1931 crisis.
4.5 Allocation of liquidity at the bank level
Until May 29th, when the Government introduced capital controls and expanded
the fiduciary issue limit, banks effectively competed for central bank liquidity.
Even if borrowing data at the bank level was not available for the public, con-
temporary observers were aware of some banks borrowing from the BdE what
was considered beyond their needs during the months when the latter was facing
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limitations to lend freely. In fact this was seen as a reason why the fiduciary
issuing limit had to be expanded. Observers claimed215:
“(...) there seems to be elements, including banks, that, be it for an
excess of precaution or to benefit from the reduction in the discount
rate they enjoy, [i.e. the 100bp bonus CSB banks enjoyed when re-
discounting bills] despite having received already important amounts
of liquidity from the Banco de Espan˜a, they turn up at the discount
window with large bill portfolios for rediscount.”.
Precisely as explained by Bagehot in Lombard Street, banks were running on
the central bank and the latter was unable to service all banks’ needs. In this
section I conduct an empirical analysis and provide qualitative evidence of the
determinants of allocation of liquidity at the bank level. First, I describe and
discuss the metrics used to define allocation. Then I run a simple regression
analysis to try and find the predictors of allocation between April and October
1931. Finally I discuss the consequences of allocation by looking at banks per-
formance after the crisis.
4.5.1 Determinants of allocation during the crisis
A central bank able to conduct outright purchases of securities across-the-board
with specific institutions under a clearly defined eligibility criteria is less limited
when coping with a market-wide liquidity crisis. Not being able to identify good
pre-crisis collateral to purchase or not having a widely known definition for that,
puts the central bank in a difficult position. It might have to tighten eligibility
criteria to protect its balance sheet from problems associated with information
asymmetries over the securities banks bring to the discount window, but this
tightening might also worsen banks’ liquidity problems. This is precisely the case
in which the Banco de Espan˜a found itself in 1931. The price of the most com-
monly used asset for securitized lending operations at the discount window of
the BdE before the crisis–public debt–collapsed by more 20% between April and
October (see Chapter 5). Holding bills of exchange that the BdE was ready to
purchase gave banks a secondary source of liquidity in the presence of a confi-
dence crisis on public debt. Political developments and rumours over a potential
default, albeit not necessarily shared by the banking community or the BdE, in-
creased the risk of securitized operations for the central bank, at the same time
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that increased their cost for banks via larger haircuts. On top of that, liquidity
provision was quantitatively limited by note issuing limits (see Chapter 3). With
these limitations present, it is important to understand how aggregate liquidity
was allocated at the bank level.
Measuring banks’ reliance on LLR assistance
In order to answer these questions, I calculate two measures of liquidity provi-
sion at the bank level. The first one, that I call Allocationi is the same used in
Chapter 3, while the second is the one provided by Bindseil (2014). For the sake
of comparison, I reproduce the definition of Allocationi again here; it is defined
by:
Allocationi =
Liquidity from the BdEi
|Deposits lost - Cash losti|
(4.1)
where the term Liquidity from the BdEi is the sum of rediscounts and ad-
vances received by bank i between April and September (1931q1-q3)216. In turn,
the term |Deposits lost - Cash losti| is the absolute value of of deposits lost minus
the variation in cash during the same period. An Allocationi value of 1 implies
perfect proportionality, as the given bank received enough assistance from the
BdE to respond to its clients’ deposit withdrawals, taking into account how much
cash the bank used to do so before resorting to the BdE. If the variable takes
a value lower than 1 (with a lower limit on 0) this implies that the representa-
tive bank is falling short of liquidity and, everything else constant, will have to
contract the asset-side of its balance sheet. A bank having an Allocationi value
greater than 1 is then receiving excess liquidity217. The distribution of values of
Allocationi for the sample of banks is presented in Figure 4.4, in which I plot the
kernel density estimates of the variable for the banks that accessed the discount
window of the BdE during the crisis. The average value is 2.0, but the median is
1.1 and the mode is lower than 1. This implies that there is an important degree
of variation within the sample that can be exploited to understand the evolution
of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Because of the definition of Allocationi,
however, if a bank borrowed from the BdE before the crisis, when it is not expe-
riencing deposit losses, this measure can grow exponentially to take very large,
meaningless values. Therefore, despite it is useful to analyse allocation during
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the crisis, it can’t be used to compare pre-crisis borrowing with crisis borrowing.
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Figure 4.4: Allocation (1931q1-1931q3), kernel density estimates
Source: own calculations based on banks’ balance sheets from Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and
Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a.
Instead, the measure proposed by Bindseil (2014) can be used. In this def-
inition, in a system with n banks that can borrow from the central bank, the
representative bank i keeps a balance sheet that satisfies the following equa-
tion218:
Li = Di +Bi (4.2)
where Li is bank lending, Di are deposits, and Bi is credit from the central
bank. In turn, the central bank balance sheet satisfies:
B =
n∑
i=1
Bi (4.3)
where B are banknotes, which is equal to the sum of all credit provided to each
bank, denoted by Bi. In Bindseil’s model, aggregate proportionality is defined
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Figure 4.5: Correlation between the two LLR reliance measures
Note: right figure does not include FONZ (see text), and left figure does not include FONZ, ALYC and BUMA.
Source: own calculations based on banks’ balance sheets from Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and
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by:
P =
B
L
(4.4)
which is the ratio between aggregate liquidity provided by the central bank
and the length of the banking system balance sheet (total loans). In other words,
it is a measure of how dependent is the whole banking system on central bank
liquidity at a given point in time. Individual proportionality, which is what we
are interested in measuring in this chapter, happens when:
Pi =
Bi
Li
= P (4.5)
that is, when dependence on the central bank is the same for all banks. Thus,
a bank with Pi > P is overrepresented in the central bank balance sheet, while
the opposite means a bank is underrepresented. Importantly, the two things can
happen without causing banks to be under liquidity pressure or excess liquidity.
Each bank’s Pi might just be consistent with its portfolio composition. How-
ever, if banks suffer deposit withdrawals (a drop in Di) at the same time that
the expansion of the central bank balance sheet is limited (so B is fixed), then
competition for limited reserves can have effects on banks’ ability to keep their
loan portfolios afloat (Li).
Using one measure or the other depends on the goal of the analysis219. In
Chapter 3 I use Allocationi because I want to understand the extent to which
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liquidity provided by the BdE covered banks’ deposit losses. In that case, I was
not interested in understanding how much banks’ borrowing behaviour changed
between pre-crisis and crisis periods as I am here. For the sake of consistency,
however, it is necessary to see if both measures provide a similar broad picture for
the moment in which they are comparable. For the reasons explained above, this
can only happen during the 1931 banking crisis (1931q1-1931q3) and not before.
Figure 4.5 shows the correlation between the two measures during this period220.
Unsurprisingly, the two measures correlate, both including and excluding outliers.
Apart from the obvious fact that the two measures should correlate if they aim at
measure the same thing, it is interesting to note that the fact that the correlation
holds also suggests that, as the next section shows, banks proportionality in the
access to the discount window of the BdE did not necessarily correlate with their
deposit losses.
Empirical estimation
I turn now to the empirical analysis on the determinants of allocation of liquidity
assistance at the bank level. I run two different regressions. First I use Allocationi
as the dependent variable in order to find out its determinants. Dependent vari-
ables innclude a number of measures of banks’ characteristics before the crisis:
size, portfolio composition, liquidity, capitalisation, deposit losses (during the cri-
sis) and a dummy for top 6 banks. I include a measure of pre-crisis dependence
on the central bank, which as explained above can’t be calculated by the same
formula used for Allocationi. I introduce this measure by calculating the ratio
between banks’ borrowing from the BdE during 1931q1 and their total deposits.
While this does not compare directly to Allocationi, it is a rough measure of
pre-crisis borrowing.
As results in Table 4.1 show, Allocationi can’t be predicted by any conven-
tional measure of bank characteristics or financial distress. Banks with a larger
portfolio of securities seem to have received proportionally more liquidity. This
is a relatively obvious finding, taking into account that the BdE could only pur-
chase bills or advance credit against public debt221. Capitalisation also seems
to have played a role in allowing banks’ to borrow more from the BdE. More
importantly, the size of the liquidity shock at the bank level does not correlate
with banks’ borrowing from the discount window, suggesting, as contemporary
accounts documented, that banks underwent severe liquidity pressure during the
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crisis. Finally, the only strong predictor of bank’s borrowing during the crisis
turns out to be their reliance on the BdE before the crisis222.
Similar results are obtained using Bindseil (2014) measure, which is more ro-
bust to time comparisons. I run a similar regression but here I can include the
same consistent measure of banks’ reliance on the central bank. I calculate pro-
portionality ratios given by Equation 4.5 both for pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Results are presented in Table 4.2. I include the same covariates as in Table 4.1
but here the pre-crisis borrowing covariate is measured exactly in the same way as
the dependent variable. Again, the only strong predictor of LLR proportionality
at the bank level during the crisis is their pre-crisis borrowing. Being a frequent
borrower from the BdE before the 1931 crisis made it more likely to borrow larger
quantities during the crisis, regardless of the liquidity shock suffered by the bank
in question. Importantly these results are not driven by banks’ size or by the
largest 6 banks. Excluding the main borrower from the BdE both before and
during the crisis, Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), weakens the coefficient,
but the correlation remains highly significant. Once BUMA is excluded, propor-
tionality before the crisis maps into proportionality during the crisis almost on a
one-to-one relationship.
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Results from the empirical estimation confirm the qualitative account pre-
sented in previous sections; frequent access to the BdE discount window predicts
banks’ borrowing during the crisis. This is not surprising, provided that the BdE
did not have the same knowledge about all banks’ portfolios of bills when they
were brought to rediscount223. To provide further evidence, Figure 4.6a shows
the shares of daily borrowing at the discount window of the BdE for the top 6
banks from April to September. Each of the three figures shows the distribu-
tion among these banks for all types of operations, discounts only and advances
only, respectively. On aggregate, no significant change occurred in the pre-crisis
borrowing patterns. Borrowing by rediscounting bills was very concentrated on
Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), which never accounted for less than 50% of
the BdE’s purchase of bills of exchange, even if the bank represented only 4% of
the banking system’s total assets (Figure 4.6b). The share is remarkably stable
over the main reference points shown in the chart: the beginning of the crisis
(14 April), the first increase in note issuing limit (7 May), the second increase
(28 May) and the discount rate hike (8 July). The case of advances is less stable
as the crisis unfolds and shows much less concentration (Figure 4.6c). This is
consistent with the fact that not all banks relied on the BdE for rediscounting
bills, but their access to the discount window was done mostly through advances
against public debt, as detailed in Chapter 2. In Figure 4.6c, some changes in the
distribution can be seen during the days highlighted by the vertical bars. The
advance window maps banks’ relative size and the absolute loss of deposits better
than the discount window, in which Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA) seems to
be overrepresented.
A relevant question here is the extent to which this overrepresentation just
responded to differences in bank portfolios. It could simply be that BUMA held
more bills (in absolute or relative terms) than the rest of banks, especially than
the two largest banks that are clearly underrepresented in Figure 4.6b. Table 4.3
answers this question. It shows different measures of portfolio composition for
the top 6 banks. Interestingly, BUMA held a relatively small portfolio of bills
compared to those held by the largest banks (BHAM and BECR) who almost
did not use them to borrow from the BdE (Figure 4.6b). In fact, according to
the liquidity ratio presented in the last column, BUMA was the less liquid bank
when the crisis started, mostly because of its large portfolio of private stocks. In
general, BUMA does not stand out in any of the categories as an outlier in terms
of porfolio composition, which suggests that the overrepresentation in the BdE
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(a) All operations
(b) Discount
(c) Advances
Figure 4.6: Top 6 banks’ share of discount window lending (April to September
1931)
Note: shares are calculated based on the cummulative borrowing at a given date. Source: author’s calculations
based on Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a (see text).
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discount window does not respond to that.
Bills Public debt Stocks Loans Bills + p.debt
as % of securities
BBIL 16 49 36 49 65
BCEN 41 32 27 29 73
BECR 48 37 15 22 85
BHAM 40 46 13 43 86
BUMA 19 36 45 35 55
BVIZ 16 43 41 45 59
Average 30 41 30 37 71
Table 4.3: Top 6 banks’ portfolios compared
Note: average shares for one year before the crisis (1930q2-1931q1). Source: own calculations, based on Boletines
del Consejo Superior Bancario.
4.5.2 Borrowing before and after the interest rate hike
Bank borrowing started right after the 12 April local elections. After the first
spike in borrowing, a second surge took place after the note issuing limit was
timidly increased for the first time in early May. Only once capital controls were
introduced and a second increase–this time larger–in the note issuing limit was
authorized, banks returned to the discount window again. Finally, the last surge
in borrowing took place as the 28 June General elections approached. On 8 July,
borrowing came to a halt after the BdE raised the discount rate. Spanish mone-
tary authorities only resorted to higher interest rates once bank borrowing from
the BdE had been ongoing for three months (Figure 4.1). In fact, after strong
pressure from the Government and aiming at stopping the collapse of the ex-
change rate, the BdE raised interest rates precisely because fiduciary circulation
was increasing too fast:224:
“(...) the convenience of studying a moderate increase in the discount
rate and other interest rates in order to regulate the fiduciary circula-
tion, as suggested by the Ministry of Finance and the Government as
a matter of public interest and convenience given the state of current
affairs.”
After discussing the issue, interest rates were raised by 50 basis points in all
operations with the exception of the Lombard rate on public debt. This excep-
tion should have had an asymmetric impact on banks depending on how did they
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borrow from the BdE. On the one hand, those that used mostly public debt to
borrow from the BdE were relatively less affected than those that used the re-
discount of commercial bills of exchange. On the other hand, banks that were
already very liquid by the time the interest rate was raised should have had more
incentives to stop borrowing from the BdE, following Bagehot’s rationale on the
effects of interest rates on the efficiency of allocation of limited reserves. Unfor-
tunately it is difficult to conduct a reliable sample-wide empirical estimation of
these effects225. However, qualitative evidence at the bank-level can shed some
light.
Discussion between CSB, BdE and the Government
During his many interventions in the CSB extraordinary meetings that took place
in April and May, the president of Banco Espan˜ol de Cre´dito (BECR), Mr. Pablo
Garnica, whose bank was experiencing the strongest liquidity pressure (Table 3.3),
argued that concerns over the depreciation of the peseta were exaggerated and
that increasing the issuing limit to provide banks with liquidity should be the
priority. Interestingly, it was the most affected bank, the one that suggested that
the government could cope with the run on the peseta and the banking crisis by
following Bagehot’s rule226:
“a solution might be that the Government would ask the BdE to in-
crease the discount rate at the same time the note issuing limit is
raised.”
It seems that given its severe liquidity needs, BECR was willing to pay more
for emergency liquidity, revealing a very inelastic demand for central bank money.
However, this rate hike did not take place until July, and in fact, Mr. Garnica
himself concluded that this idea would probably be discarded by the BdE as
this could affect domestic credit227. Did Garnica’s concerns reflect in the balance
sheet of BECR? How did liquidity shortages affect the asset side of bank balance
sheets during the six months of the crisis, from April to September? And then,
how did April and May liquidity shortages (before the BdE could lend freely)
affect banks’ loan portfolio?
In order to answer this question, Figure 4.7 shows banks’ accumulated credit
contraction and liquidity shortages between April and September. These are
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calculated for each month as the sum of previous months’ deviations from an op-
timal Allocationi value of 1. Any liquidity shortages in April are carried forward
to May, and so on. The opposite applies if a bank becomes liquid at any given
month. Therefore, a negative number means a bank remains under liquidity pres-
sure. Figure 4.7a shows the correlation between the accumulated loan contraction
and the accumulated liquidity pressure by September. The correlation suggests
that banks ought to have been able to borrow much more from the BdE in order
for the loan contraction to be smaller. Figure 4.7b plots the same but for short
term commercial credit. In this case, the correlation is not that clear, but what
this chart shows is that in presence of liquidity shortages, banks seem to have
chosen to restrict loans instead of short term commercial credit. Both results are
consistent with the regression results presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 in Chapter
3. In both figures, however there is a striking difference between BUMA and the
rest. Within the rest, the bank suffering the largest accumulated liquidity pres-
sure, BECR, is also clearly the one that contracted more loans. Data presented
in Figure 4.8 shows the same correlations presented in Figure 4.7, but for loans
and for each month. It was during May when the two extreme cases (BUMA
and BECR) started diverging. Considering that the BdE was constrained until
the very last days of May, this divergence shows the effects of banks’ competi-
tion for funds. The allocation of emergency liquidity across different banks had
distributional consequences on banks’ ability to keep lending through the crisis228.
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Figure 4.7: Liquidity pressure and credit crunch, September 1931
(Note: the y-axis is accumulated loan (left chart) or short term commercial credit (right chart) contraction by
September. The x-axis is accumulated liquidity pressure by September. Source: author’s calculations based on
Servicio de estudios del Banco de Espan˜a (1935) and Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a
(see text).)
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Figure 4.8: Liquidity pressure and loan contraction, April to September 1931
(Note: the vertical line crossing the axis a 0 represents no deviation from the ideal Allocationi value of 0. A
deviation to the right implies accumulated excess liquidity. The opposite applies to the left. Source: author’s
calculations based on Servicio de estudios del Banco de Espan˜a (1935) and Actas de la Comision de Operaciones
del Banco de Espan˜a (see text).)
All the evidence presented points to a credit crunch during the first months
of the crisis, with banks’ access to the discount window of the BdE being limited.
Figure 3.8 and 4.1 show that banks’ demand for emergency liquidity started right
after the proclamation of the Republic, when the BdE conducted the largest op-
eration, and then ceased until the Government authorized for the first expansion
of the note issuing limit. Note that banks were under severe liquidity pressure
during April, even considering the increase in the monetary base conducted by
the BdE (Table 3.3). When the fiduciary limit was timidly raised on May 7th,
banks resorted to the BdE again, but then stopped as the limit was reached again
(Figure 3.8). Only after it was raised vigorously on May 29th, liquidity provided
by the Banco de Espan˜a could be injected without a de facto limitation. The
sharp spike in borrowing that took place right after the limit was raised in late
May reinforces the idea that all banks’ liquidity needs could not be fully satisfied
during the first two months of the crisis.
Following the initiative of the Government, the Banco started a discussion
about raising interest rates229. On July 8th, the Banco agreed to raise the dis-
count rate by 50 basis points, less than what the Government considered nec-
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essary. To compensate his lack of influence in the BdE, on the next day, the
Ministry of Finance reduced the rediscount bonus that had been granted by the
1921 Banking Law to banks by another 50 basis points230. Apart from curbing
the increase in the provision of liquidity, with this move the Government also
tried to restore some of the liquidity premium that public debt had over bills of
exchange, since the Lombard rate was left unchanged231. The result was that the
rediscount of bills became 100 basis points more expensive; the sharpest increase
since the outbreak of the First World War and the highest nominal rate since
the mid-nineteenth century. The increase in the discount rate had a clear and
immediate effect on banks’ borrowing. Discount window activity came to a halt
the day after the increase in the discount rate (Figure 4.1). This was especially
the case for Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA); despite suffering sharp deposit
losses it was very liquid already by July (Figure 4.9). The bank’s borrowing pat-
tern changed drastically when the discount rate was raised on 8 July.
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Figure 4.9: Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), daily borrowing from BdE
Source: Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a
The BdE did not follow Bagehot’s dictums. It could not do so. When faced
with large and sudden demands from the banking system, its room for action
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was limited; it could not lend entirely at banks’ demand. Instead of allowing
for an unconstrained increase in the monetary base and raising interest rates at
the same time to protect the exchange rate (and the Banco’s limited reserves),
Spanish monetary authorities were capped by quantitative limits and left the
discount rate unchanged, despite banks in deer need of funds were willing to
pay more. When, capital controls were introduced and the BdE was freed from
quantitative limitations, Bagehot’s rule had to kick in and the discount rate was
raised in early July. That the BdE did not follow Bagehot’s rule from the very
onset of the crisis—the only way it made full sense, as banks’ price-elasticity of
demand for central bank money was at its lowest—had nothing to do with the
fact that it was operating an unconvertible currency, but with the institutional,
political and economic context in which this intervention took place. Moreover,
the money market in which the BdE operated, made Bagehot’s rule even more
difficult—if theoretically not impossible—to apply, because the price that banks
paid for short-term liquidity at the discount window was not reactive to market
conditions, unlike the money market that Bagehot had in mind when he wrote
(Bignon et al., 2012; Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013). As described above, Spanish
banks rediscounted bills with the BdE below market rates. Therefore, when a
given bank faced liquidity needs, if it held eligible bills and there was still room
for note issuing to increase, it could just obtain liquidity at the BdE without this
having any effect on how much it would paid for it. This was a profitable frame-
work for the given bank and for the BdE, provided that the former was willing
to reveal the latter–still an effective competitor in many provinces—its private
business information when it rediscounted a bill. However, when the 1931 crisis
hit and all banks were under sudden liquidity pressure, quantitative limits pre-
vailed and distributional problems appeared.
4.6 Consequences of allocation
How did the largest Spanish banks fare after the crisis? This section addresses
this question by conducting two exercises. First, I look at the evolution of banks’
balance sheets during the six months of the crisis. In particular, I am interested
in the developments of April and May, when liquidity provision was constrained.
Secondly, I look at the evolution of banks’ dependence on the provision of liquidity
by the BdE after the crisis. Here the goal is to show that crowding out between
banks when borrowing from the BdE seems to have been persisent. Again, the
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main illustration of this is Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA).
During April and May, before the Government authorized for a large increase
in fiduciary issuing, the BdE provided liquidity assistance to the six largest banks
in Spain for a total of 309 million pesetas (dark green), while the same banks lost
310 million deposits (light grey). Figure 4.10 shows the monthly evolution of bank
balance sheets between April and September 1931. These are aggregated figures
that include the largest six banks for which there monthly data is available. It can
be seen that on aggregate, during both months, LLR assistance almost covered
all deposit losses. Banks also made use of their cash reserves to liquidate deposits
(light green) and contracted credit (dark grey), albeit only in April. Variation
in cash and credit appears in positive as it is a negative variation in assets that
compensates the negative variation in liabilities caused by deposit withdrawals.
The same figure also shows how, from June, when the BdE was no longer quan-
titatively constrained, borrowing surged; top banks borrowed 340 million pesetas
in June (more than in April and May combined). Looking at aggregate figures,
one would be pushed to conclude that there was no evident liquidity pressure;
the system obtained enough liquidity from the BdE to liquidate deposits with-
out having to contract credit. However, a look at disaggregated, individual data
shows a different picture.
Figure 4.11 shows the same monthly variations between April and September
1931 but at the bank level. The story changes substantially. In particular, there
is a sharp contrast between the evolution of Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA)
and Banco Espan˜ol de Credito (BECR), especially during April and May, when
banks were effectively competing for liquidity at the discount window of the BdE.
During these two months, BUMA rediscounted bills and pledged public debt at
the BdE for an amount that almost doubled its liquidity needs, while BECR did
borrow almost nothing, despite it suffered twice as much deposit losses. As a re-
sult, credit provided from these banks to the real economy followed very different
patterns. From April, but mostly in May and June, BUMA could expand its loan
and bill portfolio, and continued to do so throughout the crisis. BECR, on the
other hand, conducted a sharp contraction in credit until June, when the bank
could borrow from an unconstrained BdE. The charts also show the evolution of
the Allocationi variable I described above. While for BECR it reached barely 1
by the end of the crisis, for BUMA it soared from the very beginning. Consider-
ing the case of BECR, it is unsurprising that its President, Mr. Pablo Garnica
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of Top 6 banks’ balance sheets (Apr-Sep 1931)
Note: Figures are the month-on-month (mom) variation of each item of the balance sheet (LHS) for each bank
and aggregated. CASH is the mom variation of cash reserves (a positive amount signals the bank is reducing
cash reserves). LOLR is the total amount of rediscount and advances from the BdE. DEP is the mom variation
in total deposits (a negative amount signals the bank lost deposits). CREDIT is the mom variation of the
bank’s bill portfolio net of LOLR rediscount and the mom variation of total loans (a positive amount signals
that the bank is contracting credit). Allocation is the monthly value of the Allocationi as defined in Table 3.3
(RHS). Source: own calculations using Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and Actas de la Comision de
Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a.
198
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 4
complained openly in the extraordinary meetings held in April and May about
the BdE restrictions in rediscounting232.
The contrast between BUMA and BECR is important, not only because it
highlights the balance sheet effects of bank-level liquidity assistance, but because
it shows the scope of the limitations that the BdE suffered when intervening as
LLR during the first months of the 1931 crisis. Despite BECR was the largest
and most widely branched bank in Spain and BUMA was a smaller, much more
local bank, the latter managed to borrow enough liquidity to overcome the crisis,
while the former conducted a sharp 36% contraction in loan portfolio. Looking at
another bank’s behaviour suggests a similar story; Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) also
fell short of LLR assistance in April, although it borrowed more in May, after the
first increase in fiduciary issuing. To compensate for that, the bank liquidated
loans and contracted credit in April. In May, when it borrowed more from the
BdE and did not lose deposits, the bank expanded credit back, something it did
in every month in which it did not lose deposits.
How did banks’ liquidity evolve once the worst of the crisis was over? Table
4.4 shows the change in liquidity coefficients for the top 6 banks calculated follow-
ing a measure of bank liquidity provided by the BdE in 1935233. This comparison
shows that BUMA was the less liquid bank already before the crisis but it was the
only bank that managed to emerge from the crisis with a more liquid portfolio,
despite it lost 56% of its deposits. How was this possible? Figure 4.12 answers
this question. It shows the evolution of the relative importance of BdE credit
over a bank’s retail deposits234 BUMA stands out as the bank that relied more
on BdE liquidity to remain afloat. More importantly, the bank would have not
been able to survive the 1931 crisis without the continued support of the BdE.
Throughout the 1930s, the bank never recovered the 56% retail deposits it lost
between April an September 1931. Therefore, the only way the bank could con-
tinue its operations was to extend its dependence on the BdE over time. By the
end of 1934, while the rest of the banking system had returned to their pre-crisis
levels of dependence on BdE liquidity, BUMA continued to rely entirely on BdE
credit. In a way, during and after the 1931 crisis, the BdE absorbed BUMA.
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Figure 4.11: Evolution of each bank’s balance sheet (Apr-Sep 1931)
Note: individual bank calculations are the same as in Figure 4.10. Source: own calculations using Boletines del
Consejo Superior Bancario and Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a.
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1931q1 1931q3 % change
BBIL 111 107 -3.60%
BCEN 97 90 -7.20%
BECR 109 104 -4.60%
BHAM 104 97 -6.70%
BUMA 78 87 +11.5%
BVIZ 122 104 -14.75%
Average 104 99 -4.80%
Table 4.4: Liquidity ratios for top 6 banks (BdE measure)
Source: own calculations, based on Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and Liquidez Bancaria.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter confirms that the disaggregated figures about the distribution of
emergency liquidity during the 1931 crisis in Spain tell a very different picture
than aggregates. Looking at the whole banking system as one unit, liquidity
pressure is difficult to find, and the contraction in credit does not seem to have
any connection with that. Instead, in the absence of any obvious liquidity short-
age, one is pushed to attribute the whole contraction in lending to an immediate
deterioration of economic expectations that ought to have come along with the
political regime change. While the latter undeniably mattered, disaggregated
data adds nuance to the story. Not all banks fared equally. Some suffered very
sharp liquidity shortages and some received excess liquidity. These differences
explain banks’ balance sheet evolution during the crisis. Importantly, the fact
that the bank that suffered the most from the political regime change because
of its religious and political ties–Banco Urquijo de Madrid–managed to expand
its loan portfolio during the crisis despite losing more than half of its deposits
points, if anything, to the contrary. There seems to be no obvious link between
the regime change and a general panic among banks that caused the supply of
credit to collapse. At least, this is not revealed by individual balance sheet data.
Instead, what evidence presented in this section seems to suggest is that liquidity
pressure caused by deposit withdrawals was too large for the BdE to assist all
banks with enough liquidity.
The findings of this chapter suggest that Spanish monetary authorities’ aban-
donment of interest rates as monetary policy tools during the crisis opened the
room for a run on the BdE when quantitative limits prevented the latter from
conducting a fully-loaded LLR intervention. Finally, the evidence presented also
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Figure 4.12: Top 6 banks’ dependence on BdE liquidity (1925-1934)
Note: y-axis measures the ratio between interbank deposits (credit accounts at the BdE) and retail deposits.
Source: own calculations using Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
highlights the importance of financial and money market development for the
allocation of limited liquidity assistance in emerging economies. Repeated in-
teraction between banks and the central bank, eligibility criteria, the transfer
of credit risk to the central bank and the evolution of fiduciary issuing played
a substantial role in determining how much and where emergency liquidity was
allocated during the 1931 crisis in Spain.
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Reconstruction of the market discount rate: 1900-
1935
In this appendix I provide details of the methodology and sources used to compute
a market discount rate for the whole period under analysis. Given the changing
nature of the banking system and the money market before and after the First
World War, this interest rate time series need a careful and prudent interpreta-
tion. However, the final picture I show provides many insights to understand the
implementation of monetary policy in Spain in the first third of the twentieth
century, as well as the changing role of the Banco de Espan˜a in relation to the
rest of the financial system.
The most remarkable facts that this new interest rate series show are:
– Before the WWI, the market rate was never above that of the Banco de
Espan˜a.
– From the summer of 1914, and as a consequence of WWI and its effects on
international financial markets, the market rate in Spain soared above the
rate of the Banco de Espan˜a.
– After WWI, a new picture emerges. The market discount rate was always
above the rate of the Banco de Espan˜a, usually between 1.5% and 2.0%
higher. This suggests that real interest rates in Spain were higher than
what using the official BdE rate suggests.
– There is a degree of correlation between the official and the market rate,
and the gap between both rates was reduced during the 1931 crisis.
The market rate before WWI, from 1900 to August 1914
From 1900 until the 7th of August of 1914, the economic journal El Economista
reported, on a weekly basis, the official discount rate of the Banco de Espan˜a
(tipo de descuento) versus what was called free market rate (descuento libre),
along with the discount rate of the main European countries (Figure 4.13)235.
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Figure 4.13: El Economista’s official and market discount rates,
Spain and other countries (1905)
Source: El Economista, 07/01/1905.
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Figure 4.14: Market rates in London, Paris and Madrid, 1900-
1914
Source: monthly average market interest rates, from (Jobst and Ugolini, 2016).
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Figure 4.15: Official and market rates, January 1900 - July 1914
Source: El Economista, weekly data, from the first week of 1900 to 31 July, 1914.
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The Spanish market rate exhibited a certain degree of correlation with in-
ternational interest rates. For example, the rates in London and Paris did also
correlate, to some extent, with the Spanish rates. During this period, the Span-
ish financial system, despite not being part of the classic gold standard system,
was integrated, to some extent, in the international markets (Figure 4.14). An
interesting fact is that despite the big spikes in interest rates that took place in
1906 and 1907, the Spanish market rate was effectively capped by the rate of the
Banco de Espan˜a (Figure 4.15).
However, the outbreak of the war changed the whole picture. The market
that had existed until that moment dried and the market rate was never reported
again. There was a financial panic, although it was rapidly contained. The first
reaction of the BdE was a rise in interest rates. The Banco de Bilbao, an ex-
tremely well reputed bank, faced deposit withdrawals and cash shortages during
the month of August 1914, and had to resort to the Banco de Espan˜a. It obtained
liquidity by pledging assets at the Banco de Espan˜a. The Banco de Bilbao236:
“(. . . ) had to reinforce the cash holdings, in case that the general
alarm could affect the public and it could withdraw its deposits; (. . . )
in order to prevent this, the Banco de Bilbao had managed to obtain
material help from the Banco de Espan˜a in Madrid, (. . . ) and the
council unanimously agreed to guarantee along with the rest of the sig-
natories, the bills discounted at the Banco de Espan˜a, and assuming
any responsibility that could emerge from the operation (. . . )”
Since then, while the journal El Economista continued to provide information
about the discount rate of other central banks and the official rate of the Banco
de Espan˜a, it ceased to inform about the free market rate. The same journal
was well aware of the far-reaching effects of the War over the Spanish banking
system237:
“After two months since the War started, we can study its conse-
quences in our banking system, (. . . ). We can summarize it in one
phrase: we have reached a truly concentration of banks around the
Banco de Espan˜a. (. . . ) There was always a certain relation between
businesses, firms, industries and banking houses, but now the rela-
tionship has become something like a dependence, because it has been
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necessary to ask the Banco de Espan˜a for help (. . . ) not only the weak
institutions but also the healthy ones (. . . )”.
According to this journal, then, the War caused the relations between the
Banco de Espan˜a and the rest of the financial system to become one of depen-
dence, whereas before, relations were more occasional.
The “market” rate during WWI: from August 1914 to 1919
With the outbreak of the War, the Spanish money market dried, just as all mar-
kets in Europe. Because there was no moratoria of payments declared in Spain,
firms and banks continued to need short term liquidity to face their payments. As
El Economista had put it, relations between the banking system and the Banco
de Espan˜a had become more intense. Despite the limit of notes issued was in-
creased on the 5th of August 1914238, the Banco had to rise the interest rate
sharply. The Banco de Espan˜a rose the interest rate from 4.5% to 5.5% on the
8th of August and kept it at that level until the 5th of September, when it cut
it to 5.0%. By the 26th of October, it reduced it again to the pre-War level of
4.5%.
For the period August 1914 until December 1918, I derive the “market” rate
from a different source. Given the absence of a free market discount rate, I proxy
the evolution of the discount rate for firms and other banks by using the discount
rate reported in the minutes of the board of the Banco de Bilbao (Actas de la
Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao) and the Banco de Vizcaya (Actas del
Consejo del Banco de Vizcaya). These banks’ boards had regular weekly meet-
ings and reported every change they implemented in the discount rate. Although
they used the word “discount” to refer to a number of different operations, they
detailed the different rates they applied for each one. I take the discount rate
applied to the purchase of bills of exchange and promissory notes, which was
usually lower than the one applied to Lombard credits. In total, the discount
rate changed four times, and followed the same pattern as the official rate of the
Banco de Espan˜a: first a sharp increase and then a progressive decline. Interest-
ingly, the market rate rose above that of the Banco de Espan˜a for the first time
during the 1900-1936 period and never fell below again (Figure 4.16). Before the
War, a firm could discount a bill below the official rate in the market and thus
compete with the BdE in the bill market. After that, banks would not be allowed
to discount bills below the BdE rates (see Chapter 2).
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Figure 4.16: Official and market rate (1914-1918)
Source: El Economista and Actas de la Junta de Gobierno, Banco de Bilbao.
While the Banco de Bilbao had a deep knowledge of the market in which it
had been operating since 1857, the Banco de Vizcaya was a relatively younger
bank, as it was founded in 1901. Before the 7th of August of 1914, the Banco
de Vizcaya discounted bills of exchange at 4.5% if they were until one month to
maturity and at 5% if they were until 3 months (it also applied different rates
depending on the solvency of the signatures)239. On the 7th of August, it raised
its discount rate to 6% for all types of bills240. The Banco de Bilbao followed
the same pattern; it had been discounting below the official rate for the whole
pre-war period, almost constantly at a 3.5% rate241. On the 7th of August, the
Banco de Bilbao also raised its discount rate to 6%, given the “abnormal situation
of the European market and given the rise in the discount rate of the Banco de
Espan˜a242. A month after the rise, on the 3rd of September, the Banco de Bilbao
cut its discount rate to 5.5%243. On the 22nd of October, it was able to reduce
its discount rate on bills discounted over other cities to 5%, while kept the rate
in Bilbao at 5.5%244. Finally, on the 5th of July 1917, it cut again the discount
rate to 5% on bills over Bilbao and 4.5% on bills over other cities245.
One might be skeptical about the explanatory power or the exact meaning
of this interest rate, and it is certainly a sui generis market rate, since the tra-
ditional free market rate ceased to exist, along with the market in the shape it
had before the war246. However, the point that is made here is that the financial
208
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 4
freezing that the War caused across Europe and that suspended temporarily the
money markets, had permanent effects in the Spanish money market. In most
European countries, the market resumed more or less shortly after the War, and
in some it did not freeze permanently during the conflict (Jobst and Ugolini,
2016) but in Spain it changed permanently, and would change even more in the
years to come.
The absence of a frequently reported market rate reduces the explanatory
power of the discount rate applied by only two banks (Bilbao and Vizcaya). Af-
ter all, these two banks were in the same area and by 1917 they had not yet
started to develop their extensive network of branches across Spain so they could
not reflect an average state of the bill market in Spain. One must interpret the
exact level of the rate and its variations carefully because, after all, banks could
very well apply different rates to different clients following their own discretionary
criteria. In addition, different banks in different cities might well have applied
different rates. However, I argue that this is not against the argument presented
here, for many reasons.
First, the point being made is that banks (and potentially the remaining
bankers) ceased to discount below the official rate and started discounting above
it. The exact level is not crucial to illustrate the change in the model of central
banking that took place. Second, the fact that the Banco de Espan˜a was present
in nearly every corner of Spain and that it raised sharply the discount rate should
have had an effect on the whole system, not only in the north, where both these
banks operated. If the War had such a strong effect on one of the most reputed
and solvent banks in Spain (Banco de Bilbao), we can expect the effect to have
been, if anything, stronger in other cities such as Barcelona247 or Madrid. So
we can expect that other banks also had to raise their discount rates given the
generalized shortage of liquidity. Third and perhaps more importantly, the banks
of the north of Spain (mainly the banks of Bilbao and Vizcaya) had tradition-
ally held the largest portfolios of public debt in Spain. Since 1921, the Banco
de Espan˜a was forced to accept public debt as collateral for Lombard credit at a
privileged rate, which made it a very liquid asset. The Banco de Espan˜a had been
accepting public debt as collateral for Lombard credit since much earlier, although
its preferred operation before the War was the discount of bills (as explained in
Chapter 2). Having the largest portfolios of public debt that could be pledged
at the Banco de Espan˜a, these banks could afford to keep their commercial dis-
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count rates low, because any liquidity shortage could be solved by pledging their
public debt portfolio at the Banco de Espan˜a without impairing their commer-
cial strategy (i.e. having to rise their discount rate more than what was strictly
necessary). In fact, the Banco de Espan˜a would systematically apply a lower
haircut in Lombard operations to banks in the area of Bilbao and the north of
Spain in general (see Table 4.5). Finally, banks of the north of Spain were, on
average, much more liquid than those in Barcelona or Madrid (Table 4.6). There-
fore, I argue, the discount rates applied in the north of Spain can be interpreted
as a lower bound of the rates available in the market for the years 1914-1919 .
Given that the point that is made here is that the discount rate applied by banks
in the market was never again below the discount rate of the Banco de Espan˜a,
the lack of more observations should not be against the argument for this purpose.
Madrid Bilbao Barcelona Weighted average
1902 46% 29% 47% 53%
1905 46% 25% 52% 44%
1910 43% 19% 49% 40%
1911 42% 19% 46% 39%
1912 42% 19% 50% 39%
1913 40% 18% 44% 39%
1914 45% 30% 51% 45%
Table 4.5: Haircut charged by the BdE to Lombard operations
Source: Memorias de las Sucursales del Banco de Espan˜a.
Madrid North Catalonia
R/K R/D R/K R/D R/K R/D
1910 14% 9%
1911 13% 8% 48% 18% 7% 5%
1912 14% 7% 48% 18% 7% 6%
1913 15% 9% 46% 16% 8% 7%
1914 15% 47% 9%
Table 4.6: Reserves, capital and deposits of different banking areas
Note: R=Reserves, K=Capital and D=Current Accounts. Source: Anuario Estadistico 1915, INE).
The market rate after WWI, from 1920 until June 1936
Once the impact of the First World War suspended the operations of the money
market, the discount rate that banks charged to the public never returned below
210
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter 4
that of the Banco de Espan˜a. After the War, banks could discount bills in the
market at a rate that was, on average, 1.5% above the rate that the Banco de
Espan˜a would charge them to re-discount. In some cases the spread between
both rates would reach 2.0% (as in 1925 and 1928). In fact, the minimum rate
that the banks could charge for a discount in the market was limited by the CSB
regulation and could never be below the official rate248.
From 1918 and until 1936, the number of observations used to reconstruct
the “market” interest rate improves significantly. Now that big banks were de-
veloping their nation-wide network of branches, their strategy was to reach the
largest market share possible. Given their dramatic change in scale during the
War, banks could now afford to open discount accounts to a wider public249.
Although its precise interpretation still needs to be done carefully, I show that
banks’ discount rate remained above the official rate, and show a relatively strong
correlation with the official rate charged by the Banco de Espan˜a. To develop
this market rate, I use a different source: the Annual Reports that the branches
of the Banco de Bilbao sent to the headquarters.
Since 1918, the Banco de Bilbao started to open branches across Spain, after
having established one in Paris in 1914 and in London in 1918. The newly opened
branches of this bank, elaborated thoroughly reports in which they explained the
situation of the market in each of the new cities in which were established250.
They commented the economic dynamism of the village or city and also listed
the main banks operating wherever they established the new branch. Some of the
branches reported yearly information about the interest rates applied to discount
and short-term credit operations by the banks that operated in a given city (Fig-
ure 4.17). Interestingly, the branches of the BdE were counted as other banks
operating in the commercial business of a given city or village.
This index includes the discount rate of many different banks (the largest
ones) for many cities. In total, I used the information available in the memories
of the 47 branches of the Banco de Bilbao that were progressively established in
relevant cities during the years 1918-1935 and that provided enough geographical
diversity. Not all the branches reported discount rates for every year and city in
which they operated and many did only report them occasionally251. To comple-
ment the index I use information from the Minutes of the Operations Committee
of the Banco Central, a big bank from Madrid (the fourth largest in Spain), which
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were reported—for some years—in the bank’s daily operations books252.
Figure 4.17: Interest rates applied by banks in the city of Cor-
doba, 1927
Source: Memoria-Informe Banco de Bilbao, Sucursal de Cordoba, 1927, p.3.
An example is provided in Table 4.7, where the reader can find the discount
rate applied in Madrid by the main banks. The homogeneity of the rates is evi-
dent, as well as the overall preference for commercial paper rather than financial
or accommodating bills. This is consistent with the fact that the Banco de Espan˜a
was a strong exponent of the “real bills doctrine” in Spain, as it always expressed
a strong preference for bills that emerged from a pure commercial transaction
with “real” goods involved and in some instances it rejected discounts of bills
that were not commercial “self-liquidating” transactions253.
Types of bills BHAM BVIZ BUMA BECR BCEN BERP BMER
1929
Commercial 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Financial 7.00% 6.50% 7.00% 6.50% 7.00%
1930
Commercial 6.50% 6.50% 6.0% - 6.5% 6.50% 6.0% - 6.5%
Financial 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00%
1931
Commercial 7.00% 6.5% - 7.0% 7.50% 6.5% - 7.0% 6.50% 6.50% 6.50%
Financial 7.00% 7.00% 7.50% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00%
Table 4.7: Discount rates charged by main banks in Spain in Madrid (1929-1931)
Source: Memorias de la Sucursal del Banco de Bilbao en Madrid years 1929 to 1931.
Banks would charge different rates to different types of bills, but the majority
of the operations were done with 3-month commercial bills of exchange. Some
banks, for example, would charge higher rates to financial or accommodation
bills or to bills without the required signatures. To harmonize the index, I weight
the rates charged per type of bill (when available) by the amounts discounted at
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Figure 4.18: Market and BdE discount rate for 3-month bills of
exchange (1921-1935)
Source: see text.
Figure 4.19: Geographical representativeness of the index (1919-
1935)
Source: see text.
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Figure 4.20: Official and market rates, Spain (1900-1936)
Source: see text.
those rates254. The resulting index is presented in Figure 4.18. Usually, the rate
that emerges from this calculation is virtually the same that banks charged to
3-month bills. In the cases in which banks did not report different operations I
take the single rates reported, assuming that most of the operations were done at
this rate. Geographically, the index is build up with data from different areas of
Spain. Although the most abundant data is from Madrid and Barcelona, there
are other cities and towns for which data is available. The map depicted in Figure
4.19 shows the cities and the number of years of the 14-year period (1921-1935)
for which is data available (number of years available in parenthesis). Finally, the
three periods are added together in Figure 4.20. As said in the beginning of this
Appendix, the continuous line of the “market rate” needs to be interpreted care-
fully, because the collateral involved in the operations is not the same. However,
for the sake of interpretation, and to highlight the changing nature of the inter-
est rate structure, a look at the connected series from 1900 to 1936 is informative.
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Explaining bank stability in Spain
during the 1930s
5.1 Introduction
Banking failures during the 1930s are one of the most spectacular features of
the Great Depression. In particular, the United States stands out with around
10,000 of the 24,000 institutions that were in operation at the beginning of 1929
failing between the beginning of that year and March 1933 (Richardson, 2007).
The role of bank failures in transmitting the monetary shocks of the Depres-
sion was highlighted by Bernanke (1983), as the main channel of transmission
of the monetary contraction that took place in the early 1930s (Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963). Although bank failures in Europe were less prevalent than in the
United States, a series of important banking closures have been associated with
strong and negative real effects. Following the disclosure of large losses by the
Austrian Credit-Anstalt in May 1931, the crisis extended rapidly to neighboring
Germany. The German Darmsta¨der- und Nationalbank (Danatbank) failed in
mid July, causing a contagion of panic to all German financial institutions, and
forcing them to a temporary closure (James, 1984; Bernanke and James, 1991;
Schnabel, 2004a). Contagion from the Central European panic ended up causing
a sharp liquidity shock to banks in London, to which the Bank of England reacted
by expanding its balance sheet through open market operations, and ultimately
pushing Britain out of the Gold Standard in September (Accominotti, 2012).
While certainly instrumental in the transmission and worsening of the Great
Depression, a narrative that focuses only on bank failures as the main metric for
understanding the severity and length of economic contraction during the 1930s,
risks neglecting important nuances that are necessary to understand the differen-
tial impact of financial shocks during the Depression in different countries. This
is important in the light of more recent developments in banking crises, where
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bank failures have become extremely rare events, but where sharp and perma-
nent contractions in bank lending have not necessarily been avoided. Perhaps the
most salient example of this is the case of the so-called “zombie banks” in Japan
during the 1990s (Krugman, 1998; Ito and Kashyap, 2000; Caballero, Hoshi, and
Kashyap, 2008), but there are more recent examples from the Great Recession
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).
As stressed above, bank failures were less prevalent in Europe during the
1930s, but the economic contraction was very severe. Therefore, bank failures
don’t tell the full story. The case of Spain during the Great Depression is an
interesting illustration of the risk of using bank failures as the only metric for
banking crises. Despite limitations to the lender of last resort intervention pre-
sented in Chapters 3 and 4, Spain saw very little and relatively small bank failures
in 1931. Only four small and non-systemic banks–representing less than 3% of
the system’s total assets–closed their doors during that year. This chapter ex-
plores an alternative explanation for bank stability during the 1930s in Spain.
I argue that the intervention of the Banco de Espan˜a (BdE) as lender of last
resort can not explain bank stability in Spain on its own. In Chapter 4 I showed
that data on borrowing from the BdE at the bank-level reveals that emergency
liquidity, while necessary to have avoided a deeper crisis, was not allocated pro-
portionately and that given banks’ liquidity shortages and currency mismatches,
other factors must have played a role in keeping banks afloat. In particular, I
argue that the suspension of mark-to-market accounting during the crisis was
a crucial and necessary factor to ensure bank stability by protecting the asset-
side of bank balance sheets. This kept bank losses to a minimum in a context
in which the price of publicly traded securities fell dramatically. I also provide
two additional factors that contributed to bank stability. First, savings banks,
which held the deposits of the popular classes were unaffected by the crisis, as
their depositors (pensioners, working classes and professionals) did not react to
the political regime change that took place in April 1931 by withdrawing their
deposits. Second, another decisive factor that prevented a widespread panic was
policymakers’ complete silence about the true depth of the crisis. This crucially
limited information available to depositors. To the best of my knowledge, the
actual depth of the crisis has not been documented until this day. Documenting
this provides new important evidence to understand political instability in Spain
during the 1930s, which is in turn a crucial element to understand the causes of
the Spanish Civil War.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents the four
cases of bank failures during 1931. Section III discusses the negotiation and the
effects of the suspension of mark-to-market accounting during the crisis. Section
IV compares the reaction of depositors in banks and savings banks. Section V
deals with the role of information disclosure and Section VI concludes.
5.2 Who failed and why?
Not all banks survived 1931. Four banks failed in July: on the 3rd, Bauer & Cia
(BAYC), the Rothschilds’ correspondent in Spain suspended payments, becoming
the only bank that failed in Madrid. Four days after, on July 7th, three more
banks failed in different cities of Catalonia. These were the Banco de Catalun˜a
(BCAT), the Banco de Tortosa (BTOR) and the Banco de Reus (BRDP); while
the first suspended payments and never reopened its doors, the other two recapi-
talized and started operating again in 1932. The historical account of these bank
failures is far from satisfactory. The failure of Bauer y Cia has been documented
by Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril (2012) and Lo´pez Morell (2013), which gath-
ered reports from the archives of the Paris Rothschild House, but the evolution
of the balance sheet of this bank before the 1931 crisis has not been included in
the analysis. This section sheds more light into the failure of Bauer y Cia by
combining data on their balance sheet with data on their daily borrowing from
the BdE. The historical account of the failure of the three other banks is more
problematic. Previous research from Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984), Tortella and Palafox
(1984) and Cabana (2003) has not established the causes of these failures con-
clusively, especially for the case of Banco de Catalun˜a. This section provides
additional evidence but, with the data at hand, it is still not possible to produce
a final conclusion on what did ultimately bring the bank down.
Overall, bank failures were relatively small (Table 5.1). That said, the fail-
ure of the Banco de Catalun˜a seems to have had regional implications (Cabana,
2003). In terms of the market share of the bank in Catalan provinces, however,
this depends on the estimates used. Table 5.2 shows the market shares I pre-
sented in Table 5.1 but as a percentage of banks with headquarters in the four
provinces of Catalonia. Because the data on balance sheets I use does not pro-
vide systematic disaggregation at the branch level, it is difficult to establish a
precise market share for this bank in Catalonia, because I don’t have system-
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atic data on banks headquartered elsewhere in Spain but that had a branch in
Catalan provinces. However, drawing from bank-specific data collected at the
largest banks’ archives, I can produce some alternative estimates that are closer
to the bank’s actual market share in the region. I start from a calculation of the
market share that does not take into account the branches that large banks based
in Madrid had in Catalonia (Estimate 1). Then, I recalculate the market share
including an estimate of the size of the branches that Banco Hispano Americano
(BHAM) and Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) had in Catalan provinces (Estimate 2).
Because these are lower bound estimates, I then I assume the other top banks,
Banco Espan˜ol de Credito (BECR), Banco de Vizcaya (BVIZ) and Banco Central
(BCEN) held a similar share of their business in Catalonia (Estimate 3). Finally,
I subtract the estimated share of the deposits that the Government held with
BCAT, which were especially deposited by the former in this bank and cannot
be computed as retail deposits. A safe estimate of the share of the Government’s
deposits in the bank can be placed at around 50% (see Section 5.2.2). Therefore,
from an initial deposit market share of 24%, the final estimate suggests that the
share of deposits of the three failed banks in Catalonia was around 12%. This is
still a sizable share255. However, considering that there are a number of banks
that held deposits in Catalonia (Spanish and foreign) that are not included in
these adjustments and that I use a lower bound measure in all different estimates,
the actual figure could be well below my final estimate. Overall, Table 5.2 con-
stitutes a substantial downward revision of the relative importance of these banks.
% of total assets % of total loans % of total deposits
Bauer y Cia 0.14% 0.36% 0.17%
Banco de Catalun˜a 1.87% 2.44% 1.60%
Banco de Tortosa 0.12% 0.05% 0.15%
Banco de Reus 0.40% 0.57% 0.47%
Total failed banks 2.53% 3.42% 2.39%
Table 5.1: Failed banks compared to Spanish banking sector
Note: all figures are from 1931q1. Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
In sum, failed banks represented a very small share of total Spanish banking
sector assets, deposits and loans. That said, the final estimate of 11.8% still rep-
resents a shock to the banking sector in Catalonia, which needs to be added to
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Estimate 1 Estimate 2 Estimate 3 Estimate 4
Banco de Catalun˜a 17.31% 15.00% 13.40% 6.70%
Banco de Tortosa 1.66% 1.44% 1.28% 1.28%
Banco de Reus 5.12% 4.45% 3.90% 3.90%
Total share in Catalonia 24.09% 20.89% 18.58% 11.88%
Table 5.2: Estimated failed banks’ market share in Catalonia (deposits)
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
the shock suffered by Spanish banks branched in Catalan provinces that suffered
severe liquidity pressure during 1931 (see Chapter 3). The next subsections dis-
cuss the failure of banks in two parts. First I deal with the failure of Bauer y Cia
and second I address the failure of the three aforementioned banks in Catalonia.
5.2.1 Bauer y Cia: misusing the right connections
After almost a century of history, the representative of the Rothschilds in Spain,
Bauer y Cia suspended payments on July 3rd, 1931.256 After a relatively stagnant
period in the first half of the 1920s, the bank started an unsustainable expansion
plan from 1928, relying heavily on liquidity provided by the BdE. Along with
the strong expansion of the Spanish economy and the banking sector, the bank
expanded its business well beyond commercial banking.
The main example of this was the creation of Compan˜ia Iberoamericana de
Publicaciones (CIAP) in 1924. The Society was born as the first large publishing
firm in Spanish. During its seven years of existence, the Society became the main
player in the publishing business in Spain, holding the publishing rights of some
of the main Spanish writers of the time.257 Right from its inception, the partic-
ipation of the bank in the Society grew to account for the largest share of the
bank’s assets. Bauer y Cia became an extension of the CIAP, which expanded
very fast during its first years (Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril, 2012). This can
be seen in Table 5.3, which shows a reconstruction of the balance sheet of Bauer
y Cia at the time of liquidation, in July 1931. By then, the bank’s participa-
tion in CIAP accounted for half of its total assets, highlighting the bank’s strong
reliance on the publishing company’s future, while having a poorly diversified
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portfolio. The other half was made up of highly illiquid securities, as it included
assets for which there was not a ready market or items such as jewels, paintings
and tapestries. Current accounts in other institutions, the bank’s only liquid
asset left by the time of liquidation, amounted to a tiny 7% of total assets. The
composition of the bank’s asset side of the balance sheet became increasingly
problematic as the expansion of CIAP turned out to be based on unsustainable
grounds. While CIAP was still regarded by its clients as a solvent firm by 1930,
it started accumulating losses due to the mismanagement of both Ignacio and
Alfredo Bauer, who failed to meet the managerial requirements of such a rapid
expansion. After having purchased some of the main bookshops in a number of
Spanish cities, the firm failed to deliver book orders, accumulated unsold stocks
and ultimately undermined the reputation of long established book retailers it
had just acquired (Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril, 2012). Moreover, the Bauer
brothers inflated the book value of some of the bank’s real estate assets258.
The structure of the bank’s liabilities was not less problematic. As can be
seen in Table 5.3, the bank relied very heavily on credit from the BdE. Instead
of supporting the expansion of the firm by increasing capital, attracting depos-
itors or issuing long term obligations, the Bauer brothers funded all purchases
done by CIAP by issuing short term bills of exchange, that their own bank would
accept (thus becoming, ultimately, its liability). The Bauer brothers would dis-
count these bills at their own bank, and then rediscount them with the BdE. As
Lo´pez Morell (2013) put it, the BdE had granted the bankers “virtually unlimited
credit”.259 When the CIAP started reporting severe losses from 1930, the bank
increased its reliance on the BdE to rediscount newly issued bills that sustained
the liquidity needs of the company. By the time of liquidation, more than one
third of the bank’s liabilities were short term bills that had to be serviced to the
BdE, with bills issued by CIAP accounting for more than half. The bank did not
rely only on rediscounting these bills, it also made extensive use of other credit
facilities at the discount window of the BdE. The bank borrowed heavily against
Gold bonds, as these were particularly liquid given that the Lombard rate set for
this type of bonds was 200 basis points below their yield (see Chapter 2). It also
used public debt and other securities to obtain advances from the BdE.260 The
bank was also dependent on advances from other banks, and in some cases it used
securities that were property of the Rothschild House or of its own clients as col-
lateral for these operations. In addition, and as a last attempt to revive the CIAP,
Alfredo Bauer had managed to obtain a 5 million pesetas personal credit from the
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Assets Liabilities
Real estate 2731126 Bills discounted with the BdE
CIAP 14000000 from CIAP 6470909
Cia. Agricola e Industrial de la Guinea Espan˜ola 1700000 from Bauer y Cia 1000000
Jewels, paintings, tapestries, etc. 4000000 from others 3154830
Current accounts in other banks or institutions 2000000
Advances with the BdE
against Gold Bonds 3150000
against public debt 349500
against other securities 2715500
Advances with Banco de Bilbao 4830000
Loan from the BdE 2000000
Personal loan from Rothschild to A.Bauer 5000000
Other maturing debts 1234500
Total estimated assets 24431126 Total estimated liabilities 29905239
Table 5.3: Balance sheet of Bauer y Cia before declaring insolvency in July 1931
Note: figures in the balance sheet are the estimates of P. Jardot, the delegate of the Rothschild House that
was sent to evaluate the situation of Bauer y Cia. The date of the balance sheet is 30 June 1931. Source:
combination of data from Table 10 in Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril (2012, p.135).
Rothschild House in Paris, which was also about to mature in the summer of 1931.
Quarterly data from the bank’s balance sheet and its daily borrowing from the
discount window of the BdE confirm this picture. Figure 5.1a shows the bank’s
debt-to-equity ratio. Figure 5.1b shows the composition of the bank’s liabilities
between 1922 and its failure in 1931. Black bars show borrowing from other fi-
nancial institutions, including borrowing from the discount window of the BdE.
As both figures show, the bank started relying heavily on borrowing from the
BdE in order to expand its portfolio, roughly doubling its debt-to-equity ratio in
less than two years. In fact, quarter after quarter, the bank kept losing long term
retail deposits (light grey bars in Figure 5.1b), which were replaced by short term
borrowing from the BdE (black bars in Figure 5.1b). At this level of aggrega-
tion, it is difficult to interpret the change in the composition of liabilities between
1924q4 and 1925q1. There is no evidence that the bank suffered a run on its re-
tail deposits back then. Also, its short term deposits remained stable and it was
only its time deposits that contracted. Instead, what motivated this change in
the liability structure of the bank was indeed the foundation of the CIAP, which
was registered in January 1925 (Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril, 2012). What is
clear is that following the foundation of the CIAP, the bank experienced a sharp
shortening in the average maturity of its liabilities. It is also evident from Figure
5.1b that as the CIAP’s business started deteriorating, from early 1930, Bauer
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y Cia doubled their reliance on the BdE. From an average of roughly 5 million
pesetas between 1925 and 1929 (around 45% of its liabilities), borrowing from
the BdE surged to account for 90%. By 1930, both Bauer y Cia and the CIAP
could not survive without continued access to the discount window of the BdE.
In turn, Figure 5.1c shows the bank’s daily borrowing from the BdE discount
window in Madrid between January and July 1931. By 20 January, Alfredo Bauer,
one of the two Bauer brothers, had reported insolvency to the House of Roth-
schild in Paris, who sent a representative to conduct and inspection, produce a
realistic balance sheet (see Table 5.3) and to find out the possibilities of the bank
remaining afloat. In the meantime, despite its insolvency, the bank continued to
borrow from the BdE to remain afloat261. When CIAP started reporting severe
losses, the bank started relying almost entirely on the BdE to roll over its short
term liabilities. It is therefore interesting to see that on 20 April 1931, two months
after having declared themselves insolvent to the House of Rothschild in Paris,
Bauer y Cia pledged their entire portfolio of gold bonds at the BdE, amounting a
total of 4.5 million pesetas, or 23% of their total assets (Figure 5.1c). By March
1931, Bauer y Cia’s total callable deposits amounted to 2.2 million pesetas (Fig-
ure 5.1b), so even if Bauer would have also suffered a run on deposits during the
first days of the Republic, the amounts it borrowed before publicly declaring in-
solvency were certainly motivated by its ongoing liquidity and solvency problems.
This situation lasted until July 1931, when the bank made its insolvency public
and closed its doors. Only then the Banco de Espan˜a stopped lending to the
bank. It is striking how the BdE continued to lend to Bauer y Cia without effec-
tive limits, and according to Lo´pez Morell (2013) against financial–not real–bills
issued by a company owned by the bank (CIAP). This is even more the case by
looking at the evolution of debt-to-equity ratios for this bank. Despite its strong
claims against lending to insolvent (unhealthy) institutions, it seems that “social
capital” (the Rothschilds’ name) counted more than any fundamental measure of
a sustainable balance sheet. As a consequence of both circumstances, the BdE
ended up making losses on its lending to Bauer y Cia, and it held a long court
case with the Rothschild House in Paris in order to seize assets to compensate
the losses262.
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Figure 5.1: Bauer y Cia, debt-to-equity ratio, liability structure and borrowing
from the BdE
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de
Espan˜a.
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5.2.2 Catalan banks and their wrong connections
The debate over the ultimate causes of the failure of Catalan banks in 1931 has
not been settled yet. However, there seems to be an agreement on the proximate
cause of their failure. In particular, the failure of Banco de Catalun˜a seems to
have roots in its political connections. In short, in July 1931, the Republican Gov-
ernment withdrew the funds from the oil monopolies that the Dictatorship had
previously entitled the bank with. From 1925, Banco de Catalun˜a had cooperated
extensively with the Minister of Finance of the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship, Mr.
Jose´ Calvo Sotelo. Two of the main joint projects that the bank helped launch
were CAMPSA and CEPSA, both firms related to the refinery and production of
oil263. Importantly, CEPSA was created at the initiative of the Recasens broth-
ers264, which had founded the Banco de Catalun˜a in August 1920 and earned the
trust and sympathy of Mr. Calvo Sotelo (Lluch, 1968b; Cabana, 2003). As a re-
sult of these political connections, the bank ended up holding the deposits of the
oil monopoly (CAMPSA) and thus was entitled with a significant rent. As time
passed, however, even Calvo Sotelo had been disappointed with the companies’
investment projects265. However, BCAT continued to hold CAMPSA’s deposits
until 1931.
The depreciation of the peseta also played a key role in fueling the banks’
exposure to swings in the political stance towards its owners. From 1928, the
exchange rate had been reaching historically low levels and this became the main
preoccupation of the Dictatorship. One of the alleged culprits of “foreign specu-
lation against the peseta”, which was the main explanation provided by the gov-
ernment for the depreciation, was the fact that large foreign oil firms held pesetas
and were dumping them on foreign exchange markets, depressing the exchange
rate and frustrating all attempts by the Government to stabilize the currency. In
fact, foreign oil companies like Shell and Standard Oil had offered the Dictator-
ship large sums in Sterling that could be used to nationalize all outstanding debt
denominated in foreign exchange that Spanish banks had accumulated during
1930 (see Chapter 3). For this to happen, the Government had to agree to either
dismantle the monopoly (CAMPSA) and liberalize entry to the market or to pay
foreign companies with CAMPSA shares. For example, on 12 August 1930, The
Times reported that Standard Oil was willing to grant the Spanish government
with one thousand million gold-pesetas in order to dismantle the monopoly266.
This was around three times the amount of foreign exchange liabilities in the
banking system. However, both the Dictatorship and later the Republic rejected
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such agreements. Interestingly, a letter sent from the De Rothschild Freres to
Bauer y Cia reveals first hand information from the House in Paris about the
issue267:
“(...) Shell and Standard Oil would buy shares of the Monopoly of
Petroleum if the Government was interested (...) they would pay in
Sterling (...) of one thing you can rest assured, and that is that neither
of the two companies have had any hand in the fall of the peseta at
the present time, nor have taken any steps in either buying or selling
pesetas to make any effect on the exchange market.”
However, that was far from the official discourse. Policymakers both from the
Dictatorship and the Republic were concerned that Shell and Standard Oil were
behind the drop of the peseta and that in no way the monopoly could be sold to
them. Both CAMPSA and CEPSA were regarded by the provisional Minister of
Finance of the Republic, Mr. Indalecio Prieto, as strong opportunities to socialize
the Spanish economy. Aiming at having a closer control over their funds, right
after the Republic was proclaimed in 1931, Prieto ordered the withdrawal of all
the deposits that CAMPSA had in the bank. In addition, the Municipality of
Barcelona, to which the bank had lent in the previous years, suspended payments
on July 1st. Along with these news, depositors also run on the bank, which had
to close its doors on July 7th.
According to Cabana (2003), Prieto withdrew the funds because of the bank’s
previous strong relations with the Dictatorship. In his account, Cabana described
that Mr. Prieto was influenced by his close relations with Basque bankers and
industrialists and transferred the deposits of the oil monopolies to them after
withdrawing them from Banco de Catalun˜a268. The evidence I present here sug-
gests that Mr. Prieto’s perception that the bank had expanded mostly thanks to
its connection with the Dictatorship was accurate. However, more importantly,
and from a bank management standpoint, this expansion already signals high
exposure to a single lender, which suggests that the bank had not diversified its
portfolio and relied almost entirely on the oil funds to expand. In fact, Lluch
(1968b) already pointed to the fact that the bank had relied too much on the
Government (the oil monopolies) to expand, rather than creating a solid base of
retail depositors on which the bank could rely. Figure 5.2 confirms this; the chart
shows the debt-to-equity ratio of the bank. The bank accelerated its expansion
right after the creation of CAMPSA in 1927 and, after recapitalizing in 1929 in
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Figure 5.2: Banco de Catalun˜a, debt-to-equity ratio (1922-1931)
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario.
order to participate in CEPSA, it continued with its fast expansion. As with
Bauer y Cia, which relied almost entirely on CIAP, Banco de Catalun˜a seems to
have relied excessively on the funds deposited by the oil monopolies. Albeit the
two cases are different in that they represent different political or economic ties as
well as different proximate cases of failure, in both cases, mismanagement in the
form of poor diversification stands out as a common and obvious ultimate cause
for failure. Until 1931, Banco de Catalun˜a relied heavily on a rent provided by
its close connections with the Dictatorship. As soon as the political equilibrium
changed, the bank lost its rent.
Along with Banco de Catalun˜a, two other, smaller banks suspended payments
in Catalonia: the Banco de Tortosa (BTOR) and the Banco de Reus (BRDP).
Both banks had close connections with Banco de Catalun˜a and were controlled
by the same owners. However, they did not hold deposits directly entitled by
the Government and, therefore, were not affected by the withdrawal of Govern-
ment funds. However, these two banks suffered deposit withdrawals as the public
feared that, being connected to BCAT, they would be the next in line to fail
(Cabana, 2003). With available data at hand, it is impossible to quantify how
much these banks were affected by unpaid liabilities from the failure of BCAT, to
which they were connected. That said, it seems difficult to conclude that, when
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Figure 5.3: Leverage ratios of banks connected to Banco de Catalun˜a
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario
they failed in July 1931, they did so only because a run on their deposits. This
would fail to explain why they had to be recapitalized a year after and started
operating again in 1932. Instead, it seems to be the case that they were brought
down by the failure of BCAT and only after recapitalizing, they could reopen.
Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of debt-to-equity ratios for both banks. Compared
to BCAT, these two little banks were substantially more leveraged (particularly
BRDP) and also expanded rapidly before the crisis. In both cases, however, after
recapitalizing, they remained almost inactive until 1935.
What was the role of the BdE in providing assistance to the four banks that
failed in 1931? As the case of Bauer already shows, the BdE did not step in to keep
the bank afloat after mismanagement problems became obvious and the bank ran
out of collateral. This bank constitutes a clear case of insolvency that was not
caused by any of the shocks common to all the rest of banks. Although the case
of Banco de Catalun˜a shows a more direct link with the change in the political
regime that took place in April 1931, from the point of view of bank management
it is not very different from Bauer y Cia. In contrast with my analysis, Cabana
(2003) concluded that the BdE could have kept BCAT afloat and that did not do
so because of a political bias against Catalan banks, an argument that was also
made regarding the failure of the Banc de Barcelona in 1920269. The Republican
Government targeted the bank, and as a consequence, it failed270. One could
add, however, that the bank was not targeted by the Republican Government; by
being provided with a rent, it had already been targeted by the Dictatorship.
Cabana reached his conclusion after showing that, when the Council of Barcelona
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missed a coupon payment to BCAT on 1 July, the BdE refused to provide the
Council with liquidity unless all banks in Barcelona provided a syndicated guar-
antee. In the end, a group of banks and savings banks provided the needed
liquidity and the Council paid the coupon with a two week delay. He concluded
that “(...) the failure would have been avoided if the Banco de Espan˜a had shown
a bit of generosity, instead of rigid and formalist criteria. (...) the bank failed
because of a liquidity crisis closely linked to the animosity of the Minister of Fi-
nance and the anger of the large Spanish banks against the bank”271. Again, it
is worth adding that by July 1931, the BdE had already exposed itself to sub-
stantial credit risk by rediscounting bills of exchange during April, May and June
and to also not minor counterparty risk, as it had lent extensively against public
debt to a number of different banks. Therefore, it seems difficult to argue that
the BdE was in a position to lend against the type of collateral that BCAT had
been accumulating. As Figure 5.5, on the way to the 1931 crisis, BCAT had be-
come much less liquid, as it had reduced its holdings of public debt substantially.
Perhaps more crucially, Cabana’s account is also difficult to reconcile with the
account provided by Lluch (1968b), who explained how the Minister of Finance,
Mr. Indalecio Prieto aimed at organizing a last minute lifeboat for the bank, but
that was rejected by the Recasens brothers who, apart from the rent from the
oil monopolies, seem to have been not very interested in the future of the bank272.
Looking at the bank’s borrowing from the discount window of the BdE, it is
hard to argue that the latter had a bias against the former. As Figure 5.4 shows,
BCAT borrowed from the BdE during the crisis, until July, when it failed. We
don’t know if the bank lost substantial deposits before July, as the last balance
sheet it reported was from the end of March. Therefore, it is hard to assess if
the bank had met its liquidity needs by borrowing from the BdE before it lost
the CAMPSA funds. Interestingly, however, the bank borrowed more before the
Republic was procclaimed than after that, which suggests that the bank might
either had liquidity problems before the crisis or that it did not experience sub-
stantial deposit losses during April, May and June, before the CAMPSA funds
were withdrawn.
A look at the evolution of the balance sheet, however, can shed some addi-
tional light. First, Figure 5.5a shows that the increase in the bank’s deposits
came right after the creation of CAMPSA and these were all short term deposits,
which increased by a factor of four in three years. Therefore, the bank was in a
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relatively fragile position was it to receive a sharp deposit withdrawal. However,
until the day of its failure, BCAT continued to receive deposits. Looking at assets,
Figure 5.5b shows the evolution of the bank’s holdings of public debt compared to
other securities. As opposed to virtually all banks in Spain, who were increasing
their shares of public debt as a means of ensuring their liquidity (see Chapter
2), BCAT started liquidating its portfolio of public debt from early 1930, right
after Dictator Primo de Rivera and its Minister of Finance Mr. Calvo Sotelo re-
signed in January. By March 1931, BCAT had sold half of its government bonds.
Where did the bank place the funds from selling half of its public debt portfolio?
Figure 5.5b shows how the bank switched its business towards the rediscount of
bills of exchange and the purchase of privately issued stocks, a somewhat similar
strategy to what Bauer y Cia had pursued. Loans, on the contrary, remained
relatively flat. This is important if we recall that the bank was funded mostly
by short-term deposits owned by the Government and was supposed to invest
them in oil-related activities (see quote above). Instead, as soon as the bank’s
main political support–Mr. Calvo Sotelo–lost power in January 1930, it seems
that BCAT opted for changing its business towards private securities and stopped
accumulating public debt, a strategy that contrasts sharply with all other banks.
In sum, it is hard to argue that any of the four banks that failed in Spain
during the 1931 crisis did so because of a deterioration in their assets associated
with the international financial crisis or with the regime change. At least, not
more than the rest of the banking system. One of them, Bauer y Cia, failed be-
cause of clear mismanagement and ineptitude of its managers; by relying on the
Rothschild’s name, the bank became an instrument to fund a publishing company
that went bankrupt. The other three banks suspended payments because they
lost the preferencial treatment that the previous regime had granted them with.
Banco de Catalun˜a benefited directly, and Banco de Reus and Banco de Tortosa
benefited because they were subsidiaries of Banco de Catalun˜a. The latter lost its
rent as the Republic was proclaimed. Just as it had earned the rent thanks to its
founders’ close ties with the Dictatorship, the Republic transferred the rent else-
where. A better banking environment might have made it easier for the banks to
survive, but it is fair to conclude that, had the regime change taken place without
any pressure in the exchange rate or a widespread bank run, it is very likely that
all these banks would have failed or suspended payments anyway. In any case,
Spain only experienced four small bank failures during the 1931 banking crisis.
The next sections explain why, apart from these four cases, Spain retained bank
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stability despite the severe shocks the system underwent.
5.3 The suspension of mark-to-market account-
ing
Among the many parallels that have been recently drawn between the Great De-
pression of the 1930s and the more recent Great Recession is the role of asset
valuation. Long forgotten, this debate was reignited during 2009, as banking
assets entered a violent devaluation spiral as liquidity dried in financial markets
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2010). The debate about asset valuation can be
summarized in two different stances. On the one hand, mark-to-market account-
ing, a type of so-called “fair value” accounting by which asset valuation in firms
and banks’ balance sheets are updated periodically (usually on a quarterly basis)
to reflect the price that they would carry if they were to be sold in the open
market. The opposite methodology, so-called “historical value” or amortized
cost, keeps asset values in balance sheets constant at the price that was paid
upon purchase of the asset (Lennard, 2018). The debate is inevitably fraught
with subjective perceptions of fairness and the political economy inherent to ac-
counting regulation.273 For some, marking assets to market exposes the financial
system to short term unfounded volatility, while for others the risk resides in
ignoring market information as the most accurate signal on real asset value (Hal-
dane, 2012; Ball and Haldane, 2018).
Marking to market improves information about the risk profile of firms in a
way that market participants can exercise market discipline and monitor the de-
cisions taken by a given firm. The main shortcoming of marking assets to market
is that while it avoids distortions caused by inefficient decisions taken by firms
based on historical outdated values, it can create new distortions. In short, since
markets are only imperfectly liquid (especially during financial crises), if assets
are marked to market, the value of a given bank’s asset does depend on other
banks’ selling decisions over the same asset (Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci, 2005).
Asset fire-sales, like the ones experienced during the Great Depression or the
Great Recession can be triggered by the effect of contagion of depressed asset
prices from one bank’s balance sheet to another via marking to market (Schnabel
and Shin, 2004; Plantin, Sapra, and Shin, 2008; Allen and Carletti, 2008).
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This was already identified as a channel of transmission of monetary shocks
during the Great Depression. In their monumental A Monetary History of the
United States, 1867-1970, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz observed:274
“(...) the banking system as a whole was in a position to meet the
demands of depositors for currency only by a multiple contraction of
deposits, hence of assets. Under such circumstances, any runs on
banks for whatever reason became to some extent self-justifying, what-
ever the quality of assets held by banks. Banks had to dump their
assets on the market, which inevitably forced a decline in the market
value of those assets ad hence of the remaining assets they held. The
impairment in the market value of assets held by banks, particularly in
their bond portfolios, was the most important source of impairment of
capital leading to bank suspensions, rather than the default of specific
loans or of specific bond issues.”
Friedman and Schwartz also hinted at the importance of marking to market
and ex-ante asset liquidity for the contagion of fire-sales of bonds and securities:275
“Because there was an active market for bonds and continuous quota-
tion of their prices, a bank’s capital was more likely to be impaired, in
the judgment of bank examiners, when it held bonds that were expected
to be and were honored in full when due than when it held bonds for
which there as no good market and few quotations. So long as the
latter did not come due, they were likely to be carried on the books at
face value (...). Paradoxically, therefore, assets regarded by the banks
as particularly liquid and as providing them with a secondary reserve
turned out to offer the most serious threat to their solvency.”
The quotes above provide two interesting benchmarks to which the Spanish
case can be compared. First, the more obvious channel of transmission of asset
depreciation from one bank to another as banks had to resort to fire-sell assets
in a scramble for liquidity. Second, the role of stock market activity during the
crisis. The fact that quotations for bonds and other securities remained active
during the banking crises in the United States increased the potential for conta-
gion via mark-to-market. The more active the market for a given security was,
the stronger the impact on bank’s portfolios, thus opening a way in which fair ac-
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counting was perversely linked with worsening liquidity conditions for banks. As
I will detail below, in both cases, the Spanish experience contrasts significantly
with the scenario described by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and explains the
different outcomes in both countries’ banking sectors during the 1930s, after hav-
ing suffered similar shocks.
Recently, some researchers and commentators have highlighted the role of the
suspension of mark-to-market accounting as key to the recovery from the Great
Depression in the United States. A number of parallels have been drawn with
the recent financial crisis (Laux, 2012). In some cases, commentators have gone
as far as implying causation from fair value accounting to the Great Recession
(Wesbury and Stein, 2009a,b). Fair value accounting also played a role during the
Euro Crisis, as banks exposed to Greek debt (among other assets) were severely
affected by mark-to-market losses, thus contributing to the so-called “doom loop”
of mounting depreciating public debt in the banking sector (Shambaugh, 2013;
Baldwin, Beck, Benassy-Quere, Blanchard, Corsetti, de Grauwe, den Haan, Gi-
avazzi, Gros, Kalemi-Ozcan, Micossi, Papaioannou, Pesenti, Pissarides, Tabellini,
and Weder di Mauro, 2015). While it is far from the scope of this chapter to dis-
cuss the direction of causality between fair value accounting and financial crises
(both in the upswing and the downturn phases of the credit cycle), it is impor-
tant to discuss the role played by mark-to-market during the 1930s in the United
States; not only its role in reinforcing contagion, but also the role played by its
suspension.
In April 1938, fears of a double dip recession prompted President Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt to organize a convention between the main representatives of the
financial and monetary regulatory bodies276. The Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Reserve Board, the US Treasury and the recently created Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) met to discuss asset valuation, in a heated
meeting that Marriner S. Eccles, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve described
as “guerrilla warfare” (Simonson and Hempel, 1993). Eccles description of the
meeting is better understood by describing the different stances taken by the
different actors involved. On the one hand, the Comptroller of the Currency
and the FDIC argued that fair value accounting was necessary. On the other
hand, the Fed argued that it should be suspended, as sticking to it implied “(...)
leading to a policy of curtailment and liquidation at exactly the wrong time”.277
Finally, the position held by the Fed prevailed. The outcome of the meeting was
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included in the June 1938 Uniform Agreement on Bank Supervisory Procedures,
which established that investment grade assets would be valued at amortized cost
and sub-investment grade assets would be valued at long-term average of market
prices. Mark-to-market accounting was effectively suspended in July 1938.
Seven years before the Roosevelt administration suspended mark-to-market
valuation in the United States, a similar move was taken in Spain. As this section
shall argue, this was a necessary move to avoid bank failures. Despite in essence
the policy decision is the same (i.e. suspending fair value accounting), there are
differences with the account provided above. First, in the Spanish case, it is
clear that the initiative came from the banking system. All other actors involved
(especially the Minister of Finance, who was not represented in the meetings)
followed the lead of the consensus reached by the Consejo Superior Bancario, the
bankers’ association. Second, the decision was reached much faster than in the
United States, and in time to avoid banks to realize otherwise unbearable losses.
Third, the suspension of mark-to-market was barely commented in the press and
did not go public. This, as I explain below responded to all parties’ desire to
prevent the actual extent of the crisis from reaching the public domain.
5.3.1 The discussion between banks, BdE and the Gov-
ernment
During the second half of the 1920s, stock markets rallied; with them, banks’
portfolios of private stocks more than doubled (Figure 5.9). Some shocks notwith-
standing, all stocks increased almost uninterruptedly until 1930, where they
reached a plateau. However, right after the proclamation of the Republic, on
April 1931, the stock market fell rapidly; the price of public debt fell 12.7% dur-
ing the rest of the year, and private stocks collapsed by 31.6% (Figure 5.6a).
During May, the Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao stock markets were closed be-
tween the 11th and 17th, during the violent clashes between Republicans and
Monarchists in the streets of different cities across Spain (Escribano Bote, 2015).
The Minister of Finance, Indalecio Prieto, claimed that the stock market tended
to overreact to all political developments, and that this was going to affect the
stability of the new regime278. In fact, if allowed to have a real impact on banks’
balance sheets, the shock would have certainly caused widespread bank failures.
By March 1931, banks portfolios of securities held substantial amounts of stocks,
bonds and public debt, all which fell sharply in value as soon as the Republic was
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Figure 5.6: Indexes of the price of public debt and stocks
Source: Indices de la Bolsa Espan˜ola, Fondo Documental del Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1930-1934).
proclaimed. Between 1922 and 1930, bank’s holding of stocks had expanded by
145% (Figure 2.1). Had banks been forced to mark their assets down to reflect
market prices, Spain would have probably undergone a second banking panic as
soon as banks reported losses by the first quarter of 1932. However, this did not
happen. The closure of the stock market avoided an initial round of asset fire-
sales. Trading activity collapsed to recover only once a Government was formed
in November (Figure 5.6b). As the end of the year approached, banks started an
initiative to avoid the realization of stock market losses in their balance sheets,
and started pushing for the suspension of mark-to-market.
The actual evolution of bank capital and securities’ portfolios is provided in
Figure 5.7. In Figure 5.7a I plot the average and the 95% confidence interval of
an index of bank capital ratios (1930q1=100). Capital remained intact. Impor-
tantly, there were virtually no recapitalizations after or during the 1931 crisis, so
what the figure shows is that banks did not reflect mark-to-market losses caused
by the collapse in stock and bond prices shown in Figure 5.6a above. Given that
capital was virtually flat during the 1930s, I then turn to measure the evolution
of securities’ portfolios against the evolution of capital. I plot an index of the
evolution of the share of private and public bonds over capital, using 1930q1
as the reference year. Figure 5.7b shows that banks valuation of securities port-
folio was completely disconnected from the market prices provided in Figure 5.6a.
How did the banking sector achieve this remarkable stability? In October
1931, the President Delegate of the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB), Mr. Au-
gusto Barcia, sent a letter to all member banks, asking for different proposals
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Figure 5.7: Impact of the stock market shock on banks’ capital and portfolios
Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and Boletines Diarios de la Bolsa de Madrid.
to deal with the depreciation of shares, bonds and public debt. As the end of
the year approached, banks had to face the realization of stock market losses.
According to the Trade Law, balance sheets of companies (including financial
intermediators) had to reflect279: the exact relation of money, securities, loans,
bills, other types of assets, commodities and other types of commercial paper, val-
ued at their real value, all of them constituting the company’s assets. However,
1931 was not the first time that mark-to-market was suspended. In 1914, trade
insurance companies had been allowed–through a Royal Decree that, being con-
sidered a temporary measure, was also not published in the Gaceta de Madrid–to
suspend market valuations of their assets temporarily, until trade could resume
after the war. In 1931, during the negotiation in the CSB, banks referred to this
case as a precedent280.
Among banks, and following the content of the Trade Law, it was custom to
mark assets to market. Given the vagueness of the Trade Law in this respect–
as it was not clear what “real value” stood for–mark to market became common
practice. For example, discussing this, El Sol explained: “(...) the drop in market
prices for securities will cause severe disruption to banks that hold large portfolios
of stocks, because, as it is common practice, these are these currently show up
in banks’ balance sheets at their market value at 31 December of last year”281.
Anecdotal evidence in some banks’ minutes and in newspaper articles suggests,
however, that in parallel to marking their assets to market at the end of the year,
some banks had established a parallel reserve to compensate for potential drop
in asset prices in the future (which was certainly not expected to be as large
as they were). For example, Banco Urquijo de Madrid reported having done so
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282. Similarly, Banco Espan˜ol de Cre´dito and Banco Hispano Americano seem
to have proceeded in a relatively prudent manner in terms of asset valuation283.
That said, it is hard to argue that banks could have been prudent enough to
anticipate an provision for an average fall in asset prices of 32%.
The board of the CSB met on November 18th to discuss the issue. All mem-
bers of the board attended the meeting. The Banco de Espan˜a was represented
by its vice-governor Mr. Pedro Pan, and all major banks were represented by
either their presidents or members of their boards284. The President Delegate
opened the discussion by summarizing the main points that he had received from
banks’ responses to his letter:
– All banks were affected by the stock market shock and most banks were
going to make substantial losses in 1931 if they had to mark their portfolios
of stocks down to prevailing market values.
– Some banks were willing to absorb these losses, and some were not. This,
of course, depended on the size of the losses.
– A possible solution was to value assets purchased before April 1931 at an
“estimated” price, and those acquired after April at their historic purchase
value.
– Individual bankers were more exposed to the problem, as, in case of capital
losses, they did not have limited liability.
– Dividend policy ought to be discussed.
– The decision of reflecting stock losses or not should consider the effects on
tax payments. The decision should take into account the trade-off between
reflecting stock market losses and paying too much taxes.
– Whatever the decision was, a fiscal exemption should be asked for 1932.
– The solution should be reached before the end of the year, when banks had
to report to their shareholders and liquidate profits.
The description of the problem by the President of the CSB shows the gravity
of the situation and highlights the importance of the arrangement in avoiding
a second round of distress for banks once they would have to publish their an-
nual reports. At market prices, many banks would have become insolvent even
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with more liquidity assistance from the BdE. First, marking assets down to mar-
ket would have required ackwnowledging large losses that would have in turn
required substantial recapitalizations for a large number of banks in a moment
where raising capital was definetely not easy. Second, revealing losses by banks
in their annual statements would have revealed individual weaknesses, and thus
increased the probability of another bank run, this time targeted at specific in-
stitutions that revealed losses.
Once the nature of the problem was exposed, banks started expressing their
individual views. The first discussion was on whether one rule should fit all banks.
On the one hand, there were a variety of exposure levels in bank balance sheets,
which required a variety of optimal individual solutions. On the other, if some
banks were allowed to take different paths, public opinion would be suspicious
about each banks’ individual motivations or balance sheet problems to take one
or other decision. However, discussions between different banks ended up in the
approval of a voluntary solution, to which banks would be allowed to adhere or
not, at their convenience.
The next question, and the main one, was about the valuation of stocks and
public debt. It was precisely the banks that had not marked their assets up to
market during the late 1920s, the ones that in 1931 suggested that it was “ethi-
cally” incorrect that banks were simply allowed to stick to book values ignoring
the sharp decline in market value. This was argued by at least two banks (Banco
Espan˜ol de Cre´dito, BECR; and Banca Arnu´s, BAAR). Both had purchased more
shares and bonds, and their portfolios continued increasing, but—according to
the points they made at the CSB meeting—they had chosen to be more prudent
in their valuation. By keeping historic values, they had created a “shadow re-
serve” as stocks revalued, that could now help to smooth the shock. However,
their opinion was not taken into account, probably because this was an exception
to what had been considered common practice in banking; banks marked their
assets to market at the end of the year. This of course, had been a relatively
easy exercise in the previous years, as asset prices had boomed almost uninter-
ruptedly since the mid-1920s. In response to the arguments made by these two
banks, however, most banks argued that the drop in stock prices did not mean
that these were necessarily losses, and therefore should not be reflected as if they
were. Banco Hispano Americano (BHAM), Banco Central (BCEN) or Banco de
Arago´n (BARA)( among others) claimed that a loss was not such thing until the
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asset was sold, and therefore banks should not be forced to mark their assets
down to market. Instead, they should be allowed to value shares and bonds, if
anything, at 1930 prices285:
“This is probably the most difficult moment for the Consejo Supe-
rior Bancario; the future of the Spanish banking sector depends on
the agreements reached here (...). It has been rightly argued that this
crisis did not originate in the management of banks, but was caused
by something external to the banking sector, which has nothing to do
with bank’s decisions. The norms we are seeking to introduce are of
strict morality in order to adapt the banking sector to something that
is not the consequence of its mistakes. It is hard to answer the ques-
tion of what is a loss. In banking, a loss is not such thing unless it
is definitive, and this is not the case today. Moreover, today’s stock
market quotations are not a reality but a fiction, because the market is
not acting freely, thanks to wise and needed restrictions.”
Interestingly, this opinion was shared by the vice governor of the BdE, Mr.
Pedro Pan. The BdE, which lent to all CSB banks against public debt and shares
and held these assets as collateral, would have been severely affected by the al-
ternative if this implied bank failures, as the collateral it would have ended up
holding would have been severely depreciated. This, of course, was also a crucial
motivation of the decision to suspend mark-to-market.
The discussion about asset valuation had another interesting side. It was not
only about the value of shares and bonds of private companies, but also about
public debt, whose price had also dropped substantially following April (Figure
5.6a). The representative of the Chamber of Commerce (Mr. Manuel Velasco)
suggested that the Banco de Espan˜a should reduce the haircut it applied to Lom-
bard operations against public debt as collateral, as this would increase its price
and drive the recovery of the stock market before the end of the year, which could
already be a powerful move. By virtue of its Statutes, the BdE could not accept
public debt on a Lombard operation above the 80% of its value, so haircuts could
not go below 20%. Moreover, Mr. Pedro Pan (BdE) immediately opposed to
any reduction in haircuts. It was not only the BdE who declined this proposal;
again Mr. Pablo Garnica (BECR) was against that. He found it unfair that
banks holding public debt which was already overvalued–as it was not reflecting
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market prices–could benefit from the reduction of the haircut. However, there
was a powerful argument against Mr. Garnica’s position. As it is also reflected
in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, Mr. A´lvarez-Valde´s, who repre-
sented Banco Hispano Americano (BHAM), the second bank in size after BECR,
claimed that there were no doubts about the morality of the proposals, as banks
were affected by a shock that had nothing to do with their previous activity (with
their fundamentals). It had been a purely exogenous shock, caused by political
factors, that banks ought to be protected from, rather than penalized by.
The discussion between the two largest banks reveals that, following the liq-
uidity shock and the stock market shock that took place from April, there were
two possible equilibria, and these were clearly reflected by the different avenues
the two largest banks had taken after April. On the one hand, BECR, who suf-
fered very strong liquidity shortages during the previous months, had to resort to
contract its loan portfolio drastically. By the end of the year, it had called back
more loans than any other Spanish bank (see Chapters 3 and 4). This certainly
reduced the bank’s future revenues, but kept it afloat without much assistance
from the BdE. According to the points made in the meetings, it was also helped
by not having to devalue its portfolio, as it had been more prudent in marking
shares up to market during the boom. On the other hand, BHAM, who suffered
also strong deposit withdrawals but had no significant problem accessing the dis-
count window of the BdE (especially compared to BECR) could keep lending,
but its survival was conditional to the Minister of Finance allowing for banks to
not mark stocks and public debt to market.
The particular equilibrium in which banks could found themselves had very
different implications for the system as a whole, especially considering that these
were the two largest and most widely branched banks in Spain. Both the Minster
of Finance and the CSB decided to keep the banking system in the second equi-
librium: the one with overvalued portfolios but the one that allowed to prevent
an even stronger contraction in credit by triggering a second round of bank dis-
tress as soon as losses were realized when banks published their annual reports in
March 1932. This was reflected in the final decision. Banks were allowed to value
public debt and “first order” companies’ shares at their market prices if they had
been bought after the drop in market values. If they had been bought before the
crisis, then they could be valued at their end-of-year value in 1930 (all types of
shares and public debt). The President of the CSB mentioned explicitly that the
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decision had been reached in order to “(...) prevent the situation from affecting
bank’s credibility”286.
There were several proposals as for how banks should reflect the operation in
their balance sheets. As the CSB distributed the balance sheets (it printed 500
copies which then could be reproduced), these would become eventually public,
and banks wanted to avoid reflecting unexplained variations in book values. The
goal was to avoid the public from realizing the magnitude of the crisis, as sug-
gested by the representative of Banco Guipuzcoano (BGUI), Mr. Victor Artola.
To do so, the solution was to create a “Securities Fluctuation Fund” (Fondo de
fluctuacio´n de valores), which appeared for the first time in the liability side of
banks’ balance sheets by the end of 1931q4.287 If banks did not want to reflect the
depreciation of shares and public debt in their balance sheets, then they would
have to create this account for the value of the depreciation. This would be cre-
ated partly with their reserves and partly with the profits from other banking
activities that banks earned in 1931, in case there were some. As time passed
and shares recovered their value—that was the expectation—banks would then
progressively reduce this account and rebuild their reserves by the same amount.
This solution left the asset side of banks’ balance sheets intact (Figure 5.7). The
obvious problem was that since there was no market price for most securities,
there was room for discretion on valuations, which implied that banks might al-
locate different amounts to the Securities Fluctuation Fund. Moreover, amounts
allocated on the Fund could then be a signal of the exposure of a bank to the
drop in asset prices, thus creating an incentive for banks to keep the Fund as low
as possible.
After the discussion on the valuation of banks’ portfolios and the new ac-
counting rule, banks discussed whether they should pay dividends or not. Some
banks considered it necessary to keep their shareholders confidence, while others
preferred to avoid dividend payments. If some banks were paying dividends and
some were not, this would be again interpreted by depositors as a sign of weakness
and could trigger another bank run, this time caused by fundamental weaknesses
at the bank level. This was the position of Banco de Vizcaya (BVIZ), a clear ex-
ponent of “universal banking”, that had suffered a strong shock with the drop in
the stock market. In fact, this bank suggested to pay no dividends, as this could
be interpreted as a sign that banks “were not aware” of the crisis the country was
going through. Interestingly, it was again BECR the bank that stands out as the
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one in favor of paying dividends. In fact, this bank had already paid dividends in
June, in the middle of the crisis, when it was suffering severe liquidity pressure.
Having paid dividends, BECR was concerned that it might be affected by the loss
of confidence caused by other banks suspending dividend payments. In the same
line, Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) suggested that not paying dividends would be in-
terpreted as general—and not particular—weakness. Depositors might be unable
to identify bank idiosyncrasies and not paying dividends might affect all banks,
as had happened during the bank run earlier in the year. Others, like BHAM
claimed that even if small, some dividends ought to be paid. Some other banks
suggested that it was unfair to cap dividend payments, as some banks did not
have depreciated assets in their balance sheets and this should be also considered.
Finally, an agreement was reached and banks were allowed to pay limited
dividends. These could not exceed 60% of what they paid in 1930; profits made
above this ought to be used to reduce the “Securities Fluctuation Fund”. Prof-
its used to reduce the Securities Fluctuation Fund would not be taxed. In case
banks reserves were smaller than the value of the depreciation suffered, then no
dividends could be paid. Some banks like Soler y Torra (SOLE) suggested that
the limitation should be extended to all firms, not only banks, so shareholders
and eventually depositors would be less suspicious about banks’ health, but this
was finally limited to banks. I have been unable to find information on all banks’
dividend payments, but Figure 5.8 shows profits, dividends and taxes paid by two
of the largest 6 banks: Banco Hispano Americano (BHAM) and Banco Urquijo
de Madrid (BUMA). Even Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), which, as shown
in Chapters 3 and 4 was by far the most affected bank during 1931, continued to
pay dividends. Again, with an average depreciation of 35% of banks portfolios
of stocks, having to mark stocks and bonds to market, even if banks managed to
survive by recapitalizing, they would have not been able to pay any dividends to
shareholders.
The last big topic that banks discussed was how they would pay taxes in the
following years, as all banks agreed in that they should apply to a tax exemption
given the difficulties they had experienced. Although the final agreement did
not include any mention to taxes, in May 1932, a law was passed which allowed
banks to not pay any taxes on the revaluation of their portfolios during 1932
and 1933288. As long as the revaluation of their portfolios was smaller than the
devaluation experienced in 1931, they would not pay any taxes on capital gains
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Figure 5.8: Bank profits, 1922-1934 (million pesetas)
Source: Libros de Actas del Banco Urquijo de Madrid and Memorias y Balance del Banco Hispano Americano
(various years).
arising from that revaluation. If revaluation exceeded the previous depreciation
of their portfolios, then they would pay normally. The law took into account the
differential impact on banks that were not subject to limited liability, as these
were exempted of paying taxes if they had to increase their paid-in capital.
Finally, there were two crucial parts of the solution that the CSB and the
Minister of Finance reached and that responded to banks’ concerns about the
publicity of these arrangements. First, secrecy about the magnitude of the bank-
ing crisis was something all actors wanted to preserve. However, full secrecy was
also a risk. The BdE warned that there should be no leakages to the public
about the actual situation of banks, but that the CSB should have all informa-
tion. The President of the CSB endorsed the point made by the BdE and claimed:
“these [accounting] proposals only make sense if the CSB is informed
about the real situation of all banks, and since this is not the case, I am
going to have to decide without knowing the real situation. This will
have good effects on some banks and bad effects on others. Knowing
the external face of banks is not knowing their true situation”.
Some banks also complained about this. For example, the representative of
Banca Arnu´s (BAAR), a bank that had maintained historic value for its stocks
and bonds throughout the 1920s, claimed that:
“(...) it could happen that some banks were in a situation that they
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had not only to declare a loss but also losses due to mismanagement
or irregularities, so I propose that all balance sheets are shown in their
full crudity before a decision is made. (...) We might find a solution
that does not involve forging the balance sheet”.
Something that Mr. Garnica (BECR) also denounced:
“(...) if a bank is in a bad situation, it would be a bad idea to allow it to
continue only to find out tomorrow that its balance sheet was not true.”
These statements reveal strong information asymmetries among banks and the
BdE, as the latter did not receive monthly but only quarterly, consolidated bal-
ance sheets. More importantly, these asymmetries appeared also between banks
and the institution that was effectively playing the role of agent (supervisor) for
the Government and the BdE in the banking system, the CSB. By the end of the
year, the CSB could not trust if all member banks were submitting real balance
sheets.
Second, and also related to the way information flowed during the crisis, banks
wanted to avoid by all means the agreement they had reached with the Minis-
ter of Finance to be published as a law in the official journal, the Gaceta de
Madrid. Instead, they preferred this to be a “banking norm”, whose publicity
was much more at their discretion, and did not look like an imposition from the
Government, but rather a solution stemming as a consensus. Therefore, when
the decision was taken, it was not officially published in the Gaceta, but the CSB
made it mandatory for banks to communicate the decision to their shareholders
and board members, something that was done when the annual meetings of banks
took place and the annual reports were published (i.e. March 1932).
5.3.2 Counterfactual analysis
The measure taken by the Ministry of Finance at the initiative of the banking
sector (represented in its vast majority at the CSB), explains why most banks did
not suffer any capital losses in the years following the crisis, despite the collapse
in the price of privately issued securities. In this sense, counterfactual analysis
can be informative. How would have banks fared if the Ministry of Finance had
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not agreed to suspend mark-to-market accounting?
First, Figure 5.9 compares the evolution of the portfolio of public bonds and
private stocks and bonds held by banks with a counterfactual estimation for the
case that mark-to-market was not suspended. Because of lack of individual bank
data on the exact composition and valuation of stocks, this counterfactual esti-
mation needs to be considered a first approximation to the actual case. That
said, capital losses appearing from the counterfactual estimation are, in some
cases, large enough to imply a much higher degree of bank distress and a number
of additional bank failures during 1931. I mark securities down to their value
in December 1931 compared to their average value during 1930 (what the CSB
agreed on) by using the price indexes provided in Figure 5.6a. This causes public
debt to be marked down by 12.7% and private securities (shares and bonds) by
31.6%. Precisely because contagion through marking to market relies on the fact
that one bank’s valuation depend on other banks decision to sell the same asset,
the counterfactual analysis needs to be taken as a rough approximation, because
I am implicitly assuming that by December 1931 banks did not know that mark-
to-market would be suspended (which they did). Also, I am dealing with stock
and bond price indexes and with consolidated balance sheets, which limits the ac-
curacy of the calculation (I am in the process of collecting more archival material
to learn about the composition of bank portfolios of shares and stocks). Figure
5.9 shows the results of the simulation for the consolidated balance sheet of CSB
member banks. Despite the problems associated with working with aggregate
figures, this is a lower bound estimate, as it assumes that after 1931, asset prices
remained flat, while in fact they continued to fall (Figure 5.6a).
A second step is to estimate the erosion of bank capital that would have taken
place in case mark-to-market was not suspended. For this, I subtract the differ-
ence between the value of banks’ public and private securities’ portfolios and
their counterfactual values from the sum of capital, reserves and the provisions
allocated in the “securities fluctuation fund”. These values are calculated for
1931q4. First, for the largest banks, results are reported in percentage capital
loss in Figure 5.10a. I exclude Banco Espan˜ol de Cre´dito (BECR) from this esti-
mation because according to its stance during the CSB meetings, this bank had
not marked assets to market, and therefore the calculation would largely overes-
timate its capital loss. The same results for all CSB-member banks (excluding
the top six banks) are reported in Figure 5.10b.
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Source: see text.
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Figure 5.10: Estimated counterfactual capital losses (1931q4)
Note: chart (b) excludes foreign banks. Source: see text.
This exercise produces two findings. First, distribution of dividends would
have been impossible if mark to market was not suspended (and so would have
been taxes paid). Second, the estimation still shows that the largest Spanish
banks were capitalized enough to absorb the losses without suffering the full ero-
sion of their capital. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that a second
round of bank distress would have been avoided due to high capital ratios, as
three large banks–Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), Banco de Bilbao (BBIL)
and Banco de Vizcaya (BVIZ)–would have lost around 50% of their capital. As
mentioned above, this estimation might be exaggerating the impact of the drop
in market prices in these banks, as they might have established parallel reserves
when they marked stocks up to market during the stock market boom. They
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might have also not marked all stocks up. However, the estimates are large
enough to consider that large losses would have been unavoidable. This is the
case even considering an extremely prudent behaviour during the upswing, either
not marking assets up or establishing a parallel reserve. While the latter seems
plausible and needs to be taken into account, the former would have gone against
what had become common practice in banking (i.e. marking assets to market at
the end of the year). In fact, reading banks minutes during 1930, they already
aknowledged a slowdown in issuance of new shares and a general stagnation of
stock market activity. However, from prudence to having anticipated a 32% drop
in asset prices there is a long way. Even considering that banks could have
technically survived that shock thanks to their capital buffers, large losses would
have been visible in their annual reports issued in March 1932, and they were not.
The picture changes substantially when all banks are included in the sample.
Results from Figure 5.10b show that capital losses for the rest of the banking
sector (excluding the top 6 banks) would have been, in the case of ten banks
representing 3% of total assets, a cause for unavoidable failure. This calculation
also shows that 41 banks accounting for 50% of the total banking sector’s assets
would have lost 50% of their capital. Again, without precise estimates of each
bank’s portfolio and individual stock valuation, this figures might be overesti-
mating the shock to their capital. However, again, the figures are large enough
to conclude that even in the case of extremely prudent behaviour in banks’ asset
valuation, large losses were avoided, and this kept a number of banks that would
have otherwise failed (or need recapitalisation) afloat.
CSB banks’ emphasis in designing the accounting rule in a way that mini-
mized the scope for the public to learn about bank-specific weaknesses played a
role that is similar to the one played by clearinghouses in the United States prior
to the establishment of the Federal Reserve, whereby members of the clearing-
house provided joint liquidity to banks in trouble and suspended the publication of
information on individual banks until the crisis had eased289. In both cases there
was, ex-ante, a degree of asymmetry of information between member banks. In
contrast to the case of clearinghouses, where interbank lending instruments were
created during crises, the CSB did not attempt to solve bank’s liquidity problems
by creating joint liabilities. This lack of interbank instruments did not pose a
strong impediment to fight the solvency problems that banks were facing, but it
shows that it would have been very difficult to arrange a fully bank-based solu-
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tion to banks’ liquidity pressure. The main reason was that the solvency problem
affected almost all banks, so the cost of banks’ free riding on other banks was
dwarfed by the individual benefits of being allowed to avoid marking assets down
to market. While some banks discussed the ethics of the measure, none opposed
it formally. Contrastingly, the same solution would have not been possible to
solve the liquidity crisis, as banks would have only been ready to trade public
debt.290 This was not an option until it was not clear that public debt would
also be protected by the new accounting rule, as its price was falling and trad-
ing collapsed (Figure 5.6). So between April and June, when liquidity pressure
was strong, banks could rely only on the BdE to fight deposit losses. As a result,
banks that did not obtain liquidity from the BdE had to call back loans and could
not borrow from other banks. The bank-based solution worked to solve solvency
issues, but it did not help banks to become more liquid and to redistribute liquid-
ity through the interbank market. This helps understand the correlation between
the allocation of emergency liquidity and bank lending to non-financial firms and
families described in Chapters 3 and 4. Efficient distribution of BdE liquidity
through interbank markets was not possible. There was no interbank market for
bills of exchange–as explained in Chapter 2–and the most widely accepted collat-
eral (public debt) traded at a very large and increasing discount between April
and September. Moreover, information on individual bank health was not read-
ily available, as revealed by the poor information held by the CSB, thus keeping
counterparty risks high, and making it harder to find incentives to redistribute
liquidity.
This section has shown that an essential part of banks’ ability to overcome
the shock in the stock market, which would have added a threat of generalized
insolvency to the already severe liquidity problem. If banks had not reached the
agreement with the Minister of Finance and the BdE that avoided a sharp de-
valuation of their portfolios, Spain would have witnessed a more severe banking
crisis, in which bank failures would have been much more prominent than they
were. As time passed, the price of publicly traded securities started recovering,
especially after 1933. Thanks to these policies aimed at protecting the asset side
of bank balance sheets, bank profitability contracted very little during and after
the crisis, especially considering the size of the shock.
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5.4 Banks vs. savings banks
Another important element in order to understand why Spain avoided a chain
of bank failures during the 1930s is the contrasting behaviour of depositors from
banks and savings banks (Cajas de Ahorro in Spanish), as it was only banks
that suffered deposit withdrawals (Figure 5.11). Savings banks–the main store of
popular classes’ savings–were almost entirely isolated from the shock that banks
suffered in their liabilities; savings banks continued to have positive inflows of
funds during 1931291. Regarding assets, savings banks’ were almost only invested
in public debt. Consequently, the suspension of mark-to-market also protected
savings banks’ assets. The main difference with banks then, was mostly on the
behaviour of liabilities.
The isolation of savings banks from deposit withdrawals was not necessarily a
universal issue. In countries where deposit withdrawals did not have such a strong
political component as in Spain, savings banks also suffered. This was the case of
the German banking sector. As Balderston (1991) showed, German savings banks
suffered sharp deposit withdrawals comparable, in percentage terms, with those
of credit banks during 1931 and 1932. Savings banks, however, recovered their de-
posits faster than banks. For the case of the United States, as Schuster, Jaremski,
and Perlman (2016) show, Postal Savings banks were the destination of a “flight
to quality” during the 1930s banking crises, when they increased their deposits
by a factor of 10. During the Great Depression, depositors moved away from unit
banks and used postal savings banks as a safe way of putting their money “under
the mattress” and finding an alternative for deposit insurance where this was
not yet established (Davidson and Ramirez, 2016). However, US Postal Savings
banks also contributed to add pressure to the banking system during the 1930s,
as they withdrew their deposits from banks (O’Hara and Easley, 1979).
Traditionally, Spanish savings banks had different goals and attracted differ-
ent types of savings. While banks focused on financing industrial and agricultural
businesses, savings banks were more focused on social spending292. However, since
the nineteenth century, both types of institutions had increased their competition
(Fernandez Clemente, 2005; Comı´n, 2008). This did not only happen in purely
financial grounds, but also in the political arena. A landmark in this competition
was the 1921 Banking law. This new regulatory framework provided banks with
strong advantages compared to savings banks, by reducing the costs of external
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funding (see Chapter 2). The law allowed banks to access the discount window
of the BdE at reduced rates, while savings banks were left out of the reform
(Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 2005).
Type of depositors Share
Pensioners (children and housewifes) 40.5%
Working class (farmers, industrial workers, servants) 33.3%
Middle class (merchants, industrialists, other employees, soldiers, professionals, priests) 14.7%
Institutions (brotherhoods, firms, etc.) 0.5%
Rentiers 0.3%
Others 10.7%
Table 5.4: Types of depositors in savings banks (1923-1930)
Source: Fornies (1979, p.293).
Regarding the impact of the 1931 crisis, however, the main differential trait
was the type of depositor. Fornies (1979) provided detailed information on depos-
itors in savings banks. As can be seen in Table 5.4, the vast majority of savings
banks’ deposits came from popular classes. The table shows the percentage of
clients (not of the value of deposits) coming from different classes. Although no
systematic or detailed data is available for the banking system, a comparison can
be done between the average balance of deposit accounts in the two types of in-
stitutions. The same author provided the evolution of average deposits at savings
banks; by 1930, the average balance on savings accounts was of 95.25 pesetas293.
During the same year, the average agricultural worker earned 5.3 pesetas per day
and the average salary of an industrial worker was 7.6 pesetas per day (Malu-
quer de Motes and Llonch, 2005). This means that the average account on a
savings bank was somewhere between 12 and 17 daily wages. Combining data
from the Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario and the Anuario del Banco
Hispano Americano (1930), a similar picture can be drawn for one of the largest
and most widely branched banks in Spain at the time, Banco Hispano Americano
(BHAM)294. In 1930, BHAM held 169 thousand client accounts for a total of 1067
million pesetas. Thus the average balance per account was of 6312 pesetas, more
than sixty times the average account of a savings bank, and somewhere around
three years worth of daily wages. These are only averages, and could therefore be
driven by outliers such as large firms’ deposits, etc. This being the case, however,
this certainly did not happen in savings banks.
One way in which banks tried to compete with savings banks was to open their
own subsidiary savings banks. By 1930, from the total of 212 savings banks, 40
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Figure 5.11: Deposits in financial institutions (1922-1934)
Note: in savings banks, dark blue is for normal savings banks, and light blue is for savings banks that operated
as subsidiaries of banks. Source: author’s database (see text) and Anuario del Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
1922-1934 .
were subsidiaries of banks. Most banks opened their subsidiary savings banks
along with their regional expansion, which took place from the end of the First
World War, although some had already been established by the late nineteenth
century. By the end of 1930, banks held 68% of total deposits in the economy,
non-subsidiary savings banks held 20% and subsidiary savings banks held the
remaining 12%295. Interestingly, Figure 5.12 shows that deposits in both types
of savings banks were more stable than banks during the 1931 crisis, although
deposits in bank-subsidiary savings banks fell substantially in 1932.
The proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic took place after a strong
deterioration in public opinion about the role of banks. Close connections be-
tween the Monarchy, the Dictatorship and top bankers had become a matter of
public domain, as explained above for the case of the oil monopoly and Banco
de Catalun˜a. The growth and concentration of financial power had also been
present after the First World War, when banks started expanding their network
of branches across Spain296. General discontentment with the expansion and con-
centration of the banking system dominated the late 1920s and the 1930s (Pueyo,
2006; Cabrera and del Rey, 2007). In particular, the arrival of the Republic coin-
cided with strong statements against the status quo in the banking sector by the
Minister of Finance, Mr. Indalecio Prieto297:
“I think the Spanish banking system is deeply faulty; the strongest
problem being the lack of organization, so the expansion of credit does
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not respond to truly democratic ends. Banks seem to be, indeed, orga-
nized to protect, predominantly, the businesses of its own board mem-
bers; and bank boards, accordingly, are just cacique organizations, from
where they spread the aim of absorbing credit to develop their own
firms. I think also that there are too many banks and that including
all their branches, they make the banking function more costly.”
Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984) documented that other declarations of the Minister of
Finance, including threats to capital owners of intervening their bank accounts
during the very first days of the Republic contributed to the bank run. In the
end, the Ministry conducted an inspection of main banks’ accounts in Madrid
in order to learn the extent to which they had played any role in the fall of the
peseta since 1928 and to the extent to which they were fostering capital flight.
The inspection did take place in most banks in Madrid but it was conducted
without major incidents or opposition from the banking sector and did not cause
any disruption to banks’ operations. The newspaper La Epoca explained that all
banks in Madrid had been inspected in order to see who had withdrawn “unusual”
amounts. All banks allowed the government to conduct the inspection, including
Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA)298. Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) considered that
rumours about the intention and the extent of the inspections were exaggerated:
“(...) the alarmist rumours, that, without any foundation, were propagated about
the possible intervention of the State in current accounts (...)”299. However, exag-
geration of rumors did not preclude deposit withdrawals related to a general fear
of expropriation from some sectors of Spanish society, particularly the wealthiest
ones and those related to the Dictatorship and the Catholic Church. A quote from
the then Minister of War and later President of the Republic, Manuel Azan˜a sug-
gests that this was also what the Provisional Republican Government thought300:
“(...) those who wanted chaos extended the rumor, some weeks ago,
that mischievous and rebellious individuals would rob the banks. This
having proved untrue, it has been the rich who have robbed the banks
by withdrawing their money (...)”
This perception is consistent with the findings of Chapter 3, where I showed
that the only strong and statistically significant predictors of deposit losses at
the bank level are variables related to political unrest, and not to observed bank-
specific fundamentals.
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5.5 The role of information disclosure
The case of the 1931 banking crisis in Spain is an astonishing example of the
importance of information disclosure (or the lack of) to avoid the aggravation of
a banking crisis. The most salient case is, as already mentioned in Chapter 4,
Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA). The extent to which this bank was affected
by deposit withdrawals–it lost more than 50% permanently–went completely un-
noticed by the public and published opinion during the crisis. Figure 5.13 shows
the severity and persistence of the shock this bank suffered. In fact, it does not
only show that the bank was kept afloat by the continued liquidity provision from
the BdE. It also shows that the bank’s lending policy was already dependent on
liquidity from the BdE before the crisis. After the Wall Street Crash, the bank
seems to have lost deposits but continued to expand its credit portfolio by in-
creasing its reliance on the BdE. This is consistent with Figure 4.12 in Chapter
4, which shows the reliance of each bank on BdE credit before and after 1931.
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Source: Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario
After examining several minutes of different banks, not a single reference to
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that case is found. Only one, vague observation to “a bank that experienced
problems” can be found in the Minutes of the Consejo Superior Bancario, but
it is not clear which bank the quote refers to. All accounts of the 1931 crisis,
including the most detailed analyses mention the case of Banco Central (BCEN)
as the main bank experiencing problems, but there is not a single mention to
BUMA301. This is mainly due to the fact that monetary institutions–the BdE
and the Government, but also the banking community–held a complete silence
about the situation of Banco Urquijo de Madrid.
Reading the minutes and the annual reports of Banco Urquijo de Madrid is
also striking. There is not a single mention to that302. The bank did not explain
why it lost 50% of its deposits and did not make any mention related to it. How-
ever, it made an interesting point that confirms that the evolution of the loan
portfolio of the bank responded to the continued emergency liquidity provided
by the BdE. In the draft of their 1931 Annual Report, Banco Urquijo de Madrid
acknowledged303:
“Our profit account reflects the unavoidable consequences of the con-
traction in economic activity in all the areas in which our banking and
industrial role is present; regarding economic activity, we have stimu-
lated it patriotically without imposing limits to our sacrifices, because
we understand that it is only by doing so that we fulfill our duty of at-
tenuating, in the measure of our possibilities, the intensity and scope
of this crisis.”
In regards to the origin of the deposit withdrawal, reading the minutes of the
BdE does not help either. The case of BUMA is not mentioned. This is striking,
since the minutes of the BdE were not public and the latter provided more than
one third of the total injection to this bank. There is, however, a report from
the Banque de France that sheds light on what happened to Banco Urquijo de
Madrid304. In a report issued in October 1931, the Banque claimed the follow-
ing305:
“(...) with the intermediation of one of its administrators, Mr. Ruiz
Senen, (...) [Banco Urquijo de Madrid] is also the bank of religious
congregations, and the latter, in a state of panic following the latest
developments, withdrew the largest share of their deposits.”
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In particular, the religious congregation to which the report refers is the So-
ciety of Jesus. Studies on Spanish social and economic history had already high-
lighted the relationship between the Society of Jesus and Banco Urquijo, as well
as the connections between the bank and the Monarchy306. Similarly, in a book
published in 1935 that dealt with the social dimension of Spanish banks, a mem-
ber of the Socialist Party (PSOE) defined Banco Urquijo as having “Jesuitic
traits” (Rosal, 1935). More recently, in their study of the political economy of
contemporary Spain, Cabrera and del Rey (2007) documented this relationship.
For example, these authors explain307:
“Another important element of the Urquijo Bank was the board secre-
tary, Valentin Ruiz Senen, who became the brother’s [Urquijo’s] right-
hand man and sat on more boards of directors than the most renowned
members of this business group. (...) The Urquijo brothers and the
King had a very close relationship. ’Estanis’ [from Estanislao], as
Alfonso XIII called the oldest of one of Urquijo brothers, very often
acted as his personal adviser and represented him on various boards of
directors.”
The stance of the Provisional Republican Government on religious matters
explains the reaction of the Society of Jesus to the regime change and therefore
the severe and persistent shock to Banco Urquijo’s liabilities. From the very
onset, one of the main political goals of the Republic was to secularize Spanish
society and to create a clear line between the State and the Catholic Church.
This confrontation between the Government and the Catholic Church, which led
to a Government crisis in October 1931, has been long studied by historians, who
have dubbed it “The Religious Question”. There is abundant evidence of different
religious congregations fearing expropriation from the Provisional Government,
apart from the Society of Jesus, as documented by Redondo (1993).
One of the strongest opponents of the Jesuits was the Minister of Finance. Sala
(2015a,b) documented how the Minister, Mr. Indalecio Prieto opposed strongly
to the role of the Jesuits, not only in finance but also in education, one of the
areas where the Republic thought secularization was more urgent. Taken this
open animosity into account, Velarde (2015) already highlighted the discretion
that characterized Prieto’s handling of the banking crisis in general308. It is very
unlikely that Prieto was not aware of the situation. It is much more likely that
he valued the importance of avoiding a widespread banking panic or a stronger
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depositor run on Banco Urquijo by revealing bank-specific information. As de-
tailed above, in a CSB meeting during the crisis, banks had urged the banking
community to avoid, in the measure of possible, revealing any bank-specific detail
to the Minister of Finance. Considering how opposed Mr. Prieto was to banks’
borrowing from the BdE at reduced rates and, more importantly, how reluctant
he was to raise the note issuing limit during the banking crisis (see Chapter 3), it
is hard to believe that he was not aware that Banco Urquijo had lost 50% of its
deposits and was borrowing heavily from the BdE to remain afloat. As explained
above, an inspection of the largest banks in Madrid had been conducted during
the very first days of the Republic. This included Banco Urquijo de Madrid309.
The complete silence about these developments in banks’ minutes makes it
difficult to conclude, and more research is needed in this front. However, what is
clear is that while at some point during the banking crisis, the Minister became
well aware of the situation of Banco Urquijo de Madrid, this was never revealed
to the public. This is consistent with the Mr. Prieto’s strong aim at containing
bank failures during 1931 and his deep concerns with the role of capital flight in
limiting his options (Velarde, 2015). As with the case of the Banco de Catalun˜a,
where Prieto tried to organize a last minute lifeboat because the bank lacked more
collateral to be pledged at the BdE, the discretion with which the case of Banco
Urquijo de Madrid was handled reflects that, despite his open animosity to the
banking sector, Prieto was not willing to let it fail. The fact that the Minister did
not reveal the actual situation of Banco Urquijo de Madrid or what had caused
its deposit losses, does not mean that nothing was done about it. On 21 August
1931, a decree was passed banning financial operations that involved religious
congregations. Article 3 reads310:“National banks or foreign banks operating in
Spain will not authorize the withdrawal of deposits of any kind, with the excep-
tion of current accounts used for religious purposes.” Finally, on January 1932, a
decree was passed in which the Society of Jesus was forced into dissolution and
its remaining assets expropriated311.
All these developments went completely unnoticed by the public. Today, it is
hard to imagine that one of the top 6 banks loses 50% of its deposits and there is
not a single mention in the press, the minutes of the central bank, the bank’s own
minutes or the rest of the banking system’s. The complete silence over the situa-
tion of Banco Urquijo has two implications. First, it highlights the importance of
information disclosure by central banks during banking panics. While the BdE
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published weekly balance sheets which included its portfolio of discounts and ad-
vances and which were commented frequently in the financial press, information
on borrowing counterparties was never disclosed. In fact, it has remained undis-
closed until now. It can only be seen by looking at the balance sheet of Banco
Urquijo de Madrid and at the daily borrowing from the BdE during the crisis.
This explains why previous accounts of the crisis have not identified Urquijo as
the main bank in trouble in 1931. Importantly, the strong liquidity needs of this
bank and the way they were met by the BdE, explain in great measure why other
banks underwent liquidity shortages until the fiduciary issuing limit was raised
in the last days of May (see Chapters 3 and 4).
A second implication of the evidence presented here is that the shock caused
by the withdrawal of the Society of Jesus deposits from Banco Urquijo should be
from now onwards included in the history of the Second Spanish Republic as one
of the main events in the 1931 crisis, which marked, to a large extent, the first
steps taken by the new regime. Fearing expropriation, the Jesuits withdrew their
funds from Banco Urquijo de Madrid. This pushed the bank towards the BdE for
emergency liquidity, crowding out other banks’ needs for liquidity while the Min-
ister of Finance was hesitating on freeing the BdE from quantitative limitations.
While this hesitation explains part of banks’ liquidity shortages, as explained in
Chapter 3, it can also be explained by Mr.Prieto’s reluctance to give publicity
to the developments in such a prominent institution in the Spanish financial sys-
tem as Banco Urquijo de Madrid (Dı´az Herna´ndez, 1998, 2007). In any case,
Mr. Prieto’s deliberate silence seems to have been a remarkably successful policy,
given the size of the crisis he was dealing with. This should be considered as a
crucial factor not only to understand his deep frustration in dealing with deposit
withdrawals and capital flight, but perhaps more importantly, as one of the key
policy decisions that contributed to contain the bank run and not deepen the
banking panic.
5.6 Conclusion
Compared to other countries like the United States, Germany or Austria, Spain
enjoyed remarkable bank stability during the 1930s, even after suffering a shock
certainly comparable to the ones suffered by these countries. This chapter has pre-
sented the three main factors behind bank stability in Spain. First and foremost,
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the suspension of mark-to-market accounting allowed banks to remain afloat af-
ter the collapse of the stock market. The counterfactual analysis provided in this
chapter suggests that a second round of bank distress (this one clearly triggered
by solvency issues) and a much more different macroeconomic outlook would
have taken place if banks had been forced to mark their assets down to market
by the end of 1931. Instead, bank capital remained intact, portfolios of securities
continued to show a healthy performance and remained overvalued during the
1930s; banks continued to show positive profits and pay dividends and taxes. In
a parallel to recent cases of “zombie banks”, this did not mean that lending re-
covered from the initial liquidity and solvency shocks. Second, the banking panic
remained circumscribed to the banking sector, but it did not affect savings banks.
Although the latter were also protected by the change in accounting rules, their
exposure to the stock market shock was much smaller, as they barely held any
privately issued stocks, which were the ones that experienced the sharpest fall
in prices. Savings banks accounted for roughly one third of total deposits in the
Spanish banking system, and these continued to expand remarkably during the
1930s. Finally, the complete silence of all actors involved in the resolution of the
crisis about its actual depth helped contain the banking panic. I documented that
news about one of the top 6 banks (and the most influential politically) losing
50% of its deposits permanently have gone completely unnoticed until this very
day.
All these factors demonstrate that bank stability in Spain during the Great
Depression can not be explained only by the intervention of the BdE as lender
of last resort. The intervention of the BdE was a necessary contributor to bank
stability, but as I explained in Chapter 3, it was severely limited by the dynamics
of a third generation currency crisis. So far, the intervention of the BdE has been
described as that of a bank that could provide unlimited liquidity because it was
not on the gold standard. Because of that, conventional accounts attribute the
few and small bank failures in Spain to this intervention. However, as this and
previous chapters show, even in the case that the BdE had had more room to act
and was willing to do so, it is very unlikely that it would have managed to fight
the effects of the collapse of the stock market on banks’ balance sheets only with
the provision of emergency liquidity. The lender of last resort intervention was
in no way sufficient. Finally, all the evidence presented in this chapter illustrates
with more detail the situation of the banking system after the 1931 crisis: banks
remained afloat with overvalued portfolios of securities, but lending to the real
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economy collapsed. Bank stability did not save Spain from a sizable and perma-
nent credit contraction. Perhaps more importantly, it masked some of the severe
political tensions that would shape the fate of the country in the following years.
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Conclusion
Throughout the four chapters in this thesis I have argued that the Spanish experi-
ence during the 1930s does not warrant describing the country as having escaped
the Great Depression. Moreover, Spain does not work as a counterfactual for a
hypothetical world in which countries (mostly European) were not attached to
the strictures of the Gold Standard. Spain operated an inconvertible but not
completely fiat currency, but from 1928 tried hard at pegging its exchange rate
to gold. In the process, saw currency mismatches grow in its financial sector. In
1931 banks suffered a sharp liquidity shock, and as a consequence of the limits
imposed by capital flight, fiduciary issuing and exchange rate depreciation, mon-
etary authorities were constrained in how much liquidity assistance they could
provide to the banking sector. As a result, bank loans and economic activity con-
tracted sharply. The intervention of the Banco de Espan˜a as lender of last resort
was not enough; crucially, the banking sector remained afloat during the 1930s
also because of the combination of administrative decisions which had little to do
with exchange rate flexibility. It was quite the contrary. Policymakers addressed
the 1931 financial crisis in Spain by imposing capital controls before allowing the
central bank to lend freely. With capital controls in place, then they secured
international financial assistance, at the same time that they concentrated and
liquidated foreign exchange liabilities held by the banking sector. Once domestic
liquidity and currency problems had been addressed–if not fully solved–monetary
authorities addressed the asset side of bank balance sheets. The last step towards
solving the 1931 crisis was, then, to suspend mark-to-market accounting. This
allowed banks to avoid a sharp erosion in capital. It also avoided widespread
bank failures and allowed banks to maintain their tax and dividend payments,
which would have also collapsed had this policy move not been taken.
The findings of this thesis have implications for three particular strands of
literature in economics and economic history. First, as outlined already in the
introduction of the thesis, they have implications for one of the strongest ar-
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guments about the causes of banking instability during the Great Depression:
the link between gold-convertibility and monetary autonomy. Second, they have
implications for the theory of central banking in emerging economies; they rein-
force the idea that monetary autonomy does not depend only on the exchange
rate regime, as implied by the so-called macroeconomic trilemma. Finally, the
unearthing of new archival sources and the discussion of new evidence has im-
plications for the historiography of the Second Spanish Republic. Perhaps more
importantly, it has implications for the political economy and the economic ori-
gins of the Spanish Civil War. As such, the findings of this thesis call for the need
of deeper research on the channels of transmission of the monetary shocks that
the country suffered between 1928 and 1936—as well as the non-monetary ones—
and raise new questions that further research can address in order to improve our
understanding of the links between the Great Depression and the Spanish Civil
War. The following subsections discuss each of these themes briefly, outline the
limitations of this thesis and suggest the direction that further steps of research
might profit from taking.
6.1 Implications for the literature on the Great
Depression
The argument I have put forward and the evidence I provided to back it suggest
that conventional accounts on the developments in banking in Spain during the
Great Depression critically overlook a number of crucial aspects. This has re-
sulted an overly optimistic picture of the impact of domestic and foreign shocks
to the Spanish economy during the Great Depression. Instead of an account that
focuses on bank failures, the Spanish case suggests that other, alternative mea-
sures of bank distress and/or banking crises might be of high informative value.
For example, my findings suggest that, regardless of central bank interventions
or the suspension of convertibility, liquidity shocks to the banking sector should
be given more importance. The Spanish banking system, as most other countries
affected by bank runs during the Great Depression, exhibits a very strong corre-
lation between bank deposits and loans outstanding. While inferring causality is
problematic because changes in bank deposits might just reflect a concomitant
creation or destruction of loans, there is evidence in the Spanish case (as in other
cases mentioned in Chapter 3) that liquidity shortages seem to have an impact
in the longer term lending behaviour of banks, causing a flight to safety as their
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liabilities revealed responsive to economic shocks or political developments. More-
over, I have shown that, in Spain, even considering political and social instability,
banks that were not under liquidity pressure continued to lend throughout the
1931 crisis. Even more so, if given enough liquidity support from the central bank
or if recovering deposits fast enough, even banks affected by deposit withdrawals
continued to lend also after 1931. My findings, are in line with recent research on
the United States by Richardson and Troost (2009) or Postel-Vinay (2016), who
highlight the importance of liquidity shocks for the supply of bank loans, even if
they do not go necessarily hand in hand with widespread bank failures.
My findings are also in line with the recent work of Baubeau et al. (2018)
for France. As in the Spanish case, these authors found that liquidity shortages
at the bank level explain the depths of the French economic contraction of the
1930s, and challenge the traditional explanation that focuses mostly on the “gold
standard mentalite´” or “gold illusion” that dominated the historiography so far.
Somewhat in contrast with the revision of the French case, however, my findings
suggest that the “gold standard mentalite´” did indeed play a role in Spain, which
is a country that is commonly understood as having forgone the gold standard
and thus having enjoyed a superior monetary regime that allowed it to escape
the Depression. I show that Spanish policymakers, just as their counterparties
throughout the world at the time, were also affected by this “gold illusion”. They
tried to join the gold standard as late as in March 1931, because they saw this as
the only way of achieving monetary stability and international credibility. This
was, in fact, part of Spain’s agreement with the Bank for International Settle-
ments in 1930. After the 1931 crisis, Spain pegged the peseta to the French Franc
(to gold) in 1932, when the system was already in the process of dismantling. In
short, Spain also found itself trapped in “golden fetters”.
Another important implication this thesis has for the underlying causes of
banking stability (and instability) during the Great Depression is that bank fail-
ures are not necessarily the best metric to use. They of course do a good job
comparing countries to the case of the United States, where thousands of banks
failed during the 1930s, but they fail to acknowledge more subtle but equally
dangerous connections between bank health, bank lending and the real economy.
I have shown that the reason why the international and domestic historiography
of the Gold Standard and the Great Depression praise the Spanish experience
during the 1920s and 1930s as the main example of how flexible exchange rates
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(and the room they open to lender of last resort interventions) explain bank-
ing stability during the Depression lies precisely in having overlooked these more
subtle factors. The evidence provided by the unearthing of a wealth of archival
sources suggests that Spain, a developing and emerging-market type of economy,
needed other policy moves to keep its banking sector afloat amid the multiple
domestic and international shocks. Operating a flexible exchange rate and a
gold-inconvertible currency was not enough to keep the Spanish financial sector
alive during the 1930s. Key government interventions were needed. Capital con-
trols, nationalization of short term debt denominated in foreign exchange and
the suspension of mark-to-market accounting were non-monetary interventions
without which the Spanish banking sector would have fared much worse.
Finally, the revision of the Spanish experience during the Great Depression
also highlights the importance of taking measures of financial development into
account in cross-country comparisons during the period. In this sense, conven-
tional arguments about the links between exchange rate depreciation and financial
stability rely strongly on the importance of depreciation in avoiding deflationary
pressures that hit bank balance sheets through debt-deflation spirals, but they
overlook other important factors. Exchange rate depreciation can be a blessing
or a curse, and the comparative levels of financial and economic development
of a country make a difference in this. As I have argued, one can not use the
same framework to think about the impact of currency depreciation in the United
States or in Britain, because these were countries whose banks were not neces-
sarily exposed to currency mismatches. In contrast, countries like Spain but
also Germany show that currency depreciation (frequently accompanied by cap-
ital flight) can be have strong destabilizing effects on banks. Moreover, different
levels of money market development are also key to understand countries’ limita-
tions to deal with financial crises. I have argued that this mattered in the Spanish
experience because monetary authorities relied on banks accessing the discount
window of the Banco de Espan˜a by using public debt which, hit by rumours of
default right after the regime change of 1931, saw its price collapse. This left
banks’ liquidity dependent on holding eligible bills of exchange to access the dis-
count window. Lacking a liquid and developed money market on privately issued
securities–as the one in which the Bank of England operated, for example–access
to emergency liquidity suffered from important asymmetries between banks. Un-
der a constrained central bank that could not expand its balance sheet at banks’
demand, differential access to the discount window had implications for bank
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lending.
This thesis does not, of course, aim at invalidating the argument about the
links between the Gold Standard and the Great Depression as a whole. It how-
ever, tries to emphasize the importance of non-monetary interventions in order
to explain bank stability. The Spanish case is only a valid counterfactual for
countries on the Gold Standard if specific and key government administrative
interventions are taken into account. The relationship between exchange rate
depreciation and bank stability needs to take financial development into account.
6.2 Implications for the literature on the his-
tory and development of central banking in
emerging economies
When Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street in 1873, he did not aim at a uni-
versal rule that all countries should–and more importantly, could–follow. Even if
he did so, this is not how we should read his work. As recently pointed out by
Ugolini (2017), Bagehot’s work is better understood as a positive description of
the London money market, which was exceptional, not only in its organization,
but also as the center of the international financial system. The bill on London
was the most liquid asset at the international level. As such–to use a modern
term–Bagehot’s “external validity” relies heavily on the level of financial develop-
ment of a country and on its relative position as issuer or holder of large-enough
amounts of an international currency of reserve.
As many other ideas in the history of economics, the so-called Bagehot Rule
(which I discuss in Chapter 4) has been used, and to some extent, one might
argue, abused. Describing the very special London money market, Bagehot pre-
scribed that the Bank of England should lend at above normal-time market rates,
on what was considered good collateral at normal times, and at banks demand.
He also argued that interest rate had to be raised early in the panic, to take ad-
vantage of banks’ differential elasticities of demand for central bank money and
that the Bank of England should make it clear beforehand that it was ready to
do–to use a modern term again–“whatever it took” to assist illiquid but solvent
banks within the “mandate” outlined by the rules outlined above. My thesis sug-
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gests that the selective interpretation of Bagehot’s prescriptions has also helped
to paint a simplified picture of central banking in emerging, peripheral economies,
in particular during the Great Depression.
First, I have argued that a non gold-convertible currency is not synonym for
a fiat currency. The Spanish peseta was backed by gold and silver (Mart´ın-Acen˜a
et al., 2013), and changes in the only completely fiat part of the monetary base
were subject to Government approval. The monetary base, therefore, could not
respond freely to demands of liquidity from the banking sector. Importantly, this
implied that during the crucial months of April and May of 1931, banks com-
peted for limited liquidity. In this context, it is somewhat misleading to depict
the Banco de Espan˜a as having followed Bagehot’s prescription. It lent as much
as it could, but it only raised its interest rates when the banking, currency and
stock market crisis had been going on for three months.
Second, as opposed to the money market that Bagehot described, the Spanish
money market was much more underdeveloped. In short, there was no liquid
interbank market for commercial bills of exchange, which is what the BdE had to
purchase in 1931 when banks accessed the discount window. Looking at which
banks discounted their commercial portfolio at the discount window during the
crisis, reveals that these were the same banks that discounted it before the crisis.
For long now, there has been an ongoing debate on the extent to which the iden-
tity of borrowers mattered more than the securities they brought to the discount
window of the Bank of England. On the one hand, some have argued that the
window was made of “frosted glass and raised just a few inches”, meaning that the
Bank only relied on bills’ quality to rediscount them, regardless of who brought
them. On the other hand, others argue that the window was transparent, so the
identity of the discounter mattered, but that even in that case, the Bank clerk
scrutinized both the discounter and the collateral with a warily “raised eyebrow”
(Capie, 2002; Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013; Anson, Bholat, Kang, Rieder, and
Thomas, 2018). My findings support the idea that the discount window of the
Banco de Espan˜a was also made of very transparent glass, but located in a room
with no windows. While the BdE was aware at all times who was coming to the
discount window, contemporary observers were completely unaware of what type
of bills were accepted for rediscount, a criteria that seems to have been also ig-
nored by some banks. Lacking a system of screening bills of exchange before they
reached the discount window of the BdE, like the one Flandreau and Ugolini
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(2013) document for Britain, and that is necessary to contextualize Bagehot’s
Lombard Street, the BdE provided liquidity through the outright purchase of bills
only to its frequent clients. The rest of banks used public debt, which the BdE
did not purchase, but accepted as collateral for short term credit. The problem
with this differential access to the discount window emerged when the price of
public debt collapsed after the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic, as
rumours of default on previously issued debts appeared. These nuances are not
trivial, because they contribute to clarify the puzzle outlined in the very first
lines of the introduction: why, if the Banco de Espan˜a could lend “freely” and if
exchange rate depreciation did not have any negative effects on banks, did Spain
witness a sharp contraction in bank lending and economic activity in 1931? The
answer is that neither could the BdE lend freely, nor were banks immune to ex-
change rate depreciation.
Accordingly, my findings also suggest that the idea put forward by some of
the most influential works in the literature of the Great Depression that the
Banco de Espan˜a could lend freely as Bagehot had advocated overlooks the im-
portance of the limitations faced by monetary authorities in emerging markets
during financial crises312. In short, and as opposed to core, developed economies,
emerging markets suffer from what economists dubbed as the “original sin”: they
can’t borrow long term in their own currency and therefore they end up holding
short-term liabilities denominated in foreign exchange, which they can not issue.
In the absence of extensive and readily available foreign exchange reserves or
timely currency swaps (as those provided by the Fed during the recent financial
crisis), emerging market monetary authorities are severely limited in the room
they have to respond to crises. This is particularly the case if these mismatches
weight on bank balance sheets. My work thus joins other recent developments in
financial history that highlight the importance of the currency-denomination of
bank liabilities, such as Schnabel (2004a,b) and Macher (2017, 2018). While these
authors provided evidence from the Central European economies that operated
gold-convertible currencies, my work reveals that similar limitations were also in
place in Spain, where a non gold-convertible currency was operated.
Consequently, this thesis is in line with recent developments in the macro-
finance literature that suggest that emerging markets do not face a macroeco-
nomic trilemma, but that their policy options boil down to a dilemma. As in-
ternational capital flows revert, as was the case from 1928, emerging economies,
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regardless of their exchange rate regime, have to choose between capital mobility
and monetary autonomy (Farhi and Werning, 2014; Rey, 2015). If this coin-
cides with a domestic run on banks, as was the case in Spain in 1931, then this
implies that the only way of dealing with the crisis is to impose capital controls–
and, lacking reserves, seek international assistance. This findings are in contrast
with the widely held idea that a flexible exchange rate is enough to provide pol-
icymakers with monetary autonomy to respond to monetary, but also real shocks.
6.3 Implications for the Spanish historiography
The Second Spanish Republic was cut short by the Civil War that started in
July 1936. While this thesis does not aim at the gigantic task of addressing the
economic or social causes of the war directly, I argue that some of the findings
can be relevant for this lively historiography as well. Most accounts of the perfor-
mance of the financial sector during the 1930s in Spain, tend to discard any of the
potential implications it could have had in Spain’s descent to the Civil War313.
Again, while retaining the necessary level of prudence in dealing with such a
complex topic, the findings of this thesis suggest that this is probably not the
case. The picture of the banking crisis that emerged from the data sources used
in the 1980s and 90s—and that has been the main account incorporated by the
international historiography–relied mostly on aggregate data on balance sheets
that did not reflect the actual depth of the crisis and the actual fragility of the
banking sector during the 1930s. Intact bank capital, intact portfolios of securi-
ties and somewhat lower but still healthy profits pushed pushed to the conclusion
that 1931 was not a deep banking crisis. Having unearthed a number of previ-
ously unused archival sources, this thesis has provided an alternative explanation.
I have argued and provided evidence that banks underwent liquidity pressure
and that this liquidity pressure predicts their lending behaviour during and after
the crisis. During the crucial months of April and May 1931, when the Spanish
Republic was still taking its first steps, the Spanish banking system as a whole
suffered a liquidity shortage; bank-level information confirms this. Perhaps more
importantly, banks that did not suffer a run on their deposits or banks that bor-
rowed enough liquidity from the discount window of the Banco de Espan˜a, did
not contract lending significantly during the 1930s. Despite the undeniable im-
plications of the political change for some sectors of society, demand for credit
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was there; industrialists, merchants and the public in general demanded credit,
but monetary authorities faced constraints and could not inject enough liquidity.
The experience of some banks, like Banco Urquijo de Madrid or Banco de Bilbao
confirms this and is, in turn, in contrast with the description provided by some
of the previous accounts of the crisis. These banks accessed significant amounts
of emergency liquidity and managed to keep their loan portfolio afloat.
My findings also shed light on previously undocumented events that have im-
portant implications for the connections between the 1931 financial crisis and the
Civil War. I have shown that right after the proclamation of the Republic on
14 April 1931, Banco Urquijo de Madrid, known at the time as “the bank of the
Society of Jesus”, suffered a 50% drop in its deposits. There is evidence in my
findings that strongly suggests that these funds were withdrawn by the Society,
as it feared expropriation. This explains why some months later, the Minister of
Finance made it illegal for banks to liquidate any assets pertaining to religious
institutions. These findings are relevant, because a continuous religious conflict
plagued the 1930s in Spain. The evidence this thesis provides helps understand
the importance of economic factors in this conflict, which is, as I have argued
above, commonly dismissed in the historiography of the period. My thesis also
shows that there was a very loud silence about the case of this bank. It is im-
possible to learn about what happened to the bank if one does not look into
its balance sheet or the operations it conducted at the discount window of the
Banco de Espan˜a. Its minutes, during the very days in which it was losing half
of its deposits, talk about everything but what was actually taking place. This
is not surprising. These were not very inviting times to write everything in one’s
minutes; bank inspections took place (as they had in the late 1920s) and capital
flight, to which banks had to be instrumental almost by construction, was among
the Minister of Finance’s main concerns. All banks welcomed and aligned with
the newborn regime in their minutes, but it is important to remember that they
did so, in some cases, at the same time that they were hemorrhaging deposits.
The informative value of banking developments in Spain during the 1930s has
to be found in balance sheets and central bank operations, as written word was
likely to be, in most cases, pure rhetoric.
Just as words contained in banks’ minutes and annual reports during this
period need to be taken with several pinches of salt, their balance sheets are
also not necessarily reflecting the true situation they faced. My findings show
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that the suspension of mark-to-market accounting in 1931, while crucial to avoid
widespread and important bank failures as the ones experienced by Germany,
Austria or the United States, masked the depth of the crisis. Bank capital and
portfolios of shares and bonds do not reflect banks’ actual situation. They mask
deep solvency problems caused by the collapse in asset prices. That banks con-
tinued to pay dividends and taxes and they did not fail should not be taken as
the proof that Spain escaped the Great Depression. It should instead be read
as the way in which Spain masked the actual scope of its own Depression. This
should then push us to ask what the implications are of this paradoxical, but ul-
timately false sense of prosperity reflected in bank balance sheets for explaining
the evolution of the Spanish economy in the years before the Civil War.
To this end, this thesis has provided an explanation for the puzzle described
in the introduction. My findings provide enough evidence to motivate a reassess-
ment of the connections between the economic shocks that the Spanish economy
suffered during the Great Depression and their relation with the political insta-
bility that preceded the Spanish Civil War. To be sure, prudence and historical
rigor ask for not drawing fast conclusions about the connections between the
shocks I described, or more broadly, the Great Depression and the Spanish Civil
War. This applies to both sides of the argument: to denying any connections or
to emphasizing too simple ones. The two episodes are very close, and only a few
years separate the late 1920s from the 18 July 1936, when the war started. This
short term imposed by historical developments, however, carries also a big risk
of compressing history. The good news for the economic historian is that there is
still much room for improving what we know about these crucial years in Spanish
economic, monetary and financial history.
6.4 Limitations and further steps for research
If this thesis is useful to motivate a deepening in the research on the connections
between economic shocks and the Spanish Civil War, it is in turn limited by the
effects the Civil War and four decades of political and intellectual repression had
on crucial archival sources. Only a few bank archives have survived and system-
atic data is not easy to find. This implies that, despite the efforts I have done in
collecting as much evidence from as many bank archives I could visit during the
time it took me to write this thesis, a lot remains to be done and a lot will prob-
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ably remain unknown forever. There are, in my view three important avenues
that further research should take in order to deepen and hopefully strengthen
this body of research.
First, we need to know more about foreign depositors. There is anecdotal
evidence that some banks suffered substantial deposit withdrawals from foreign
depositors. My thesis relies partially on the assumption that the bulk of the
deposit withdrawal was caused by domestic hoarding. While this is consistent
with evidence from contemporary observers, it is not final. Finding out that
the deposit loss that banks suffered was caused by foreigners and not mainly
by domestic depositors would not impair my argument. Both agents had very
similar–if admittedly not identical–incentives to dump their pesetas in foreign
exchange markets, as recent episodes in emerging markets show (Argentina’s ex-
change rate history since the 2000s is an example). It would, however, have
implications to my conclusions about the social profile of the depositors that run
on banks and, in turn, this would have then implications for the interpretation
that policymakers made of the crisis at the time. Therefore, we need to know
more about these exact proportions. The rich data that I have collected tells us
how much deposits in banks were held in foreign exchange, which are the crucial
part of the “twin crisis” explanation I provide, but they do not tell us who held
them.
Second, but related to the first, deeper research on individual bank idyosin-
crasies during the crisis is crucial. I have documented the shocking case of Banco
Urquijo de Madrid, the interesting failure of Bauer & Cia, the internal discussion
of banks at the Consejo Superior Bancario and the case of the three banks in
Catalonia that suspended payments in 1931. Still, we need more bank-specific
stories that focus on 1931, to understand the extent to which exact proportion of
their contraction in lending was due to liquidity shortages. Being able to attach
weights to the argument provided by Gabriel Tortella and Jordi Palafox in 1984
and to the argument I provided here is important to draw the counterfactual–
somehow ironic, given my discussion in the introduction–of how would have Spain
fared if it had enjoyed currency stability during the 1931 crisis. Similarly, in order
to be able to enrich the counterfactual analysis about bank failures I conducted
in Chapter 5, we need to know the exact composition of banks portfolios of se-
curities, to be able to price them at the share/bond level. This is only possible if
we can dig deeper in bank archives, in their daily operations and go beyond their
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written minutes or annual reports.
Finally, there is an extremely interesting and promising research agenda that
needs to be undertaken, and this is the regional dimension of banking during the
1920s and 1930s in Spain. The destruction of the daily operations of the branches
of the Banco de Espan˜a during the 1960s has somewhat limited the depth of my
analysis, as I acknowledged in Chapter 3. However, my research has exploited re-
gional variation when possible, showing that the 1931 crisis exhibited interesting
regional patterns. That said, if we are to deepen our research into the connections
between the economic shocks of the late 1920s and the early 1930s and further
developments in Spanish history, we need to extend the analysis to incorporate
regional dynamics. It is to this and other ends that I expect to devote my future
research efforts.
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Archival sources
These are the archival sources used in the thesis. They are divided by the archive
from they were collected. Finally, I outline online and digitized sources. For more
details, see text and footnotes.
• Archivo Histo´rico del Banco de Espan˜a
– Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a (L.12106,
L.12107)
– Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a (L.27159)
– Liquidez Bancaria, Servicio de Estudios del Banco de Espan˜a (D.6505)
– Boletines del Consejo Superior Bancario, Tomo I (1924-29), Tomo II
(1930-36) (1/1/3/1)
– Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario, Vols. I-II (1922-28), III (1928-
31), IV (1931-32), V (1932-35) (L.109572, 109573, 109574, 109575)
– Estatutos del Banco de Espan˜a
– Regimen de las Sucursales y otras dependencias del Banco de Espan˜a
(various years)
• Archivo Histo´rico del BBVA
– Libro de Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao (various
years)
– Libro de Actas del Consejo del Banco de Vizcaya (various years)
– Memoria-Balance de las Sucursales del Banco de Bilbao (various years
and branches)
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• Archivo Histo´rico del Banco de Santander
– Banco Comercial de Barcelona, Libros Mayores 9-10 (L.6797,L.6798)
– Banca Tusquets, Libro Mayor 9 (L.284)
– Banco Soler y Torra, Libro Mayor 11 (L.1256)
– Banco Central, Libros de Actas de la Comision Permanente (L.2,3,4,5)
– Banco Central, Actas de la Comision de Operaciones
– Banco Hispano Americano, Inventarios (L.6217)
– Banco Hispano Americano, Revista Mensual, An˜o III, May 1931
– Banco Hispano Americano, Anuario (1930)
• Archivo Histo´rico del Banco de Sabadell
– Actas de la Comision Delegada del Consejo de Administracion del
Banco Urquijo (L.4)
• Archivo Histo´rico de la Bolsa de Madrid
– Anuario Garciceballos
– Anuario Financiero del Banco de Vizcaya
– Boletines de Cotizacion de la Bolsa de Madrid
• The Rothschild Archive (London)
– Letter from De Rothschild Fre`res and Bauer y Compan˜´ıa, 25/03/1931
(111/459)
• The BIS Archives
– Letter from BIS Vice-President Leon Fraser to BdE Governor Federico
Carlos Bas y Vasallo, 30/12/1930 (BISA, 2.81)
• The Bank of England Archives
– Relations between Bank of Spain and Bank of England (OV61/25,26)
• Banque de France Archives
– La crise economique, financiere et politique en Espagne. La situation
monetarie et le credit de la Banque de France a la Banque d’Espagne
• Online sources
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– Anuario Historico del Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (various years)
– Financial Times Historical Archive
– Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Nacional de Espan˜a
– Diarios de Sesiones, Serie Historica, Congreso de los Diputados (vari-
ous years)
– Gaceta de Madrid (various years)
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1Rothschild Historical Archive, 111/459.
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Pedro Mart´ınez-Mendez, an economist at the Research Department of the Banco de Espan˜a
who sadly passed away in the process of elaborating a monograph about the Banco de Espan˜a
during the first third of the 20th century and that was supported by a monumental wealth
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(Mart´ınez Mendez, 2005).
3Herna´ndez Andreu (1983, p.303 et passim).
4Tortella and Palafox (1984, p.105).
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6Palafox (1991, p.191).
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James (1991), Bordo et al. (2001) and Temin (2008).
14Choudhri and Kochin (1980, p.566).
15Temin (1993, p.97).
16Banco Vasco also suspended payments in 1925. Bernanke and James (1991) time the failure
of the bank in September 1925, but the bank failed in February 1925 (Alonso Olea, 2012).
17Since the data I use does not disaggregate by branch, I attribute all the balance sheet to the
province in which a bank had its headquarters. This increases the size of the crisis in Madrid
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20Grossman (1994, p.678).
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situation” (Grossman, 1994, p.679-680).
22See Ferguson and Temin (2003); Schnabel (2004a); Ferguson (2004); Schnabel (2004b) and
Temin (2008) for a discussion on the extent to which the German crisis of 1931 should look at
the connections between banking and currency problems.
23This move–which has been studied before as a case of indirect monetization of public debt
(Sabate´ et al., 2006, 2015)–was not dissimilar to the experience of the United States after WWI,
in which several bonds were issued under conditions that made them eligible at the discount
window of the Fed at rates below their nominal yield (Meltzer, 2003).
24Estatutos del Banco de Espan˜a (1902).
25Spain: questionnaire, Bank of England Historical Archive (OV61/25).
26(Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1985, p.17).
27See, for instance, Sarda` and Beltran (1933); Cabana (1965, 1978, 2003, 2007)
28Before this new detailed account of the crisis, scholars suggested that the failure was caused
by the inaction of the BdE. For example, in line with contemporary accounts provided by Sarda`
and Beltran (1933), Cabana (1965, 1978, 2003, 2007) concluded that the bank was allowed to
fail because of private business interests of the BdE and other Spanish banks in expanding their
market shares in Catalonia. According to this view, the failure of the Banc de Barcelona came
as the ideal opportunity to increase market shares for other “non-Catalan” banks and for the
Banco de Espan˜a, which marked the beginning of the decline of “Catalan banking institutions”.
Mart´ın-Acen˜a (2013) provides a brief summary of the opposite view, albeit does not include
the more recent research produced by Blasco and Sudria` (2016).
29Cambo´ (1991, p.720 et passim).
30Cambo´ (1991, p.727).
31Diario de Sesiones, Serie Historica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 80, 26/10/1921,
p.3777 et passim.
32After the suspension of payments in December 1920, the first months of 1921 produced
no news about the situation of the bank. In February, the Annual Shareholder Meeting took
place and a Comission that represented the bank’s shareholders was formed. In May, the
Comission discussed to create a new bank, while individual, smaller shareholders asked the
Spanish Government to intervene by accusing the Board of the Banc de Barcelona of fraud
(selling their shares when they knew the bank was going to fail). In July, without a clear
explanation of the reasons behind the collapse of the bank, an Association of Creditors of the
Banc de Barcelona was formed in order to find out the actual accounting situation of the bank
and determine the value of its remaining assets. It was not until 1923 that the Banc was
officially declared under Payments Suspension, and in 1924 its remaining assets and liabilities
were added to the newly founded Banco Comercial de Barcelona (BCBA) (Blasco and Sudria`,
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2016).
33Mr. Cambo´ himself claimed that “(...) our private banks are undergoing times of fragility
and, thanks to this, Spain has suffered an invasion of foreign banks (...) I have never been an
enemy of foreign collaboration in the form of capital or foreign culture; however, I understand
that we can only be open to such collaboration without being in danger if, by action of the
State or private initiative, we intensify our internal strength, so foreigners come to Spain as
to collaborate with us and not to dominate us. (...) I noticed foreign banks’ concerns over the
new law. They came to me and talked to me about it! I told them: in Spain, the same law
for everybody. We have today a taxation legislation that, with respect to foreign banks–I say
it here as I said it to them–that establishes precepts of excessive rigour, that could be unfair,
and I am ready to ask the Parliament to attenuate them; however, everything that has to do
with protection, help or State assistance, this is only going to be available for Spanish banks.
I will not step back in this point, and I told them this and their main supporters. I told them
even more: only Spain, when private banks reach enough strength, will be able to provide an
equal treatment to foreign banks, (...) it is in your own interest that the Spanish banking sector
strengthens, as the more strong our system will be, the more generous and liberal will be the
legal regime that Spanish governments will concede to you.” (Cambo´, 1991, p.739).
34In response to a question raised by Mr. Pedregal, Mr. Cambo´ replied: “[Mr. Pedregal]
held that I should not be concerned, when drafting the law, with the “statu quo”; that I shall
not attend the imperative reality that the issuing monopoly rights would expire on the 31st of
December and that the Government could or could not extend it for some time. I would like to
reply that this statement is not supported in real facts. (...) it is obvious that if the monopoly
rights had to be extended, I had to do it before the 1st of December; because it would have been
no only risky, but foolish, to think that between the 1st and the 31st of December we could have
nationalized the issuing of currency by creating a section within the Treasury or a private bank
that would take over the issuing of notes, the branch network or the organization of credit in the
country. Moreover, who would have bought the gold from the BdE? I assume that it would have
been bought at today’s market value. And then I suppose that the BdE could have not dreamed
about a better business than selling all its gold at current prices. There was no freedom; we
needed to continue with the monopoly of issuing of the BdE.” (Cambo´, 1991, p.737).
35Diario de Sesiones, Serie Histo´rica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 80, 26/10/1921,
p.3776 et passim.
36Diario de Sesiones, Serie Histo´rica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 80, 26/10/1921,
p.3778 et passim.
37As Mr Cambo´ put it: “(...) I was warned that it was more convenient to establish a ratio
between the note and its guarantee and, that the needs of the national economy would then
determine the quantities. (...) I understood that a limit had to be put in place. First, when
the limit is reached and needs to be increased, there is a negotiation between the Banco and
the Government, and in the past, the Government has always obtained something from this
negotiation.” (Diario de Sesiones, Serie Histo´rica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 80,
26/10/1921, p.3780 et passim.). As Broz and Grossman (2004) discussed for the case of the
renewal of the Bank of England charters between 1694 and the concession of the monopoly
of issuance in 1844, negotiations were influenced by the fact that all sides were “contracting
under uncertainty”. The Spanish case bears similarities. In fact, this uncertainty explains why
Cambo´, as reflected by the quote above, decided to keep open the option for renegotiating
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the charter every time the fiduciary limit had to be expanded, even if this happened before
the expiration of the monopoly of issuing. Interestingly, as I discuss in Chapter 3, the first
time the limit had to be raised after 1921 was in the middle of the 1931 crisis. This being an
emergency measure, left little room for deliberate negotiation between the Government and the
BdE during the crisis. In fact, a revision of the charter was introduced, however, in November
1931, once pressure on the exchange rate had eased. The new law increased the State presence
and control over the BdE. As Sala (2015b) documented. what Prieto tried in November 1931
was to take the first step to nationalize the BdE, something that was done in 1962. The reform
contained, essentially five points. First, the BdE could lend to the government a maximum of
12% of the latter’s budgeted expenses, up from the previous 10%. Second, profits and losses
from exchange rate interventions would be shared, regardless of the BdE’s willingness to join
the intervention. Third, establishment of a progressive tax on BdE “excessive profits”. Fourth:
introduction of different valuation scenarios for the BdE gold reserve if a gold standard was
to be implemented in Spain. Fifth (and perhaps more important): the number of members
appointed by the Government in the BdE board would increase from one to three.
38In fact, as I discuss in Chapter 3, this became the cornerstone of the economic policy of
the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship from 1926.
39Diario de Sesiones, Serie Histo´rica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 80, 26/10/1921,
p.3785 et passim.
40Cambo´ left the Government in August 1922.
41Articulo 1, Seccion 7, Ley de Ordenacion Bancaria, (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1921).
42Moreover, since the BdE valued its gold reserves at the 1868 parity, its profits were relatively
isolated from a falling peseta.
43In 1918, a similar Law was drafted, which included a reduction in the discount rate to banks
and bankers, while the Lombard rate would be decided by the BdE and needed the approval
of the Government. The BdE opposed this law, not for it tried to make the reductions in the
discount rate compulsory, but because other parts of the law, mainly those referring to a tax
on fiduciary issuing and having to sell its the securities that yielded profits (Paret, 1921).
44“(...) it had been tried before to impose to the BdE a regime of bonuses when discounting
to other banks; however, this was a voluntary arrangement, and I understood that this had to be
made preceptive in the law I am presenting (...)”. Diario de Sesiones, Serie Historica, Congreso
de los Diputados, Numero 80, 26/10/1921, p.3787 et passim.
45Estatutos del Banco de Espan˜a, 1902.
46See, for example, in Chapter 4, the extreme case of the 1931 crisis, when the composition
of the pool of discounters at the discount window of the BdE in Madrid did not change at all.
47Diario de Sesiones, Serie Historica, Congreso de los Diputados, Apendice 2 al Numero 102,
06/12/1921, p.1..
48Diario de Sesiones, Serie Historica, Congreso de los Diputados, Apendice 2, Num. 102,
06/12/1921, p.1. and Ministerio de Hacienda (1921).
49Mr. Cambo´ referred to the problem with the law being vulnerable to time-inconsistencies
derived from the specific fiscal needs of future governments: “(...) such a delicate and momen-
tous machine as the discount rate, should only be moved by purely economic needs, never mixed
with any fiscal consideration. Mixing fiscal considerations with the discount rate is the most
dangerous combination that can be put in place for issuing banks.”(Diario de Sesiones, Serie
Historica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 80, 26/10/1921, p.3782 et passim.)
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50Liquidity requirements and proportionality rules can be found at Actas del Consejo Superior
Bancario, Libro de Actas N.1, Acta de 22 de Septiembre de 1924, p.181-182.
51It also included a share of long term loans which comprised already paid coupons for long
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all long term lending out of the liquidity ratio.
52Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario, Libro de Actas N.1, Acta de 12 de Julio de 1923,
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Hungarian banks had equity ratios of 13-18% during the second half of the 1920s (Macher,
2018). Portuguese banks held capital ratios between 8 and 10% during 1920-1930 (Reis, 1995).
54Both liquidity and capital ratios are statistically significantly lower for CSB members,
compared to non members.
55Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario, Libro de Actas N.2, Acta de 28 de Septiembre de
1926, p.166-176. This regulation was extended to all banks in 1926, so non-CSB members
could also not underprice the BdE Gaceta de Madrid, N.146, 26/05/1926, p.1116 et passim.
56Balparda was member and founder of “Liga de Accion Monarquica”, a liberal party in the
Basque country.
57Diario de Sesiones, Serie Historica, Congreso de los Diputados, Numero 103, 7/12/1921,
p.4679 et passim.
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60Paret (1921, p.116,138-143).
61Olariaga (1946).
62Sabate´ et al. (2006) estimate fiscal dominance using the monetary base. However, given
that the channel of monetization of public debt is the banking system, it seems perhaps more
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63Regimen de Sucursales (1896), Capitulo IV, De los prestamos y de los creditos con garantia
de efectos publicos, Art. 59, p.87 et passim.
64Regimen de las Sucursales del Banco de Espan˜a (1916), Capitulo XI, De los prestamos con
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65Instrucciones para el Regimen de las Sucursales y otras dependencias del Banco de Espan˜a
(1932), Capitulo XII, De los prestamos con garantia de valores, Art. 240, p.213 et passim.
66An occasional deviation from the norm took place in 1917, when the Government had
to issue debt as it was unable to get the budget approved by the Parliament. According
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to Pedro´s Abello´ (1978), this deviation marked the beginning of the change in the lending
practices of the BdE. However, as Figure 2.9 shows, while it might have shown the way to the
Government, this lending practice was only fully embraced by the BdE once, after the 1921
Banking Law was passed, the latter was forced to interact with a much numerous and large
pool of counterparties.
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75Reglamento del Consejo Superior Bancario, Gaceta de Madrid, 16, June 1922.
76Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario, 15 May 1928.
77Coefficients are, in absolute values, never larger than 0.06.
78Since Albers (2018) only starts in 1925, I interpolate annual data from Prados de la Escosura
(2003) with the industrial production index for 1922-1925, although this data does not enter
the final regressions.
79See Albers (2018, p.6-11) for a detailed discussion on the advantages of a broader index
as opposed to the industrial production index. In the case of Spain, particularly in the second
quarter of 1931, the industrial production index spikes to its highest level. Using this would
be certainly misleading, since the spike comes from the sharp increase observed in May 1931, a
month in which economic climate in Spain was certainly not improving.
80See Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000); Angeloni et al. (2003); Ehrmann et al. (2003).
81All bank characteristics’ measures are normalized against their average across all banks
over the whole period. Size is also normalized over each period, in order to avoid the trend
effects that arise because measures are done in nominal terms, following Ehrmann et al. (2003)
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and Gambacorta and Marques-Iban˜ez (2011) (see Appendix)
82Liquidez bancaria. Servicio de Estudios, Banco de Espan˜a, 1935. D.6505 (AHBDE).
83The estimated elasticities are within the range of those found in the literature. Table 2.6
reports these results. In general, my findings are in line with recent scholarship that suggests
that the main determinant in the transmission of monetary policy is liquidity, while size and
capital ratios play, at best, secondary roles.
84Arellano Bond Tests for autocorrelation of first and second order are reported (second order
autocorrelation is ruled out), as well as Sargan and Hansen tests for instrument validity. While
in all regressions the Sargan does not confirm correct over-identification, it is because it is not
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. However, the Hansen test, which is robust,
is also reported and shows that all models are correctly specified and instruments are valid
(Roodman, 2009b).
85It is not surprising that for non member banks the rediscount rate had a larger effect than
the Lombard rate (Columns 1 and 2). Although data on specific interbank borrowing between
non-member banks and CSB member banks does not exist, it is plausible to think that, when
in need of liquidity, non member banks could always borrow from CSB banks using public
debt as collateral, but not by selling bills of exchange. It could thus be that large and well-
diversified CSB banks borrowed more intensively from the BdE and then lend to non-member
banks through interbank loans (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004).
86In line with Equation 2.8 in the Appendix, banks’ funding costs depended negatively on a
health signal, which apply a risk premium to the interbank market rate. Results in Columns 5
and 6 of Table 2.4 and Columns 4 to 6 in Table 2.5 which show non-member banks reaction to
changes in the Lombard rate and yield of public debt reflect this risk or “health” premium.
87See the discussion of rate changes in the Appendix.
88In this section, I follow the derivation and explanation of the model as in Ehrmann et al.
(2003), with comments specific to the case under study in this paper.
89The first relation, which is presented in Equation 2.4, holds for this case only to a certain
extent, as banks had could hold a credit portfolio of ten times their equity. Although the
definition of equity was blurred by the fact that it included non-disbursed capital and holdings
of own stocks as part of the reserve requirement (Artola-Blanco, 2016), there is a positive
relation between the two measures. With respect to deposits and securities, the relation is
much clear. A simple panel regression for the whole sample of banks provides an estimate of
coefficient k in Equation 2.5 of 0.21, significant at the 1% level, with an overall R-Squared of
0.54. Coefficient s in Equation 2.5 is estimated at 0.69, significant at the 1% level and with an
R-Squared of 0.98.
90The final econometric model accounts for fixed effects that are expected to control for the
effect of these characteristics.
91Angeloni et al. (2003) deal with this problem by including bank-specific loan-demand proxies
that allow for differences among banks, which is a more precise but still similar solution to what
I propose. Unfortunately, I lack the data needed to conduct their approach.
92Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario, 15 May 1928.
93Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario, 27 July 1928.
94El Sol, 15 December 1928, p.7.
95Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a, Sesion Extraordinaria, 18 December
1928.
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96Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984, p.136).
97Actas de la Comisio´n Delegada del Consejo de Administracion del Banco Urquijo, L.4,
p.52, 24 December 1928.
98Memoria de la Sucursal de Barcelona, Banco de Bilbao, 1928, p.1.
99There were rumours in the press that the rate change was not a final decision and that
it could be raised again soon (ABC, Edicion de la man˜ana, 16 December 1928.). This was
also an option taken into consideration by banks, as it is reflected in their reaction to the rate
increase. For example, Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA) “discussed about the possibility of
a further increase in more than half a percentage point” and emphasized its strong opposition
against “any increase in the discount rate” (Actas de la Comisio´n Delegada del Consejo de
Administracion del Banco Urquijo, L.4, p.52, 24 December 1928.).
100Actas de la Comisio´n Delegada del Consejo de Administracion del Banco Urquijo, L.4,
p.53-54, 24 December 1928.
101Actas del Consejo de Administracion del Banco de Vizcaya, L.8, p.59, 28 December 1928.
102See Appendix of Chapter 4 for the elaboration of the market rate.
103With the exception of 1925, when the collapse of the Credito de la Union Minera, which
caused a big withdrawal of deposits from the banking system, although mainly in the north of
the country.
104Memoria de la Sucursal de Madrid, Banco de Bilbao, 1928, p.3-4.
105Memoria de la Sucursal de Madrid, Banco de Bilbao, 1928, p.3.
106El Economista, 2291, 26 October, 1930, p.617; quoted in Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984).
107La Epoca, Madrid, 19 December 1928, p.1.
108Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a, L. 27158, p.155, 16 July 1930. and
La politica monetaria del Gobierno, ABC, 25/11/1930, p.1.
109Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a, L. 27158, p.156, 16 July 1930.
110The Finance Minister reached the BdE with a proposal of 0.75 percentage points increase,
but when it imposed its criteria to enact the rate change, this was only done by 0.5 percent-
age points. Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984) provides a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the
discussions that took place regarding the rate change in 1930.
111Memoria de la Sucursal de Madrid, Banco de Bilbao, 1930, p.4.
112Actas de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a L.12107, p.174.
113Publicaciones de El Financiero, La peseta en 1931, p.77
114The proclamation of the Republic had also an almost immediate effect on the stock market,
which is why some authors classify this crisis as triple, and not twin (Betra´n et al., 2012).
Considering its size, the stock market shock had a relatively small effect on most banks, as
mark-to-market for shares and bonds (private and public) was suspended until December 1933,
thus avoiding widespread bank insolvencies. I deal with the importance of the shock to the
stock market and policy reaction in Jorge-Sotelo (2019).
115I explore the underlying reasons for the absence of widespread bank failures in Jorge-Sotelo
(2019).
116I am not the first to question the traditional account. Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984) concluded that
monetary policy in Spain during the 1930s was definitely not expansive, while Garc´ıa Ruiz
(1992, 1993) suggested that this might have had an effect on the supply of credit after the 1931
crisis. As a matter of fact, Spain underwent a very severe economic contraction during the
1930s.
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117The Minister of Finance of the Dictatorship, Jose Calvo Sotelo, considered the appreciation
of the peseta in 1926-27 as the undeniable result of the “rhythm of progress and vigor that the
dictatorship was imposing on Spain” (Calvo Sotelo, 1933). By December 1928, when the peseta
was starting to fall rapidly, Calvo Sotelo claimed that “the value of the peseta needs to be the
expression of moral reality, present and future, and of racial capabilities, incompatible with
a sharp depreciation of our currency” (Cambo´, 1991, p.335). By that time, the defense of
the value of the peseta had become a matter of political prestige for the dictatorship (Tapia,
1998, p.16). The Minister, however, failed to understand power-purchasing-parity theory of
exchange rate determination, something that was highlighted by the Comisio´n del Patro´n Oro
(1929). As Sarda` (1936) observed, “the Spanish government, undoubtedly pushed by political
motivations, started the [unfruitful] intervention in the exchange rate in 1928”, until the cost
of this intervention was too large, interventions had to stop and Calvo Sotelo resigned. Several
pieces of evidence supporting this thesis can be found on Eguidazu (1979), Tapia (1998), Mart´ın-
Acen˜a (1984) or Mart´ınez-Ruiz and Nogue´s-Marco (2014). In particular, Tapia (1998) explains
how Calvo Sotelo failed to understand power purchasing parity determination of exchange rates,
and was convinced that the peseta could be stabilized at a level consistent with the deserved
reputation of the country.
118A clear example of this is the report produced by the Comisio´n del Patro´n Oro (1929), but
there are other instances. For example, as late as 1933, there were internal discussions within
the BdE about an eventual de jure peg to gold (Banco de Espan˜a, 1933).
119In his visit to Madrid in June 1930, John Maynard Keynes held an interview with El
Sol in which he claimed: “Frankly, in a moment of international falling prices as the one we
are going through now, in no way does the fall of the peseta seem to me synonymous with
weakness. The freedom to allow a certain moderate looseness in the exchange rate, in times
of general depression affecting the rest of the world, can be a valuable measure to maintain
internal stability, which would otherwise be impossible to maintain” (El Sol, 12/06/1930, p.1-
4). The words “certain” and “moderate” are striking, considering that when Keynes visited
Spain, the peseta had lost more than 40% of its value during the two previous years. Even more
so because Dictator Primo de Rivera (and his Minister of Finance) had resigned in January,
unable to tame the discredit of the Dictatorship, to which the fall of the peseta was one of the
main contributing factors (Ben-Ami, 2012).
120For example, Tortella and Palafox (1984) concluded that “(...) nothing massive or drastic
occurred, no really important banks suspended payments; no large scale “salvaging operation”
was required. (...) no drastic downturn occurred. (...) The banking system never had a
liquidity problem Following their account, Bernanke and James (1991) considered that Spain
had a crisis in 1925 but not in 1931, because no important bank failed in 1931. The same
is true for Grossman (1994), who does not include Spain in a list of countries experiencing
crises during the 1930s. More recently, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), summarized the traditional
account by claiming: “the country avoided the worst of the Great Depression by staying off the
gold standard; it experienced runs, but the Bank of Spain could lend freely as a lender of last
resort.”
121See for example, Martin (2009) for an argument about how flexible exchange rates eliminate
all constraints to lender of last resort interventions. In contrast Ugolini (2017) highlights the
fact that in the presence of fiscal limitations or political instability, flexible exchange rates are
not a sufficient condition to allow for LLR interventions.
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122In 1928, Calvo-Sotelo claimed that “the value of the peseta needs to be the expression of
moral reality, present and future, and of racial capabilities, incompatible with a sharp deprecia-
tion of our currency” (Cambo´, 1991, p.335).
123Citation taken from Pabo´n (2000, p.566).
124Calvo Sotelo (1933, p.186-187).
125This was perceived also abroad, as can be seen in the correspondence between the De
Rothschild Freres and the Spanish bank Bauer y Cia, their correspondent in Spain. On 20
August 1930, Ignacio Bauer, the chair of the bank, wrote: “It is hard to believe how much the
question of the exchange rate weights in all aspects of Spanish politics.” (...) “Mr. Arguelles
[the Minister of Finance] has been replaced by Mr. Wais. I have nothing to say against the new
Minister, on the contrary, he is intelligent, young and honest. His predecessor, however, had the
same qualities, and despite all this, the exchange rate continued to worsen. Nowadays everything
depends on the exchange rate.” (Rothschild Historical Archive, 111/459). The Financial Times
also reported on the importance of the exchange rate for the resignation of Dictator Miguel
Primo de Rivera: “(...) it is probably correct to say that one of the causes which led to his
resignation was (...) the weakness of, and obscurity in regard to, the exchange value of the
national currency” (Financial Times, 31/03/1930, p.31).
126La Gaceta de Madrid, Num.339, 5 de Diciembre 1929, p.1474 et passim.
127Until September 1931, virtually all subscribers of gold bonds asked to be paid interest
in Sterling. After that, US Dollars and then French Francs replaced payments in Sterling
(“Manifestaciones del Ministro de Hacienda”, Ahora, 26/09/1931, p.10).
128From a total of 350 million pesetas-gold, the Government had drafted an allocation of 150
million for Spanish banks, 100 million for the BdE, and 100 for the public. However, the final
allocation of gold-bonds differed from the initial draft, because foreign banks, members of the
public and large firms demanded more than what they had been initially allocated (Table 3.8).
129Figures of bondholders are provided in Table 3.8. These are estimates provided by the press,
but it is plausible that Spanish banks did actually buy more bonds, as their balance sheets show
larger increases in foreign-currency denominated liabilities during the first quarter of 1930. It is
also very possible that the category “Others” includes bonds bought by other, smaller banks. By
16 April 1931, two days after the proclamation of the Republic, the Financial Times reported
that bonds had not changed hands (“Rights of Spanish Sealed Bonds”, 16/04/1931, page 1,
Edition 13, 184.).
130Some contemporary accounts argue that the Primo de Rivera forced banks to subscribe the
gold bonds. An example of this can be found on Vida Economica, 30/06/1931, An˜o XX, Num.
775, p.231-232. However, the fact that there was strong demand from the public and foreign
banks casts doubt on this account.
131Between 1929 and 1930, customs revenues fell by 17%, while between 1929 and 1931, they
fell by 28% (Comı´n and Diaz, 2005a).
132Foreign banks also played a role, as they had directly subscribed around 13% of the issued
bonds (Table 3.8).
133The BdE had conducted a very similar operation in 1924/25 when the Credito de la Union
Minera failed. The BdE extended liquidity at the branch where this bank was located, and
there were very little, if any, effects on the rest of the system.
134Acta de la Reunion Extraordinaria de la Comisio´n de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a,
17/04/1931.
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135There are many examples of this. On 28 December 1928, after rising the discount rate, the
Banco de Espan˜a argued that its operations would involve only “purely commercial” bills (Actas
de la Comsion de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a, Libro 12.101 ). On 20 April 1931, during
the bank run, BdE claimed that ”banks should operate mainly on commercial transactions
(. . . ) and should restrict the concession of credit through discount of financial bills” (Actas del
Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a, Libro 27.159, p.56).
136The BdE dealt with increased counterparty risk by narrowing the elegibility criteria for
bills. See (Jorge-Sotelo, 2019) for details.
137Section VII of Article I of the 1921 Banking Law stated that if the Government embarked
in a specific action in the defense of the currency, if the BdE mediated in the intervention or
if it intervened directly, half of the gold used with that end would be from the BdE’s reserve
(Base Septima, Articulo I, Ley de Ordenacio´n Bancaria, 27/12/1921 ).
138One day after the proclamation of the Republic, the Vice-Governor of the BdE Pedro Pan,
expressed the concerns about the Government using the Banco’s gold to guarantee external
credit operations to intervene in foreign exchange markets: “if the Government was to guar-
antee the credit operations with gold, if these matured and the government did not honour its
compromise, then the BdE would lose gold” (Acta Extraordinaria del Consejo Superior Ban-
cario, 15/04/1931, p.267.). This was so feared that the BdE and the banks discussed the extreme
case in which, to avoid to pay debtors in gold from the BdE, the new Government might have
to sell its Patrimony (Acta Extraordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 15/04/1931, p.268).
139Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a, 24/10/1930.
140In a meeting of the board of the CSB in October, the Secretary explained that the Banco
de Espan˜a was willing to contribute to support the currency, but that gold from the Banco
should not be involved: “the operation should be done under more advantageous conditions,
without using the Banco’s gold as guarantee, because doing this, the same as moving its gold,
fills the Banco with disgust” (Acta de del Consejo Superior Bancario de 8 de Octubre de 1930,
p.194).
141Toniolo and Clement (2005, p.80).
142Toniolo and Clement (2005, p.81).
143Letter from BIS Vice-President Leon Fraser to BdE Governor Federico Carlos Bas y Vasallo,
30/12/1930. Bank for International Settlements Archive, BISA 2.81, Bank of Spain, Policy.
144Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984, p.201).
145JP Morgan canceled the credit on 17 April. Mendelsshon & Co. on 20 May. The BIS also
cut its credit line and it was let to expire by the end of June. Officially, the credit was canceled
by JP Morgan, and not by the Spanish Government. The reason for the cancellation of the
credit, according to a letter that JP Morgan sent to the BdE, was the abandonment of a clear
stabilization plan for the peseta, and not the composition of the government. This last statement
is of course, difficult to prove, but JP Morgan also provided the BdE with a memorandum in
which it explained which was the best way to stabilize the peseta. Interestingly it suggested
using the discount rate and the gold reserve. In another letter, Mendelsshon & Co. mentioned
that they had canceled the credit, partly because of the tensions in foreign exchange markets
due to the Credit-Anstalt crisis, although they were not the main providers of the line of credit
(Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984).
146Ley de Ordenacio´n Bancaria, Gaceta de Madrid, 30/12/1921, p.364 et passim.
147Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 15/04/1931, p. 267 et
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passim. and 05/05/1931, p.279-280.
148The two largest and most widely branched banks in Spain entered the discussion. Mr.
Ramon Alvarez Valdes (BHAM) claimed that “we just have to overcome the first 15 days”.
Note that BHAM did not experience liquidity pressure during April (Figure 3.3). The opposite
was true for Mr. Pablo Garnica (BECR), who claimed that it had always been the case that
when banks were in deer need of funds, it was the BdE who held the “ultimate reserve” and
added that as long as the BdE was within the fiduciary limits, it should not be concerned
over lending to banks at demand. Garnica’s point is important because, on the following days,
restricted by the fiduciary limits, the BdE injected 180 million pesetas, but Garnica’s bank
(BECR) did not borrow at all. Both Garnica (BECR) and Pan (BdE) agreed in that, whatever
happened, they did not want the Government to know about specific banks’ difficulties (Acta
de la Sesion Extraordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 15/04/1931, p.266.
149Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 18/04/1931, p. 278 et
passim.
150In fact, Mr. Prieto did not want to acknowledge receipt of the petition that he received
on 18 April, and he asked banks to rewrite the petition with the date of 5 May, so he would
not be liable for the delay in the authorization (Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria del Consejo
Superior Bancario, 05/05/1931, p.280).
151International observers commented on this problem. On 31 May, the Financial Times
acknowledged the “(...) exceptional demand for the Franc (...) to purchase against sales of the
peseta by people withdrawing capital from Spain.” (”Spain’s money troubles”, Financial Times,
01/06/1931, p.5).
152Gaceta de Madrid, 07/05/1931, p.581 and 28/05/1931, p.974-975. Spain was the first
country to impose such controls, in the last days of May 1931 (Bernanke, 2000).
153Gaceta de Madrid, 31/05/1931, p.1051-1053.
154“Spain and the peseta” (Financial Times, 13/04/1931, p.4”).
155There are very scarce references to the bank run in the Financial Times during these months.
156“Credit for Spain” (Financial Times, 07/05/1931, p.6”).
157“Peseta creates new record” (Financial Times, 30/05/1931, p.1) and “Decline of the pe-
seta” (Financial Times, 02/06/1931, p.4).
158La Epoca, 27/05/1931.
159El Sol reported that: “A meeting between members of commerce and real estate industry
took place in Madrid, in order to take all actions possible to stop the crisis in real estate as a
result of the restrictions in banks’ credit”, El Sol, 29/05/1931, p.1.
160This appeared in all main newspapers. The one I cite is from Ahora, 28/05/1931, p.6.
161El Liberal, 28/05/1931, p.4.
162La Libertad, 28/05/1931.
163“Peseta’s low level” (Financial Times, 02/06/1931, p.7).
164“Spanish credit in Paris” (Financial Times, 11/06/1931, p.6).
165“Spain after the election. Firmer pesetas.” (Financial Times, 01/07/1931, p.6).
166The Government guaranteed 50% of the gold shipments to France.
167“Peseta stabilisation”, (Financial Times, 24/08/1931, p.5). The actual target was 51.9
(Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984).
168See Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984, p.237-251) for a detailed account.
169“Peseta credits” (Financial Times, 28/08/1931, p.5).
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170In fact, four of the largest six banks had their headquarters in Madrid, where they also
conducted the majority of their operations with the BdE, especially during the 1931 crisis.
171These are: Soler y Torra Hermanos (SOLE), Banca Tusquets (BTUS) and Banco Comercial
de Barcelona (BCBA). For this, I am especially indebted to Dr. Jose´ Antonio Gutie´rrez, from
the Historical Archive of the Banco de Santander, who patiently walked me through the bank’s
archive to find as much useful data as possible.
172The proclamation of the Republic had almost immediate effects on the stock market, the
exchange rate and the banking sector. Considering its size, the stock market shock had a
relatively small effect on most banks, as mark-to-market for shares and bonds (private and
public) was suspended until December 1933. Therefore, banks did not enter into a fire-sale
of securities. The stock market crisis had, however, an indirect impact on the way the crisis
unfolded. Banks had become used to pledge public debt at the Banco de Espan˜a under favorable
conditions since the early 1920s. The government could issue new debt, which it did at nominal
yields above the Lombard rate of the BdE, thus providing an incentive for banks to subscribe
it and keep expanding their loan portfolios by pledging it at the BdE. However, just after the
proclamation of the Republic, the price of public debt and gold bonds collapsed. Rumors about
default on public debt issued by the Dictatorship started to circulate, as well as concerns over
the ability of the Government to service its debts in foreign currency (gold bonds). Despite
on 16 April 1931 the Minister of Finance claimed all debt would be acknowledged and repaid
(Sala, 2015b), the price of public debt fell sharply until a permanent Government was formed in
October. Because of this, it became more costly for banks to use public debt to obtain liquidity
from the BdE. Therefore, the stock market crisis had an effect insofar banks did not hold eligible
bills of exchange that could be rediscounted at the BdE. In sum, although affected by the stock
market correction, the asset side of banks’ balance sheets was relatively protected by the freezing
of their shares and stocks’ book value. This explains why Spanish banks suffered little capital
losses after the crisis and why Spain experienced no significant bank failures compared to other
countries. For more details on this, see (Jorge-Sotelo, 2019).
173(Martorell and Julia, 2012, p.270).
174Alternative measures of currency mismatch such as share of foreign exchange deposits over
total deposits or over total assets do not change the regression results.
175Capital ratios enter the regression with unexpected coefficients, signaling that having high
capital ratios made a bank more likely to suffer a sharp deposit loss (Columns 4 and 8 in Table
3.1. However, these results are driven by four banks in the 99th percentile of the distribution
of capital ratios. This means holding capital ratios of more than 70%, which are very far from
the 90% percentile (capital ratios of 50%) and farther from the mean of 25% capital ratios and
the median of 20% capital ratios. Interestingly, the coefficient associated to the variable that
measures pre-crisis liquidity pressure (i.e. deposit losses between 1930q1 and 1931q1) suggests
that suffering a sharp deposit loss during the crisis is not positively correlated with pre-crisis
pressure, but rather the contrary.
176For example, in its 1931 Annual Report, Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) mentioned that this was
the case in a number of provinces in which the bank had opened branches, as depositors feared
that their savings would be in danger and run to withdraw deposits (Memoria Anual de la
Sucursal del Banco de Bilbao en Madrid, 1931).
177The newspaper La Epoca explained that all banks in Madrid had in fact been inspected
in order to see who had withdrawn “unusual” amounts, and that all banks allowed the gov-
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ernment to conduct the inspection, including Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA) (La Epoca,
22/04/1931.). For example, Banco de Bilbao (BBIL) considered the rumors of expropriation ex-
aggerated: “(...) the alarmist rumours, that, without any foundation, were propagated about the
possible intervention of the State in current accounts (...)” (Memoria y Balance de la Sucursal
del Banco de Bilbao en Madrid, 1931, p.5).
178It must be noted that an Allocationi value of 1 does not necessarily imply that the bank
could just keep its total loan portfolio afloat. The representative bank had to make a choice
between using the emergency liquidity to continue supplying short term credit, invest in other
securities, buy foreign exchange to meet its maturing short-term foreign exchange liabilities,
and/or maintain its loan portfolio. A given bank could also use its cash reserve to pay depositors
back, although it is reasonable to think that banks wanted to keep a relatively comfortable
cash reserve given the circumstances. Therefore, Allocationi ought to be interpreted as a lower
bound, because it is likely that actual liquidity pressure was stronger.
179Comparison is done with 1934q3 because in October, new political developments caused
shock to bank lending although it was relatively small. Also, in 1934q4 there was an important
merger between BCEN and BERP.
180I deal with the idiosyncrasies of this bank in Jorge-Sotelo (2019).
181Results are not driven by Banco de Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), the aforementioned outlier.
Introducing a dummy for this bank, increases the coefficient on Allocationi, signaling that after
a certain point, decreasing returns kicked in and more liquidity did not translate into more
lending. This bank had an Allocationi value of 5.6.
182A way of showing the relative importance of currency mismatches in adding pressure to
individual bank balance sheets is to conduct the same estimation but, instead of using OLS,
using Weighted Least Squares (WLS). Weighing by bank size adds statistical significance to the
currency mismatch coefficient, although it remains relatively weak. That said, it shows that
larger banks were more exposed to gold bonds, as confirmed by Figure 3.8 in the Appendix.
183A potential identification problem stems from the fact that when banks create loans they
also create deposits. Therefore, the drop in deposit values in bank balance sheets might just
be capturing that firms reduced demand for loans, canceled them and therefore the given bank
experienced a drop in deposits. Because of that, the drop in deposits might not be signaling
that the bank is suffering a run but just a reduction in the demand for credit. This would
compromise my conclusion. However, there are three reasons why this does not seem to be
the case. First, the qualitative evidence presented above proves, first hand, that banks were
cutting on credit because of their inability to replace depositors with liquidity from the BdE.
Second, the drop in demand for credit would be signalling an automatic worsening of economic
expectations right after the proclamation of the Republic. This would fail to explain why
certainly the most affected bank by the regime change, Banco de Urquijo (BUMA), maintained
its loan porftolio intact throughout the 1930s thanks to liquidity from the BdE. A similar
case applies to Banco de Bilbao (BBIL), a bank that did not suffer strong deposit losses and
continued to lend throughout the crisis (see Jorge-Sotelo (2019) for more details). Finally,
another reason is that the fact that deposits recovered their pre-1931 level by the end of 1934
while loans remained depressed shows that the cash that deposit losses were not the consequence
of the contraction in loans demand. If deposit losses were just the product of a contraction in
loans, then deposits would have also remained depressed.
184This is more evident if we consider the case of two of the largest banks. Banco Urquijo
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de Madrid (BUMA) was arguably the bank that was more affected by political developments.
The anticlerical stance of the new Republican Government had caused the Company of Jesus to
withdraw all its funds from this bank, which lost more than 50% of its deposits between 1931q1
and 1931q3. However, thanks to its preferential access to the BdE discount window, it received
excess liquidity and could afford to keep its loan portfolio afloat during the crisis (Figure 3.11).
Banco de Bilbao (BBIL), in turn, suffered little deposit withdrawals and thanks to the liquidity
received by the BdE could also keep lending.). See (Jorge-Sotelo, 2019) for details.
185Supporting evidence for this can be found on the Minutes of the branches of Banco de Bilbao
(BBIL). This bank opened a number of branches across Spain during the 1920s and 30s. Every
year, this bank reported the main competitors that it faced in its branches; not only in the new
ones but in the ones that were already in operation. Among its list of competitors, one can find
many of the banks in my sample, including the BdE (Memorias y balances de las Sucursales
del Banco de Bilbao, various years and branches). In addition, none of the banks included in
the sample are from the group of nine Spanish banks that carried the word “Agricultural” in
their names, as banks that were linked to agricultural lending did.
186Bagehot (1873, p.58-59).
187While the idea of the lender of last resort is often attributed to Bagehot (1873), its roots
can be traced at least as back as the early nineteenth century or even before (Capie and Wood,
2007). Despite it is widely recognized that the first to conduct such operations was the Bank
of England, there are important differences in the interpretation of such a role depending on
the monetary arrangement in which Britain operated. When Britain suspended convertibility
during the Napoleonic Wars, emphasis was put on quantities, rather than prices. In 1802,
Thornton (1802) already pointed to the special role of the Bank of England and the need of
a monetary expansion to avoid a collapse in credit: “It is indeed, in every respect plain that
it must be important to maintain, and to maintain carefully, the credit of the country, at that
time in particular, when its guineas are few, and are also leaving it; that is the time when
our own funds are necessarily low, when the most regular industry should by every means be
promoted, and when there is the most need of the aid both of our domestic and foreign credit and
it belongs to the Bank of England, in particular, to guard and to superintend the interests of the
country in this respect.” Thornton (1802, p.1-22). While Thornton wrote during the suspension
period (1797-1821), Bagehot did so when the pound was convertible to gold. This has been
interpreted usually as the reason why Thornton did not refer to the interest rate at which this
liquidity was provided, while for Bagehot this was the central issue in the implementation of
LLR interventions (Laidler, 2002). Another reason, pointed out by Goodhart and Illing (2002)
is that the usury laws, which capped interest rates to 5% until the 1830s, prevented Thornton
from ascribing any role to “penalty rates”.
188Bagehot (1873, p.199).
189Some authors have argued that in the presence of a liquidity shock, the central bank should
provide unlimited funds at low interest rates to troubled banks in order to make sure bank runs
are avoided (Rochet and Freixas, 2004; Martin, 2006). More recently, Cecchetti and Disyatat
(2010) argued that if the nature of the crisis is systemic, liquidity ought to be provided at
subsidized rates. This is because the systemic nature of the crisis makes it hard for a specific
bank to benefit relative to others or behave strategically, as the risk of contagion is shared.
However, they argue that this is the case if the central bank grants uniform access to all
financial institutions, which implicitly assumes a well-defined eligibility criteria and unlimited
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room for liquidity provision. Regarding the way in which liquidity is provided, for the case of a
developed money market the literature has reached a consensus in which the use of open market
operations is generally preferable to outright purchases of assets through the discount window
(Flannery, 1996; Bindseil, 2004; Chapman and Martin, 2013). One reason lies in the fact that
the provision of aggregate liquidity instead of individual bank liquidity can avoid moral hazard
and allows banks to compete for funds, which avoids the problem of a suboptimal allocation by
allowing banks’ need for liquidity to be reflected in its price (Martin, 2009). Regarding moral
hazard, Martin (2006) also finds that large liquidity injections at zero interest rates through
open market operations (repos) are preferable to a scheme of deposit insurance as they are less
prone to cause moral hazard. In contrast, Goodhart and Huang (2005) developed a theoretical
model in which they find potential moral hazard by modeling strategic behavior of banks based
on the fact that they learn that will be assisted by the central bank. An interpretation of their
work is that long-term relationships between the lender of last resort and banks can allow the
latter to pursue more risky strategies as banks assume they will have preferential access to
the lending facility. This is especially the case if central banks enter into what Bindseil (2014)
described as central bank inertia, which is the continuation of non-crisis operations during crisis
periods, just increasing their scale. This critique, which has become again a central concern of
the lending of last resort policy, was previously stressed by Hirsch (1977). In response to the
moral hazard critique, Chapman and Martin (2013) argued that the central bank can restrict
lending to an ex-ante fixed number of banking institutions in order to induce the whole banking
system to monitor its risks better. If banks have to compete for funds or for being allowed to
access the discount window, they can bid up the price of these funds until it reaches the expected
value of the collateral they provide to the central bank. In this way, the central bank can also
obtain information about the real state of the economy, because the price the banks are willing
to pay for liquidity carries the information about their valuation of their long term investment
portfolios (whose liquidation they are trying to avoid). This rationale, however, builds up on
the premise that the central bank can develop anonymous open market operations, which are
only a late-comer practice in the history of most central banks, especially in emerging economies
(Borio, 1997). Moreover, this interpretation needs to account for the eligibility criteria of the
central bank and the political economy that lies behind its institutional design. Frequent access
to the discount window might signal a bank’s dependency on short term liquidity from the
central bank, but it can also lower the cost of screening a given bank’s creditworthiness for
the central bank through the benefits of repeated interaction (Dreschel et al., 2016; Banerjee,
Gambacorta, and Sette, 2017).
190Ugolini (2017, p.114).
191In 1913, it had provided emergency liquidity to Banco Hispano Americano, when the latter,
increasingly exposed to Latin American securities, was affected by the collapse of the Banco
Central Mexicano, amid the Mexican Revolution (Tejada Bergado, 2013; Marichal, 2007). One
year later, in the summer of 1914, the BdE also provided assistance to banks and bankers
following the eruption of the First World War and the consequent freezing of international
capital markets. Spanish banks holding bills denominated in Sterling were unable to rediscount
them with foreign counterparties, and the BdE had to expand its balance sheet to cope with
the shock. While large in magnitude, the intervention, was very short lived (see Appendix the
to this chapter). In 1920, the BdE had provided liquidity to the Banc de Barcelona, when the
latter was unable to survive the effects that post-war deflation had on its rapidly expanding
291
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter B
balance sheet (Blasco and Sudria`, 2016). Some years later, in 1925, the Credito de la Union
Minera suspended payments and was on the verge of dragging down Banco Central. Following
pressures by Dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera, the BdE acceded to provide emergency liquidity
to Banco Central to avoid contagion (Mart´ın-Acen˜a, 1984; Tortella, 2001)
192In all previous crises the BdE had to deal with one specific institution (with the exception
of 1914). This implied that systemic risk was not evident, and therefore, banks that did not
undergo liquidity pressure continued to operate normally. This was the case in 1920, when the
failure of the Banc de Barcelona did have almost no effect on the rest of the country, although
it had strong implications for regional credit. Similarly, in 1925, let aside Banco Central (which
was the bank that received assistance from the BdE), the rest of the banking system did not
suffer substantially. While banks’ deposits dropped in 1925, bank lending remained stable (see
Chapters 2 and 3).
193Some reopened their doors, like Banco Hispano Americano in 1913, and some didn’t, like
the Banc de Barcelona in 1920
194See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion. Even the main banks’ association, the Consejo
Superior Bancario (CSB), was not entirely sure about its own member banks’ fundamental
weaknesses. For example, when discussing banks’ portfolios of stocks and bonds during the
crisis, the President of the CSB claimed: “(...) these proposals only make sense if the CSB
is informed about the real situation of all banks, and since this is not the case, I am going to
have to decide without knowing the real situation. This will have good effects on some banks
and bad effects on others. Knowing the external face of banks is not knowing the true situation
of banks.” (Acta Ordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 19/12/1931 ). This discussion took
place in December, nine months after the beginning of the crisis. It is therefore plausible to
think that information in April was much less reliable. This is not to say, however, that the
BdE had no information on banks’ balance sheets. The CSB sent balance sheet data to the
BdE on a quarterly basis, but balance sheets were too aggregated to tell, and could easily hide
exposure to different types of risks, as the board of the CSB lamented. Importantly, the BdE
could not know which kind of bills of exchange banks held unless they had rediscounted them
frequently before the crisis.
195In previous crises, bank troubles had a clear origin in the asset side; signalling a depreciation
of their portfolios due to a lack of diversification, excessive exposure to specific markets or simply
by a sudden external shock. This helped the BdE to discriminate between cases in which a
given bank would be provided with emergency liquidity or not. While the criteria of the BdE
for deciding which banks were allowed to fail or not has been long discussed in the literature,
with frequent allusions to politically motivated biases (Sarda` and Beltran, 1933; Cabana, 2003,
2007), sudden and unexpected shocks to banks’ liabilities that are unrelated to fundamentals
pose a more difficult problem for a central bank in terms of discriminating among borrowers.
In the case of the BdE, this was coupled with the lack of timely information on bank balance
sheets I described above.
196However, the essentially political nature of the bank run allowed the BdE (and the Gov-
ernment) to learn which banks could be certainly under more pressure from their depositors.
This was notoriously the case of Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA), the bank that was linked
and to a large extent managed by the Company of Jesus, to which the Provisional Government
of the Republic became increasingly hostile (Castella-Gassol, 1975; Redondo, 1993). As I show
below, this would also affect the allocation of liquidity.
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197When depositors ran on banks in 1931, Spain’s macroeconomic conditions had been severely
worsening for at least three years, leaving the country and its monetary authorities in a very
fragile position. The peseta had been losing ground month after month since 1928, and by
March 1931 it traded at 54% of its 1868 parity with the Sterling, the US Dollar and the French
Franc (i.e. with gold). The balance of payments was not in a better position; capital had been
leaving the country since 1928, as current account deficits continued to increase (Betra´n and
Pons, 2018). The stock market boom that took place between 1927 and 1930 had come to
a halt. Moreover, during the booming 1920s the BdE had approached the note issuing limit
established by the 1921 Banking Law, so when the crisis started in April, notes were at 95% of
their limit, something that had never happened before.
198While this is might just reflect the margin attributed to financial intermediation, it was far
from the norm at the time. Jobst and Ugolini (2016) provide a survey on different central bank
practices at the time, while Jobst and Scheiber (2014), Lazaretou (2014) or Hinic, Durdevic,
and Sojic (2014) provide cases (Austria-Hungary, Greece and Serbia/Yugoslavia, respectively)
similar to the Spanish case in which market rates were above central bank rates. See Appendix
for details.
199See Chapter 2 for details on the 1921 Banking Law and its effects on interest rates.
200These particularities did not go unnoticed by contemporary observes. Prominent economist
Jose´ A. Vandello´s commented on the problems associated with this interest rate structure: “(...)
in countries with more developed financial systems, banks are much more independent from the
central bank, and usually the discount rate of private banks is below the official rate of the central
bank. However, in Spain, banks follow the official rate, having a positive difference between the
rate they are charged and the rate they charge to their clients” (Vandello´s, 1936, p.97-98).
201As described by Bignon et al. (2012) for the case of Britain and France, for example, when
money markets dried, market rates hit the central bank rate, which was a ceiling, rather than a
floor. If banks were willing to pay higher rates for accessing the central bank liquidity facilities,
they could do so. This mechanism, which Bagehot (1873) described as giving incentives for
banks to return to interbank lending, was also a way of protecting the gold cover from internal
and external drains, and to ensure efficient allocation of limited reserves. While eligibility of
collateral and the identity of the borrower still mattered, as Flandreau and Ugolini (2013)
showed, the pricing mechanism allowed for banks to reflect their price-elasticity of demand for
central bank money and thus, in principle, allocate limited reserves more efficiently
202Art. 16. Estatutos del Banco de Espan˜a (1900).
203After scrutinizing the BdE’s daily operations in Madrid, I found that this rarely happened,
and when it happened it was the case of a specific operation where a large sum was involved.
204Unfortunately, I have been unable to access information on banks’ credit scores at the BdE.
I had access to some information on credit scores for firms and for a couple of small banks in
Barcelona, but no systematic information was available when I visited the BdE’s Historical
Archive. That said, the fact that CSB membership granted banks with access to advances on
public debt would reduce the informational value of credit scores, because all CSB banks could
borrow from the BdE by pledging public debt as collateral and the BdE was forced to accept
that. Individual quantitative credit limits are also not available systematically.
205The BdE claimed that it would not raise haircuts for the rollover of advances, but this
did not include new advance operations, to which banks had to resort to pay back depositors
during the bank run.
293
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter B
206Sarda` and Beltran (1933, p.62).
207See for example, King (1936) or Truptil (1936) for a contemporary explanation of eligible
bills at the discount window of the Bank of England and Bignon et al. (2012); Flandreau and
Ugolini (2013) for a detailed analysis of the lending policy of the Bank based on the eligibility
criteria. In particular, Flandreau and Ugolini (2013) move beyond the traditional account
advanced by Capie (2002) of the discount window of the Bank of England being made of
“frosted glass and raised just a few inches”, in which the Bank of England did not care about
the counterparty, just about the collateral brought to the window. For a detailed explanation
of the case of France, Avaro and Bignon (2017).
208Acta de 10 de Enero de 1931. Libro de Actas del Banco Urquijo de Madrid. Libro 4, p.367.
209A more recent discussion about this can be found on Anson et al. (2018).
210Acta de 22 de Abril de 1931. Libro de Actas del Banco Urquijo de Madrid. Libro 4, p.400.
211In Chapter 5, I also provide a clear example of this: the case of Bauer y Cia. See also
Lo´pez Morell (2013).
212Banco Urquijo was discussing joining other banks in the capitalization of Banco Aragones
de Credito. Acta de 10 de Enero de 1931. Libro de Actas del Banco Urquijo de Madrid. Libro
4, p.367.
213Quotes are grouped into a single one for the space reasons. They are all from Libro de Actas
de la Comision Permanente del Banco Central. Respectively: Libro 2, p. 298 (28/03/1925),
Libro 3, p.146 (29/07/1925), Libro 4, p.156 (01/11/1930) and Libro 5, p.75 (26/06/1932).
214Acta de la Reunion Extraordinaria de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a,
17/04/1931.
215El Sol 24/05/1931.
216The amounts included in the term Liquidity from the BdEi are BdE notes ready to be used
to liquidate clients’ retail deposits.
217It must be noted that an Allocationi value of 1 does not necessarily imply that the bank
could just keep its total loan portfolio afloat. The representative bank had to make a choice
between using the emergency liquidity to continue supplying short term credit, invest in other
securities, buy foreign exchange to meet its maturing short-term foreign exchange liabilities,
and/or maintain its loan portfolio. Moreover, for a given bank it was easier to pay depositors
back without this affecting its cash reserves than paying them back by running cash reserves
down. Therefore, the measure of liquidity pressure ought to be interpreted as a lower bound,
because it is likely that actual liquidity pressure was stronger.
218See Bindseil (2014, p.275-279) for details.
219While the two measures aim at the same–quantifiying a given bank’s reliance on the central
bank–they both have shortcomings. One the one hand, Allocationi can’t provide a long term
notion of the system’s reliance on the central bank, because it needs a bank to lose deposits
for it to make sense quantitatively. A given bank might borrow from the central bank without
losing any deposits and this would produce misleadingly large results with no informative value.
Bindseil (2014) measure, while useful to provide a longer term view on aggregate reliance on the
central bank, does not include the variation of deposits in its measure of proportionality. This
is because the latter considers a bank to be borrowing proportionally if the bank’s behaviour
is in line with the rest of the system; it does not account for variation in the liabilities of
banks, which can affect banks’ reliance on central bank liquidity during a bank run. Instead,
Allocationi aims at capturing indvidual bank’s needs of liquidity (i.e. the amounts of central
294
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter B
bank money that are needed to repay depositors and keep the length of its balance sheet stable)
during a liquidity crisis.
220I exclude FONZ from the sample because it has an Allocationi value of 20, precisely because
of the problems outlined above, as the bank did not experience deposit losses but still borrowed
heavily (relative to its size) from the BdE.
221This is in line with the argument advanced by Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984) in which he suggested
that the automatic liquidity of of banks’ portfolios of public debt helped avoid the widespread
collapse of the banking system.
222See Chapter 3 for details on contemporary concerns over banks suffering from not being
able to borrow enough from the BdE.
223It could be, however, that pre-crisis borrowing is just correlated with banks’ portfolio
quality. Some banks might have had frequent access to the discount window of the BdE simply
because they had better bills. This is unlikely, however, if we think that the bank that had more
access to the discount window before the crisis, Banco Urquijo de Madrid (BUMA) could count
on the BdE not conducting a thorough screening of the bills the bank brought to rediscount.
Rather than that, it would be more plausible to argue that some banks might have deliberately
chosen not to rediscount bills with the BdE until the unfolding of the crisis made it unavoidable.
This makes sense if we think that, at the time, many Spanish banks considered the BdE a
competitor in the bill market. This was not uncommon. For the case of Italy, Battilossi (2009)
found that banks would not be keen to disclose their bill portfolio to the Banca d’Italia because
they feared losing market share. A similar situation might have been in place in Spain. This
would be supported by the fact that neither of the two largest and most widely branched
banks in Spain at the time, Banco Hispano Americano (BHAM) and Banco Espan˜ol de Credito
(BECR) did almost not discount any bills before the crisis even if they held the largest bill
portfolios and were, by far, the most commercially oriented banks in Spain. Finally, and as
argued above, it could be that BUMA operated as an extension of the BdE in the bill market,
screening bills for the BdE which would, in turn grant open access to its discount window.
While this would explain why BUMA relied so much on the BdE already before the crisis, it
would still not tell us a lot about the quality of its bill portfolio. (After having accessed what
remains from Banco Urquijo’s accounting books, I have not been able to identify which types
of commercial paper they held or brought to the discount window).
224Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a L.12107, p.174.
225The sample is very small, data on deposits is at best monthly, and data on borrowing is
daily. In addition, the price of public debt kept falling as the crisis unfolded, which makes it
difficult to rationalize banks’ demand for liquidity at the BdE by each type of operation based
on the relative cost of each of the two borrowing instruments: discounts or advances. While the
cost of borrowing from the BdE through rediscounting bills was unaffected until the discount
rate was raised, banks using Lombard lending against public debt had been finding it more
and more expensive due to the falling price of collateral, which the BdE accepted at market
prices. There are references in the minutes of the Board to the BdE relaxing the haircuts on the
reposition of collateral. However, there is no mention on the same happening to new borrowing.
New borrowing through advances surged during the crisis, so the effect of relaxing the haircuts
on the rolling over of advances was probably small.
226This had also been suggested by JP Morgan during the first days of the crisis as a solution
to Spain’s banking and currency crisis. See Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984, p.238).
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227Acta Extraordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 15/04/1931, p.269.
228During the first weeks of the crisis, BECR was the bank that complained more loudly
about the need for raising the limit of notes in circulation, while others seemed less pressured
(BHAM) and some did not complain at all (BUMA). Juan Manuel Urquijo, the vice chair
of BUMA and spokesman of the CSB remained in complete silence during these discussions,
while Pablo Garnica (BECR) complained in repeated occasions (Actas del Consejo Superior
Bancario, various dates (see text).
229“(...) the convenience of studying and deciding over a moderate increase on the discount
rate and other interest rates as means of regulating circulation of notes, to which the Ministry
of Finance and the whole Government agree as a matter of public interest and doubtless con-
venience (...)” (Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a, 07/07/1931 and
08/07/1931, (L.27159, p.174-185)).
230La Gaceta de Madrid, 09/07/1931, p.251.
231Public debt had been almost an automatic source of liquidity for banks since 1921, but
given the rumours about default and the uncertainty about the stability of the new regime, it
had suffered a sharp drop in its price, making it a very expensive way of obtaining liquidity at
the BdE for any given bank that held eligible bills of exchange.
232As I explained above, this bank was the one that proposed that the BdE should raise
interest rates sharply and lend freely (i.e. follow Bagehot’s rule), and only once liquidity
pressure had subsided then start addressing exchange rate depreciation. Contrastingly, during
the meetings, Juan Manuel Urquijo, vicepresident of BUMA but also Chairman, whose role
was consultive within the Board of the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB), did not leave any
registered intervention in the minutes of the CSB, despite Banco Urquijo de Madrid lost almost
half of its deposits while these meetings were taking place and was borrowing intensively from
the discount window (the position held in Spanish is Vocal del Consejo Superior Bancario.
233The source is Liquidez bancaria (see text). The document contains a measure of liquidity,
although it does not contextualize the measure. It is not possible to infer what the BdE con-
sidered a desirable minimum, although it can be used to compare the different values of the
same measure for the top 6 banks, which is what the BdE used it for. The ratio was calculated
using the following formula:
Liquidityi =
Cash + Interbank assets + Securities + Loans
Interbank liab. + Call dep. + Forex dep. + Other dep. + Other liab.
(B.1)
The measure of liquidity of the BdE can be considered as very lax. In fact, it included
almost the whole portfolio on it. Under securities, bills of exchange, stocks and public debt
were not weighted, regardless of the fact that they were not equally liquid. The same was true
with the measure of liabilities; long term deposits were considered as illiquid as sight deposits
or interbank liabilities. What can be inferred from the BdE’s vague liquidity measure is that all
banks’ portfolios appear to be considered equal from the point of view of the central bank, and
thus the measure is comparable, regardless of its actual validity as a realistic liquidity ratio.
234This is a good proxy of banks’ dependency on BdE liquidity because interbank deposits
mostly include the credit accounts at the BdE. Thus a value of this ratio that equals 1 means
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that the bank is equally funded by retail deposits and by rolling over of its credit accounts at
the BdE. A bank with a value of 0 is entirely independent from the BdE and relies only on
retail deposits. Banks with values higher than 1 are funded mostly by BdE liquidity.
235El Economista was one of the oldest and most prestigious weekly journals about finance
and economics in Spain. It was published on a weekly basis and provided not only quantitative
information, but also insightful discussions on the relevant discussions in Spain and the situation
of other countries’ economies.
236Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao, 01/09/1914, Libro 3, p.279.
237El Economista, 1914, p.1168.
238Mart´ın-Acen˜a et al. (2013)
239Libro de actas del Consejo del Banco de Vizcaya, Libro 3, p.36.
240Libro de actas del Consejo del Banco de Vizcaya, Libro 3, p.53.
241Libro de Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao, Libro 1, pp. 8, 26, 48, 79,
97, and 231.
242Libro de Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao, Libro 3, p. 275..
243Libro de Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao, Libro 3, p. 281.
244Libro de Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao, Libro 3, p. 290. For the
index, I use the average rate of the two, i.e. 5.25%.
245Libro de Actas de la Junta de Gobierno del Banco de Bilbao, Libro 4, p. 94.. For the index,
I use the average rate of the two, i.e. 4.75%.
246Other authors, however, have used the 3-month bill rate discount from banks to firms as
the best proxy of a money market rate. See Jobst and Scheiber (2014); Lazaretou (2014) and
Hinic et al. (2014).
247Blasco and Sudria` (2016) show that the Banc de Barcelona was also discounting below the
BdE rate before WWI.
248Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB), 28/09/1926.
249In 1900, banks deposits accounted for 35% of the total and those in the Banco de Espan˜a
for the remaining 65%. By 1919, banks accounted for 70%. At the end of the period, banks
held more than 90%.
250This bank was created in 1857 as a bank of issue under the so-called free banking period in
Spain (1856-1869). When the Banc de Barcelona went bankrupt in 1920, the Banco de Bilbao
became the oldest bank alive in Spain (excluding the Banco de Espan˜a) and still exists today,
after several mergers and acquisitions.
251The fact that this information was not at hand even for the Banco de Bilbao, is a telling
one about the total absence of the market that had existed before.
252Actas de la Comision de Operaciones del Banco Central.
253 There are many examples of this. On the 28th of December 1928, after rising the discount
rate, the Banco de Espan˜a argued that its operations would involve only “purely commercial”
bills (Actas de la Comsion de Operaciones del Banco de Espan˜a, Libro 12.101 ). On the 20th of
April of 1931, during the banking panic in Spain, the Banco de Espan˜a urged to “banks should
operate mainly on commercial transactions (. . . ) and should restrict the concession of credit
through discount of financial bills” (Actas del Consejo de Gobierno del Banco de Espan˜a, Libro
27.159, p.56.).
254This is possible for the period 1921-1925.
297
“Escaping” the Great Depression Chapter B
255The first column of Table 5.2 shows that Banco de Catalun˜a accounted for 17.3% of total
deposits of banks headquartered in Catalonia. Since balance sheet data from the Boletines
del Consejo Superior Bancario only provides consolidated figures, I am unable to produce a
disaggregated account at the branch level that could provide a more realistic estimate of these
banks’ regional market share. This implies that regional shares in the first column of Table
5.2 are overestimated, as they do not include branches of other large banks Spanish banks in
Catalan cities. This is problematic because banks with headquarters in Madrid gained strong
presence in Catalonia after the failure of the Banc de Barcelona in 1920 (Sarda` and Beltran,
1933; Cabana, 2007). By the time of the 1931 crisis, all top Spanish banks had branches, at
least, in Barcelona, but also in other cities and towns of Catalonia. These figures also fail to
account for banks headquartered in Catalonia that branched in the rest of Spain, although this
is a not a problem since the only banks falling under this category were Banco de Catalun˜a and
Soler y Torra Hermanos. If anything, including this would reduce the market share of Banco de
Catalun˜a in Catalonia even more. Additionally, foreign banks’ branches in Catalonia are not
included, which is also inflating the market share of failed banks. By 1930, for example, Cre´dit
Lyonnais, the Anglo South-American Bank, the International Banking Corporation and Socie´te´
Ge´ne´rale had branches in Barcelona, among others (Memoria de la Sucursal del Banco de Bilbao
en Barcelona, 1930, p.4.). While I can not deal with the problem of neglecting branches of banks
headquartered in Catalonia in the rest of Spain and the presence of foreign banks, I was able to
collect non-systematic but disaggregated data at the branch level for some of the largest banks
in Spain. This includes Banco Hispano Americano (BHAM) and Banco de Bilbao (BBIL). For
BHAM, the data comes from the bank’s inventories, which were reported in its books at the
branch level (Inventario N.3, Banco Hispano Americano. L.6217. Archivo Historico del Banco
de Santander). This does not provide total volume of deposits at the branch level, but provides
interest earnings and earnings from commissions charged to clients. This helps improving the
estimates of the regional importance of the three failed banks in Catalonia in 1931. By the end
of 1930, Banco Hispano Americano’s branches in Catalonia accounted for 7.3% of the bank’s
interest earnings and 4.7% of the commissions it charged. By that time, the bank held total
deposits of 1258 million pesetas in deposits. It is plausible to assume that interest earnings
and commissions were proportional to the amount of deposits held by the bank at each branch.
Thus, taking 6.0% as an average estimate of the share of the bank’s deposits in its branches in
Catalonia, this suggests that the bank held around 75 million deposits in Catalonia. For the
case of Banco de Bilbao, a precise measure of the share of the bank’s deposits in Catalonia can
be obtained, as data comes from the balance sheet of its branches outside Bilbao (Memoria de
la Sucursal del Banco de Bilbao en Barcelona, Reus, Sabadell y Tarrassa, 1930). By the end of
1930, Banco de Bilbao held 773 million pesetas in deposits, from which 86 million, or 11%, were
held in Catalonia. Adding the contribution of these two banks to the total pool of deposits in
Catalonia, this reduces the market share of failed banks from 24.1% to 20.9% (Table 5.2). This
measure can be considered to substantially overestimate the importance of these banks, as it
does not account for branches of other large banks such as Banco Espan˜ol de Cre´dito, Banco de
Vizcaya or Banco Central. A conservative estimate of these banks’ market shares in Catalonia
can be constructed by assuming that they held 6.0% of their deposits in Barcelona, as Banco
Hispano Americano did, but well below the 11% of Banco de Bilbao. Adding this estimate to
the total pool of deposits in Catalonia, reduces the market share of failed banks to 18.6% (Third
column in Table 5.2). Another adjustment is due in order to have a more realistic estimate.
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Deposits in Banco de Catalun˜a, which after the two previous adjustments account for 13.4% of
deposits in Catalonia, contain a very large share of funds deposited by the Government, and
therefore should not be counted as part of private sector deposits. These deposits are associated
with the oil monopolies in Spain, and were deposited by the Government at the bank in 1927 (as
I discuss below). While precise figures are not available, the evolution of deposits in Banco de
Catalun˜a throughout the 1920s is revealing. Right after the government deposited funds from
the oil monopolies in the bank, its deposits almost tripled (Figure 5.5). A safe estimate of the
share of the Government’s deposit in the bank, therefore, can be placed at around 50%. This
implies that its market share for deposits in Catalonia (retail and interbank) would be around
6.7% instead of 13.4%, thus bringing down the market share of failed banks in Catalonia from
an initial estimate of 24.1% to a final estimate of 11.9%.
256In 1835, Daniel Weisweiller, an agent of the Rothschild House, was sent to Spain as part
of the family’s extension of a global network of Banking Houses (Ferguson, 1999; Penn, 2000).
Twenty years later, Weisweiller joined Ignacio Bauer under the name of Weisweiller & Bauer
Cia. When Weisweiller died in 1892 and Ignacio Bauer became the only representative of the
Rothschilds in Spain. Ignacio Bauer died in 1895 and his son Gustavo took over the banking
house, which started to operate under “Bauer y Cia”. When Gustavo Bauer died in 1916,
his sons Ignacio and Alfredo took over the bank, with the approval of the Paris House. They
constituted the bank as “Bauer y Compan˜ia”. The bank became very inactive during the first
half of the 1920s, as the Bauer brothers limited the operations to a very conservative standard
(Lo´pez Morell, 2013). However, along with the strong expansion of the banking system and
the Spanish economy during the second half of the decade, the bank started to expand. In
particular, the Bauers invested into a new publishing Society, the Compan˜´ıa Iberoamericana de
Publicaciones (CIAP). The Society purused a very strong expansion plan from 1928. To fund
this, the CIAP issued three month bills of exchange that would be accepted by Bauer y Cia
and rediscounted with the Banco de Espan˜a. In January 1931, Alfredo Bauer communicated
the Rothschilds in Paris that he was broke. As the CIAP started accumulating losses, the
bank . According to a report issued by P.Jardot, a representative that the Rothschilds sent to
investigate the situation of Bauer, by June 1931, the bank had assets worth 25 million pesetas
and liabilities worth 30 million. The bank closed its doors on July 3rd, and was liquidated in
a process that lasted 10 years.
257Among others, the Society held the publishing rights of Manuel Azan˜a (who would become
president of the Second Spanish Republic), Eugeni d’Ors, Juan Ramo´n Jime´nez, Salvador de
Madariaga, Antonio Machado, “Azor´ın”, Ruben Dar´ıo, Miguel de Unamuno or Ramo´n Mar´ıa
del Valle-Incla´n, among others (Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril, 2012, p.120).
258Lo´pez Morell (2013, p.347-349)
259Lo´pez Morell (2013, p.345).
260By the time of liquidation, the bank held a significant portfolio of securities from Latin
American countries, including, for example, Argentinean utilities bonds, which became very
difficult to liquidate after the failure (Rothschild Historical Archive, 111/459 ).
261When examining daily borrowing from Bauer at the discount window of the BdE, it is
surprising that its operations usually involve one bill of a very high denomination and with
rounded values. This is a clear sign that the bills were issued by CIAP in order to be redis-
counted. In comparison, virtually all the remaining operations of the rest of banks have not
rounded values, which proves that they had been originated from a trade transaction. This
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is not a trivial observation, since the BdE always reported its concerns over banks bringing
“financial” or “accomodation” bills to its discount window, as it was a firm supporter of the
real bills doctrine. Bauer’s borrowing, however, does not seem to follow this strict policy. It is
apparent, then, that the bank did indeed enjoy a certain special treatment from the BdE, as
Lo´pez Morell and Molina Abril (2012); Lo´pez Morell (2013) suggests.
262Banco de Bilbao was also involved in the seizure of Bauer y Cia’s assets. The correspondence
and the liquidation process, involving the House of Rothschild in Paris, Ignacio Bauer’s wife
and the two Spanish banks is available at Rothschild Historical Archive, ledger 111/459.
263The first was a public monopoly, while the second was a private company. CEPSA was
founded after CAMPSA, when the Spanish government wanted to explore oil fields in Venezuela,
something that CAMPSA did not have the capacity to do
264The bank, in fact, came to be known for some time as “Banc de Recasens”, as it was,
at its inception, an enterprise with which both brothers (and Evarist Fabregas, a co-founder)
aimed at reviving the dynamism of Catalan banking and eventually aiming at having a Catalan
“bank’s bank” or central bank (Lluch, 1968b).
265During the second half of the 1920s, Calvo Sotelo claimed that “the CAMPSA bankers lived
in the best of all worlds, happy and carefree, apparently with no other mission than that of mere
and simple resale. But the monopoly was not simply an organization of retail gasoline sales!”.
With this, the Minister referred to the fact that Banco de Catalun˜a was not accomplishing
the investment projects that had committed to by holding the deposits of the oil monopoly
(Cabrera and del Rey, 2007, p.35-36).
266Rothschild Historical Archive, 111/459.
267Letter sent on the 25 of September 1930, Rothschild Historical Archive, 111/459.
268See Lluch (1968b,a), Cabana (2003) and Velarde (2015) for more details.
269See Chapter 2 and Cabana (2007). The bias against Banco de Catalun˜a was also highlighted
by the lawyer of the bank, Pedro Corominas, who claimed: “[the Minister of Finance] can’t digest
the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, and did not find a better way to make it collapse than
to push the Banco to fail.” See Sala (2015a) for more details.
270On the contrary, Tortella and Palafox (1984) concluded that the Ministry of Finance with-
drew the oil funds because of the imminent failure of the bank. According to them, the with-
drawal of the current accounts of CAMPSA (the oil monopoly) was a consequence of the failure,
rather than the cause, although they do not explain why, if most of the activity of the bank
was linked to the oil monopoly, would it have had a sizable problem on it assets that preceded
the withdrawal of funds from the Government.
271Cabana (2003, p.77).
272Ernest Lluch explained how the brothers learned about the failure through the press, as
they were not very involved with the day-to-day functioning of the bank. He wrote: “The arm
that hit the bank dead was Indalecio Prieto, one of the main heads of the peninsular socialism,
but tightly connected, under the scenes, with the great Basque bourgeoisie, which saw in the Banc
[de Catalun˜a] a dangerous competitor. However, Prieto tried, through his political coreligionist
Josep Recasens, with whom he aimed at having good relations, a last minute lifeboat operation.
Hopefully, the memoirs of Josep Andreu will clarify why and how the Recasens brothers rejected
the option.” Lluch (1968b, p.547)
273The debate also revolved around the problem of labeling mark-to-market as the cause of the
recent financial crisis, rather than dealing with accounting principles as potential limitations
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to synergies with other policies that were implemented by monetary authorities in the United
States (Smith, Boje, and Melendrez, 2010).
274Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.355).
275Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.356).
276As Simonson and Hempel (1993) highlighted, it remains unclear, however, if the meeting was
organized by the requirement of Roosevelt, as “(...) the publicly visible origins do not reveal the
behind-the-scenes politicking that actually created them” (Simonson and Hempel, 1993, p.253).
277Eccles made the discussion public by taking it to the New York Times, in which he claimed
that “(...) bankers cannot justly be held responsible for such restrictive governmental policies as
confuse soundness with liquidity or true worth with current depressed market value.” (Simonson
and Hempel, 1993, p.256-257).
278El Sol, 17/05/1931, p.5.
279Articulo 37, Libro Primero, Codigo de Comercio (1885). Gaceta de Madrid, 16/10/1885.
280Acta de 18/11/1931, p.118, Actas del Consejo Superior Bancario.
281“A 31 de Diciembre de 1931”, El Sol, 13/12/1931, p.11.)
282Actas de la Comision Ejecutiva del Banco Urquijo de Madrid, L.4, p.124.
283Several references to this are present in the banks’ press releases. See for example Revista
de Credito, 15/04/1932, p.231-232.
284This subsection draws entirely from the meetings of the Board of the CSB (Actas del
Consejo Superior Bancario, in particular, Acta de la Sesion Ordinaria 18/11/1931 (p.108 et
passim) and Acta de la Sesion Ordinaria 19/12/1931 (p.141 et passim).
285Acta de la Sesion Ordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 18/11/1931, p.122.
286Acta Ordinaria del Consejo Superior Bancario, 19/12/1931, p.141.
287Originally, the CSB suggested “Rehabilitation Fund”, but left it open for banks to decide.
Ultimately, banks chose a formula with a less negative connotation.
288Gaceta de Madrid, 28/05/1932.
289For the role of clearinghouses and the management of asymmetric information, see Sprague
(1910), Timberlake (1978, 1984), Gorton (1985, 2012), Moen and Tallman (2010), or Jaremski
(2015, 2018).
290Commercial bills of exchange were not a widely used money market instrument among
banks, as explained in Chapter 2.
291Imposiciones y reintegros durante el an˜o de 1931, por meses, Anuario Historico del INE,
1931.
292Fornies (1979) provides a detailed account of the different types of social projects that
savings banks invested in. These include pious donations, benefits, social spending, cultural
spending or the funding of health-related projects.
293Fornies (1979, p.293).
294Banco Hispano Americano, Revista Mensual, An˜o III, Mayo 1931, Num. 19, p.668-669.
295Movimiento en los Montes de Piedad en Espan˜a desde el dia 17 de Febrero de 1839, fecha
de su fundacion hasta 31 de Diciembre de 1930, Cajas de Ahorros de los Bancos y Sociedades
de Credito, Anuario 1930, Fondo Documental del Instituto Nacional de Estadistica.
296For a summary of the debate over the political leverage of banks in financial regulation, see
Chapter 2.
297Crisol, 16 June 1931, p.8-9. as quoted in Velarde (2015, p.95).
298La Epoca, 22/04/1931.
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299Memoria y Balance de la Sucursal del Banco de Bilbao en Madrid, 1931, p.5).
300As quoted in (Velarde, 2015, p.32).
301Tortella and Palafox (1984); Mart´ın-Acen˜a (1984); Garc´ıa Ruiz (1987); Tortella (2001);
Mart´ınez Mendez (2005); Garc´ıa Ruiz (1993); Mart´ın-Acen˜a (2013); Velarde (2015); Sala (2015a);
Betra´n and Pons (2018).
302Libro de Actas del Banco Urquijo, Libro 4. contains several entires commenting on the
general situation of the economy and the country, including an endorsement to the new regime.
However, there is not a single mention to the bank losing 50% of its deposits.
303Acta de 12 de Marzo de 1932. Libro de Actas de la Comision Delegada del Consejo de
Administracion del Banco Urquijo. Libro 4. p.124-125.
304I thank Miguel Artola Blanco for pointing to and sharing the source of the report. The
source is “La crise economique, financiere et politique en Espagne. La situation monetaire et
le credit de la Banque de France a la Banque d’Espagne”.
305Banque de France (1931, p.7). Another annectdotal source is the famous novel by Arturo
Barea, titled La forja de un rebelde. Referring to the bank’s alleged manipulation of the price
of shares it underwrote, the author claims: “There is another business which is much better.
This business is done by Banco Urquijo, which is owned by the Jesuits.
306It is very likely that the King Alfonso XIII held some funds at the bank, but I have not
been able to find specific information on that in the detailed accounts by Gortazar (1986).
307Cabrera and del Rey (2007, p.8-40).
308Albeit no reference to Banco Urquijo de Madrid was made by the author.
309In fact, all main banks, again including Urquijo, signed a letter to the Minister of Finance
on 29 April in which they committed to collaborate in the fight against capital flight. “La
exportacion de capitales y el Consejo Superior Bancario”, Actualidad Financiera, Num 1478,
An˜o XXX, p.5-6.
310Gaceta de Madrid, Num. 233, p.1368, 21/08/1931.
311Gaceta de Madrid, Num. 24, 24/01/1932, p.610-611.
312The quote is from Temin (1993, p.97), but a similar quote can be found on Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009, p.383). In general, this is the underlying assumption in virtually all accounts of
the Great Depression in Spain.
313See, for example, Tortella and Palafox (1984), who concluded that “the Spanish case dis-
tinctly differs from those of Italy, Austria or Germany; something which superficially may
appear all the more surprising since Spain was soon to become the theater of a bloody civil war.
Whatever economic causes can be ascribed to the conflict, a general banking crisis is not among
them” (Tortella and Palafox, 1984, p.105).
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